

SERBIA AND EUROPE

1914-1920

DR. L. MARCOVITCH

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1914-1920

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PREFACE

THIS book is to be considered as an attempt to exhibit the whole policy of Serbia during the war. It is not a study of Serbian politics, but simply a collection of articles published in *La Serbie* in Geneva (Switzerland) between 1916 and 1919. Although limited, the collection gives full information about the chief points of Serbian policy and the ideal which has guided us in our national struggle. We think that it might be interesting for British readers to obtain for once an authentic explanation of Serbia's policy—as Serbian publicists and politicians conceive it. The diversity of collaborators does not rob the book of its character of an organic whole, which is another proof of the unity and straightforwardness of our policy. One essential feature characterizes indeed the whole attitude of the Serbian people, before and during the world conflict, and this is their clear vision of the German peril and the firm and fixed determination of Serbia to resist it at all costs, and to make the greatest sacrifices in defence of her political and economic independence.

Europe did not understand Serbia's policy, and when, on certain occasions, she did display more comprehension of our affairs, it was done with ill grace and evident reluctance. The fault of European diplomacy did not lie in ignorance of the existence of the German peril—Paris, London and Petrograd were well aware of it—but rather in its under-estimation of German aims in the East. German expansion, revealed in two different methods—one pacific,

tending to economic penetration, the other political and aggressively arrogant—had for a long time been directed towards the East. But this significant fact had not been appreciated by Allied Diplomacy as it should have been. In spite of the experiences of the Balkan Wars, the Entente continued to neglect the Balkans and made herself the dupe in the game of Ferdinand of Coburg and his docile servants. The Entente diplomats did not discern between friends and enemies and thus neglected an important element in the Eastern problem—leaving things to take a rather tragical turn. The Serbian disaster of 1915 would have been averted if the Entente had invited and encouraged Roumania and Greece to stand by the Treaty of Bucarest in 1913. Instead of it the Entente forced them to come to an agreement with the Bulgarians at any price and so to disinterest themselves eventually from the anti-Bulgarian, i.e. anti-German alliance formed at Bucarest in 1913.

We have criticized the anti-Balkan policy of Roumania and of King Constantine of Greece very severely, but it would be unjust not to remind people that a great share of the blame falls also on the Allies, due to their Bulgarophile illusions. It is to be hoped that errors of the past will serve as a lesson, not only to the Balkan people, but also—and particularly—to the Western democratic powers.

Having revealed the true policy of Serbia, we discuss in Chapter II the Serbo-Croat Union, which is inscribed as the ideal on every page of the history of the Kingdom of Serbia. In connection with it we have outlined in the following chapter our campaign against Austria-Hungary, which consisted mainly in our effort to provide public opinion in Allied countries—(badly infected with Austrophilism)—with a new view of Austro-Hungarian affairs. Our estimate of Austria-Hungary and her rottenness proved to be quite correct; our forecast was realized and our prognostication of the fate of the Habsburg Monarchy has

been confirmed by events. We have always held that the attempt of Sarajevo—the work of a Bosnian patriot—was only a welcome pretext for Austria to proceed to the execution of her war plans, conceived and elaborated a long time before. We can state with satisfaction to-day that our defence of Serbia in this respect was only too legitimate. The official Austro-Hungarian documents, published by the Government of the Austrian Republic, reveal a fact hitherto unknown, that the decision to declare war and crush Serbia had been taken some time before the attempt of Sarajevo. It was inspired by purely political considerations of the prestige of the Balkans.¹

As to relations with Bulgaria they are discussed as fully as they deserve. Our aim was to enlighten Europe on the true motives of Bulgarian policy, and we think that we have succeeded. The documents we furnished were worthy of retaining attention. Since then official German and Austro-Hungarian secret documents have dissipated all doubts of Bulgarian servility and bondage to the German imperialistic policy. Yet in 1914 Bulgaria was prepared to enter formally the Triple Alliance, whilst the Entente diplomats during the whole of 1915 believed in the Ententophile assurances of Bulgarian politicians.

The next chapter is devoted to the question of Italo-Serbian relations. The spirit of moderation and conciliation in which we have always conducted our relations with Italy—despite the errors and false calculations of Italian diplomacy—is revealed clearly in all our articles. We believed that we should find in Italy a friend and an ally ; we regarded her as the native country of Mezzini.

To-day we are obliged to publish that, after five years of unsuccessful attempts, Italy did nothing but pursue

¹ *Diplomatische Aktenstücke zur Vorgeschichte des Krieges, 1914. Ergänzungen und Nachträge zum oesterreichisch-ungarischen Rotbuch. I Teil* (Wien 1919, Staatsdruckerei). See document No. 1 and the enclosed memorandum.

the same politics that the Triple Alliance practised before with Austria and continued since 1915 without her. It is the darkest point on the Southern Slav horizon, this attempt to compromise our future by annexing large territories of our national soil. The Adriatic question is not yet settled, and the Allies seem to have lost all authority to impose a solution which would safeguard the vital interests of both parties. In the occupied territories in Dalmatia, Istria, and Fiume an intolerable situation is entertained, full of danger for peace in this sensitive corner of Europe. It is high time to put an end to the comedy of D'Annunzio and to proceed to the definite settlement of the Adriatic problem. The patience of our kingdom has been tried past endurance.

Chapters VI-X are devoted to Germany, Russia, Roumania and Greece, and finally to the suffering of our people under the foreign yoke.

Our attitude to all these questions is perfectly consistent with the main trend of Serbian policy. Europe has not sufficiently appreciated this Serbian firmness, which affords, however, a splendid example of the wisdom and intelligence of the Serbian statesmen, who have led Serbia through all the phases that she had to pass before realizing her national programme:—the union of all Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in an independent Kingdom under the Karageorgevitch.

* * * *

The Southern Slav union is a political fact of primary importance. But it must not be thought that we are unaware of the many difficulties which for a long time to come will check the free development of our national forces. To-day the chief work of our people is internal. The political, economic and social organization of our state, nationally united, is a formidable task, demanding the collaboration of all our intelligence and initiative. A great trial still awaits our heroic nation. It is to be

hoped that it will be surmounted, and that the people, after so many physical and moral sufferings, will at last find peace in which to devote themselves to pacific work and to culture.

Our greatest aim at present is to achieve a peaceful organized life within. If we are united internally we shall be able to confront all external dangers and injustices. Our enemies are watching us, hoping to profit by our internal disorganization for the realization of their imperialistic aims. The high national consciousness of our people, of which we have given so many proofs, will surmount, we are convinced, all our difficulties, and will lead us to a happy and glorious future.

In conclusion, I must ask for the indulgence of readers towards the translation of these articles—made under circumstances of difficulty which will perhaps excuse its many imperfections.

DR. LAZARE MARCOVITCH.

BELGRADE.

September, 1920.

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SERBIA AND EUROPE

(1914-1919)

CHAPTER I

SERBIAN POLITICS

SERBIA AND THE ALLIES.

"Your Royal Highness, in applying to me at a particularly difficult moment, is not mistaken in my sentiments regarding himself and my heartfelt sympathy for the Serbian people. So long as there is the smallest hope of avoiding bloodshed, all my efforts will be directed towards this object. If, in spite of our sincerest wishes, we do not succeed, Your Royal Highness can rest assured that under no circumstances will Russia cease to concern herself with the fate of Serbia."—(*Telegram from the Emperor of Russia to the Crown Prince of Serbia, 27th July, 1914.*)

SERBIA indeed found herself in a difficult position on account of the Austrian ultimatum, and did all she possibly could to avoid an armed conflict with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The reply of the Serbian Government to the Austrian Note is, in fact, the model of submission of a small State to the demands of a Great Power; but at Vienna and Berlin either war or complete diplomatic victory was desired, accompanied by the humiliation of Serbia and, from her diminution or annihilation, of Russian prestige in the Balkans. In attacking Serbia it was not only desired to crush for ever the realization of Southern Slav unity, but also to get rid of a State hostile to the German "Push" towards Constantinople, Bagdad, and the East.

The German Empires, which never ceased to complain of their unfavourable geographical position, of their "cen-

tral" situation exposed to enemy attacks, had succeeded during the nineteenth century in growing larger and extending considerably on all sides at the expense and to the great detriment of other nations—chiefly the Slav nations. After a period of interior consolidation, economic development, and formidable armament, the Central Empires decided on a new advance—on land and sea. On the Continent they wanted to establish a German communication: Hamburg-Constantinople-Bagdad. On the Seas, they demanded the "freedom of the seas," which meant the destruction of British Naval Supremacy and the establishment of German domination.

To the German plans of expansion in Asia Minor, Serbia always represented a serious obstacle, especially after the Serbian victories in the Balkan Wars. Serbia had no desire to become an Austrian province or a vassal of Germany. She wished to preserve her independence and liberty; from 1903 she practised democratic politics, which drew her closer to the great democratic Powers of the West; she exercised a national policy—a policy of Slav unity, which naturally brought her to the side of Russia in all European problems. To secure the goodwill or co-operation of Serbia by diplomatic means appeared impossible to Germany and Austria-Hungary. There remained but one solution: crush the little nation which so obstinately refused to become *mittel-europäisch*, to quote Mr. Friedrich Naumann, former leader of the German Democrats and propagator of Pan-Germanism.

The three preceding wars had weakened Serbia to such an extent that the Austro-German plan seemed to have every chance of succeeding. Left alone, in such a critical moment, Serbia never could have escaped the fate which the German Empires had prepared for her. But Russia, France and England understood the gravity of the situation. In aiming at Serbia, the Austro-Germans wished to strike a friend and ally of the Entente, to whom they thus wished to deal a death-blow.

As the Entente was not prepared for a decisive struggle, there was great anxiety in Serbia as to whether France, England and Russia would not deem it better to sacrifice

her so as to defer the great struggle till later on, when all preparations would be ready and the chances of victory greater. But the aforementioned telegram from the Emperor of Russia at once reassured the Serbians, who gathered all their forces to defend themselves. France and England refused to remain neutral, and the Great War commenced, which must end and will end in complete victory for the Allies.

Serbia's rôle in this great struggle is well known. She withstood, and on three occasions repulsed, the Austrian offensive. At the last attack by the combined German, Austrian and Bulgarian forces, the Serbians opposed the invaders with a desperate resistance, hoping to withstand them till the help which the Allies were sending should arrive. But, owing to unforeseen circumstances, errors in estimating Bulgarian policy, and the attitude of the Greek Government, the reinforcements arrived too late to save Serbia from enemy invasion. The hardest endurances did not save our gallant nation, which, even in these hours of great distress, never wavered or lost courage. Having perfect confidence in the Allies and the justice of their cause, they have recovered from all their reverses, and are more than ever devoted to the Allies whose victory will give them independence, national unity, and free development.

In order to express the sentiments that all Serbians entertain for the Allies, we can only quote the words of our distinguished minister at Paris, Mr. Vesnitch, pronounced on the occasion of the great demonstration of the Allies in favour of Serbia at the Sorbonne :

“ When the Allies have gained victory, which they will do, before everything else the two nations, the Belgians and the Serbians—sisters in martyrdom and in zeal for national honour—will be reinstated in the integrity of their political and territorial rights. It is the first task that our great Allies will undertake and one in which they will not fail.

“ It is not Russia, our powerful sister-nation who for three centuries has watched over, with the solicitude of a mother, the fate of the oppressed Slav nations—it is certainly not Russia who will abandon us.

“ It will never be Great Britain, who knows us since

Richard, Coeur-de-Lion, spoke of our hospitality—Great Britain who has always been the first to champion liberty and autonomy, and who during the past four years has given us so many proofs of her goodwill.

“It will not be—it cannot be Italy, with whom we have never had any differences, in spite of the fact that we have been near neighbours for a century or more, and whose greatest son has linked the two nations by placing us in his immortal spiritual temple—in his *Divina Commedia* beside his best brethren.

“How can any one think that France will bargain for her co-operation—France who has always been our chosen sister; France, who in spite of distance has always been a trusty and devoted friend, and who even to-day receives us with unequalled tenderness.

“No, my Serbian brethren, with such friends our country can never perish. She will revive soon—once more prosperous and great. And we will return there, happy at her resurrection, happy also to be able to say to our compatriots, who have remained in temporary slavery, to the widows of our heroes and sisters in sorrow, how good all our Allies have been to us and how we owe them eternal gratitude—especially immortal France.”

We also are animated by the same sentiments, and it is in this spirit and with this conviction and devotion that we undertake to defend the Serbian Cause, which is the common cause of all Southern Slavs.

May 17, 1916.

SERBIA AND THE TREATY OF LONDON.

In the House of Commons on the 2nd May, Mr. R. McNeill, Unionist, asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether Serbia was included in the Treaty or Declaration of the 5th September. “If not,” added Mr. McNeill, “will the Minister state whether his declaration, that the character of the said Treaty excludes the possibility of negotiations for Peace between the British Government and Bulgaria without the consent of the other contracting parties, applies to the Serbian Government also.”

According to *The Times* of the 3rd May, Sir Edward Grey replied as follows: "The answer to both parts of the question is in the negative, but in a matter so intimately affecting the interests of Serbia, the Serbian Government would naturally be consulted in common with the other Allies."

This statement of the British Minister is not quite clear, and to avoid ambiguous and misleading interpretations, we venture to make some remarks.

To the first question: "Whether Serbia had signed the Declaration of the 5th September," Sir Edward Grey replied that Serbia had not signed the Treaty of the Allies. This fact was known to the Honourable Member; he only asked the first question in order to be able to put the second, i.e. to know "What would be the position of Serbia in the event of negotiating peace with Bulgaria." The Treaty of the 5th September bound the Allies, as is well known, not to conclude a separate peace without the consent of all the others. Serbia did not sign this Treaty, because she was not asked to do so. Legally she is free to conclude a separate peace, and the Allies themselves—from a legal point of view—have the right of making peace without Serbia. But in reality, such solutions are not to be dreamt of. Serbia had already refused offers of a separate peace, and even recent misfortunes could not shake the faith of the Serbian people in the justice of the Allies' cause and their devotion to this cause—which was also their own. A formal undertaking from Serbia not to conclude a separate peace would change nothing in the existing situation, which makes such a peace quite impossible.

Let us turn to the other side of the question and consider the contrary supposition of a peace concluded by the Allies without Serbia: it is also theoretically possible, but will never take shape. The categorical statements of Allied Ministers, especially the last statement of the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in reply to the speech of the German Chancellor, lays down the re-establishment of Serbia as an essential condition of Peace. For the Allies, the Serbian question is, apart from their political interests, a question of justice and ethics, and the possibility of peace

negotiations without Serbia is absolutely inconceivable. For this reason we attach no importance to the purely theoretical conclusions which result from the fact that Serbia was not a signatory to the Treaty of London. The bond which unites Serbia to the Allies is much stronger than any Treaty, and on this point we are all agreed.

So far we have only taken the question of principle into consideration, and we have stated that a peace which did not re-establish Serbia is materially and morally impossible. Mr. R. McNeill's question refers to a possible peace between the Allies and Bulgaria. Sir Edward Grey's reply to this part of the question is incomplete, because it does not specify the main point. No peace concluded by the Allies can be imagined, according to Mr. Asquith's statements, without the complete re-establishment of Serbia. The territorial and political integrity of Serbia is the minimum of the Allies' pretensions. This integrity logically excludes the hypothesis of territorial concessions to the Bulgarians in southern Serbia; and the previous promises of such concessions made by the Allies and in a great measure consented to by the Serbian Government, have completely lost their value since the armed intervention of Bulgaria in favour of the Central Empires.

When the British Minister declared that in the event of peace negotiations with Bulgaria the Serbian Government would be consulted, it must necessarily be supposed that the consultation with the Serbian Government would be on points unconcerned with the political and territorial integrity of Serbia, this being an indispensable and preliminary condition in all negotiations for peace. The integrity of Serbian soil is a question on which there can be no discussion.

The British Minister's brief reply has given rise to the supposition that our Allies could begin negotiations for peace with Bulgaria, binding themselves only to "consult" Serbia. This conception is unjustified, because the object of the eventual consultation with Serbia, as we have stated, is not the question of our integrity—which is beside the point—but the general position of future Bulgaria. Sir Edward Grey did not specify this, but it is naturally under-

stood, and we believe it is in the common interest to lay stress upon it, so as to dispel all misunderstanding. Recent statements of the British Minister regarding the conditions of peace confirm this point of view, which is the only reasonable and logical one.

May 21, 1916.

SERBIA AND THE EUROPEAN WAR.

In the struggle against Austria and German expansion, a struggle in which we were compelled to join to safeguard our future and the unity of our people, we began by showing irresolution, defects, and errors. Our people were unprepared to resist all the ruses and well-known manœuvres of Ballplatz politics. Austria, who was aware of the danger that our unity would be for her plans for the future, exploited our weakness to make us less dangerous. As we were divided into provinces, Austrian policy consisted in encouraging local patriotism in the different sects of our race; in sowing religious discord; and in perverting true patriotism and national conscientiousness. Ballplatz statesmen even ventured to exploit our differences and tried to make us give up our legitimate ambition. During the thirty years following the Berlin Congress, Serbia was divided by internal conflicts and dynastic rivalry in which she spent all her strength. And these internal political quarrels, which were absolutely out of place and dangerous for our national ideal, were encouraged, developed, and supported by Austria, who thus hoped to make us incapable of agitating for the liberation of our brethren who were oppressed by her. Austria weakened us on one hand and slandered us on the other. For a long time Serbian credit in Europe was very low. We Serbians, no doubt, like all other nations, have our good and bad qualities. And unhappily Austria, who was our only means of communication with civilized Europe, systematically exposed our defects and concealed our good points.

At last, Vienna, believing us sufficiently weakened, divided, and disorganized, thought the moment had arrived to strike us a death-blow. Taking advantage of the general

favourable circumstances, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. By a strange coincidence, the Bulgarians at the same time declared their independence.

Well, this annexation which was contrary to all principles of International Law and the liberty of nations, instead of being a death-blow to us, has been the means of reviving our national energy, which till then was latent and wasted. The Austrians imagined they could dispose of us. We were weakened by internal quarrels and party rivalry, which had even penetrated into the Army, making them believe that we were incapable of great deeds and unconscious of our national duty. They grabbed hold of Bosnia and thought that impotent Serbia, paralysed by discord and having a reputed worthless army, was going to look on unmoved at the crumbling of all her national hopes. What a shock and surprise, when we were found rising up, oblivious of our rancour, our personal hatred, our party quarrels, electrified by the danger which menaced our race—having but one object, one idea: to save our people and gain the independence of our whole race.

It is only right to admit that prior to 1908, we had never thought of settling the Austro-Serbian question by force of arms. We were only too well aware of the disproportion which existed between the forces of Austria-Hungary and Serbia to dream of war. Our chief object was to strengthen pride of race, and to develop and enlighten the national conscience of the Serbians under Austria. We must then work within the limits of Austrian political law, but with a perseverance which would not remain unfruitful. Before us we had the admirable example of national energy displayed by the Czechs. We felt convinced that after a period of national propaganda—not revolutionary but pacific, intellectual, literary and artistic—we would reach a point when the question of the liquidation of a superannuated State such as Austria was, would settle itself; and having realized the intellectual unity of all parties of the Serbo-Croat people, we would attain political unity without much difficulty or bloodshed.

Austria did not wish it. Our work of pacific propaganda, though barely organized and started, appeared too

dangerous, too opposed to her designs of German penetration, for her to tolerate it very long. And since 1908, it is Austria who has provoked, deceived, and persecuted us. To our peaceful organizations—the only object of which was to strengthen the nationalism of the Serbians in Austria, by raising their intellectual level, to these organizations conformable to the orders of the Monarchy—Austria hastened to give a false revolutionary character. In Croatia and Bosnia she concocted plots to compromise the most influential Croats and Serbians. She organized trials in which her agents did not hesitate to invent untruths of which she made use to persecute and condemn our friends. She made use of *coups d'état* to prevent the Serbo-Croat majority from taking part in the local government of Croatia and Slavonia. In face of these persecutions, this ever increasing terror, the Serbians of Croatia and Bosnia showed a superb resistance, national energy and dignified tenacity worthy of their ancestors.

All hopes of peaceful work were scattered. We began to feel that Austria found us too dangerous to tolerate longer. Free Serbia was an obstacle not only to Austrian ambition but to the whole German plan of penetration by the Balkans into Asia Minor as far as the Persian Gulf. Our enemies had then to try to get rid of this obstacle. With resignation we prepared to resist the attack which was going to be sprung upon us some day or other.

The whole nation had a presentiment that serious and decisive events were going to happen. The moral force which was latent in us, and which we ourselves did not dream of, revived and increased to a very high degree. In expectation of the war with Austria, the Balkan War broke out.

Austria had counted on our defeat. We were victorious. In this war, in which the bravery of our soldiers won back after five centuries the ancient cities and provinces of our Kings and Emperors of the Middle Ages, our national patriotism increased.

We quickly finished with Turkey. But if our old reckoning with the Asiatic Empire was definitely settled, there were others with whom a settlement was about to

arise. Austria watched; and she was going to ask us how we dared dream of the future prosperity of our race. Austria, who had already thought us dangerous, was going to consider us as altogether menacing. Our victories over the Turks had stirred up patriotic feelings in all sections of our race, and Austria was terrified at the enthusiasm of her Southern Slav and Serbo-Croat subjects at our success. After the Balkan victories of 1912, Viennese politicians had but one idea, one purpose: "Crush Serbia." Since 1913, they have incited the Bulgarians against us. And when their treacherous attack was checked—the result being to increase the size of our State more than ever—the wrath of the Austrians knew no bounds. They had wanted to make use of others to fight us; having failed in this, they attacked us themselves. Germany wanted nothing better. And less than a year after, Austria declared war on us.

We did not want war. The best proof of this is that we were quite unprepared. We were worn out by the two successive wars of 1912 and 1913, which had cost us many lives. Our arms and munitions were exhausted. We needed a long period of peace to repair our losses and to reorganize. Austria knew all this and looked upon us as a mere mouthful to swallow. But she was mistaken. Although circumstances were against us, for three months we resisted an uninterrupted offensive, and in December 1914 inflicted a complete defeat on the Austrians. During fourteen months of war we checked the enemy and preserved our country from invasion. And finally, if we were compelled to retreat, it was owing to the coalition of three armies, a simultaneous attack on three fronts, and the crushing superiority of heavy artillery—we having only a few big guns. We retreated step by step, never losing courage and always hoping to be reinforced. But reinforcements never reached us. We retreated towards countries less and less hospitable, and the retreat became more and more difficult. Our soldiers, famished, exhausted and half-frozen, still continued to repulse attacks and take prisoners. I have seen the soldiers and refugees who have come through Albania. They still bear traces of the terrible

physical sufferings they have had to endure. But do you think they were dejected and discouraged? Far from it. Their words were full of an infinite sadness—the sadness of no longer being in their own country. And through their sorrow, hope and faith revealed themselves.

I must conclude. Every nation has certain qualities, and these qualities are not only the characteristics of the race, but also the result of the historical, geographical and physical conditions in which these people have been brought up. The conditions under which the Serbian people have lived for centuries have inculcated them with great power of resistance and unequalled tenacity. These qualities, combined with intense patriotism and a great love of independence, have given the Serbians the moral power which has distinguished them till now and which will help them not only to reconquer their country, but finally to realize their national ideal.

July 16, 1916.

THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLES OF SERBIA.

The Economic Conference of Paris led to an exchange of views regarding new regulations for economical relations between the Allies. Serbia took part in these conversations, and the peace which will give us a new Serbia—greater and happier—will also give us new economic conditions.

Having alluded to the discussion on the economic future of our country, we wish to point out in a few words the economic struggles we have had against Austria-Hungary, and the deluded hopes of certain Serbian personages on the possibility of an economic agreement between ourselves and Germany without Austria. As a matter of fact in our country there existed a certain volume of opinion which desired an economic agreement with Germany, and attempts were made to realize it. Serbian politicians thought at one time that the community of political interests between Germany and Austria-Hungary would not prevent the development of commercial relations between Serbia and the German Empire. Experience has shown us that this

was an illusion and that the Central Empires formed an economic body just as they were a political unity.

For a long time, from an economic point of view, Serbia was in a state of almost complete dependence on Austria-Hungary. Being an agricultural country, she could only send agricultural produce to the European markets, and the only markets she knew were Budapest and Vienna. The only practical commercial routes were the Danube and the Belgrade-Budapest-Vienna Railway. At the same time, the manufactured goods that she imported came from Budapest and Vienna. About 90 per cent. of Serbian foreign commerce either came from the north or went to the north. The Serbians were accustomed to Austro-Hungarian produce, and Serbian exporters had nothing to complain of about the Budapest and Vienna markets. The idea of emancipating themselves from Austrian markets would never have occurred to the Serbians, if Austria-Hungary had not sought to gain political advantages from the economical position. Instead of regarding this situation, so favourable for her commerce and industry, as the result of circumstances which might change, the Dual Monarchy deceived itself by a dangerous illusion. Viennese politicians believed that Serbia, on account of her geographical position, was indissolubly bound to Austria-Hungary, and that she was condemned to remain for ever in this state of dependence. Austrian economists, with Mr. Matlecovitch at their head, supported this opinion and maintained that from the moment the Austrian frontier was closed to Serbian produce, Serbia would find herself in a desperate position and would literally be suppressed.

Political leaders in Vienna, believing in the accuracy of this argument, set about bringing pressure to bear on Serbia with a view to gaining political advantages, frankly threatening to close the frontier if the Government at Belgrade would not accept Austrian terms of political domination. The limit of this vexatious and deceitful policy was the Austro-Hungarian demand, formulated in the spring of 1906, that the field-artillery which the Serbian Ministry of War wanted to order in France at Creusot's, should be supplied by the Austrian Scoda Factory at Pilsen !

It was the chief condition in the negotiations for the conclusion of the Austro-Serbian Commercial Treaty. Serbia would not accept this condition, considering it, rightly or wrongly, as a blow at her sovereignty. An economic conflict ensued which, with a few intervals, lasted for nearly three years; from this conflict Serbia emerged victorious and economically stronger than ever.

Austrian calculations proved entirely wrong. It is true that the complete cessation of commercial traffic with a country which was our only market, was a great blow to Serbia. But there were other commercial routes, very difficult it is true, and full of risk and danger, but they were used all the same. The desire to free ourselves from the continual aggressions of our powerful neighbour, encouraged us to make certain efforts which had their effect. The economic conflict would, therefore, mean a temporary weakening for Serbia, whilst Austrian industry would lose clients that could not be replaced, if Serbia succeeded in finding other markets. This possibility must certainly have occurred to Austrian politicians, but they never thought that we were capable of maintaining the struggle till the end. In estimating Serbian energy, the Austrians were entirely wrong. Serbia did not give in, and maintained the economic conflict with unparalleled skill and perseverance.

The steps that Serbia took for defence were of several kinds, and they all proved efficient. Among them was the attempt made by the Government to conclude a commercial treaty with Germany at a special tariff. It was the first time that we concluded a treaty of this sort with a country other than Austria-Hungary. We generally concluded commercial treaties which contained a clause for the most favoured nation, and the concessions made to Austro-Hungarian industry virtually spread to the industry of the contracting State. Meanwhile Austria-Hungary preserved her superiority, thanks to her geographical position, to the proximity of the Serbian market and to the ties formed by a commerce established for many years.

To replace Austrian goods, Serbian merchants applied to German manufacturers, and the latter quickly adapted themselves to the taste and needs of the Serbian public.

The Germans did all they could to monopolize the market. They allowed their clients long credit, to which the latter were accustomed, they consented to produce articles specially required by Serbian customers—chiefly cheap articles of an inferior quality. The Germans succeeded in setting a firm foot in Serbia, and at once became formidable competitors for Austrian industry and commerce.

In spite of the German commercial development in Serbia, the Government at Berlin adopted a very undecided attitude. They replied in the affirmative to the Serbian request for a tariff treaty, but they considerably restricted the number of articles specially mentioned in the tariff.

The German Consul at Belgrade, Mr. Schlieben, made great efforts to facilitate German commerce, and manufacturers in Germany were quite satisfied with his activity. The percentage of German commerce increased in a marked degree, while the Austrian 90 per cent. fell to 20 per cent. ! Then, owing to Austrian diplomatic intervention, Mr. Schlieben was recalled and the Serbian Government ascertained that official Germany did not wish to maintain German competition against Austrian industry. Political events which followed convinced our Government of the necessity for seeking elsewhere—in France, Italy and England—the manufactured goods which she needed.

Formerly, Serbia was quite satisfied with German and Austrian goods, but the present war has put an end to all commerce with Germany and Austria-Hungary. It is to their friends the French, British and Italians that Serbian merchants will in future apply for all the articles that Serbia imports.

May 14, 1916.

THE 23RD JULY, 1914.

It is two years ago to-day that the Austro-Hungarian Minister Plenipotentiary, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, called at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgrade and presented, by order of his Government a Note, the tenor of which produced great consternation in Serbia. The history of diplomacy contains no parallel for the demand from an

independent country of conditions so humiliating and so incompatible with its sovereign dignity.

The conditions of the Austrian ultimatum were so exorbitant, that they could not be explained except as a desire of the Monarchy to bring about a rupture and war. In spite of this evidence, Serbian circles which were accustomed to the extraordinary proceedings of the Austro-Hungarians, did not wish to think of war, and the Government, in order to avoid an armed conflict, consented to nearly all the terms of the Note. Serbia, whom the three campaigns of 1912 and 1913 had acquainted with all the horrors of war, bowed her head and accepted all the conditions, in the hope that this complete diplomatic victory would suffice and that the catastrophe of a general war would be spared Europe. But Austria wanted war!

It is no secret that the revival of Serbian national pride, which manifested itself so brilliantly in the Balkan Wars, menaced the plans of Austro-Hungarian politics in the Balkans, and that the Monarchy sought by every means to prevent the enlargement and development of Serbia. Since the month of November 1912, when the Austro-Hungarian Government protested in the name of "rights of nationalities" against a Serbian outlet on the Adriatic, till the ultimatum of the 23rd July, 1914, Vienna diplomats did not tire of raising obstacles in the way of Serbian progress and in trying to provoke an armed conflict. The negotiations which took place in London for settling the boundaries of Albania; the question of Scutari; the inciting of the Bulgarians to attack the Serbians; the attempt to cajole Italy into a war against Serbia, immediately after the Treaty of Bucarest; the ultimatum to Serbia in November 1913, demanding that all Serbian troops be immediately withdrawn from strategic positions they occupied in Albania to prevent a new Albanian invasion of Serbian territory—all these acts, malevolent and directly hostile to Serbia, showed a dangerous disposition in leading circles in Vienna regarding the Serbians, who had great trouble in extricating themselves from these onslaughts. The constant failure of these actions ended by exasperating Austria, and when she was certain of effective help from

Berlin, she decided on a big attack and sent Serbia the ultimatum of the 23rd July.

The history of this ultimatum has not yet been cleared up, for Germany and Austria-Hungary will not allow the correspondence exchanged between them, before and after the ultimatum, to be published. Direct proof that the Central Empires wished to provoke a general war is not needed. All discussions based on the diplomatic negotiations which took place after the sending of the ultimatum appear absolutely useless to us, for the two principal documents, the Austrian ultimatum and the reply of the Serbian Government, establish in a most emphatic manner that the Monarchy wanted war and that Germany also wanted it—and not only a war with Serbia, but a general European war. Sir Edward Grey, with his customary lucidity, had declared that it was a well-known fact in European politics that Russia would never allow Serbia to be crushed, and from the moment that Austria-Hungary, in company with Germany, prepared to annihilate Serbia, it was quite evident that they wanted a general war.

Germany and Austria-Hungary are alone responsible for the conflagration which is devastating Europe. To prove their guilt, one has only to read the provocative Note of Austria-Hungary and the completely submissive reply of the Serbian Government. These two documents will always remain the most damning proof of Austro-Hungarian aggression. Posterity will never understand the mentality of the people who with inconceivable levity set Europe on fire, because the reply of the Serbian Government—so humble and submissive—did not satisfy them.

When the Entente Powers asked Germany and Austria-Hungary to wait a few days, promising to obtain other concessions from Serbia, German diplomats refused to intervene with the Austro-Hungarian Government for an extension of the forty-eight hours, and replied evasively. The war broke out in accordance with the wishes of Austria-Hungary and Germany—a terrible war, which will fill humanity with shame for ever, and for which the responsibility lies entirely with Vienna and Berlin.

July 23, 1916.

SERBIA AND PEACE.

Platonic conversations regarding peace have not yet come to an end, and they will probably last a certain length of time, thanks to the German efforts to induce the nations to leave off the struggle and accept the "German Peace." These tactics are not at all new. They emanate from the same system as practised by the Germans before the war. All conflicts which preceded the European war, and in which the Germans participated, appeared indeed under this aspect. Germany arbitrarily undertook an action affecting the general interests of the whole of Europe, and when the other powers protest and rise up against such an abusive practice, she accuses them of wishing to disturb the peace ! The case of Serbia and of the Austro-German policy with regard to this little country is typical in this respect. In 1908 Austria-Hungary violated the Treaty of Berlin in proclaiming the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, contrary to the fundamental rules of the law of nations and of international morality. The Entente powers protested and demanded an international conference in order to settle the fate of the two Serbian provinces. At that moment, Germany rose up threateningly and sent an ultimatum to Russia. The Russian Government, in face of such an arrogant and aggressive attitude, was obliged to yield and to approve the annexation. Immediately afterwards the whole of Germany uttered cries of joy in proclaiming the German Emperor as a peacemaker !

In 1914, the same game. Austria-Hungary and Germany decided to crush Serbia and do away with the sole barrier which closed to them the road to the East. With underhand scheming they prepared the blow, hoping to obtain the same result as in 1909. Russia, again this time, took the part of the threatened kingdom of Serbia ; but the Berlin Government cried : " You want war, you are provoking war ! " Serbia, for her part, with the desire to avoid a conflict artificially provoked by Austria, went to the utmost limits of concession in her reply to the Austrian ultimatum, and accepted all the demands of the Monarchy, humiliating and unjustified as they were. We will not only

quote the opinion of Viscount Grey, that "never was any country exposed to such humiliation as Serbia in accepting, in her reply, the unreasonable claims of Austria." The *Vorwaerts* wrote in the same sense, on July 25, 1914, before knowing the Serbian reply: "The demands of the Austrian Government are more brutal than any Note that has ever been addressed in the whole course of history to an independent State. They have only one aim: to provoke war. The conscious proletarians of Germany, in the name of humanity and culture, raise their violent protests against this criminal action." The editors of the *Vorwaerts* thought the Serbian Government would not be able to accept the ultimatum, and yet Serbia did accept it, in the interests of peace. The *Neue Freie Presse* of January 5, 1917, confessed, for the first time, that the reply of the Serbian Government was satisfactory! The Ballplatz, however, expected a negative reply, and the order had been given to Baron Giesl, the Austrian Minister, to leave Belgrade in any case on the 25th of July, on the expiration of the delay granted for the reply, which he, in fact, did. During three days, from the 25th to the 28th of July, the Austrian and German Governments deliberated, and it was only on the 28th of July that Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, taking no notice of the satisfactory reply of the Serbian Government.

One knows only too well in what manner the Austro-Hungarian armies penetrated into Serbia and accomplished the task of "punishing the Serbian people." The testimonies of Professor Reiss and the authentic documents not yet published on all the atrocities committed by the Magyar soldiers, are distinct proofs of the intention of the Austro-German Governments to annihilate the Serbian nation. This intention Austria-Hungary alone was not able to realize. Thrice defeated by the Serbians, the Austro-Hungarian armies found they were incapable of accomplishing the work of destruction and were obliged to ask for German and Bulgarian assistance. The real motive of the war and the German plans of conquest were plain after this fourth military expedition against Serbia, confided to the famous Mackensen. Serbia, ravaged by epi-

demics and weakened by former wars, inspired no pity on the part of the Germans. She was the barrier in the way of the German thrust towards the East, the sole obstacle to the *Drang nach Osten*. And it was necessary to get her out of the way, since she was not willing to bend before the German fist and German Culture. Attacked on three sides, Serbia had to give in. She was badly bruised, but not conquered.

To-day Germany has the Balkans provisionally in her power. The route to the East is open to her for the moment, and she would like to keep it so always. To the bleeding nations she holds out her hand and speaks to them, in the name of humanity, of the bloodshed, of the immense sacrifices of war and the blessings of peace. Certainly the unfortunate Serbian people would rejoice more than any other if there could be peace, but a real peace, a peace with liberty and not with slavery. It is this desire to remain free that urges our nation on to resistance, that gives it the strength to bear the heavy burden of the war until the end, until the victory of Justice over Injustice. It is also the reason why it sees in the offer of peace from those who wished to crush it, a manœuvre which it repels with all its strength, as it repelled the former offers made in view of a separate peace.

February 4, 1917.

THE FUTURE OF THE BALKAN NATIONS.

The nearer we feel to the issue of the present conflict, the greater is the obligation imposed upon politicians to consider the final solution of various problems presented by the war. Among these problems one of the most serious and most important is, without doubt, the Balkan problem.

The present war, of which one of the more remote causes was the dissension in the Balkans, has upset the equilibrium which, thanks to the conclusion of the Treaty of Bucarest, had at last been established in the East. This equilibrium can never more be restored. The Bulgarians, who did not desire it, have destroyed it in joining the Austro-Germans for the dividing up of the Balkans. Having done every-

thing in order to upset equilibrium in the Balkans and not even hesitating to get the Germans to intervene in the affairs of the Peninsula, they have by that very action lost the right and the advantage of appealing to the principles of which they had failed to appreciate the strength and the value. Not wishing to respect the formula "The Balkans for the Balkanic peoples," they will be the first to suffer the consequences. It can therefore no longer be a question of re-establishing the equilibrium existing before the war, but of making a judicious and fair partition, by which each nation will obtain that part forming its national patrimony. The boundaries of the regions inhabited by different elements, that is to say where the different races are so mixed up and confused that it would be difficult to define precisely the ethnical character of these regions,¹ must necessarily fall, at the time of partition, to the most important of the nations; we mean that one to which will belong in the future the principal rôle in the Balkans by virtue of its ethnical and political importance and its geographical position. Which nation should this be? That is the question to which we propose to reply, basing our argument on facts and reasonings taken from the writers of enemy countries as well as from those of allied countries.

If by the importance of a nation we mean only its material power, in fact the power of numbers, it is not difficult to prove that, among the Balkan nations, the Serbian nation forms part of the race comprising the greatest number of the inhabitants of the Peninsula. The Serbian nation, or Southern Slavs, numbers more than 12 millions, forming an ethnical whole, well defined and easily recognizable, of an imposing amplitude and variety. Its ethnical frontiers extend from the shores of the Adriatic on the West, as far as the rivers Iskar and Mesta on the East, and from Temesvar and Theresiopel (Szabadka) on the North, as far as to Salonica on the South.² The moral strength of the Serbian nation equals its numerical import-

¹ As is the case with the population of the valley of the Mesta.

² For the ethnographical frontiers of the East, see the ethnographical map of Mr. M. Andonovitch, university professor, 1892 (in Serbian) and 1903 (in French).

ance. Its glorious past, the purity of its moral ideal, its ancient civilization,¹ its capacities for development, lastly the purity of race and chivalrous character of the people, these are all elements of moral power which mark it out for the important rôle, and give it the right to a special place in the Balkans.

Finally, the geographical position of the Serbian nation, occupying the centre of the Balkan Peninsula, with the basins of its principal rivers, Morava, Vardar and Strouma, also constitutes an important element of its political power. The possession of these river basins by the Serbians dates from 1330, as is proved in the book of the Bulgarian author, Jschirkoff, *The Western Boundaries of Bulgarian Lands*, in which one reads: "But it was only after the battle of Velboujde (Kustendil, June 28, 1330) that the rivalry between Bulgarians and Serbians for the possession of the valleys of the Morava, the Strouma and the Vardar was decided in favour of the latter" (p. 12). Thus the justice of these observations is confirmed, even in certain enemy avowals. To quote another one, interesting and, perhaps, less known, we refer to the correspondence exchanged between Karl Marx and Engels, in which one finds a letter produced recently by the socialistic review *Die Glocke*. In this letter Marx, speaking of the Eastern question, declares that the Turkish Empire in disintegration must disappear and give place to a young nation, which, according to him, is none other than the Serbian nation. The latter, according to Marx, by its central position in the heart of the Balkans, is clearly meant to succeed the Ottoman Empire. The compatriots and successors of Marx, the Germans of to-day, in publishing this letter, do their

¹ Except for a few rather vague notions as to our national poetry, recognized as belonging to the most beautiful and most original epic verse, almost nothing in general is known in foreign countries regarding the ancient Serbian civilization. Here, however, is a competent judgment of ancient Serbian art: "And it is marvellous to see these patriarchal tribes, which have lived for centuries in proud independence, turn again towards Byzantium, to listen to its lessons and to surpass it in boldness of conception, in number and magnificence of their monuments. We owe them indeed the richest collection left us by Christian art in the East.—(G. MILLET, *Glorious Serbia*.)

utmost to lessen its effect and diminish its importance, by pretending that the master socialist was mistaken and that it is to the Bulgarians, their present allies, that the predominating rôle in the Balkans is due. All the same, the celebrated socialist writer saw clearly in assigning to the Serbian nation the predominating rôle in the Peninsula. Besides, all facts tend to favour this opinion.

The attitude adopted by the Serbian people in the present conflict, in embracing the cause of Right and of Liberty, and the degree of political development attained in the free part of the nation represented by the kingdom of Serbia, where the democratic and representative régime has long been in force, are both proofs of the development as well as of the political sense of the Serbian race. Indeed, the political régime, more or less free, under which a country lives, is also one of the expressions of the culture of the nation. The notions of liberty, justice and equality, firmly rooted in the minds of the Serbian people, are pillars of the social and political edifice of its State. When the soul of a nation is braced up by its past and by a high moral ideal, its future is for ever assured. Its rôle among its neighbours is therefore determined beforehand. This rôle the Serbian nation played already in a not distant past. Under the Prince Michel Obrenovitch (1860-1868) the Balkan Confederation, with Serbia at its head, was on the eve of being formed, and it was only the sudden death of this prince that prevented its realization. Without being impelled by a spirit of conquest, without coveting the lands of its neighbours, and without cherishing projects of hegemony, the Serbia of that time assumed the rôle of guide and protector of the Balkan peoples, with the lofty moral mission of liberating the oppressed nations, among which were her enemies of to-day, the Bulgarians. The heads of the Bulgarian nation at that time called for the protection and support of Serbia and of her prince, not having faith in the strength of the Bulgarian nation which in those days represented an amorphous mass with no national sentiment. The future belongs, then, to the Serbian nation. That proceeds from a law of historical necessity, against which

no force is capable of struggling. It would be wiser to understand and follow historical laws than to try to stop their course.

May 20, 1917.

SERBIA AND OBLIGATORY ARBITRATION.

The replies of the Germanic Powers and of their Turkish and Bulgarian allies to the Note of the Pope, reveal such extraordinary political hypocrisy that it seems useless to lay special stress upon it. One believes one is dreaming when one sees the factitious deference with which Germany and her acolytes speak of the principles of Right in the international reports and of obligatory arbitration for the pacific solution of conflicts. It is particularly Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria who to-day declare themselves ready to adopt obligatory arbitration, as though the world had forgotten that these two powers, encouraged and supported by Germany, have committed the most serious offences against this principle, one of them having even broken her formal agreement to submit all disputes with Serbia to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia. What a difference between Serbia, who, on two occasions, in particularly unfavourable circumstances, preferred to accept arbitration rather than provoke armed conflict, and Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, whose whole policy was hostile to the idea of a peaceful solution of political differences!

On the 28th of June, 1913, in the Serbian Parliament, the Prime Minister, Mr. Pachitch, declared, after having expounded at length the political situation, that the Serbian Government, in answer to the request of Russia, had decided to submit the dispute with Bulgaria regarding the settlement of frontiers, to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia, in conformity with the formal stipulations of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. Mr. Pachitch asked the Serbian Parliament to approve this decision, which, although dangerous from the point of view of the legitimate pretensions of Serbia, was in conformity with the loyalty with which Serbia intended to hold to her engagements. The next morning the political clubs held long meetings in order

to determine their attitude. The Radical party, which was in the majority, unanimously decided to approve the decision of the Government. The Opposition also stated precisely their opinion, but had not time to express it publicly, because in the night of the 29th-30th June the Bulgarian army, by the orders of its commander-in-chief, had attacked, without declaration of war, the Serbian troops all along the line. On the 30th June, in the morning, when the Serbian Parliament was going to approve by a formal vote the point of view of the Government, the Radical Club having already given its adhesion to the policy of Mr. Pachitch, a telegram announcing the Bulgarian attack rendered all discussion and all voting useless. It is therefore an historical fact that the Serbian Government and Parliament had, in 1913, in spite of Serbia's favourable chances in the event of an armed conflict, preferred to accept arbitration.

In 1914 Serbia received the brutal ultimatum of Austria-Hungary, the unreasonable demands of which were more than humiliating. In London, where they have regard for international propriety, the most peace-loving men were stupefied at the humiliation imposed upon the little country by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Serbian Government, nevertheless, accepted all points of the ultimatum except two accessory questions. According to the subsequent avowal of the authorized organ of the Ballplatz, the *Neue Freie Presse* of January 5, 1917, the Serbian reply was satisfactory. But the Serbian Government went still further in its submission and accompanied its reply with the following declaration, which will ever remain one of the most important points of the accusation which humanity will have to bring forward against those who have ruined the world by bringing about the present slaughter:

"In the event of the Imperial and Royal Government not being satisfied with this reply, the Royal Serbian Government, considering it is in the interests of all not to precipitate the solution of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a peaceful agreement, submitting this question either to the decision of the International Hague Tribunal, or to the great Powers." Austria-Hungary and

Germany would not hear of this. The Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade left the Serbian capital half an hour after receipt of the Serbian reply. And it was war. . . .

To-day, in front of a million graves (to speak only of the Serbians), the very ones who brought about the carnage dare speak of right and of arbitration !

Hypocrites !

October 7, 1917.

THE RUSSIAN PEACE AND SERBIA.

The Russian maximalists have just accomplished, by the conclusion of an armistice with Germany and her Allies, an act, the consequences of which, however serious they may be, must be considered calmly and coolly. Russia will not, or cannot fight ; such is the brutal fact with which one must henceforth reckon. As military factor in the struggle against Germanism Russia no longer exists, and it is with one Ally the less that we must continue the war, if we wish to gain the victory. The Russian breakdown is all the more grievous in that it occurs under circumstances rather tragi-comic. It is tragical to see a great and noble nation commit an act of treachery, not only odious from a moral point of view but disastrous for the future of Russia herself. And it is comical to assist at peace negotiations between Lenin, Trotsky and party on the one side—who adorn themselves with the title of apostles of revolution and of social justice—and representatives of William, Charles, Ferdinand and Mohammed on the other—these four monarchs knowing no other right than that of their own power: issue of the divine will ! However, this is not the moment to look at the grotesque side of the situation created by the Bolsheviks, whose audacity seems to be boundless. That which occupies our attention is the fate of our people and of our dear Fatherland who believed in Russia as in God, and who feels the treachery of the Bolsheviks like a blow struck at the very heart of its hopes.

The war has, however, hardened the Serbians, and the numerous trials through which the Serbian nation has had to pass has taught it to resist the greatest misfortunes,

The moral basis of our policy is not weakened by the treachery of Petrograd, and if we cannot count upon the co-operation of the Russian divisions, that is no reason for forgetting that the high ideal of liberty and justice, to which we have sacrificed everything, commands us to continue the struggle. Russia, represented at this moment by a band of adventurers and German agents, accepts the German domination. She consents to submit to the Prussian mailed fist rather than continue the war.

We had already been confronted by this dilemma, we and our Allies, before the war, and to-day, like yesterday, it appears under the same form. We have to choose: either to perish and lose political and economic independence, to serve eternally the interests of German masters, or else to continue the defence in alliance with the greatest and most civilized states in the world. Under such conditions, there is no choice. Russia was very dear to us; we believed in her and we looked to her for salvation. France, England and America did not know us and were not much interested in our fate. The war has changed the situation, and not only political ideology, but also and above all the most elementary interests, advise our Allies to guarantee us our national liberty in the fullest sense of the word. The spectre of a "Mittel-Europa" stretching from Hamburg to Bagdad has taken a particularly threatening form after the Russian breakdown. The fate of the whole world is at stake on the European continent, and courageous Serbia represents there the most serious obstacle to the establishment of a German hegemony. The Allies have pledged their honour for the restoration of Serbia, but the most vital interests of a calm and peaceful Europe demand the realization of our national aspirations.

The Austro-Germans wish to insinuate that after the treachery of Russia Serbians should give up the struggle, the chief support of their policy having collapsed. We shall have occasion to come back to this false argument, and for the moment we will only affirm that the principal pillars of our policy are the justice of our cause, the right to live and the desire to be free and delivered from all foreign domination. Russian treachery has altered nothing.

After all, the war is far from being at an end and the material forces of the Allies are so imposing that even the faint-hearted revive when they look closely into things. But among the Serbians there are no weaklings. And we have reason to believe that the errors of the past will not be repeated and that the Salonica front will in time be reinforced to meet any eventuality.

December 23, 1917.

ON THE EVE OF THE FIFTH YEAR.

This week is the anniversary of the week of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. The 23rd of July, 1914, will ever be a sinister date in the world's history. It is on that day that Austria-Hungary, acting in unison with Germany, attacked the independence and liberty of a little nation whose only fault was that it was situated on the road chosen by Germany for the conquest of the East. The pretext of Sarajevo—of which we speak elsewhere—was meant to cover Austro-German premeditation—premeditation condemned even by some enlightened Germans. To-day, Serbia has no longer any need to defend herself against the calumnies issued by the Vienna and Budapest press. It is she who now rises up as the accuser, it is she who calls upon the nations to render justice and to render it in full. The kingdom of Serbia was the only barrier against the German thrust towards the East. The Serbians would not own themselves beaten in an unequal struggle, full of fine exploits of unparalleled heroism. They have had to yield, losing all save honour. It is not only for the defence of their country, but also for the liberty of their race, that they went out to fight, these admirable Serbian soldiers. At the most critical moment of her existence, Serbia thought first of all of her unredeemed Serbian, Croatian and Slovene brothers. In the appeal issued by the Prince Regent Alexander to the Serbian Army, on August 4, 1914, the unequal struggle against powerful Austria-Hungary was set up as the symbol of the deliverance and the union of the whole Southern Slav world.

"My heroes," said the Prince Regent in his proclamation,

“ the greatest sworn enemy of our State and of our people has suddenly and without any motive made a furious attack upon our honour and our life. Austria, our insatiable neighbour of the north, has massed her troops on our frontier and has already tried to cross our northern frontier in order to subjugate our beautiful Fatherland. It was not sufficient for her to have witnessed for so many years our sufferings over the desperate lamentations of millions of our brothers who have come to us from Bosnia-Herzegovina, from Banat and Batchka, from Croatia, from Slavonia, from Syrmie, from the sea coast and from our rocky Dalmatia. Austria now demands of us the supreme sacrifice : she desires the life, the independence and the honour of Serbia herself.

“ After our brilliant feats of arms of 1912 and 1913, which have won for us acquisitions recognized by all Europe at the Peace of Bucarest, I sincerely desired that the country and my valiant warriors might rest from the great efforts of war and enjoy the fruits of their victory. That is why Serbia was ready to come to a friendly agreement with Austria-Hungary in all disputed questions. Unfortunately, we soon realized the true aims of Austria, who refused to treat with us, even had we yielded to all her unreasonable demands. She was determined to attack us, to humiliate us and to assassinate us. Though still exhausted from recent victories, I call upon you to reassemble under our victorious banners and form a solid rampart for the defence of the Fatherland. To arms, *mes glorieux faucons !* Forward into battle for the liberty and independence of the Serbian nation and of Slavism ! ”

These aims were confirmed by Act of Parliament and by the Government. After the Austrian defeat, in winter 1914, the Serbian Government, on the 7th December, made the following declaration before the National Representatives :

“ The Government, assured of the confidence of the Parliament as long as it endeavours to serve the great cause of the Serbian nation and the Serbo-Croatian and Slovene race, believes its first duty is to salute with the utmost respect the sacred victims who have heroically and

voluntarily sacrificed themselves on the altar of the Fatherland.

"The Government of the kingdom, sure of the firm intention of the entire Serbian nation to persevere to the end in the struggle for the defence of its country and its liberty, looks upon it as its principal and unique duty in these critical moments to assure a favourable issue to this war, which became, as soon as ever it broke out, the struggle for the deliverance and for the unity of all our undelivered Serbian, Croatian and Slovene brothers.

"The Government will endeavour to remain faithful to this national decision and will await the hour of victory in company with its powerful and heroic Allies, confident in the future."

Hoc signo vinces. The Southern Slav flag borne by the Serbian bayonets has served, also, the cause of democratic Europe. Serbia is fighting for the victory of Right and Justice, and the victory of these great principles over German militarism and hegemony will give occasion to Europe to acquit herself of her debt towards Serbia by helping her to accomplish on the one hand her Southern Slav mission, and on the other, her task of democratic guardian of the entrance to the Balkans. It is with this firm belief and animated by the resolute intention to hold out to the end, that all Serbians, without exception, are entering upon the fifth year of the war.

July 20, 1918.

II

PRINCIP—ADLER.

It was the 28th June 1914 at Sarajevo. A young man of eighteen years, a Serbian of Bosnia, an Austrian subject and the son of a people which had had the unhappy fate of exchanging, after the rising of 1875, '76 and '77, a Turkish master for an Austrian master, fired a revolver at the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, when the latter was driving in state through the streets of Sarajevo. The 28th of June is the day of Vidov Dan, the greatest national festival, the greatest symbol of Serbian hopes, and one can easily

conceive what effect was produced on the minds of young men of the oppressed Serbian nation, by the announcement of the visit which the Archduke, ill-inspired, had fixed expressly for that day, in order to show the solidity of the Austrian régime in the Serbian provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. A crime committed under such circumstances is nothing extraordinary. But an attempt upon the life of any one is always an odious action, and the shots fired by Princip, a fanatical young patriot, shocked the whole world. But, instead of seeing in this assault the rash action of an irresponsible mind, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, ignoring all the rules of logic and good sense, accused as guilty the whole Serbian nation and particularly Serbia as a state. The Austrian ultimatum of July 23rd is based upon the assertion that it is the entire Serbian nation that is the author of the assault, and therefore the nation must bear the consequences. Austria carried this theory into practice by giving to her army the formal order not to spare the civil population. And the whole war against Serbia was called "Strafexpedition," the "expedition of punishment," which, after the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian army in December 1914, was ironically changed by the Serbians into "bestrafte Expedition," the "punished expedition!"

Yet Dr. Frederic Adler, the author of the attempt on the life of the Minister Stürgkh in Vienna, is an intellectual Austrian, a man over forty. A well-known politician, director of a socialistic review *Der Kampf*, of which the collaborators are recruited from among the best Austrian writers such, for example, as Karl Renner, he was fully aware of the consequences of his act. The attempt on the life of the Prime Minister Stürgkh did not take place either in a centre of nationalist agitation, in a town smarting from the offence to its most sacred sentiments, but in the sumptuous drawing-rooms of the luxurious hotel Meissl and Schadn. After a succulent repast, Dr. Adler approached the table of the Prime Minister and, with perfect calmness, pressed against the smiling face of his victim a loaded Browning. Shots rang forth, and as Mr. Stürgkh sank powerless, Dr. Adler, without even trying to escape,

declared to the astounded witnesses that he would explain the motives of his action before the judgment seat.

The two crimes of Sarajevo and Vienna owe their cause to the faults of a superannuated system on which the Austro-Hungarian edifice is based. The excited patriot Princip and the educated and well-balanced socialist Adler, in killing men, wished to kill the system. But in Austria one takes care not to put them on the same footing. Princip's crime was made use of by the Monarchy, which hoped to stifle the cries of her oppressed subject nations in carrying out a victorious war against free, democratic and independent Serbia, towards which were directed the eyes of all the Southern Slavs. This plan has failed, and the Monarchy has seen the question of her own existence brought up for discussion. As to the crime of Dr. Adler, Vienna's difficulty in explaining it to the world is comprehensible. The first action taken was to declare that its author was mad, but the impossibility of maintaining such an assertion in presence of the categorical and perfectly reasonable declarations of Dr. Adler was quickly perceived. That is why the Vienna press commentaries contain nothing precise or definite, while the German papers, less scrupulous in hiding the weaknesses of the Monarchy, abound in the most interesting commentaries.

As for ourselves, we see in this crime still another proof of the absolute necessity for a transformation of the old Habsburg Monarchy into a group of national states—free, independent, and united in resistance against any Germanic domination. Princip and Adler were wrong to kill men in order to get at the system. The system is too strong, as the German papers say, to be destroyed by revolver shots. Its fate can only be decided on the battlefields.

October 29, 1916.

AT LAST !

An Austrian Confession of Premeditation.

The truth is unalterable and immortal. This truth was systematically dissimulated by the Austro-Germans

in the course of the present war, but it is beginning to come to light even amongst the most deluded of our adversaries. We are able to record to-day a formal and categorical confession of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, that it desired war, and since the Monarchy desired war, it is perfectly clear that its master, the German Empire, also desired it. We read indeed, in the leading article of the *Neue Freie Presse* of January 5th, the confession that the reply of the Serbian Government to the Austrian ultimatum of July 23, 1914, satisfied all the demands of the Monarchy. This is the first time that Austria has confessed her premeditation as well as her intention of provoking war and crushing Serbia. This confession is of the greatest importance, and we quote the passage in question: "Die serbische Regierung hat von der Note in der Hauptsache nur abgelehnt, dass unsere Polizeibeamten an der Verhütung von politischen Morden durch Ueberwachung der Grenze und durch ähnliche Massregeln mitwirken, wie Deutschland und Frankreich sie freiwillig für die russischen Sicherheitsbehörden zugelassen haben"; in English: "The Serbian Government has really, out of the terms of the Austrian ultimatum, only declined to agree to the demand for the co-operation of our police authorities in guarding the frontiers, and other similar measures—a participation that Germany and France accepted willingly for the Russian police authorities."

At last, Vienna decides to confess her crime. Since, therefore, Serbia accepted all the points of the ultimatum, except that which we have just quoted, why was war declared upon her, why has our country been ravaged and the whole world set ablaze? Why? Answer, you who to-day assert that you did not want war!

January 21, 1917.

THE MYSTERY OF SARAJEVO.

More False Documents.

Certainly the Austrians do not wish to give up their customary habits and, in spite of repeated checks, they

persist in returning to the charge against Serbia. The crime of Sarajevo, which was so cleverly exploited by the Monarchy, is still shrouded in mystery, and this encourages the Ballplatz to renew, from time to time, the accusations against Serbia and Serbian official circles, and to denounce them as the instigators of the assassination. The effect produced by these puerile accusations is very mild, especially after the experiences one has had with the "documents" and the "proofs" produced by the Austrians in the Friedjung lawsuit. It has also happened that the last communiqué of the Viennese Correspondence Bureau regarding the pretended culpability of Serbian official personages in the Sarajevo drama, which we will deal with here, was reproduced in Swiss newspapers "as a curiosity"! But we have no intention of showing the same indulgence towards the chanceries which concoct such documents, and we therefore permit ourselves to go more closely into this fresh—is it the last?—Austrian attempt to justify the aggression against Serbia and the instigation of the European war.

In this communiqué it is related that the debates in the course of the trial for high treason of a Serbian of Ljesnica, named Banjac, have proved that the Serbian Society, Narodna Odbrana, was a Serbian institution! We cannot help laughing at such an assertion! A purely private association, whose aim is intellectual culture, and which was founded by a small number of private persons, is said, in this Austrian communiqué, to be an official institution, and it is pretended that the debates of the Banjac trial have confirmed its "official character"! But this is not all. In order to give it at least the appearance of truth, the authors of this communiqué remind one, in capital letters, that the President of the Odbrana was General Jancovic, without mentioning, however, that General Jancovic is a retired general and that he exercises no official functions. In order to impress readers, the names of the Serbian commanders, Tankosic and Pribicevic, well known for their activity in Macedonia, are also added. However, since the legend of the culpability of these two Serbian officers has been launched forth already several times,

without taking root, a further step is taken, and we are told that it "has also been proved that the Crown Prince Alexandre himself for a long time took an active part in the agitation against the Monarchy." Thus, it was not only Serbian officers who took part in the assassination of Sarajevo, but also the Prince Regent of Serbia himself! Finally, we read—*risum teneatis!*—in this communiqué, that the Ballplatz "possesses an original document of the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, addressed to the Serbian Minister of War, from which it appears that the Narodna Odbrana was directed by Serbian committees." What! The Narodna Odbrana directed by Serbian committees! Well really! And we had believed that the Narodna Odbrana was a society of Patagonia and that it was directed by Patagonians! He who has procured this new "document" has, indeed, discovered a great truth and posterity will owe him much for his inventive genius.

But joking apart, we beg to say that these new "proofs" are vulgar forgeries. We can easily prove it. The communiqué in question was edited in two versions: one for Austria and Germany, the other for neutral countries and the Allies. In the communiqué destined for neutral countries and which was reproduced by Swiss papers, there are missing two important assertions which are to be found in the Austrian and German papers, and which, if they were not fictions, would strengthen the accusations against Serbia. The first concerns Tchabrinovitch. We are told that the Crown Prince of Serbia came one day to the Serbian state printing office, in order, with the assistance of the director of the printing office, to make the acquaintance of this individual and to encourage him in his anarchist designs! The Vienna Chancery, knowing that Europe is well informed about Tchabrinovitch and the patronage he enjoyed at the hands of Austrian diplomatic representatives, preferred to suppress this passage so as not to expose itself to an easy refutation. The other assertion is more characteristic. It is suggested that a former Serbian Minister, Dr. Vojislav Belimarkovitch, had made compromising statements regarding the relations of official Serbian circles

with the pretended dealings of the Narodna Odbrana. Now, we affirm that there exists no former Serbian Minister of the name of Dr. Vojislav Belimarkovitch. There does not even exist to-day in Serbia any person of the name of Dr. Vojislav Belimarkovitch. It is therefore an entirely faked-up story. The fact that this passage was also suppressed in the communiqué destined for abroad, while it was published by the Austrian press (see the *Neue Freie Presse* of February 11th), sufficiently emphasizes the doubtful character of these "documents."

Since the Vienna Correspondence Bureau is endeavouring to throw more light on the mystery of Sarajevo, we beg to put a few questions to it in order to facilitate its task. We will speak neither of the hypotheses of Mr. Steed nor of the researches of Mr. Chopin, nor yet of the possible revelations of the head of the Sarajevo police, Gerde, who, in spite of the high favour he enjoyed in Budapest and Vienna, has just been arrested. We shall only deal with the points which those who are carrying on the calumnious campaign against Serbia should be able to clear up without great difficulty. Here are these questions: 1. Why was the Sarajevo trial carried out with closed doors? If the crime was instigated and perpetrated by Serbia, the Habsburg Monarchy, which, at the time of the trial, had already declared war on Serbia, had every interest in establishing with all publicity the guilt and complicity of Serbian circles. 2. Why were the evidence of the witnesses and the declarations of the authors of the assassination of Sarajevo not published? The first measure did not absolutely entail the second and one could doubtless have learnt something from these documents. 3. Finally, the third and principal question concerns the extraordinary attitude of the Sarajevo police and of Austro-Magyar official circles towards Tchabrinovitch, the young man who threw bombs at the Archduke, in a street where Francis-Ferdinand should not have passed according to the arrangements made beforehand. This Tchabrinovitch was a well-known anarchist, and the Sarajevo police had once expelled him as such from Sarajevo and sent him to his native town, Trebinje. From Trebinje, Tchabrinovitch went to Serbia, to Belgrade, but

the police of that town would not allow him to stay there as they suspected him, and it was intimated to him that he must immediately leave Belgrade and return to Austria. Tchabrinovitch, a notorious anarchist, protests and invokes the protection of the Austrian consulate! The Austrian Consulate makes enquiries and stands guarantee for Tchabrinovitch's good conduct to the Belgrade Prefecture. Thus, the Belgrade police was obliged to allow him to stay in Belgrade!

Here now is the most serious aspect of the affair. Tchabrinovitch went to Sarajevo by an unknown route. The Austrians assert that it was the Serbian frontier authorities who facilitated his passage, but this assertion is a farce. Indeed, we do not understand why it should have been necessary to facilitate the entry into the Monarchy for an Austro-Hungarian subject who was vouched for by the most competent authority, the Austro-Hungarian consulate at Belgrade. Arrived at Sarajevo, Tchabrinovitch walked about there in perfect liberty for several days, paying visits, and nobody troubled him, not even the Sarajevo police, who, as a rule, do not show so much indulgence. For instance, at the time of the visit of Francis-Joseph, some years previously, this police had even ordered, as a precautionary measure, the expulsion of two members of the Bosnian Parliament, as suspected persons! How can one explain such conduct on the part of the police, the head of which was the famous Gerde who, now that he is in prison, could no doubt tell us something. Let the Vienna Correspondence Bureau therefore pay a little attention to these very important clues and give up the pleasure of issuing "news" and "established facts" regarding the culpability of Serbian official circles in a purely Austrian matter. This advice is all the more justifiable, as neutrals, to whom these "explanations" are addressed, register them simply "as curiosities," and we think that a press bureau, even though it is Austrian, ought to serve for something other than the production of "curiosities" in the form of forgeries.

February 18, 1917.

THE CRIME OF SARAJEVO AND THE EMPEROR WILLIAM II.

Most allied papers have not paid any attention to a conversation of the German writer Dr. Hans Müller with William II, at the time of the Emperor's last visit to Vienna, which was published in the *Neue Freie Presse* of February 14th. Like all preceding declarations of the German Emperor, this conversation contains many interesting and characteristic things which should not be overlooked by any student of German psychology. The historic mysticism, with which William II loves to see himself surrounded, is revealed here in the Emperor's words, when he confessed to his interlocutor that he has been haunted, ever since his early youth, by "some historic figures who still expect to receive their promotion through a poetical genius. . . . This is especially the case with Charles V. . . . Think, if the Emperor Charles were to meet Martin Luther—cannot one see in that one of those contrasts which produce, on the stage, eternal effects?" And, after a short silence, the Emperor slowly and gravely adds: "Who knows, if these two men, Charles V and Luther, had indeed met to work together, who knows where the German nation would now be!" And so on. The conversation turned upon present day questions, and the Emperor says, speaking of his letter to the Chancellor of the Empire: "Yes, this letter ought to be written, this step ought to be taken!"

In the second part of the conversation the mysticism had given place to more concrete statements, and it is then that the Emperor pronounced words which have astounded us and to which we must make a summary reply. In speaking of the general character of the present war, the Emperor cried: "How short people's memories are! Is it already forgotten that the Entente is protecting the assassins of the Archduke Francis-Ferdinand?" The assassins, these are the Serbians, because it is the Serbian nation that the Entente wished to save from the destruction to which the Austro-Germans had condemned it! Thus, from the mouth of the German Emperor himself we hear the accusation we have refuted already a hundred times, but which our adversaries never cease to renew. We are

therefore forced to repeat what we have already said many times :

1. That the Sarajevo crime was committed by two Austro-Hungarian subjects, natives of Bosnia ;

2. That the Sarajevo police showed, before and after the crime, an almost criminal negligence ;

3. That one of the authors of the crime, Tchabrinovitch, a notorious anarchist and the son of a Sarajevo police spy, had enjoyed, at Belgrade, the special protection of the Austrian Consulate ;

4. That the Sarajevo trial was held behind closed doors ;

5. That the evidence was never published ;

6. That the Serbian Government expressed its indignation at the crime and was ready to assist the legal commission in the search for accomplices, but that the Vienna Government and the Sarajevo authorities did not pay attention to this declaration ;

7. That, even in the event of the crime having been committed by Serbian subjects, it would be an enormity to make a whole nation responsible for a crime committed by private persons. This theory, which the Austro-Germans have applied to Serbia—starting with a false accusation—and which has resulted in the destruction of a quarter of our population (the Serbian losses amount to one million souls, exactly a quarter of our population) would have incalculable consequences if one applied it to the Germans for crimes they have committed in reality and of which the number is enormous.

As to the Emperor William, we will say nothing about him, out of respect for the hospitality we enjoy in Switzerland, a country neutral by its character and its position. Impartial history will confirm, in so far as it has not already done so, whether it is to the Serbian nation that the title of assassin belongs, with which the Emperor William has deigned to honour it. With the calmness and composure which have never deserted us, we shall go still further and plead certain extenuating circumstances in favour of the German Emperor, who has accorded none to a martyred nation. Indeed, the serious accusations which the Emperor has raised against our nation were pronounced by him on the

13th February, two days after the publication of the last communiqué of the Viennese Correspondence Bureau regarding the pretended complicity of Serbian official circles in the Sarajevo crime. In this communiqué, it was asserted that a former Serbian Minister, Dr. Vojislav Belimarkovitch, had made revelations most compromising for Serbia with regard to the affair. It was therefore under the influence of this publication, brought to the Emperor's knowledge by the first chamberlain of the Archduke, Baron Rummer-skirch, that the Emperor William uttered his accusations against Serbia and the Serbian people, calling them assassins. We have already asserted, in the last number of *La Serbie*, that there exists no former Serbian Minister of the name of Dr. Vojislav Belimarkovitch and that there is no person at all of that name in Serbia. There is therefore not the slightest doubt that the communiqué was a fabrication from beginning to end. Its first and only victim was the Emperor William.

February 25, 1917.

THE GUILTY PERSONS UNMASKED.

The Lichnovsky-Mühlön revelations, appearing just at the moment of the great German offensive, have served to confirm the devout character of the decisive struggle going on on the western front. The allied soldiers who are sacrificing their lives to hold back the German push and save the world from a régime unworthy of our state of civilization, are not fighting for a mere chimera. Two eminent Germans, the one an aristocrat, the other a business man, affirm, proofs in hand, that this atrocious war was desired by Austro-Germany, that she had made preparations for it and deliberately provoked it. After these undeniable testimonies it can no longer be questioned. The culprits are unmasked for ever. And if to-day one sees Germany proceeding openly or disguisedly to annex vast foreign territories, it is only the realization of the plan conceived in 1914 and put into effect by the conflagration of the whole world.

The Lichnovsky-Mühlön statements have a particular

importance for Serbia and the Serbian people. The perfidious accusations brought forward against our country by an unscrupulous press and a lawless propaganda starting from Vienna, Budapest and Berlin, are found to be false by the categorical affirmation of Prince Lichnovsky that Austria was practising a policy of strangulation with regard to Serbia and that he, the ambassador of a great empire, could not conceive for what reason his country lent her support to such a policy. The Austrian ultimatum, drawn up with the mutual consent of the highest Berlin circles, had alarmed this honest German, and in order to avoid the world war, he tried to obtain from Serbia a conciliatory reply. Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Sazanoff brought pressure to bear upon Belgrade and the unprecedented ultimatum of Vienna received from the Serbian Government a reply which nobody expected. All the demands of the ultimatum were accepted, except the two points upon which, according to Count Lichnovsky, an understanding could easily have been accorded. But the Germanic powers were determined upon war and did not wish to discuss the matter. At one moment it was Vienna, at another Berlin who showed herself inflexible, and behind all this play-acting there appeared the threatening figure of the Kaiser, resolved to stake the adventure that his eldest son, the Crown Prince, has called "the greatest sensation," the sudden attack.

We have already shown several times how the Sarajevo crime, still somewhat a mystery in itself, served as a pretext for an open declaration of war to crown the policy of chicanery, pressure, blackmailing, and intimidation practised by the Monarchy in regard to the Southern Slav Piedmont. The Lichnovsky-Mühlön revelations teach us Serbians nothing new. Serbia had long since become conscious of the Germanic danger, and when the Serbian Government, at midday, on the 25th July, 1914, issued orders for mobilization, before the Serbian reply which was only sent at six o'clock in the evening of the same day, was known at Vienna, it did so with the full consciousness that Austria and Germany desired war, and that the Serbian reply, however docile it might be, could alter nothing. But for those who do not look closely into things and who still

believe that little Serbia was the cause of the European war, the Lichnovsky-Mühlön revelations will be a useful lesson. Serbia is completely exonerated from the reproach made to her sometimes even by her friends, unconscious victims of the Austro-Magyar-German propaganda.

It is thus that the Germans appear to-day completely unmasked, their own sons having brought upon them this merited humiliation. For our ravaged country, violated and befouled by insidious calumnies, it is indeed a splendid satisfaction.

May 30, 1918.

SERBIA AND THE SARAJEVO CRIME.

A Reply to German Professors.

In one of his recent writings on the Sarajevo crime, Professor Kohler, of Berlin University, with the picturesque language peculiar to himself, has been so kind as to honour the Serbian people with epithets which one usually finds only in the black and yellow press. He calls us a nation of "Nihilists, anarchists, terrorists, and rebels against God and against all order of state." I take the liberty of replying briefly to all these invectives, as well as to the other reflections of the learned professor upon Serbia and her pretended guilt.

I wish to do so, first of all because Mr. Kohler speaks himself, in one passage of his book, of discussions he had in 1908 with me on the subject of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Besides, the opinions of Kohler regarding the Sarajevo crime differ so greatly from his theories in the happy pre-war days about crime and punishment, causality and responsibility, it is only fair to grant to those who were inclined to agree with his former theories the right to make at least some remarks on the subject of the prejudiced ideas put forth to-day by the learned Berlin professor.

In reading Kohler's book I involuntarily thought of that international legal congress held at Frankfurt-on-Main, in May 1914, under the presidency of Mr. Kohler. When the official work of the congress was finished, an

excursion was organized to visit the surroundings of Frankfurt, particularly an old Roman castle, reconstructed by German professors under the supervision of the Kaiser himself. After the visit to this castle, in other respects devoid of interest, the congressists betook themselves to a neighbouring restaurant where, during the meal, beautiful speeches were made by the German professors on the community of nations, on the legal and economic equality of all nations, as well as on the peaceful development of civilization. These words produced a peculiar impression upon me and I wondered whether it was not doing harm to the Germans to flourish the phantom of a Germanic danger. At that same moment, my neighbour at table, a very witty Frankfurt lawyer, a certain Doctor G., whispered in my ear: "My dear doctor, why on earth are you looking so serious? All this is only chatter; there is not a word of truth in the whole story." Very surprised, I turned towards him: "What do you say? I do not understand you." "But," replied he, "I think . . . the story of the Roman castle, you know, our Kaiser loves that sort of child's play and our professors, in their capacity of Privy Councillors of the Court, are eager to construct such mirages. . . ."

To-day I ask myself if my Frankfurt friend, who is an excellent man, was not alluding to other mirages! What does Privy Councillor Mr. Kohler think of that? Was it a coincidence or something else?

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The Sarajevo trial took place behind closed doors. It is known that the Austro-Hungarian Government led up to its famous ultimatum and the declaration of war on Serbia, as well as "the punishment expedition" against the little country (expedition afterwards turned by the Serbians into a "punished" expedition), by sensational revelations brought to light by the proceedings against the authors of the crime, revelations which, according to Vienna and Budapest, proved the culpability of official Serbia.

It seemed, however, very strange even to the Austrians

themselves that the Sarajevo trial proceeded almost in secret, behind closed doors, in a little room of the Kommandantur of Sarajevo. The Monarchy had, however, prime interest in seeing Serbia unmasked. Austria-Hungary had proceeded to convict a whole nation on the evidence of pretended damning proofs supplied by the preliminary examination. But, strange to say, the publication of these proofs and of these revelations took a long time, and the trial itself was conducted in the greatest secrecy. How could this enigma be explained? It is only to-day that the Austrian Government, with the help of a professor of Berlin University, has decided to publish a few facts taken from the records of the proceedings of the trial. The book *The Trial of the Authors of the Sarajevo Crime*, should attain this end, and it has been entrusted to Privy Councillor Professor Kohler to write the preface to this publication.¹

The author of the book says in his preface that he has given the proceedings of the trial according to the official shorthand reports. It must, however, be stated that it is not a question in his book of a verbatim report, but rather of a partial publication of the stenographed reports. He has neither preserved the continuity which enables the reader to get a clear and faithful idea of the proceedings, nor has he reproduced the declarations of the accused *in extenso*. Only the first examination of the accused has been reproduced almost in full. The declarations of the witnesses are all missing, as well as the ulterior and last declarations of the accused. But, nevertheless, what has been declared by the accused, according to the reports published in the present book, is one of the most terrible accusations against the Habsburg Monarchy and at the same time the best and most visible proof of the innocence of Serbia. All the accused persons, namely: Tchabrino-vitch, Princip, Grabez, Illitch, as well as their young accomplices, have declared that the decision to kill the Archduke was an act of their own personal will and that nobody

¹ *Der Prozess gegen die Attentäter von Sarajevo*. Aktenmässig dargestellt von Professor Pharos. Mit Einleitung von Professor Dr. Joseph Kohler, Geh. Justizrat (Berlin, 1918, R. v. Deckers Verlag).

incited or ordered them to make the attempt, least of all any authority of the Kingdom of Serbia. The crime was, according to its conception and its realization, a personal act of Bosnian patriots who believed that by such an action they were serving their oppressed people. The official Austro-Hungarian fables as to the complicity of Serbia therefore fall to the ground and humanity, after this fresh proof of the premeditation of the Central Powers, supplied by an official publication of the Vienna Government, will have to insist with still greater energy on the absolute security of the future peace.

The only thing one can lay to the charge, not of Serbia, but of a Serbian subject, concerns the relations of a Serbian officer, Tankossitch, with the authors of the crime. It is asserted of him that he was aware of the plan to make the attempt on the life of the Archduke, and that it was he who helped the assassins to procure money and weapons. The other person who also knew of the attempt is a subordinate official of the Serbian railway management, of the name of Ciganovitch, but this last is an Austro-Hungarian subject. However, the principal accused, Tchabrinovitch, Princip and Grabez, spoke of Tankossitch as of someone who knew of the preparation of the crime and who was ready to assist the authors of it, but they all definitely add that Tankossitch exercised no influence on their decision taken previous to their conversation with the Serbian officer, and an act of their own free will.

But even supposing Tankossitch to have really been an accomplice, it is evident to every one that a Serbian officer is not identical with the whole Serbian nation and especially not with the Serbian Government. I may also add that Tankossitch was a very self-assertive officer, who gave a lot of trouble to the Ministry of War. In spite of his personal bravery, he had, just at that time, to be dismissed from the active service list. The Austrian legation in Belgrade had full information about this officer, and it is impossible that it could have identified a subordinate Serbian officer, whose name was associated with scandals, with Serbian official circles. When the Austrian ultimatum was transmitted to the Serbian Government,

Tankossitch was immediately arrested by order of the Government, so that his guilt and complicity might be enquired into and established. Serbia could not do more than that. The Serbian Government was willing to have other possible accomplices arrested had the Austrian Government made such a demand in the usual formal manner and accompanied by the necessary proofs. This demand failed to come and in its place there arrived the declaration of war.

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It is known to-day that the Austro-Hungarian Government was not very anxious for the punishment of the criminals. The first examinations had at once proved that the crime was an act solely of Serbians of Bosnia, that it had been conceived and carried out by Austro-Hungarian subjects by way of protest against the oppression of a whole nation. If it had then come to a public trial, it would have been a fresh scandal for the Monarchy. One sees, in fact, as the Pharos-Kohler book shows, that the young accused persons were not afraid to state, even behind closed doors in a room of the barracks, some bitter truths concerning Austria-Hungary. One can get some idea of what they would have said in a public trial, from the results of the famous trials of Agram and of Friedjung. The Viennese Government wished to prevent that, and that is why the trial was held in barracks and in secret ; but neither Vienna, nor Budapest, nor Berlin wished to lose the opportunity of declaring war on Serbia and ruining if possible the Serbian people. The whole Serbian people, in Serbia and out of Serbia, was declared guilty and immediate steps were taken to carry out the sentence. The unprecedented atrocities committed by the Royal and Imperial army in Serbia were to be the expiation of an imaginary crime, and such proceedings, which recall the times of Attila, Privy Councillor Kohler, one of the greatest German jurists, has the courage to shield with his illustrious name !

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The Faculty of Law of the Berlin University had three eminent representatives : Franz v. Liszt, the eminent

criminal lawyer and specialist in international law ; Otto Gierke, the head of the Germanic legal school, and Josef Kohler, the world-renowned jurist and the most democratic—by reputation at least—of German jurists.

What has become, in the course of the war, of these great Germans? Franz v. Liszt made himself celebrated by an article published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of October 29, 1916. At the very moment when the Germans were carrying out the deportation of numerous Belgian families, Professor Liszt was writing that the German administration in Belgium was a model of international justice. "Future occupations will be carried out according to the German pattern, because Germany," cried Mr. Liszt, "by her methods in occupied Belgium, has enriched international law!" Otto Gierke went a step further. During forty years Gierke taught that Right is not identical with Might, that its root is to be found in the idea of what is just and consequently, that Right and Might are in two totally different categories. And now, what does Professor Gierke think about it? In his book *Unsere Friedensziele* (Berlin 1917), Gierke writes that Right is simply the expression of Might. Might creates first an indeterminate state of affairs and Right then moulds it to form. Gierke labels his previous conceptions "doctrinal theories and phrases of no importance. It is Might which finally decides everything" (page 29). Let us point out also that Gierke considers it superfluous that the little States, as for example Serbia, should continue to exist after the war.

Mr. Kohler has not been able to resist the temptation of following these fine examples. All his previous theories on crime, causality and responsibility, have become void and he teaches an incredible and monstrous theory, according to which every act of private persons is the responsibility of the whole nation!

Really one doubts whether Berlin University will gain in reputation from such theories.

July 20, 1917.

III

TO THE SERBIAN ARMY IN SALONICA.

We have seen from the papers that the whole Serbian army is now at Salonica. The long months of reconstitution and reparation are therefore over and the soldiers of King Peter are starting again to fight, in order to rescue their country from the vile hands of the enemies of the Entente.

Without doubt General Sarraill will have cordially welcomed these admirable warriors. May a friend, who had the honour of accompanying the Serbian Army almost since the beginning of this terrible war until the autumn of 1915, also be allowed to send his best wishes to these valiant soldiers.

Soldiers of heroic Serbia, we ask from you a new and great sacrifice. We ask you, you who represent the remaining youth of your country, to enter the struggle again, and, if necessary, to die for the common victory. I know you will accomplish this sacrifice joyfully and proudly. Have you not already solicited the honour of being the first to attack your enemies, particularly the Bulgarians, who have betrayed the Slav race?

There is no need to wish you good courage. I have seen you in battle: at Goutchevo, in the trenches of Matchkov Kamen, at Chabatz under the bombardment, and on many other occasions. Your nation does not know fear. I have also seen you taking prisoners. Before a disarmed enemy your anger cooled, and you only saw in the man trembling before you, a poor defenceless being. Your first question was: "Are you hungry?" and, on the affirmative reply of your adversary, always starving, you drew from your pocket your last morsel of bread to give it to him. I am sure that you will continue to maintain this admirable behaviour and that, in presence of your enemies, you will remember that the laws of humanity always count, and that he who does not observe them puts himself under the ban of society.

History must not only be able to proclaim your material

victory, but also your spiritual victory! Advance, then, heroes of Choumadia, of Timok, of the Danube and of the Morava, to fight with your generous brothers-in-arms of France and England. The best wishes of your friends go with you. Victory is yours, for you are fighting for sacred rights and for liberty!

June 4, 1916.

SERBIA ON THE EVE OF BATTLE.

Speeches and discussions have just been brought to an end and bleeding humanity nerves itself for a fresh shock of material forces, the last, it is said, and the most formidable of all. If present signs are not misleading, it is Germany who has decided to take the offensive, and to try again to finish with fire and sword the work begun in 1914, and originally conceived as a purely military enterprise. After the check to the original plan and with the gradual wearing out of her strength, Germany has had to alter her strategy. In fact, during the whole of 1917 she showed herself in the light of a "pacifist," and her leaders aspired rather to a diplomatic victory, in accordance with the first results of the war. This diplomatic strategy has failed, like others, and Germany therefore sees herself obliged to have recourse to arms, these natural resources of her policy of aggression. She does so reluctantly, for in spite of the elimination of Russia, the chances of a decisive German victory on the western front are no longer so great as they were in the preceding years, and this shows pretty clearly what will be the issue of coming battles. But this confidence, which the Serbians share equally with their Allies, could not and must not prevent us from conscientiously considering whether fresh sacrifices are really necessary, and whether there are not some means of sparing the world new sufferings, perhaps more terrible and more deadly. The following is the Serbian point of view:

Serbia finds herself, in the midst of all the belligerents, in an exceptionally grave situation. The Serbian army at Salonica, after proof of its accustomed heroism, sees itself forced, by an unjust fate, to shed its last drop of blood

on the altar of the Fatherland. The country is entirely occupied by the enemy, violated, ravaged and exposed to systematic spoliation, to ill-treatment of all kinds, from the coarsest to the most refined. The acts committed, for example, by the Bulgarians in occupied Serbia surpass all imagination. After having recruited the few Serbians remaining in the country who were fit for service, under the pretext that they are Bulgarians and not Serbians, to-day, after two years of occupation, they fall upon the women and old men, that is those who had not yet been deported, and wish to force them to declare themselves Bulgarians !

In answer to all the cries of despair, no encouragement, no help is given, no effort made to put an end to these infamous proceedings, which are a disgrace to the whole world which calls itself civilized and remains unmoved before such cruelties. Besides this, famine is raging mercilessly among the exhausted and exasperated population. For a whole year a discussion continues as to whether it is necessary to send food to Serbia or not, and the generous initiative of the Swiss encounters the resistance of the bureaucrats of London and Paris. What can one say to our Serbian, Croatian and Slovene brothers in Austria-Hungary, who are only longing to be united to Serbia, and for whom Serbia, confident in the political programme of the Allies, has sacrificed more than a quarter of her population ? The Southern Slav question is not yet, however, understood by our Allies, and we run the risk of being delivered up to the Germans and Magyars in pursuance of an entirely false conception of Austria-Hungary.

Under such circumstances any other nation would give in, but the Serbians do not dream of doing so. They are fighting for liberty and independence and they will never consent to German bondage. The faults and errors of the Allies, however great they may be, do not affect the steadfast and unchangeable decision of the Serbians to hold out to the end, and this we proclaim at this very moment when at Corfu the constitution of the new Serbian cabinet is under discussion. The Serbian policy remains the same because the Germano-Magyar-Bulgarian danger is still the

same, even greater to-day than yesterday, especially after the peace imposed upon Roumania. Serbian soldiers and civilians are animated by a robust confidence in the justice of their cause. They are living in the hope that justice will be done to all, and that the war cannot end without the violated rights of all the martyred peoples being restored and sanctified. To those who speak to us of Macedonia and of the eventual assignment of Serbian territories to Bulgaria, we reply that Serbia is not fighting for territory, but for a much higher ideal. Before thinking of bestowing a part of Serbian territory upon Bulgaria—what a monstrous idea!—we demand that the crime committed by the Bulgarians should be punished. It is, therefore, justice that we are claiming from our Allies. The first duty of that High Court of Nations, of which Mr. Wilson spoke recently, will be to perform this justice.

Belgium is awaiting it, Serbia also is awaiting it, and it is this faith which holds together the remnant of the Serbian nation. Justice for the Austro-Magyar aggression, justice for the Bulgarian crime—this last above all. Instead of distributing lands and marking off frontiers, the Allies must think of the redress of wrongs and the execution of justice. That is the great aim worthy of fresh sacrifices, and it is for this aim that the Serbians are ready to submit to everything.

March 9, 1918.

TOWARDS VICTORY!

The victorious advance of the Allied armies in France promises the happiest results. The march of the Germans "nach Paris" has been transformed, all at once, into a forced retreat, a sure sign that the combative strength of the enemy is giving way. The German offensive, started on the 21st March, is thus ending in a collapse, the political importance of which far surpasses the immediate strategic consequences. At the time of the allied offensives in 1916 and 1917, the Germans were rather contemptuous of the result obtained; in 1918 it is with very different sentiments that the press and public opinion across the Rhine are

receiving the news of Foch's victories. The Allies, however, without indulging in excessive optimism, are reckoning with new combats, still harder, still bloodier, but they have the steadfast conviction that all combats will henceforth take place with the omen of victory. This victory of Right over injustice, of Truth over falsehood, of Mind over matter and brute force, will bring peace and security to the suffering world. It will inaugurate a new era in the life of all nations. It will, above all, put an end to the Serbian martyrdom.

The Serbians have never doubted this final victory. For whole centuries the Serbian people have been subject to the Ottoman yoke, but their faith in the future and the resurrection has never been extinguished. The national sentiment, already very strong in the Middle Ages and developed from contact with the two neighbouring civilizations, eastern and western, has been able to resist all the attacks of Turkish barbarism. The rising of Karageorge in 1804 found the Serbian nation, in spite of four centuries of bondage, ready to resume the struggle for the supreme blessing, national liberty. During the whole of the nineteenth century Serbians, alone or with the support of Russia, have been putting forth every effort to break loose from Turkish clutches and not to fall into Germano-Magyar slavery. Squeezed in between Turkey and Austria, Serbians could scarcely breathe freely. An almost uninterrupted struggle against two great dangers, a perilous oscillation between the Turkish Scylla and the Austrian Charybdis, such is the character of the whole of modern Serbian history. When, in the second half of the nineteenth century, the gradual decline of Ottoman power began to awaken the greatest hopes in the soul of the Serbian nation, the Germano-Magyars succeeded in replacing the Turks with the Bulgarians and setting the latter to lie in wait for Serbia. The Bulgarian nation, of Touranian origin but by all outward signs Slav, especially in their language, proved a most docile tool in Austro-Magyar hands. Psychologists, after the war, will have to enquire into the means by which it proved possible to persuade the Bulgarian nation to turn aside from the only path it ought to have followed, that

of Balkan solidarity. The Bulgarians, yoked to the German chariot, rushed upon Serbia in 1913 and 1915, in order to clear the road for the German conqueror. The Serbian nation was obliged for the moment to bend beneath the weight of the triple attack, but its desire to live and to resist all bondage has only been thus increased. The Allies' victories in France are for Serbia the first sign of dawn.

But, as we have often stated, there will be no security either for the Serbian nation or for the whole of Europe, without complete victory. The supreme aim of the Allies is to abolish for ever the German peril, and this peril will only be done away with when its living source, Prussian militarism, has been broken and exterminated. In the domain of politics, the suppression of German militarism signifies the deliverance of the Slav and Latin nations from an encroaching State, founded on militarism and dynasty. The victory of allied arms must be the victory of the principle of nationality, the consecration of the right of each nation to self disposal. Serbia does not insist merely on her restoration and her independence. She is fighting for the deliverance of the whole Southern Slav nation. The sacrifices made by the Serbian people for the victory of right over might are not to be rewarded, but crowned by the realization of the high ideal aspired to by all Serbians, Croats and Slovenes. All the Southern Slavs look forward to victory bringing about the resurrection of Serbia and the realization of the Southern Slav political union with Serbia and around Serbia. It is for this ideal that they are ready to sacrifice all the strength that remains to them. It is with such sentiments that we follow the heroic march of the allied armies towards victory.

August 17, 1918.

THE VICTORY OF THE VARDAR.

The victorious advance of the Allied troops on the Serbian front is a fresh blow to German power, not less vigorous than that dealt in Picardy by the armies of Foch. The Serbian divisions, overcoming formidable difficulties due to the nature of the ground and breaking, in an impetuous

rush, the Germano-Bulgarian resistance, are engaged in retrieving, day and night, with the fraternal support of the French, English, Italians and Greeks, the sacred soil of their Fatherland. What renders the Serbian victory still more important is the efficacious co-operation of the thousands of Serbian, Croatian and Slovene volunteers of Austria-Hungary, formed into a special Southern Slav division, which has proved its worth at Dobroudja. By its present exploits it has added fresh laurels to its reputation for valiance and heroism. Southern Slav solidarity has thus manifested itself once more in the most indisputable fashion. A nation which sheds blood for the sake of the Fatherland, has by this very fact acquired the best right to liberty and independence. At the moment when the Serbian Prime Minister was discoursing at Paris upon the subject of the concrete solution of the national union of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, the victories in the south of Serbia were most opportune, as indicating the only possible road to true Southern Slav independence. This independence is about to be realized with Serbia and around Serbia, on the basis of the Declaration of Corfu.

Just recently we have heard the categorical declarations of Senator Lodge and of the former President Roosevelt, as to the absolute necessity of freeing the nations of Austria-Hungary and constituting national Czech, Polish and Southern Slav States. By a regrettable coincidence the question of Serbia is treated separately in this connection, a fact which can give rise to misunderstandings and uncertainty. It may, however, be pointed out that the Southern Slav problem is essentially a Serbian problem, and that no reasonable man could for a single instant think of separating Serbia from the millions of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes of Austria-Hungary. It is the Habsburg Monarchy that is seeking, by the camouflage of the Southern Slav question, to solve, no matter how unsatisfactorily, this vital problem of the Balkans and Central Europe, but the Allies will not make the deplorable error of considering our national question from a point of view other than anti-Austrian, that is, from the Serbian point of view. To put an end to all equivocation, it is certainly time that

the Allies expressed their opinion on the Declaration of Corfu and that they should state in terms as clear as possible, that the independence of the Serbo-Croates and Slovenes will be realized in a Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, instituted on the basis of the principles established by the Declaration of Corfu and placed outside any combination, however federalist it may be, of Austria-Hungary.

And this is not all. The Allies must not hesitate over the question of sending Southern Slav troops into Serbia. America and Italy should profit from recent experiences in Southern Serbia and as soon as possible should dispose all the available Serbo-Croats and Slovenes on the Serbian front, because that is the surest and most efficacious way to strike a blow at our most powerful and most dangerous enemies, the Austro-Magyars. It is through Serbia that the road passes to Jugoslavia.

The victory of the Vardar is the symbol of the Southern Slav union. The punishment of the Bulgarians is well on the way, and the Serbian heroes, so eager to deliver their country, are greeted all over the world with unutterable admiration and respect. But, while dealing the accomplice the blow he has merited, one must not forget the principal enemy, he who is treading under foot the bulk of our nation. The Bulgarian collapse is only the prelude to the favourable solution of our national question.

October 1, 1918.

THE RETURN OF THE SERBIANS.

This is more the moment for silence than for speech.

It was necessary to speak when we were insulted by the odious Austro-German ultimatum, which some of us would like us forget for love of Charles IV.

It was necessary to speak when the cannons of Francis-Joseph—old evil-doer—or of Conrad—over-ambitious field-marshal—were firing their first shots against the citadel of Belgrade, ringing the knell of Europe, striking to the heart the liberty of small nations.

It was necessary to speak when the armies of the valiant General Potiorek penetrated into Serbia on several sides

at once, but only to be beaten hollow by the "swine-breeders" of the old voïvode Putnik.

It was necessary to speak when the Serbian regiments, attacked from behind, as usual, by their former Bulgarian allies, fell back step by step before the guns, rather than before the soldiers, of Mackensen.

It was necessary to speak during that epic retreat, across the mountains of Albania, of a whole nation in arms, preferring exile to bondage, annihilation to a shameful peace offered with the left hand.

It was necessary to speak when the august descendant of the mountaineer chiefs, liberators of Serbia—and not a mere sovereign borrowed from some poor Germanic branch—King Peter Karageorgevitch, horribly jolted on his rough litter, set forth at the slow pace of his bearers, shedding as he went tears as of Priam and of David.

It was necessary to speak when those miserable remnants of one of the finest races in Europe arrived, worn and emaciated, on the inhospitable shores of the Adriatic, living skeletons rather than men, and of whom a great number gave way utterly at the sight of the ships which were to receive them and bear them away to a more merciful land.

It was necessary to speak when those barques filled with Serbian corpses put out to sea, one by one, to empty their sinister load into the wide stretch of smiling blue water.

It was necessary to speak when the few surviving Serbians in Serbia did not cease to be taxed, ill-treated, martyred, massacred—men, women and children—by Magyar or Bulgarian—in danger of disappearing also—if the Serbian people, that hardiest of races, could ever disappear from the earth! But I am thinking of how still at this hour these sufferings, this persecution, this famine is continuing, and how at Belgrade alone, under Austrian administration, there are 8,500 tuberculous Serbian children.

It was necessary to speak when the voracious and plundering Bulgarian, encouraged by the Prussian, his emulator, stole from the Serbians, in order to destroy or to sell them, their *objets d'art*, their books, their flocks, their wool, their corn, and all they could find in the bottom

of abandoned cupboards, pots of pomade or bottles of Eau de Cologne—and even, oh! unsurpassed profanation, the monuments from the cemeteries, in order to use them for their own dead.

It was necessary to speak when the government of the felon Czar ordered the recruitment of the Serbians of Macedonia and of Serbia, in order to force them to fight against the liberators of their brothers.

It was necessary to speak when Bulgarian divisions suppressed with the sword the least effort at revolt and avenged themselves upon the inoffensive population, by massacre or wholesale deportation, for the alarm caused them by the indomitable Kosta Voïnovitch.

It was necessary to speak when, amid the clamour of miserable diplomatic disputes, Serbia, slowly and unflinchingly, sank into the abyss, without the slightest glimmer of light on the horizon to sustain her faith and her courage—yet still she remained faithful and did not despair.

It was necessary to speak even when, in the eyes of men, there was no longer any Serbia.

It was necessary to speak in order to protest in the face of the world against such an iniquity, to speak again in order to re-animate, if possible, with a word of sympathy, those who were defending against the vultures this great remnants of a people, whether in Serbia or abroad.

But to-day we are constrained to keep silent, while the work of resurrection begins, while this handful of valiant men which at this hour represents the whole of the Serbian army, goes back again towards the north, while on all sides the dead heroes rise up from their graves to show to the survivors the road to the lost Fatherland, the road to victory.

What words would be fitting to describe such a return, such a prompt revenge? Where can one find words to express not only the thundering march of the Serbian warriors, but that voice which echoes in their hearts as they approach their devastated homesteads, that murmur which ripples on the surface of the mutilated earth and advances to meet them, half wail and half song of joy? All that is too great, too profound, too solemn to bear the

least comment from a stranger, the least sound coming from a country that has not suffered, where they have not fought, and where they have perhaps doubted.

Silence, sceptical and cowardly lips! on the road from Salonica to Monastir, from Monastir to Prilep, from Prilep to Veles, from Veles to Uskub and to Nisch—passing by Kumanovo are advancing, draped in the tri-colour banner, those two immortal sisters: Justice and Liberty!

Silence . . . Silence. . . .

October 7, 1918.

VICTORY!

Immense joy is being spread over the world at the news of the capitulation of Germany. The accomplices having laid down their arms one after the other, first the Bulgarian, ever a gambler, then the Turk, brigand and fatalist, after them the Austro-Magyar already on the point of death, it is now the turn of the principal actor, the head of the whole enterprise. The Germanic nightmare of which the black spectre was haunting the world in the sinister form of an "armed peace," is definitely dispelled. All nations will be able, for the first time in history, to breathe freely the fresh air of a veritable League of Nations. Their future will no longer depend upon any but themselves, their fate being placed in their own hands. We are not to-day in a position to calculate the full extent of the victory and realize all its significance. One thing is certain, and that is that it brings to Serbia and to the whole Serbo-Croat-Slovene nation, union and liberty. The martyrdom of the Serbian people will not have been in vain. The high ideal of national union which has been their guide throughout, has culminated in a complete triumph. What a fine recompense for the Serbian people, what a revenge for the brutal force and criminal premeditation of Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Sofia and Constantinople.

The work accomplished by Serbia in this struggle against oppression belongs to history. It is for history to render homage to the Serbian statesmen, who were able to lead the country in its historic mission, to glorify the Serbian

army whose bravery and endurance astonished alike friend and foe, and finally to judge the faults and errors committed. That must not, however, prevent us from stating that the Serbian conception of the Southern Slav union triumphs over the false conception of an eventual Jugoslavia within the Habsburg Monarchy. As specified by the German deputy Wendel two months ago, in the *Neue Rundschau*, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene union had to be formed with the Habsburg Monarchy or with the Kara-georgevitch. In order to destroy at the outset all chances of the Serbian solution, Austria decided in 1914 upon a preventive war against Serbia. The blow has not struck home and "little Piedmont," in spite of the unutterable sufferings endured, has gained the upper hand. It is this unequal struggle of the Serbian David against the Austro-Germano-Bulgaro-Magyar Goliath, that has conferred upon Serbia the title of "Piedmont," a glorious title, but one which must not cast a shadow in any way on the other parts of the nation. Serbia has done her duty, simply, nobly. In the great re-united family she aspires to no special position. It is absolute equality, political, economic and social, which is inscribed on her programme for the internal organization of the united nation.

In the Constituent Assembly heroic Serbia will not have to blush for democratic Serbia. The Serbo-Croat-Slovene State will range itself worthily alongside the democracies of the entire world.

November 18, 1918.

SERBIA AT THE PEACE CONFERENCE.

The inter-allied conference will meet next week to prepare the preliminaries of peace. Each allied power will on this occasion set forth its own particular claims, the legitimacy of which will be examined by the conference.

Serbia will present herself to the conference in her new capacity of Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, but this national union will in no way diminish the actual rights which the Serbian nation intends to maintain in support of its national aspirations. The

Wilson principles, to which our enemies also make appeal to-day, only signify for Serbia the consecration of the sacred rights she has acquired, long before the messages of Mr. Wilson, by her heroic struggle and by her unequalled political idealism.

The annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908 had wounded the Serbian nation to the heart. But Europe, in order to preserve peace, was disposed to accept without a murmur this flagrant attack upon the most elementary principles of international law. Serbian protestations awakened, however, the consciences of the western democracies, who did not fail to perceive the great peril incurred by the acceptance of this dangerous and immoral practice of changing an international treaty like the Treaty of Berlin at the sole desire of one of the contracting powers. In face of the German menace the Entente, however, gave way and advised Serbia to do the same. The Bosnian crisis ended in the victory of German diplomacy, but the victory of right and morality was on the side of the Serbians.

In 1912, on the advice of Russia, Serbia concluded a treaty of alliance with Bulgaria, but this treaty, in the minds of Austro-Bulgarians, was intended to become the grave of Serbian independence. In accord with Austria, Bulgaria counted upon a Serbian defeat, and in order to render this defeat more sure, the Bulgarians withdrew their formal engagement at the last moment and did not send the Serbians the 100,000 soldiers promised. A still more serious fact, and one that remains to be explained, is the eagerness of the Turks to attack the Serbians at Koumanovo, before the junction of the three Serbian armies on the plateau between Uskub, Stip and Veles could be effected, and even before the concentration of the Turkish armies was complete. It was probably suggested by Vienna, and in view of the secret connections between Sofia and Vienna, it is not impossible that this suggestion had its origin in Sofia! In any case the Bulgarians counted upon the Serbian defeat, and Austria-Hungary held herself in readiness to interfere under pretext of "saving" Serbia from the Turkish invader.

That would have been the realization of the famous programme of Count Berchtold for administrative "decen-

tralization" in Turkey under the form of an autonomous Macedonia protected by Bulgaria, and an Albania, also "autonomous," which would extend as far as the Vardar, and which would be entrusted to the protection of Austria.

Austria and Bulgaria would thus have shared the Balkan Peninsula. The Serbian victory over the Turks at Koumanovo in 1912 saved not only Serbia, but also the entire Serbo-Croat-Slovene nation and, in certain respects, also democratic Europe. Without this victory, Serbia, being vanquished, would have lost her force of resistance and all the Balkans would have fallen under Austro-Germanic guardianship. The line Berlin-Bagdad would have been re-established and Germany would have had much more favourable chances for the general war.

Furious at the Serbian victories, Austria-Hungary, urged on and supported by Germany, tried in every way to limit the success of the little Kingdom. After having forced Serbia to withdraw from the Adriatic, Austro-Germany, on June 29, 1913, set Bulgaria against our country in the hope of seeing us crushed by the Balkanic Prussians. The Serbian victory of Bregalnitsa thwarted this diabolic plan and, for the second time in 1913, Serbia escaped the fate prepared for her by Germany. The Serbo-Greek-Roumanian solidarity of 1913 proved a great success, and the preservation of peace in the Balkans depended only upon these three nations. Unfortunately Greece and Roumania were not ripe for an anti-German policy. The treaty of Bucarest, which should have formed the basis of this triple Balkan alliance, was abandoned by Greece as well as by Roumania at the very moment when it should have produced its principal effects. So Serbia remained the only rampart against the German "Drang nach Osten."

In 1914 Austria and Germany decided to accomplish for themselves that which their Turkish and Bulgarian mercenaries had not been able to realize. Serbia resisted and this time the Entente supported her. The support given by the Allies to Serbia has been well merited by our country, which has been drained of its last drop of blood, but has held firm. Roumania, not only abandoned us to our fate in 1915, but she even went so far as to conclude

in 1916, at our expense and behind our back, an agreement with the Allies which was afterwards dropped, through the separate peace made by Roumania, but which nevertheless forms a document of which the Roumanians have no reason to be proud. We have had no treaties with the Allies in 1915, but at no moment of our national catastrophe has the idea occurred to us of concluding a separate peace. Roumania, at a like moment, has not adopted the same attitude. As to Greece under Constantine, she formally betrayed us and abandoned us to the Bulgarians. King Constantine only waited for the opportunity of serving his brother-in-law William, without caring about the true interests of the Greek nation. Thanks to Venizelos the Hellenic nation has adopted again the policy of Balkan solidarity, and the Greek divisions have distinguished themselves by their combative ardour in the last offensive in Macedonia. And Roumania now finds herself in a position to be able to take up again the threads of that 1913 policy, the only one which is in the interests of her national development.

Italy, former member of the Triple Alliance, had adopted a special attitude. Italy has in fact never considered as a political possibility the liberation and integral union of our nation. She was preparing, rather, to protect herself against Austria-Hungary in assuring for herself the possession of a good part of our national soil. History will relate whether Italy had the idea of coming to a friendly arrangement with Austria, at the expense of our territory, and of remaining neutral until the end of the war; or whether she had from the beginning of the world war a clear realization of the importance of the struggle that had begun. What is certain is that Italy stipulated as a condition of her intervention on the side of the Allies that special advantages should be guaranteed to her, and that Serbia should not be acquainted with them. The London Treaty ratified this bargain. This treaty is not binding on the conference, which must solve the Italo-Slav problem on quite another basis. As to ourselves, it is rather interesting to recall to mind that on one occasion Serbia refused, and refused categorically, to obey the Allies, and this was when

Italy, who had refused to recognize Serbia as one of the Allies and who had pledged and mortgaged Southern Slav lands, applied to the Allies in June 1915 with the demand that Serbia should be forced to take the offensive in order to facilitate the task of the Italian army! We were asked to do so at a moment when we were enduring a terrible internal crisis, provoked by epidemics. And the Italians still have a grudge against us to-day for our refusal.

We abstain intentionally from speaking of the military exploits of the Serbian army and of the volunteer legions of Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes. What characterizes Serbia's policy is the perseverance shown in the struggle against Germanism, her loyalty towards the Allies, and a spirit of sacrifice which indeed does honour to the Serbian national conscience. The peace conference must bear in mind these elements of our national problem. It will do so not only by the recognition of the new Kingdom of the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, but by the absolutely legitimate protection of the integrity of our nation in the east as well as in the west, in the south as in the north. And if the future security of Europe is to rest, apart from the League of Nations, on a solid bulwark against Germanism, it is the Serbian barrier that must be strengthened. But for that it is necessary that Serbia, who has never bargained, should not be the object, neither she nor any part of the united Serbo-Croat-Slovene nation, of any bargaining.

December 23, 1918.

IV

THE WAR AND SERBIAN DEMOCRACY.

The internal political organization of Serbia, too little known by the European public, merits being called to mind in these historic hours when this country is fighting at the side of the great democratic powers of the West for the same ideal of liberty and justice. It is not by chance that Serbia finds herself in the group of the Entente powers. The determinative causes of this community of arms are

more profound, and it is necessary to point out in the first place the similarity of the forms of government enjoyed in the allied countries. Conformity in forms of domestic government has contributed greatly to the formation of the same tendencies in foreign policy, which are embodied in the programme of the Allies and which have for basis equal rights for all nations and respect for the liberty and peaceful development of each of them. If we set aside Russia, the great sister nation of Serbia, to whom the Serbian people owe so much of her independence and political liberty, and for whom all Serbians are animated with a deep love and sincere devotion, one can say that the gravitation of Serbian policy towards France and England was the consequence of the democratic Serbian form of government, borrowed entirely from those nations and from Belgium. A free and democratic Serbia had necessarily to rely upon the countries which practised a similar form of government. The truth so oft repeated regarding the intimate connection existing between the foreign policy of a country and her home policy is confirmed anew by the example of Serbia.

Political life in Serbia has passed through three principal phases: (a) autocratic and bureaucratic government which lasted until 1869; (b) constitutional government, inaugurated by the constitution of 1869 and practised without any great change or check until 1883; from 1883 to 1903, the same constitutional government, with fierce struggles for the establishment of parliamentary government. This period of twenty years was characterized by pretty frequent changes of government, by various experiments, all of short duration, by the incessant struggle between the democratic nation and a Crown more or less autocratic; (c) democratic and parliamentary government from 1903 up to the present day. This form of government was inaugurated by the constitution of 1903 and the accession of the Karageorgevitch dynasty, and it is to it that Serbia owes the progress attained since that time in all domains of social life. In giving here the synthesis of political organization in Serbia, and in insisting on its democratic character, we wish to show how this little nation,

with matchless courage, has been able to gain for itself, from the point of view of political liberty, a first place among the civilized States of the West.

The constitution of 1903 endowed Serbia with parliamentary rule based on the principle of national sovereignty and on the effective participation of the people in the government of the country. This form of government, judicially constructed by the constitution, would not have been able to function regularly without the consciousness possessed to a high degree by the Serbian people of its right and its duty to take a very active part in the affairs of State. The political education of the Serbian people is also shown by the marvellous organization of the parties ruling political life in Serbia, which are real factors of progress and civilization. It is a most characteristic fact that Serbia, a relatively young State, should be considered as the model of a democratic State, because of the constitution of her political parties, the firmness of their convictions and the devotions of their members to the parliamentary régime. In Bulgaria, for instance, the men called to power by the Crown always have a chance to obtain a majority by new elections, the Bulgarian people not having enough moral independence to form a personal judgment upon the government in question. The Bulgarian democratic party, the head of which is Mr. Malinoff, was not represented in the Bulgarian Sobranje, when Malinoff was appointed to office, except by two members. Mr. Malinoff succeeded, however, without great difficulty in obtaining by means of new elections an overwhelming majority, and the number of democratic members went up from 2 to 140 ! When the Malinoff Cabinet was replaced by that of Mr. Guechoff, the democrats almost disappeared and only had a few representatives. The same phenomenon occurred at the time of the elections held under the Radoslavoff government in 1913. In Greece and in Roumania such practices, it seems, are also very frequent, and there constitutional government with the preponderance of the Crown is preferable to parliamentary government. In Serbia any such effort to create a ministerial majority would be condemned beforehand to complete failure, universal suffrage, open

and secret, not permitting misuse, and the conscience of the electors, organized into large political parties, not facilitating the creation of purely personal majorities.

Political life in Serbia is all concentrated in political parties which, by free competition, with equal chances, develop their programmes and seek to win over the electors to their cause. The Serbian elector is, in general, very well informed as to political matters and does not lightly place his confidence in those to whom the Crown would confide the power. If one wishes to acquire power one must go among the people, gain their sympathies and their confidence, and it is only then that the Crown, taking into account the will of the people, consecrates it by the call to office. That is the road that leads to power in the countries having parliamentary rule, and not the contrary fashion practised under the constitutional system, where the confidence of the Crown is the first essential, the confidence of the people not being difficult to gain by elections more or less arranged to conform with the Government.

The parliamentary system is considered in Serbia, and that justly, as the greatest benefit of the new era begun in 1903. The two principal factors of public life, the Crown and the national representation, have done everything to preserve and perfect it. Thanks to this political system, Serbia has drawn decidedly nearer to the great western powers, because the Germanic Empires, Germany and Austria-Hungary with their anti-parliamentary home policy, their bureaucratic and militarist régime, had nothing to offer to the free and democratic Serbia. These same principles of right, justice and equality, applied in all the domains of home political life, Serbia would like to see realized also in the relations between nations and between States. When it is said that the Allies are fighting for a new international law, more just and more humane, these are not empty words—it is a fact, which can justify all the sacrifices of the war. The States which, in their home policy, have realized democratic and parliamentary rule, are well qualified to fight for an international democratic policy. We are glad to know that Serbia can, in this respect, range herself on the side of the powers who first gave birth to political

liberty. Serbian Democracy has been able to lead the country to where her place was already prepared for her.

June 25, 1916.

THE SERBIA OF YESTERDAY AND OF TO-MORROW.

The book of Mr. Stoyanovitch¹ is distinguished from similar publications by its great variety of arguments and political, economic and psychological sketches upon Serbia and the other Southern Slav countries. The author's idea is to represent in its entirety the essential rôle played by Serbia in the struggle for the independence and the union of all the Serbians, Croatsians and Slovenes. He has done so by drawing in turns short sketches of the national and social forces which have made of Serbia the Southern Slav Piedmont. His book bears the stamp of a work destined not only to inform, but also to instruct, by means of explanation more or less documentary. Such books are the most difficult to write and it is not to be wondered at if Mr. Stoyanovitch, who is more a fighter than a political writer, has not been able to attain equal success in all parts of his work, which is without doubt very interesting. The picture he draws for us of the political, economic and national activity of the Serbian nation is indeed rendered rather dull by an awkward effort to represent the work accomplished as the fruit of such and such a factor, of such and such a political or social routine and not of another. Mr. Stoyanovitch, being a native of Bosnia, where he has spent nearly the whole of his life, does not possess a profound knowledge of Serbian affairs, which is some excuse for the superficial and one-sided character of his elucidations, but all the same we must regret the digressions into which he has been drawn and which have inevitably diminished the value of the book.

Without wishing to enter thoroughly into the questions which in our opinion have been treated erroneously, and have caused Mr. Tardieu himself to make some reservations in his preface, we yet must make some observations on the

¹ *La Serbie d'hier et de demain*, by Nicolas Stoyanovitch. Preface by André Tardieu (Paris, Berger-Levrault).

subject of a few important points relating to the progress realized by Serbia.

Thus the distinction made by Mr. Stoyanovitch between the young and the old is on the one side arbitrary and on the other ill-founded. The work of Serbian regeneration, prepared in the period from 1883 to 1903 and accomplished in the decade 1903 to 1913, ought in reality to be credited almost entirely to those who were born before 1875. Doubtless the old men, as Mr. Stoyanovitch calls them, have had excellent collaborators among the young generations, but they were none the less the principal actors and instigators. History will judge of their work, which is still in course of realization and which the allied victory will crown with well merited laurels. Any discussion at this moment would not only be premature, but necessarily subjective and prejudiced. In the second place, we must remark on the strange opinion formed by Mr. Stoyanovitch as to the concrete factors of the Serbian evolution, especially as to the rôle and activity of political parties in Serbia. The Liberal party, with Yovan Ristitch, and the Progressive party, with Garachanine and Pirotchanac, cannot and ought not to be presented to the European public in a few insignificant words, as has been done in Mr. Stoyanovitch's book. As to the Radical party, it has only met with mixed sympathy with Mr. Stoyanovitch. That would be of no importance if it were a question of a book expressing only the sentiments and the personal opinions of the author and not of a work on the Serbia of yesterday and to-morrow. If the Radical party was indeed, in character, constitution and activity, such as Mr. Stoyanovitch depicts it, it would not be possible to conceive the remarkable work accomplished by the Radicals, the founders and propagators of the modern Serbian democracy. Neither can one pass by in silence the quite inaccurate appreciation of the elements which have rendered Serbia capable of undertaking the immense task of the liberation of the whole Southern Slav nation. Mr. Stoyanovitch, for instance, represents Serbian officers as the torch-bearers of progress and evolution. It is true that our officers are most admirable, but they are only the worthy leaders of their soldiers, whose valiance is

proverbial. Serbia's development, which has manifested itself also in the formation of a corps of excellent officers, is due in the first place to the intelligent and perspicacious work of Serbian statesmen. Well managed finances, development of the national productive forces, consolidation of the general economic situation, armament of the country on the most complete and modern lines, political tact, conclusion of necessary international agreements, courage in making great decisions and accepting entire responsibility, all this is what has enabled the Kingdom of Serbia to rise up and become with extraordinary rapidity the uncontested centre of Jugoslavism. What was indeed nothing but the abuse resulting almost inevitably from military successes, that auto-suggestion manifested by some officers who occupied responsible posts in the army, is taken by Mr. Stoyanovitch for the starting point of national progress. A fatal error like this has led many officers into regrettable excesses, and it must not be repeated. Every good Serbian and patriot must wish the army to keep within its limits and its functions, leaving the civilians to take care of political matters. Mr. Stoyanovitch, writing a book upon Serbia, did wrong to arouse, even involuntarily, by thoughtless words, a useless and prejudicial discussion.

The second part of the book, which treats of the Slavs of the South, in Austria-Hungary, of the psychological results, of the Serbian Balkan victories, of the future Serbian or Southern Slav State, is very suggestive and merits the greatest attention.

August 19, 1917.

AN UNJUSTIFIED REPROACH.

The excellent review *The New Europe* published, in its fortieth number of the 19th July, an important article on the decisive phase of the war, in which can be found some very just and useful information relating to Balkan questions. Much interest is shown in our national problem, which is treated with impeccable logic. It is particularly noticeable that the author pays special attention to Serbia, insisting on her position and the importance of the complete solution

of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene question. Following this train of thought, the author reminds us that the allied powers will not be able to admit, when it comes to the realization of Roumanian national unity, that the districts of the Banat and of the Central Hungarian plain, where there is either a total absence of Roumanian population, or else a distinct minority, should be assigned to Roumania. In the same way, as we read further on, it is impossible to uphold the claims of Italy to a part of Dalmatia, where the inhabitants of the Slav race, as compared to those speaking Italian, are in the proportion of 10 to 1. Some just and outspoken words are addressed to Italy, and it is to be hoped they will find listeners among those concerned in the matter.

There is, however, in this same article a passage relating to the action of the Serbian Government, a passage which we cannot pass over in silence precisely because of the high esteem in which we hold the *New Europe* and its honourable contributors. The author of this article finds that the Serbian Government is not irreproachable—is there any Government that professes to be so?—and he sums up his criticism as follows: “The Prince Regent has indeed proclaimed the realization of the Southern Slav ideal as the supreme war aim, but his government has never placed this war aim frankly before the Allies as being the Serbian national programme. He has hesitated, bargained and wrangled, placing the friends of Serbia and the partisans of a lasting European arrangement in the unenviable situation of appearing more Serbian than the Serbians themselves.” It is not at all our intention to take up the defence of the Serbian Government, the time having not yet arrived when every one, the government as well as private individuals, will have to give an account of what they have done for the Fatherland. We shall then hear what the Government has to say and each of us will be able to pass judgment on it one way or the other. But the reproach made, however vague it may be, appears to us so unjustified that we feel ourselves obliged to clear it at once. From the beginning of the war until to-day, the Serbian Government, supported by the Crown, by the Parliament and by the public opinion of the entire nation, has kept to the

programme of the deliverance and the integral unity of our single nation of three names. In respect of this, never—we repeat it—never has there been nor will there be any hesitation, still less bargaining or wrangling. It is the programme of our whole nation stated by the Serbian Government on several occasions, in spite of the passive resistance of those who themselves, according to the *New Europe*, have not yet decided to accept Serbia as an Ally on an equal footing. It is in view of this supreme aim that the Serbian nation has sacrificed almost everything, and the Serbian Government, upon which rests the heavy responsibility of the national policy, faithfully followed in the darkest days of our history, ought not to be accused of weakness in a question in which it has shown only firmness and consistency.

August 19, 1917.

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE "NEW EUROPE."

The British review, the *New Europe*, has just started an incomprehensible campaign against the present government of the Kingdom of Serbia. In two of its last numbers, of the 22nd and 29th August, it has published no fewer than three articles attacking vehemently Mr. Pachitch and his Ministry, composed at present solely of members of the Radical Party. Two of these articles emanate from the editors themselves of the *New Europe*, while the third is signed by "a group of Serbians" who have not wished to give their names, but for whom the *New Europe* gives its formal assurance that they are persons "inspiring respect and confidence."

We do not wish to enter upon an examination of the questions dealing with home affairs raised by the *New Europe*, our paper being consecrated solely and entirely to the defence of the independence and the liberty of the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes and to the realization of the national mission of Serbia.

The one thing which we must, however, assert with regard to the criticisms and menaces of the *New Europe*, in as far as they concern Serbian home affairs, is that happily

the governmental organization of Serbia has remained intact in spite of the occupation of the country, and that consequently all contested and disputed home questions, however difficult they may be, can find their solution in the forms prescribed by Serbian laws and constitution. The appeal issued by the *New Europe* in favour of the interference of the Allies in Serbian home affairs is therefore unwarranted and will certainly meet with no response. The western democracies are not accustomed to meddle with the independence, at home or abroad, of their Allies, small or great. Therefore, it is for the three constitutional factors of Serbia, the King (Prince-Regent), the Government and the Parliament, to decide on Serbian policy, and it is for them to find, by constitutional means and in the forms prescribed by the usages of Parliamentarism, the solutions for any disputed question. The editors of the *New Europe* should not have lost sight of the fact that Serbia is an independent State which does not admit of foreign interference in its own affairs. If the *New Europe* has formed another idea of Serbia, it is grossly mistaken.

But if we ignore the criticisms of the *New Europe* concerning questions dealing with home affairs, we cannot pass over in silence the other part of the *New Europe* articles dealing with Serbia's foreign policy. There lies the root of the whole campaign of the *New Europe*, and it is this that obliges us formally to contest some quite uncalled for assertions contained in these articles. Two of these assertions are most absurd: the first relates to an assumed "choice" with which Serbia finds herself confronted in consequence of her policy, and the second refers to the application of the Corfu manifesto. Now, Serbia has no choice open and neither has she ever wavered in her national policy. Since the first cannon shot in 1914, Serbia has proclaimed her national programme, and it is to this programme that she has sacrificed more than a quarter of her population. Serbia is fighting for the deliverance of her Serbian brothers, she is fighting also for the deliverance of the Croats and Slovenes, and all her efforts are strained towards this lofty aim: to reunite all Serbians, Croats and Slovenes in an inde-

pendent Serbo-Croat and Slovene kingdom, free from all domination and from all foreign influence. Serbia is faithfully fulfilling the mission entrusted to her by destiny itself, and she has preferred to accept the unequal struggle with a great power, rather than submit to the order from Vienna to give up her independence and all idea of a union with her brothers of Austria-Hungary. The article of the *New Europe* is a deplorable error, an action contrary to historical and national realities, a sword thrust in the air. The policy of Serbia has not to be created, it exists and has existed for a long time, clear, precise, full of abnegation and sacrifice, but resplendent with faith and with confidence in the victory of right and justice. The glorious tombs of a million Serbians have well marked the track of Serbian policy, and one must be blind to be able to speak to-day of a "choice"!

The *New Europe* reproaches also the Serbian Government with not carrying out the policy of the Corfu Declaration, but striving rather after selfish and narrow aims. And the proofs? The *New Europe* does not furnish them, for the very simple reason that these proofs do not exist. Serbia is fully conscious of her duty towards the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes, and she would be unworthy of the fallen victims if she followed the advice of the *New Europe* to merge the martyred Piedmont into incomplete Italy, before the accomplishment of her historic mission.

As to the article signed "a group of Serbians," it contains some things which one is not accustomed to see expressed by Serbians. The signers of this article appeal in effect to the allied governments to intervene in Serbian home affairs and to take up an attitude in favour of the opposition parties and against the present government. As excuse for such an unwonted step they declare "that in normal times the opposition would have advised the people not to pay the taxes, and would have forced the government to appeal to the electors. Under present circumstances it can only apply to the allied governments." Now, this way of looking at it is more than astonishing. In other allied countries there also exists an opposition, even an opposition which does not even approve of the

general policy pursued by the governments, yet nobody in these countries has thought of resisting the government by such fantastic means as those employed by the "group of Serbians" patronized by the *New Europe*.

What is most deplorable is the imprudent and carelessly made declaration of these anonymous Serbians, saying "that to-day there does not exist any Serbian or Yugoslav who would not consider that our moral duty and our national interests command us to remain to the end with the Allies, but if the present government continues to hold the power, no one can guarantee the future."

How have the editors of the *New Europe*, who assert that they have for Serbia and the Serbian nation "the greatest admiration and the most profound esteem," how have they been able to extend hospitality to lines so unworthy of any Serbian, no matter whom! If in the frenzy of party struggles there have been found over-excited politicians writing such stupidities, the *New Europe*, as a sincere friend of Serbia, ought to have prevented the publication of words which are as unseasonable as they are untrue. In spite of party differences all Serbians will be unanimous in condemning the aforementioned declaration, which is contrary to our national ideal, to all the political past of Serbia, and to the admirable spirit of sacrifice of which Serbia has given so many brilliant proofs in the course of the present war. Political morality should have demanded that the anonymous authors of the article in question should sign their names to a declaration which is in flagrant opposition to the formal declarations of the heads of the opposition themselves in Parliament and out of Parliament. [See the speech of the member Drachkovitch in the Skoupchtina, published by *La Serbie*, 18th May, and the letter of the member Marincovitch in *The Times* of the 5th August.]

September 14, 1918.

CONCERNING AN UNFRIENDLY CRITICISM.

It is neither easy nor agreeable to reply to friends, especially when their reproaches lack clearness and precision. The criticisms formulated by the *New Europe* and repeated

in part also by *The Times*, oblige us, however, to contest in the most formal and categorical manner the unfortunate assertions published lately by these papers.

* * * *

The criticisms of the *New Europe* do not date from yesterday. In No. 40, of July 19, 1917, the *New Europe* vigorously attacked the Serbian Government, accusing it of not displaying enough energy in the defence of our nation. "The Prince-Regent," wrote the *New Europe*, "has indeed proclaimed the realization of the Southern Slav ideal as the supreme war aim, but his government has never openly placed this war aim before the Allies as being the Serbian national programme. It has hesitated, bargained, wrangled, putting the friends of Serbia and the partisans of a lasting European arrangement in the unenviable situation of appearing more Serbian than the Serbians themselves." To this criticism our collaborator Politicus replied in *La Serbie* of the 19th August, by an article entitled "Un reproche injustifié" (an unjustified reproach), in which he made the following assertions:

"From the beginning of the war until to-day, the Serbian Government, supported by the Crown, by the Parliament and by the public opinion of the entire nation, has kept to the programme of the deliverance and the integral unity of our single nation of three names. In this connection, never—we repeat it—never has there been or ever will be any hesitation, still less bargaining or wrangling. It is the programme of our whole nation, stated by the Serbian Government upon several occasions. It is in view of this great purpose that the Serbian nation has sacrificed almost everything, and the Serbian Government, upon which rests the heavy responsibility of the national policy faithfully followed in the darkest days of our history, ought not to be accused of weakness in a question in which it has shown only firmness and consistency."

It may be pointed out that the criticism of the *New Europe* came at the moment when the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav Committee had already terminated their discussions and drawn up the famous Declaration of

Corfu, a fact of which the *New Europe* cannot have been ignorant.

Last August—a year later—the *New Europe* returned to the charge with criticisms no less violent. In spite of evidence, the editors of the *New Europe* spoke this time of a “choice” laid before Serbia in her national policy; and the Serbian Government was besides accused of not following the policy formulated by the Declaration of Corfu. Hospitality was even given in the *New Europe* to articles dealing with our home policy, and so ought to be put in the background. In *La Serbie* of September 14, 1918, we have replied to the criticisms of the *New Europe* and we have established: (1) that no “choice” was laid before Serbia and that her national policy, in complete accordance with her historic mission, has been aiming for a long time at the complete deliverance of all the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes and their union with Serbia and Montenegro into an independent State; (2) that Serbia has no intention of departing from this national programme which has found expression in the Corfu declaration, and that she remains faithful to this declaration which she considers as the basis of our national union. In the same spirit the Serbian Government still to-day insists upon the Allies recognizing the Southern Slav unity and independence.

The *New Europe* has received besides a very efficient reply from Mr. Stoyan Protitch, but it does not seem at all satisfied with the arguments brought forward in answer to its criticisms. In the number of the 26th September, the very one containing the reply from Mr. Protitch, the *New Europe* has brought fresh charges against Serbia, charges of a very serious nature, but, naturally, as unfounded as those previously instigated.

“Serbia,” writes the *New Europe*, “has the choice, either of guiding the Yugoslav movement towards union, or of remaining a little Balkan kingdom, without any claim to the consideration of those who believe that the complete unity of each different race is the indispensable preliminary to the formation of that league of free nations which will have to control in the future the destinies of human civilization. If Serbia guides the Yugoslav movement in a

disinterested fashion, discarding all thoughts of 'pre-dominance' or of simple 'annexations,' she can lay the foundation of a glorious future for her people and for all her brothers. If she only endeavours to enlarge herself in order to ensure an agreeable existence, she must run the risk of failure in her aims. One thing is certain, and that is that when the terms of peace are laid down, there will be no place for 'annexations' or 'compensations.' Government with the assent of the governed, that will be the dominating principle. The support of the Allies will only be accorded on a basis of complete unity, and this unity must be obtained not by conquest but by voluntary consent."

Never has an adversary of Serbia thrown so much suspicion on our country and her national policy. The editors of the *New Europe* have very strange ideas if they are capable of supposing for a single instant that the union of our brothers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Dalmatia, of Croatia, Slavonia, Syrmia, Banat, Batchka and of the Slovene countries with Serbia could be designated by the name of "annexation" or "compensation"! We regret exceedingly that such thoughts should have appeared in a review which proclaims its love for Serbia and the Serbian people. What will those legendary Serbian heroes say, those last remains of the glorious battalions, who, at this very moment, are in the act of freeing their little country and who will dash forward to-morrow, as they have done in 1914, on the other bank of the Save, of the Danube and of the Drina, in order to rescue their brothers from the Austro-Magyar clutches, what will they say upon learning that there are in London, among our British friends, people who give that the name of conquest and annexation?

* * * *

The Times of the 8th October has repeated the accusations of the *New Europe*, but delivered them in a slightly different form. In an article devoted to His Royal Highness the Prince-Regent, on the occasion of the promotion of the Prince to the rank of General, *The Times* says that the Allies ought not to lend an ear to the suggestions of

those who would like to discard the Corfu declaration and adopt the narrow principle of Serbian imperialism! This implication is a very serious one, although quite without foundation. It would be desirable, particularly in the interests of our national cause, that *The Times* should name those who make such suggestions and that it should indicate at the same time the sources of its information. Serbia is a democratic and parliamentary country where there is no room for secret combinations. As to the national programme of Serbia, "only superior force can compel Serbia to content herself with a limited Serbian basis, and against this force Serbia has battled in the past with all her strength, and she will continue also to battle in the future" (Stoyan Protitch, in the *New Europe* of 26th September). Instead then of unjustly suspecting Serbia and thus injuring the Yugoslav Piedmont, the influential editors of *The Times* ought rather to help her to remove for ever the possibility of that superior force of which Mr. Protitch speaks. A greater service to the Yugoslav cause could not be rendered.

October 21, 1918.

REPLY OF STOYAN PROTITCH TO THE "NEW EUROPE."

CORFU, September 3, 1918.

SETON WATSON, ESQUIRE, LONDON.

DEAR SIR,

I have just read your article "Serbia's Choice," which appeared in the *New Europe* of the 22nd August last. Your friendship, your sympathy, your work on behalf of our national cause, and, to a certain extent, my political past career, give me, I think, the right to write you these few words. You have, my dear friend, been rather taken in regarding this affair.

The removal of the Voïvode Putnik was necessitated by his physical incapacity for work. It is my firm belief that this should have been done much sooner and then we would not have witnessed the unusual and unprecedented spectacle of the Serbian army bearing its commander on its shoulders instead of being led by him. More than a

year has already passed since the Voïvode Putnik first became incapable of paying a single visit to the front. It was nothing unusual for a whole week to pass before he would take an urgent decision. For the change in his General Staff you will find a sufficient reason in your article itself. The group "Union or Death" had obtained a remarkable influence in the Voïvode's circle. We, old Radicals, or, as you put it, the Conservative forces of the country, have always fought against the preponderance of military authorities in the Government, we wished and still wish that civil authority should have the upper hand, and that it should be the sole representative of the will of the State and of the people. The "Black Hand," or the group of officers "Union or Death," was a secret society which dealt with politics and desired to gain for itself a predominating influence in the Government. The Voïvode Putnik himself succumbed to this influence and his great authority served as protection to the members of this secret society. Colonel Dimitrievitch was the head of the "Black Hand." It is he who protected and hid Malobabitch; as to Malobabitch's past, you can ask for information from Hinkovitch. According to my firm belief, he was an Austrian spy. In any case, it is a notorious fact that he was the election agent of the Government at the time of the elections in Croatia.

None of the accused officers have made any complaint whatsoever against the court of justice or the judges.

Throughout the crisis His Royal Highness the Crown Prince maintained the only attitude worthy of a modern and constitutional sovereign.

The Opposition had not, nor has it to-day, a clearly defined attitude with regard to the officers who dealt in politics and who had founded the "Black Hand." In the struggle against the Government and the Radical Party, the Opposition threw in its lot with the "Black Hand"; it is for this reason that the Opposition provoked the crisis of July 1917, in spite of the existence of an expressly written document which absolutely prohibited the pardon of Dimitrievitch. This is even to-day one of the principal obstacles in the way of concentration of political forces.

The Opposition, moreover, shows the following inconsistency: it desires concentration and coalition, but at the same time it excludes Pachitch, myself, Lj. Yovanovitch and Andra Nikolitch whom it has obliged, in a vehement manner, to resign the chairmanship of the national Skoupchtina. Pachitch is, it is true, advanced in years, but in mind and opinion he is much younger than many of those gentlemen of the Opposition. He is a national asset, that no wise man and no wise group would wish to throw away. To our great regret our Opposition has done so. In Pachitch's youthfulness there is no semi-Turkish tradition; on the contrary, in this youthfulness there are revolutionary and western traditions, just as one finds with us, the Conservative forces. In the Serbia of Karageorge there has never been room, either for semi-Turkish traditions or for semi-Austrian traditions. The history itself of the Kings of Serbia proves this, and that is why Serbia has been and still is the standard-bearer of liberation and of national unification. She is the personification, if you like, of the great revolutionary principle. You yourself must have feared, a few years ago, that the unification and liberation of our nation could not be realized without the destruction of Turkey, which is nothing but a military camp in Europe, on foreign territory, and without the destruction of Austria, which is only an administration and not a State, as Mazzini has said. What is more to be feared is, in my opinion, that one may encounter in your own vicinity, my dear friend, semi-Turkish and semi-Austrian traditions, hindering the realization of the liberation and unification of our nation on the basis of the Declaration of Corfu, which Serbia only wishes to consolidate and enlarge and by no means to limit or to weaken. A parliamentary and democratic Serbia, that is the best guarantee that Piedmont may become immersed in Italy, provided always that Italy is parliamentary and democratic. In Germany the greatest particularist is Prussia, and with us it is those who choose Prussia as a model, and those who show themselves inclined to form in our united kingdom new relations modelled upon those which exist between Hungary and Croatia.

Serbia can only be constrained by superior force to

content herself with a restricted Serbian base. She is, however, fighting against this force by every possible means, still to-day as she was doing yesterday and before yesterday, and as she will do to-morrow and after to-morrow.

While being at your disposal for any other information, which you can always verify, as well as for any discussion even though our views may differ, I beg you, my dear friend, kindly to remember this : Serbia also has her difficulties, like all the others, in this great and terrible war ; in her most exceptional and delicate situation it would be rather astonishing if they were not even greater and more serious. Would it be too much to ask of her tried friends, of which you are one, not to aggravate these difficulties by such ill-founded criticisms. I leave it to you and to our other good English friends to give a fair answer to this question.

I am sending you by post the communiqué of the Government of the 26th June-9th July last, concerning the last crisis.

I need hardly say that I authorize you to make what use you think fit of this letter with my signature.

Your devoted,

(Signed) STOYAN M. PROTITCH.

November 4, 1918.

CHAPTER II

THE UNION OF SERBIANS, CROATIANS AND SLOVENES

I

SERBIA AND THE SOUTHERN SLAV UNION.

AN official communiqué announced the other day that the Serbian troops, after violent combats on heights reaching to 2,700 metres, have repulsed the Bulgarians and Germans and driven them across the frontier. Our brave soldiers have made a victorious entry into Serbian territory that an unjust fate had obliged them to abandon for a time last winter. "Freed Serbia now comprises 200 square kilometres, seven villages and a frontier of 45 kilometres." It is with these words, modest and at the same time full of pride, that the Serbian staff has announced the first victory, the first step towards the realization of complete liberty. After 4 years of war, entailing inestimable losses, after terrible ravages caused by epidemics, after the tragic retreat through Albania, whose horrors are not yet sufficiently known, the Serbian army, reduced in numbers but inspired by the same spirit of sacrifice and abnegation, continues the struggle. The last able-bodied sons of faithful and heroic Serbia, do not hesitate to offer their lives to save their mother country. This unique spectacle of a people struggling to the death, in the literal sense of the words, is the proof of the determination of the Serbian nation to go on to the end, to obtain a complete deliverance, that is to say the union of all the Southern Slavs into one free and independent State.

History can already furnish examples of nations paying for their national unity with their blood. But the efforts

of the Serbian people, the sacrifices they have made, and continue to make, in order to assure their independence and to free their Serbian, Croatian and Slovene brethren from a foreign yoke, surpass all that has been seen up to this time, and in the presence of this spectacle, so tragic from the human point of view, so noble and so significant from the point of view of the destinies of nations, the friends and the enemies of our nation will be able to understand why Serbia maintains this life and death struggle. The communiqués speak of square kilometres set free, but Serbian blood shed in torrents indicates the aim, the only possible, the only conceivable aim, the complete and total liberation of our nation.

Serbia did not desire the war. The struggle was forced on our people by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which, seconded and urged on by Germany, proposed to break the national strength of Serbia, to nip in the bud the development of a free Serbia and, by the German advance towards the East, to render impossible all attempts of the Southern Slavs to disengage themselves from the grasp of the Austro-Magyars. But Serbia would not submit tamely. She defended herself, and the Allied powers—who were not slow to perceive the danger they themselves ran should Germany and Austro-Hungary realize their plan of reaching Salonica, Constantinople, Bagdad, Egypt—took up the contest likewise. Thus began the great war in which the forces of Germanism measure themselves against the resistance of the Latin-Slavs and from which Europe must emerge purified from the mediæval spirit of certain monarchs, freed from Prussian militarism and democratized internationally. With the framework of this general programme, the Serbian or Southern Slav question presents itself as one of the principal elements of the regeneration of Europe. The unity of the Southern Slavs is thus not a theory, a sentiment or an idealist aspiration. It is one of the aims of the present war. It is not only from a sociological point of view that the reunion of the Southern Slavs justifies itself, not only by the community of race, of language, of aspirations, but it is above all from a political standpoint that the Southern Slav question demands solution. If the war ends in a draw, if the *status*

quo is re-established, Europe will have no more peace. The German forces, kept in check for the moment, will seize the first favourable opportunity of attempting again what they have failed to do in the present war. Such a prospect would be sad enough but nothing could then be done to save humanity from another war, still longer and more frightful. If, on the other hand, the Allies crush Germany and force her to a peace, which must be a firm and lasting peace, the conclusion of such a peace would necessarily imply the liberation of the Southern Slavs from all foreign domination.

Serbia has always been aware of the gravity of what is at stake; if she had wished to consider only her territorial integrity, she might have accepted the repeated offers of a separate peace that have been made to her. Even under the hardest trials Serbia did not flinch and would not bow before the German mailed fist. The Serbian nation wishes to be free, whole, and united to her Croatian and Slovene brothers. It is in view of this union that she sheds the last drops of her blood. Thus one should cease, if not from conviction, at least out of respect for her glorious soldiers, to talk about the "integrity" of Serbia or of her "outlets" on the Adriatic. The Serbian people bleed for their integrity and they claim that it shall be absolutely complete.

October 15, 1916.

THE GERMAN SOLUTIONS OF THE SOUTHERN SLAV QUESTION.

For some time the Southern Slav question has been pre-occupying the Austro-Magyar-German publicists and politicians in an alarming manner. The persevering declarations of the Southern Slav deputies to the Austrian Parliament, claiming nothing less than political independence, have produced visible uneasiness in the ruling circles of Central Europe. The Central Powers went to war in order to solve, in the German sense, not only the Southern Slav question, but the whole Balkan and Asiatic Eastern question. The concrete form of the solution was worked out by the staff at Berlin, while the theoretical side was treated by Friedrich

Naumann in his famous work on *Mitteleuropa*. It only needed German victory to realize this vast project of the hegemony not only of Europe but of the world. But the victory has miscarried and the questions raised by the German war are in process of receiving different solutions from those foreseen and prepared by German aggression. That is what determines some Germans to change their tactics and begin to plead in favour of solutions less brutal, but not differing perceptibly from the original projects. They wish to preserve German power over Slav peoples and with this object in view they are ready to sacrifice the form, to change the exterior. But the Southern Slavs will not be taken in by these new snares, that is a foregone conclusion. To-day new German plans fill the columns of the German press. We do not mean the fantasies of Mr. Danzer who simply wishes to annex Serbia ; we are thinking of the small number of shrewd Germans and Austrians who reckon with realities. The Austrian deputy Zenker continues his campaign in favour of an Austrian Yugoslav State which, while nominally an autonomous Slav formation, would follow the path traced by the German leaders. "The definite solution of the Croat-Serbian question"—writes Zenker in the *Dresdner Anzeiger*—"ought to be one of the strongest corner stones of a lasting peace. That is why it is of the most vital interest for us in Austria and Germany, that this question should not be settled against us. . . . The Southern Slav union, outside the Monarchy and against it, would create a situation unbearable even for Germany, because the new Slav state would hold in her power all the keys to the doors of the East, and the Adriatic ports as well as the railways to Constantinople would be in the hands of Great Serbia."

Mr. Zenker declares that he does not wish to do any injury to Serbia nor to the other Southern Slav States and assures us that it would be in the interest of our nation to form an integral part of the Empire of the Habsburgs. Another German, Hermann Wendel, a member of the Reichstag, better informed as to the Serbian character and mentality, only proposes a customs union of Serbia with Austria-Hungary and the improvement of the situation of the Southern

Slavs within the Monarchy. A Magyar democrat, Oskar Jaszi, pronounces himself also in favour of the Southern Slav union, but joined to Hungary and under the Magyar protectorate. The Austrian and Hungarian socialists on their side, promise democracy to every one, with the express reservation that Austria shall be preserved! There is only one small Austrian socialist minority, anonymous, moreover, that does not consider the existence of Austria as a political dogma. All these manifestations of Germanism, open or disguised, malevolent or benevolent, suspicious or sincere, that are noted in this number, should attract the full attention of democratic Europe. Our Allies should not lose sight of the solution "in reserve" nor of the lines "prepared beforehand" of the political retreat of the Germans. The Southern Slavs are struggling for their lives, but they are also struggling for Europe and her peace. The Southern Slav question is eminently a European question and it is in the solution of this question that the victory over Germanism should be reflected. No guarantees of peace are possible without the liberation of the Southern Slavs from the German-Magyar yoke. The Serbian people, victims of a premeditated aggression, have sacrificed even their country rather than submit to Germanic power. They have the right to expect that dangerous delusions of benighted minds should not hinder the accomplishment of a work demanded by morality and justice in the interests of humanity and civilization.

July 8, 1917.

FALSIFICATION OF THE SOUTHERN SLAV IDEA.

The Southern Slav question has forced itself on the attention of Europe. Before the war, the general public was in the habit of placing all the Balkan peoples in the same basket; it confused the Czechs of Bohemia with the Tziganes and saw in the empire of the Habsburgs only Germans, Magyars and Poles. The general public knows to-day that Austria-Hungary is "a Slav building with a German frontage." Still better, the world conflagration has brought to light the aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks, the Southern

Slavs, the Poles, the Ruthenians, the Roumanians and the Trentins. It is known that the Slovenes, the Croatians and the Serbians form one and the same people, whose ideal is to be united to the Serbians of Serbia and of Montenegro in an independent State.

It is necessary to recall that the future Southern Slav State, as conceived by the manifesto of Corfu, realizes all the conditions of a visible entity. Unfortunately this union of all the Slavs of the South, which for centuries haunted the imagination of the Southern Slav intellectuals and which ended by becoming the ideal of the great mass of the people, this union is hindered by one obstacle: namely, the Habsburg State.

Lord of the majority of the Southern Slav, Francis-Joseph formerly expected to be able to bring about a union in his own fashion, by introducing the principality of Serbia into the framework of his empire. Such an annexation by gentle means clashed with the indomitable spirit of independence of the Serbian people who desired the union with Serbia and not with the Monarchy. Because nationalism was reviving in the Yugoslav territories, the Habsburg government endeavoured to stifle the idea of union by dividing the mass of the people—7½ million souls—into eleven distinct administrations, with fourteen different legislations; the scission was completed and reinforced by an artificial opposition of the Catholic Croatians to the Orthodox and Mussulman Serbians.

The Serbian victory in the economic war against the Monarchy, and especially the glorious Balkan campaign, had aroused such enthusiasm amongst the Slavs of the South that Austria-Hungary, tyrannical and mediæval, could not fail to take offence at Serbia, become the Piedmont, the centre of attraction of Jugoslavism and the incarnation of the idea of national unity. Rather than abandon his old policy, of "divide to rule," the autocrat of Vienna had recourse to violent means, to war, which by strangling independent Serbia, should annihilate the idea of which she was the living symbol. Never did men more completely lack psychology and fail to follow the trend of the age than did Francis-Joseph and his advisers. Serbia was invaded,

trodden under foot, the Yugoslav peoples were tortured, massacred, but the ideal remained victorious and avenging.

By the declaration of May 30, 1917, the Yugoslavs acquainted the Parliament of Vienna with their unanimous desire to be united freely into an independent state under the sceptre of the Habsburgs. This was only a provisional and temporary formula and the true and definite formula appeared in subsequent declarations, in which the Pact of Corfu is regarded as the ideal realization of the projected union and the independent Yugoslav State is placed outside the limits of the Monarchy. Such is, for example, the memorial addressed on January 31, 1918, by the Yugoslav Club of the Reichsrat to the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and Ukrainian negotiators at the conference of Brest-Litowsk.

From Ossiek to Lioubliana (Laibach), from Mostar to Zagreb (Agram), from Tselovetz (Klagenfurt) to Rieka (Fiume), there were manifestations in favour of Yugoslav unity, with cries of "Long live Serbia!" "Long live King Peter!" "Long live Trumbitch!" Austria-Hungary finds herself incapable of stemming the impetuous flood of the triumphant, national idea. After four years of an exhausting war she is obliged to reckon with the Yugoslav question. Necessity is the mother of invention and the untractable Dual Monarchy which no longer dares to ward off the peril by "gallows and prisons," offers now to make concessions, which she is prepared, according to a tradition dear to the Habsburgs, to withdraw as soon as the danger is past. From the negotiations held between Vienna and Budapest, this delightful plan issues: To balance the attachment of the future Poland to Austria, Hungary, by the union with Dalmatia and Croatia-Slavonia, by the total acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is actually common territory, would become mistress of the greater part of the Yugoslav territory, for this plan of union in the protecting bosom of Hungary does not exclude an annexation of that part of Serbia which has fallen into the hands of the Monarchy. However, this caricature of a Great Croatia is contrary to the wish of the overwhelming majority of Croats who place the idea of an integral union above a regional partic-

ularism. It goes without saying that a certain number of different interpretations might be grafted on to the original project. But all these plans have only one aim : to deceive Europe and the Jugoslavs. For the Jugoslavs know their masters too well to be taken in once more. They will not modify by one iota their formula : " full union outside the Habsburg limits." It is consequently impossible for them to accept any of the solutions proposed by Vienna or Budapest, for full union must unite the Slovene territories, retained by the Germans as means of access to the Adriatic, and it can have nothing in common with the dual Monarchy.

Although incomplete, the recent Declaration of Versailles is, however, a compliance of the Entente with the legitimate aspirations of the three-named Yugoslav people and of her dear Czecho-Slovak brothers.

As a Croatian newspaper wrote recently : " Only a single idea stands out, the new times have not changed them." The Habsburgs have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing. Their methods are out of date, their tricks are discovered, the eyes of the Slav are opened, he knows his enemy and will resist him until the general peace which alone will decide his fate.

June 29, 1918.

THE SOUTHERN SLAV QUESTION AND THE ALLIES.

The Southern Slav question has developed and come to maturity independently of the great European policy. Not long ago this question, as a whole, was considered Utopian, pernicious to the maintenance of the existing political situation and it was only taken into account to be set down as a negative and unimportant phenomenon. The burden of such an erroneous conception of our national question fell with all its weight upon Serbia. It was upon small and weak Serbia that the task devolved of freeing our national cradle, our classical Fatherland : Macedonia. Serbia, while honourably acquitting herself of the task, was hindered by the complexity of interests of the Powers, which since the Congress of Berlin guarded the integrity of the Ottoman

Empire considering that to be an absolute and indispensable necessity.

Then Serbians had also to think of her sons living under the domination of Austria-Hungary. In so far as that concerned the solution of this question, all Europe showed herself inflexible towards the national aspirations of Serbia. The archaical and chimerical dogma according to which the double Monarchy must be preserved in the interests of European equilibrium, had sapped the foundations of the realization of our national aspirations. The Congress of Berlin had placed the fate of the Southern Slav Piedmont, of Serbia, in the hands of Austria-Hungary, so that the question of our national unity lay at the mercy of our worst enemy, Austria-Hungary. Europe had thus condemned Serbia to the following dilemma : either to perish or consent to be the vassal, the vanguard of Germanism. And Serbia chose the first possibility by not only refusing to be the vanguard of Germanism but by proposing to be the barrier against it.

In 1908 we had made Europe realize that there existed a national question which ought to be examined : the Southern Slav question. Serbia's energetic protestation against annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina had aroused Europe from her inertia and shaken the frail edifice of the double Monarchy. But all the same, Europe did not understand the significance of this national movement.

The wars of 1912-1913 proved to our friends and to our foes the real value of the Southern Slav Piedmont, Serbia. The years 1912 and 1913 made Vienna and Berlin understand the danger of the apparition of the Southern Slav question. The monster State of Germano-Magyar dualism which exists at the expense of the oppressed Slav peoples, must of necessity break up, which was proved indeed by the fermentation in the south of the Monarchy that manifested itself on the eve of 1914. The Southern Slav tendencies which became an important question of the day, were a sure symptom of the partition that threatened the Monarchy.

The manifesto of the Serbian Parliament of 1914 which aimed at the creation of an independent Southern Slav

State, which would unite all the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, was not rightly understood in the political circles of our Allies. However, before this manifesto, at the very beginning of the war, Austria-Hungary set to work to exterminate the Southern Slav intellectual classes who might serve as guides to the people. All the Southern Slav intellectuals whom Austria-Hungary judged capable of working for the emancipation of the people, found a place on the bench of those accused of "high treason" and were thrown into prison.

When we think of our Russian brothers, it does not seem astonishing to us that our English and French friends should not have perceived this lamentable situation, during the first year of the war. When our politicians, working for our national unity, had made known to the Russian public the ideas of Southern Slav national unity, the "Slav circles" of Russia treated us as imperialists, evidently not knowing that the unity of the Southern Slav people is no more "imperialist" than was the unity of the Italian people.

It is only after three years of effort, of struggle, of super-human sufferings and of immense sacrifices, that the public opinion of our Allies begins to get a clear idea of the legitimacy and justice of our national unity. But public opinion is separated from the cabinets of ministers by a distance which has still to be bridged. To demonstrate the accuracy of this opinion we shall refer to the Polish question, drawing a parallel between it and ours.

The Southern Slav and Polish questions bear a strong resemblance to each other; they are nearly identical as regards their interior aspect and their importance from a national point of view. Still, the Polish question passed long ago from public opinion to the real policy of the allied cabinets. The deliverance and unity of the Polish people have found a place in the programme of all the Allies as an essential condition of peace. It is not the result of sympathy for the noble Polish people, but rather the result of a clear and just conception of the Polish question. A great and strong Poland is necessary to the Allies: a free and united Poland must prevent the German penetration into the Eastern Slav countries. The necessity of creating such a Poland has made

itself felt especially since the revolution in Russia ; the Russian patriots as well as the socialists are quite well aware of it. It is for this reason that every one considers the restitution of Belgium and of Serbia with Montenegro, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the reconstitution of Poland as the minimum of the revendications of the Allies.

The Southern Slav question does not thus form a part of the minimum programme of the Allies, but it belongs to the number of questions to be solved, to the number of questions which will be settled by the realization of the principle in virtue of which the peoples are free to dispose of themselves. This principle has its real base in the decision of the Allies to end this struggle only with victory, in the programme of the Republic over-seas, in our firm intention to carry out our national emancipation to the end, in the sympathy of our Allies for our just and lawful cause. However, it is necessary, it is indispensable, that our Allies should have a clear and just conception of the real advantage they will derive from our deliverance and our national unity.

The resistance of Serbia to the military penetration of the Austro-German troops is for the Allies an epic heroism, a great episode of the war. It was at the moment when Serbia succumbed to the triple enemy invasion that one realized the true and great importance that the little Serbian front possessed for the Allies. That alone would suffice to prove that a Southern Slav State of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes is called upon to play a part as important as that of Poland. A Southern Slav State in the south will have the same importance for the Allies as a Poland in the north ; our task is to convince the Allies of it and then we may consider our national question as having triumphed over the errors that our friends and Allies have laboured under up till now.

When a just conception of the importance of a Southern Slav State has been formed, all the compromises concluded to our detriment will no longer be justifiable and will consequently have to be annulled. Neither from a practical nor a moral point of view will it be possible to demand now, in order to fulfil some compromise, that the integrity of the Polish people should be mutilated ; why then should it be possible to demand it with regard to our people and

especially while we are waging war in common with our Allies? We deserve to be treated with equity and justice by the Allies. It is in their own interest, to be fair to us at the moment of solving our national problem.

February 2, 1918.

THE DECLARATION OF VERSAILLES.

The Southern Slav question progresses. This unquestionable fact can be gathered from the manifestations and events of these last days. After the congress of oppressed nationalities at Rome, the official declaration of Lansing, saying that the national aspirations of the Czechs and Southern Slavs meet with the liveliest sympathy at Washington, came at the right moment to throw more light on the vague formula of national autonomies. The Declarations of Versailles, too, have taken a step forward. The Allied governments, associating themselves with the manifestation at Washington, have expressed the same sympathy for the Czecho-Slovak and Southern Slav aspirations towards liberty. If there were no clear, precise and categorical postulate concerning Poland, one could not but heartily applaud this official declaration about the Southern Slavs, which connects itself after so much hesitation with the Allied Note of January 10, 1917. The distinction drawn between Poland on the one hand, and Jugoslavia and Bohemia on the other, obliges us to examine the situation more closely. And that in order to discern, if necessary, what lies beneath the surface. The jubilations of the *Neue Freie Presse* of June 11th, saying that the Declaration of Versailles throws cold water on the creators of Southern Slav and Czecho-Slovak States, seem to us to be as unjustifiable as is the unconditional approbation expressed by a part of the Allied press. Let us make, like the Council of Versailles, a *distinguo*.

Considered from a purely political point of view and judged according to all that has preceded it, the Declaration of Versailles only represents in reality one stage in the evolution of the ideas of liberty to which the war has given birth. As such we greet it with the greatest satisfaction.

If the Declaration of Versailles was, on the contrary, the last word of the Allied Powers, if it expressed their definite formula, then we should have the most serious objections to make. The tactics to be adopted differ according to the countries and the special circumstances. We, mere onlookers, who do not possess the faculties necessary in order to judge objectively a concrete action, are the last to wish to criticize *a priori* the expediency of an attitude determined by questions of ways and means. But from the moment that final aims and definite solutions are in question, the situation changes and it is our duty to give warnings and make reserves. In the present case, in spite of the errors and the many illusions of Allied diplomacy, we cannot think there is a question of anything else but tactics, which that do not injure in any way the principle of the complete independence of the peoples and more especially of the Southern Slavs. One may judge tactics as one likes, but they must not be confused with the ideal whose realization is sought after. Thus we see in the Declarations of Versailles a powerful encouragement to our struggle for national independence, and our faith in the Allies has become greater and stronger.

The leading idea in the work of liberation of peoples must remain steadfastly the same. The Allies have no interest in granting privileges to some and in neglecting others. As regards Poland, all the Slav efforts tended up to now to obtain from the Poles a policy of solidarity. The tempting promises from Vienna, made lately to the Poles with the view of separating them from the Southern Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks, seem doomed to complete failure, to judge from the resolution voted by the assembly at Cracow. The Allied declaration on Poland would certainly have gained in strength and importance if it had been accompanied by similar declarations on the Southern Slavs and Czecho-Slovaks. All is linked together and a really free Poland is only possible if the other national states beside her are free and independent. If Poland, once united, were to remain wedged in between Germany and Austria, her fate would be the same as that of Belgium. She would be always at the mercy of the German Staff. The Southern Slav question is in a certain measure more advanced than that of

Poland. As the Southern Slav State is to be formed round the Kingdom of Serbia, the much tried home of the resistance to German penetration, on the basis laid down by the manifesto of Corfu, it would have been preferable, precisely for tactical reasons, to employ a clearer and firmer language. At the moment when the Magyar lords are preparing calmly to appropriate Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia, calling it, with unheard of cynicism, the "solution" of the Southern Slav question, the Declaration of Versailles ought to have recalled the act of Corfu, to show that the liberty promised to the Southern Slavs by the Allies will have no connection with the Monarchy of the Habsburgs.

June 22, 1918.

MR BALFOUR AND THE SOUTHERN SLAV QUESTION.

The remarkable speech delivered by Mr. Balfour at the inaugural meeting of the National Serbian Committee represents a step forward in the evolution of British conceptions. By this speech Mr. Balfour has indeed emerged from general formulas to come into close touch with the Czech and Southern Slav problems. For a responsible Minister of Great Britain, who holds in his hands the political direction of the Allied war, it is no small matter to express himself in a definite manner on questions which, for the British public, have still to come to maturity. If we also take into account the special qualities of Mr. Balfour, his philosophical inclinations, we shall neither find his words obscure nor his conclusions equivocal. The whole construction of his thoughts leads inevitably to a single result : the political and moral necessity for Europe to proceed to the liberation of the peoples of Austria-Hungary and to their constitution into free and independent States. For the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes, the speech of Mr. Balfour signifies the complete acceptance by Great Britain of the Serbian point of view, the unqualified approbation of the general aspirations of all the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, and the forecast, we may dare to hope, of promises and engagements still more formal, still more pronounced.

The guiding principles contained in the four points read

by Mr. Wickham Steed, express our whole programme. The independence and the union of the Southern Slavs, that is the primordial point in the war aims of the Serbians. Mr. Balfour in speaking of Austria-Hungary, pointed out the conclusive circumstances which should determine the Allies to solve the question of the Dual Monarchy in a radical manner. First, there is the brutal domination exercised by the Germans and Magyars over the Slav races, a domination obtained formerly by marriages, by cunning and by violence, but incompatible with the elementary conceptions of modern civilization entirely based upon liberty and independence. This situation, very precarious in itself, is still further aggravated by the fact that Austria-Hungary has put herself at the service of Germany and of her plans of world domination. Great Britain considers that German domination must be broken at all costs; otherwise there will be neither peace nor liberty in the world. As for Austria-Hungary, Mr. Balfour declares that in future the Polish, Czecho-Slovak and Southern Slavs slavery must come to an end. For the Southern Slavs in particular, Mr. Balfour finished his speech by expressing his conviction that the Serbian Minister would see, when peace came, not only his country restored and indemnified, but also all his Serbian, Croatian and Slovene brothers set free and in full possession of liberty and independence. This declaration will have a considerable echo which will reverberate from end to end as far as the last Southern Slav cottage.

The Allied victory on the Marne inaugurates to-day a new phase in the struggle for the world's liberties. The hour of deliverance from the German nightmare approaches and then cunning, the other weapon of the Germans, will be brought into action. It is not without reason that Mr. Wickham Steed mentioned the ignorance of the Allies as the fourth factor in the preservation of Austria. It is upon that ignorance that the Austrians and Magyars stake their greatest hopes. The day of peace will be, according to Mr. Steed, the most dangerous day of the whole war. The enemy, vanquished by force, will seek by cunning to secure for himself the possibility of a return to his original plans. They will shrink before no means and will do their utmost

to prevent the complete and definitive destruction of the foundations of the German power. The question of Austria-Hungary will play the principal part and after it and in connection with it, the question of Bulgaria. To parry this danger, Mr. Steed recommends the education of the public and the formation of a strong and enlightened public opinion which would be capable of preventing all policy contrary to the supreme interests of the nation. It is certainly the surest and most efficacious means. But events are hurrying on and the governments themselves ought to guard against the danger of solutions having an appearance of justice, but, in fact, serving the interests of Germany. To the Southern Slavs it is of the highest importance that the project of an independent State of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, in the sense of the Declaration of Corfu, should be inscribed on the official and minimum programme of the Allies. What Mr. Balfour said at the meeting of the National Serbian Committee, is the forecast, the announcement of imminent decisions still more concrete, still more definite. The Allied cause can only gain by it and the enemy will see that the other weapon will serve him still less than the sword.

August 10, 1918.

DEPLORABLE INCOHERENCE.

The fine speeches delivered at the opening meeting of the Paris Conference have not effaced the painful impression produced by the decision of the five great powers not to grant to the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes the right of being represented at the Conference. The Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes not being formally recognized, this decision might, strictly speaking, be defended by subtleties of a juridical order. But the law, if it remains what it is by nature—an assembly of rules resulting from the idea of what is just and useful, and regulating the real life of individuals and of nations—must not deviate from the ground of realities. Now it is an uncontested and incontestable fact that the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes exists. All the constitutive

elements of a State are present : territories, subjects and organized power ; and we cannot suppose that those who voted the decision in question were not aware of it. The motives of their decision are then of a political order. Some political interest must have prevailed over all the arguments of law and equity. We do not know what this interest is and we can only deplore that the first act of the Conference should have been unfavourable to our people. We must emphasize all the more that it is the second disappointment we have had since the collapse of Austria-Hungary.

Everyone remembers, indeed, the declaration of the Italian Government recognizing the aspirations of the Slavs of the South for a national union. It was in the month of October of last year. The reply of President Wilson to the last Austrian Note will likewise be remembered, a reply in which it stated that America leaves the peoples of the Monarchy free to settle their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Empire themselves. Now what has happened since then ? At the moment when the Austro-Hungarian Army broke up, the Allies concluded an armistice which took into account only the Monarchy of the Habsburgs and whose clauses were compiled in correlation with the Treaty of London. The powers who declared themselves in sympathy with the national movement of the South Slavs and seemed ready to support it with all their strength, forgot to put these promises into practice when the opportunity presented itself. The consequences of this incoherent policy are well known : a brutal occupation of purely Slav regions by the Italian troops, a dangerous awakening of Italian imperialism, and an extreme excitement amongst the Slav populations.

Another inconsequence characterizes the attitude of the Allies in the question of our national union. When the Kingdom of Serbia asked, long before the downfall of Austria, that Serbia and all the Serbian people, Croats and Slovenes with her, should be recognized as Allies, and that the right of Serbia so to represent from an international point of view, the other "irredente" parts of our nation, should be recognized, the Allies did not accede to the request. Now that Serbia has realized her national programme and has trans-

formed herself into the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes, the Allies, rather late in the day, admit that Serbia should represent the whole South Slav nation. The request of the Serbian Government was quite legitimate, because it was indeed only Serbia that could represent abroad that part of the nation which was under the Austro-Magyar yoke. To-day the authorized representatives of this freed people have allied themselves with Serbia; they make common cause with her; it is therefore just to recognize them and to accept them at the Conference. The arguments of those who hinder the realization of our national unity did not succeed in forcing Serbia to draw back and to separate herself even momentarily from her kinsfolk. So recourse was made to a fiction. The Conference considers the delegates of the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes as delegates of Serbia. They consider themselves as delegates of the whole nation. It seems it was necessary to invent this expedient in order to conceal the mystery for some time longer. Let us hope it will soon be cleared up!

January 27, 1919.

II

CONSTITUTIONAL BASES OF THE SERBO-CROAT-SLOVENE KINGDOM.

The Serbian Government and the Southern Slav Committee, the one representing the Kingdom of Serbia and the other the Slavs of the South under Austro-Hungarian domination, have come to an agreement concerning the essential basis of the future organization of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, which is to unite all the sons of our single though three-named people. This document, which we published in our last number, will have a considerable importance as much from an exterior as an interior point of view. From the exterior point of view it came at the right moment to reaffirm the steadfast determination of the three fragments of a single Southern Slav people, to be delivered at all costs from the foreign yoke and to be united with Serbia into an independent and democratic national State. This aspiration

of our people is not new, and when the war broke out, when the numerous Austro-Hungarian armies threw themselves on little Serbia to crush her, the Prince-Regent Alexandre and the Serbian Government, in the proclamation they addressed to the people and to the army inviting them to defend themselves, placed in the foreground of the gigantic struggle which was to be one of life or death for the whole nation, the liberation of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene brothers from the Austro-Hungarian yoke. Since then the Serbian Government has formulated this programme several times, inviting democratic Europe to support it, because without its realization the future peace could not be lasting. The work of the Serbian Government has been upheld by the Southern Slav Committee, composed of notable personages, very well qualified to be the interpreters of the desires of their enslaved brothers. At the present moment, when the right of self-determination is everywhere proclaimed, the Southern Slav people confirms, by the Declaration of Corfu, its firm intention to be free and to escape from all foreign domination. Those belated minds that are trying to preserve the broken down organism of the Danubian Monarchy will be struck by the breath of vital energy with which the manifesto of Corfu is animated.

From the internal point of view the principles laid down in the Declaration of Corfu will not fail to produce an equally profound impression. The Kingdom of Serbia is ready to give up its democratic constitution, in the conviction that the constituent assembly of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene people will be animated with the same democratic spirit, and that it will endow our future state with a liberal constitution based on the principles expressed in the Declaration of Corfu. The unity of the State and the absolute equality of all, such are the leading ideas of this project, and in the framework of a united State the door of the decentralization of those branches of public life that do not directly effect the mechanism of the State as such, is left wide open. In the same way the autonomies of an administrative order, prescribed for economic and social reasons, would be granted by the Constituent Assembly, which, elected by universal suffrage, would know how to safeguard the interest of the

Southern Slav people as a whole. Reserving the right to discuss further the special points of the Declaration, we conclude for the moment with the ardent hope that democratic Europe and Republican America will support, for their own good also, this programme of the Southern Slav national democracy.

August 12, 1917.

SOME REMARKS ON HOME AFFAIRS.

The Allied victory, the first condition for the union and independence of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene people, permits us to think also of the political construction of our united State.

With the breaking up of the ancient Habsburg Monarchy all difficulties have not disappeared, and we cannot yet devote ourselves to the work of interior organization with that serenity of mind which should preside over work of that kind. Our national question is at present in a transitory phase and the first duty of every good Serbian, Croatian and Slovene patriot is to impose on himself a sort of national discipline, and not to hinder by idle talk the unifying action directed by the Government of Serbia and the National Council of Zagreb. This restriction applies equally and more especially to the press, whose task consists in elucidating affairs and not in confusing them. If we speak to-day of internal questions we do so solely with the desire to rectify certain erroneous information which has been circulating for some time and which is evidently spread by circles hostile to our national union. The manifest tendency of all these rumours is to represent the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene people as divided and pulled asunder by profound interior divergencies, and thus to weaken the sympathies of our great friends and Allies for our national cause. Two principles, universally admitted by the Kingdom of Serbia, by the emigrated representatives of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene people, as well as by the National Council of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes at Zagreb, dominate our whole interior problem. First, it is the resolute and quite spontaneous affirmation of the unanimous desire of the whole

nation to form a unified state corresponding to the sentiments of national duty. The psychological conception of South Slav national unity leads up logically to the constitution of a unified State, compact and animated by a single mind. This conception of the unified State does not exclude an administrative organization based on the widest autonomy, the State as a whole having every interest in delegating a part of its functions to autonomous bodies (districts, departments, provinces). The second principle stands for the absolute equality of all branches of our people, political, economic, religious equality, which alone can guarantee by the free competition of the forces inherent to all parties of the people, the prosperous development of the whole nation. Serbia, in uniting herself with other parts of the nation, did not exact for herself in the Declaration of Corfu any special position.

Serbia intends to end the work of national union, as she has begun it, in a spirit of absolute equality. The mere fact that Serbia does not think of reserving a special position for herself and works rather to produce a political fusion as rapidly as possible, proves in an unmistakable manner what are the dispositions and intentions of the South Slav Piedmont. If we cherished the slightest desires of domination, we should not demand a unified and absolutely equal organization, but should follow the example of Prussia, who, while accomplishing German unity, reserved for herself, in the German Federal State, a predominant and privileged situation.

These things are so well known that they become almost platitudes, and yet voices are heard, for the most part anonymous and consequently suspicious, calling out against a pretended Serbian imperialism and demanding as remedy, federation and a republic. The confusion produced by such suggestions is utilized by the adversaries of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes to prove the want of necessary cohesion amongst the different parties of our people. The other day, a collaborator of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, wrongly informed by some "good friend" of the South Slav union, wrote in the said paper (of the 19th November) that a divergency of views existed between Serbia and the other parties of our people as regards the future organization of our State.

According to him, the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes would like to give a republican and democratic character to the new State and to construct it on the federal basis, whereas the Government of Great Serbia (!) would prefer a union of all the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene countries with the Serbian Empire (!). Briefly, a pack of lies. The National Council of Zagreb has pronounced itself resolutely in favour of a unified State, and this manifestation should satisfy every decent man. If any one personally is in favour of federation, there is nothing to prevent him from saying so publicly, but let him abstain from passing off his personal views as the desires of the people. Serbia has proved by the Declaration of Corfu, that she recommended a union *inter pares* and it is malevolent to suspect her and to talk of the imperialism of a little State that has lost a quarter of its population in the struggle against the oppressors of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene people.

Again, the *New Europe*, by a fresh attack against Mr. Pachitch (see November 14th number) and by the attempt to oppose the "reactionary" government of Serbia to the "democratic" Southern Slav Committee, imitates absolutely the Austrian press, which has worn itself out in seeking to divide that which in the long run must remain united. What surprises us is that the *New Europe* should try to revive the already ancient divergencies between the Government of Serbia and the Southern Slav Committee, at a moment when these divergencies no longer are of any importance, the National Council of Zagreb having taken in hand the power to which the members of the Yugoslav Committee aspired and the Government of Serbia having expressly recognized this Council of Zagreb. The *New Europe* will excuse us for not following her in this path, which can only lead to injury to the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene cause.

As regards the form of State, which is also troubling some South Slav "friends," this question has nothing to do with democracy. Those who know the history of Serbia even superficially, know very well that Serbia elected the dynasty Karageorgevitch of her own free will and that this dynasty derives its authority from the confidence of the people. The Serbian parliamentary and democratic régime

has made of Serbia a veritable monarchical republic, which was happy to have at its head a Peter Karageorgevitch, an essentially national and democratic king, and a young Crown Prince who has devoted himself entirely to the work of national unity and who has never dreamt of separating himself from his people.

The Declaration of Corfu, signed by the President of the Southern Slav Committee, paid a well deserved homage to the dynasty of the Karageorgevitch, by proclaiming the union of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene people, under the sceptre of Peter Karageorgevitch, King of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes. The question of the form of State is thus solved for all those who desire the unity and concord of our people.

This very simple situation does not suit those who wish to trouble our union, endeavouring to create artificial differences and to sow mistrust. The conscious nation of Serbians Croats and Slovenes will not let itself be misled.

November 25, 1918.

THE KINGDOM OF SERBIANS, CROATIANS AND SLOVENES.

The Declaration of Geneva, first fruit of the direct contact between the Serbian Government and the authorized representatives of the Serbian, Croatian and Slovene nation of the former Habsburg Monarchy, does not seem to have satisfied the great mass of our people. The extreme caution with which the question of the constitution of the single State of all the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes was broached is explained, with the exception of more or less incomprehensible reasons, by the distance at which the conference was held, that is to say, by the want of direct contact with the native land, as our distinguished friend Mr. Marincovitch very justly remarked in his article on the Declaration of Geneva. This Declaration had one main fault, that of having proclaimed the State without having at the same time instituted its supreme organ, its chief, who would be the expression of its unity and sovereignty. This chief need not necessarily have been a person, a monarch, but

in principle, without him there was no practically "organized State." Why the members of the Conference of Geneva have neglected this elementary postulate, we do not wish to enter into here. What is certain is that failing a Chief of State it was not possible either to constitute his responsible organ, the South Slav Ministry. The constitution of the State of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes has been proclaimed but its logical inferences have not been drawn. The nomination of a commission of six members—three designed by the Government of Serbia and three by the National Council of Zagreb—was only of a temporary nature, because in spite of the name of Ministry given to this commission it was really nothing more than the mandatory of the government of Serbia and of the National Council of Zagreb. Its authority and its competence depended on the confidence of the two above-named factors, which had preserved their plenary powers.

Now the Serbian Government at Belgrade and the National Council of Zagreb have agreed together to enlarge and complete the work of Geneva. While proclaiming the political union of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes they have at the same time summoned the Prince Alexandre to the Regency of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. Having thus elected the chief of the new State, they were able to proceed to the formation of its responsible organs. Indeed, according to news from Zagreb, the delegates of the National Council, furnished with mandates in due form, have just gone to Belgrade, where the constitution of the South Slav Ministry will be determined. This Ministry will be appointed by the Prince Regent, but its members will be elected by a body called the Council of State, which will play the part of preliminary parliament, until the convocation of the National Assembly, for the whole South Slav territory. This national assembly will work out the constitution and will thus decide definitely all the questions concerning the organization of the State. There is every reason to believe that the practical questions on which depends the effective unification of our people will be easily and satisfactorily solved. All the Serbo-Croat-Slovene patriots must remember that our national unity still encounters secret opposition, and that

only concord and union can guarantee to the nation the realization of all her legitimate aspirations. The great friend of the South Slavs, Mr. Gauvain, writes, in the *Journal des Débats* of November 27th, of all sorts of obstacles interior and exterior, which are being raised "against the realization of Southern Slav unity. . . . Quite lately again evil influences had been at work against the application of the programme of Corfu." Some day we shall know the source of these influences. They are not to be neglected because they are found in different circles. This is proved by the incident of the false communiqué sent by a former functionary of the Serbian Press Office at Geneva to the newspapers of the Swiss and Allied Press, as emanating from the official Serbian Bureau, in which it was stated that the Conference of Geneva had recognized the State of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes of the former Dual Monarchy. Instead of the union, separation would have been proclaimed. In spite of the immediate contradiction by the Serbian Consulate at Geneva, this false communiqué was circulated even in the important papers, producing confusion and uncertainty. The work that is being accomplished at Belgrade, at this very moment, will cut short, we hope, all these dangerous and malicious intrigues.

December 2, 1918.

THE UNION WITHOUT AND WITHIN.

The solemn proclamation of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom inaugurates a new era in the life of our nation. United without and within, we are to-day prepared to face with more strength and more energy all the difficulties that the realization of the integral union of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene people may encounter in Italy, as well as elsewhere. The Kingdom of Serbia had entire moral authority to represent the wishes of the whole nation in so far as concerned the defence of our national integrity. In order to construct and to give a visible and concrete expression of the collective will of the whole nation, the Kingdom of Serbia needed the formal adhesion of the other parts of the nation to the national programme pursued by Serbia with an unexampled tenacity.

This adhesion has just taken place at Belgrade in a form that on the one hand preserves the continuity of our national effort, and on the other assigns to all the branches of the nation a situation of perfect equality. The union of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes of former Austria-Hungary with the Kingdom of Serbia is so formed that all the South Slav countries will form henceforth part of the united Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes. The Royal Regency of this united State will be exercised by Prince Alexandre Karageorgevitch, according to the principles of modern democracy.

The first consequence of this memorable act will be the formation of a government exercising power over the whole extent of our national territory. This government may be organized in a decentralized manner to facilitate the normal function of the authorities in the different provinces, but that will have no influence on the interior and exterior state unity. This unity is expressed in the Chief of the State as well as in his parliamentary government. On the other hand, to agree with the principle of parliamentary government that is in force in Serbia, and which will be fully preserved in the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, the government must enjoy the confidence of national representation. Now at the present moment our nation has no real parliament for the whole country and we are obliged to create a kind of preliminary parliament. For Serbia, which is an organized state, the delegates for the preliminary parliament will be chosen by the Government and the Serbian Skoupchtina. They must not necessarily be the deputies of the Skoupchtina, because their function in the preliminary parliament will exceed the limits of their mandate as Serbian deputies. In the other part of the nation, the inhabitants of former Austro-Hungary, the national organizations which have formed the National Council of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, will choose their delegates. And as for Montenegro, on account of its special internal situation, it is Skoupchtina that will appoint the delegates for the preliminary parliament.

The preliminary parliament thus constituted will act until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The

South Slav Ministry will be formed only with the consent of this preliminary parliament, and it is to the latter that the Government also will have to give account of its actions. This organization of the public executive powers is the best and most appropriate to the circumstances. It safeguards the principle of national sovereignty, at the same time creating a stable government, provided with all necessary power.

The Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes is no longer a dream. It is a reality. And we can only join in the enthusiastic acclamations which have greeted the definite formation of our political unity. May the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes be for ever happy and glorious.

December 16, 1918.

III

NATIONAL FRONTIERS.

The question of national frontiers, which has already been mentioned in *La Serbie*, will become more and more interesting to all friends of international peace and justice. The following lines were written to clear up certain points of primary importance, and on which there can be no two opinions.

Politicians and journalists eagerly demand that the great war should end in the realization of the principle of nationalities. Napoleon III and Piedmont made Italian unity by opposing to the former diplomatic régime the clear and simple idea of national States. This principle has been called a clear idea falsified. In this expression the criticism is far-fetched. The principle of nationalities is a natural, clear and sound idea. That all those having the same national conscience should form one State, is not that a conception that simplifies many an international relation?

We must not create difficulties by asking: What is a nation? The French, the Italians, the Germans have a national conscience; they are nations. But, it will be asked: What are empires and federations like Switzerland? One often exaggerates a pretended difference between a national

estate like France and an empire like the British Empire, uniting so many individual state organizations. The contradiction is not well founded. The British Empire is the ingenious association of five democracies which, after the war, will be changed into a federation whose character will be juridically defined. But each of these democracies like Canada and Australia, is a state organization having its own individuality. The British Empire is to-day already *de facto* an association of states independent in all interior affairs. After the constitution of the British federation, the principle of nationality will also be settled in the British Empire ; national states, and over these states, the empire, the federation. Exclusive of this federal organization there is the complexity of colonies without self-government, which will be under the administration of the Empire and no longer of the United Kingdom as to-day.

The objection that Switzerland is a negation of the principle of nationality may be refuted. Switzerland is composed of twenty-two states and in each of these states, except Valais, Fribourg, Berne, Grisons, there is only one nationality. The cantons are national states but the federal state is international. The question of language had no importance in fixing the nationality. It is thanks to the division between Germans and non-Germans, provoked by the great war and by German mentality, that a problem of spoken language and contending cultures was created.

There are empires of the old régime and modern empires. The type of an empire of the old régime is Turkey and Austria-Hungary. In both, the same mixture of races, the same autocratic will that does not allow nationalities to dispose freely of their destinies, the same coercion, the same subjection to political ends, quite foreign to the national life of the subject nationalities. The autocratic and aristocratic régime is at the base of these types. But here is the type of the modern empire, the Anglo-Saxon type. The British Empire accords to each dominion the free development of all its political forces. It is a union founded almost on the civil contract. There is no coercion, but the democratic commonwealths are free members of the world empire. The modern empire is composed of organized ethnical

unities, each of which has already realized at heart the principle of nationalities ; there, you do not see the chaos of the oriental empires, in which Austria-Hungary must be included. It is these false empires that are the negation of the principle of nationality. In order to compromise the principle of nationality, these false empires are quoted. However, there is a more dangerous argument to be answered. It is said : how can the principle of nationality be realized, if there are no national frontiers separating distinctly the different nationalities ? It is also said that it is impossible to create truly national estates without committing an injustice towards the nationality which is attached to the foreign state. This is a serious objection, but it may be overcome more easily in practical life than in theory. Look at the ethnographical map of the Adriatic coast. The national western frontier between Jugoslavs and Italians is a fixed line which has not undergone any change during the course of centuries. Mr. Colajanni, the venerable leader of the Italian Republicans, mentioned this frontier in his speech at the Republican Congress at Naples. He set forth his point of view which is in contradiction with a democratic policy. Mr. Colajanni thinks that the principle of nationality cannot be applied in a mixed country where the national frontier cannot be fixed. In this case geography, history, political events, culture, must be more decisive than superiority of numbers. But it can be objected that there is no country where the national frontier is more clearly indicated than in Gorica-Gradiska. There is no mixing of nationalities there, the linguistic frontier being so strictly defined that the peasant on one side of the frontier does not speak Italian and his neighbour on the other side does not understand the Slovene tongue. It is astonishing also that a radical democrat like Colajanni should deny that the superiority of numbers should be decisive, though all democratic institutions are founded on superiority of numbers, otherwise we would have to abolish universal suffrage. From the Italian point of view, it is very dangerous to proclaim the hegemony of the most cultured elements, because in the bordering Yugoslav countries, in the west, that is to say in Gorica-Gradiska, the mass of the Slovene

people is much better educated than the Italian peasant, as is proved by the statistics of the illiterate. Even the most cultured Italians have but a very imperfect knowledge of their Jugoslav neighbours. It has been declared that the great war is a struggle between Prussian autocracy and democracy. But there is no more distressing fact than that one of the great belligerent powers should have nearly forgotten the plebiscitary foundations of her state. The quintessence of the modern political régime is each nation's right of self-determination and that no territory can be under a foreign sovereignty without the consent of the population.

Treitschke said in 1871: "We Germans, knowing Germany and France, know what is good for the Alsatians better than these unfortunates themselves. . . . Against their will, we wish to restore them to themselves!" That is the German point of view expressed very forcibly. Henri Hauser in his *Principle of Nationalty* has well defined the difference "between the revolutionary, democratic French theory of the consent of the people" and the "fatalistic Bismarckian German theory of the right of great agglomerations to increase their territory. . . ."

The Italian generation which has struggled for Italian unity was frankly democratic. It knew very well that general consent alone can be the base of the unity of the nation. But plebiscites have not been organized only for the Italian provinces. The Savoyard deputies in the Piedmontin Parliament were against the nationalist Italian policy of the Government of Piedmont; they wished to remain Piedmontin in 1860 and did not wish to become Italian. But the Italians did not prevent Savoy from expressing the popular desire. A plebiscite declared the desire of the Savoyards to become French. That is an example of a plebiscite organized by the Italians for a population that was not of Italian race.

It is a great mistake to suppose that the plebiscitary idea became obsolete at the end of last century. On the contrary, the referendum was introduced into Switzerland, into the United States, and we may suppose that it will soon be a form of legislation in all the democratic states. But when the referendum has been adopted for the minor affairs of the

state, how can we refuse to ask the nation's opinion, the fundamental question for each citizen, when it is a question of his future fatherland, of his civic existence.

To consult the people is particularly indispensable when the population of the country and the nation which has occupied the country are of different races. If it is certain that the annexation was made against the will of the population of foreign origin, the plebiscite becomes a moral duty for the governors. Without doubt precautions must be taken so that the plebiscite may be the true expression of national sentiment.

If the plebiscitary régime is to be applied in countries of mixed nationality, Italian-Jugoslav, the problem must be viewed from the following points of view : (1) What is the territory in which the population is to be questioned ? (2) What precaution must be taken in order to ascertain the political opinions of the population in normal times. (3) What public authority is to intervene to organize the plebiscite ?

To reply to the first question it must be stated that in the past, the plebiscite did not take place in artificial territories formed for the purpose. Lombardy, Venetia, Savoy, these are well-defined unities, which were, in the course of centuries, under the same influence of common traditions. One cannot and ought not to form new unities for the organization of the plebiscite. For example : the Adriatic coast, which for centuries was governed by the same laws, had the same administration, formed the same economic unity, must not be divided. The plebiscite must be applied to Gorica-Gradiska, Trieste and Istria together as one administrative unity.

Never has the population suffered so much in the countries where military operations are in progress as during the present war. Evacuation has become almost a natural consequence of modern warfare. By evacuation, the true ethnographical character of the country has been destroyed. Nevertheless, there are towns which have not as yet been the theatre of war, like Trieste, whose population has greatly changed since the beginning of the European conflict. A plebiscite exercised to-day at Trieste would give an overwhelming Slovene majority ; on the other hand, the country of Gorica has lost

a great part of its Yugoslav population. There is no doubt that nostalgia will cause the evacuated population to repatriate themselves as rapidly as possible. They will return to their devastated fatherland. But if a considerable part of the population is still absent, special arrangements will be necessary. As basis for the establishment of the register of the citizens who will be entitled to take part in the plebiscite, the electoral register of the last elections by universal suffrage must be taken. All the citizens who voted at the last general elections will take part in the plebiscite. The vote of absentees must be facilitated.

To exclude from the plebiscite the population that has entered the country on account of economic necessities, would be a very arbitrary proceeding. How can one prove to what extent the new-comer is attached to the soil, has made it his own? These are very subjective judgments and the worst errors may be committed. It is one of the principles of a just, democratic policy to facilitate to new-comers ways for becoming citizens of their new country. The democratic régime, industrialization, modern economic circulation, demand a legislation that renders it possible for the foreigner to acquire quickly a new nationality.

December 3 and 10, 1916.

THE CORRIDOR TO BOHEMIA.

I read with the greatest interest the very remarkable article on Austria-Hungary that Mr. Marc Dufaux published in the issue of April 27, 1918, of your courageous paper. I heartily applaud the arguments of the honourable chief editor of *La Suisse*. Like him, I esteem that "the European equilibrium would acquire a better and more lasting stability if the oppressed diverse nationalities were set free."

Allow me to add a complimentary argument to all those developed by Mr. Marc Dufaux with irresistible logic. To free the Slavs of Austria-Hungary is evidently the first act to accomplish; to unite them is the indispensable final act which will set the seal on their independence and on the peace of Europe. This end can only be reached by creating the corridor of communication that I have imagined and

which includes the territories of the Comitats of Moson, Sopron, and Vas and Zala. On the one hand, indeed, this corridor would separate Hungary from Austria, on the other, it would permit the territorial union of the Czech countries and of Jugoslavia.

After the war, economic activity will revive little by little and the Slavs of Austria will certainly not be behind-hand in endeavouring to revive industry, agriculture and commerce. Now what are the elements indispensable to this revival? Are they not easy, rapid and cheap means of communication? In what situation will the Southern Slavs and Czechs be placed in this respect? They will only be able to communicate through Austria and Hungary and the difficulties will certainly be great on all points. The Germans and Hungarians would, no doubt, like to reserve the Southern Slav trade for themselves. They will not allow Slav goods to cross their territories without burdening them with heavy duties and long delays in transit in order to discourage them. Thus, Southern Slav trade could not be supplied with coal and the products of all the Czech industries which it lacks, without passing under the Caudine Forks of the Austro-Hungarian tariffs and customs. Jugoslavia will have, certainly, every facility for trading by sea with Italy, France and England. But of the Czech products which might reach her easily and cheaply, she will be in a great measure deprived.

Already the corridor is traversed by numerous branch railway lines and two main lines: First, the line from Vienna to Budapest by Grammat-Neusiedl and Győr; second, the line from Vienna to Pécujsziget (Pecs) passing by Wiener-Neustadt, Sopron, Szombathely, Nagy-Kanizsa (where it joins the great line Budapest to Trieste, by Pragerhof), Celje (Cilli), and Ljubljana (Laibach), then Mura-Keresztur and finally Gyekenyes where the junction of the line Budapest to Rieka by Zagreb takes place.

To insure an independent communication between the Czech and Jugoslav countries, it will then be sufficient to utilize the existing local line: Pressburg to Szombathely passing by Parndorf, Vulka and Sopron. In this way Pressburg will be in direct communication with Zagreb and with

the Port of Rieka. So if the corridor existed it could be used for easy, rapid and cheap communication between the Slavs. It would be at any rate a way of escape, when Austro-Hungarian interests or ill-will threatened to render the others impracticable.

I believe then that the creation of the corridor must certainly enter into the essential desiderata of the Slavs of Austria and I trust that *La Serbie* will follow up this idea.

May 11, 1918.

ARTHUR CHERVIN.

THE CROATS AND RUSSIA.

The entry of Roumania into the world war, on the side of the Allies, marks a fact of which the Latin race has every reason to be proud. All the other European races have been divided into two camps, but the entire Latin race fights, united, in the same camp. We Slavs unfortunately cannot say as much for ourselves. It is true that the circumstances and political conditions in which we find ourselves differ appreciably from those of the Latin peoples, but besides that there is an important factor, a factor which cannot be set aside: our enemies, while endeavouring to push their way through our homes towards world domination, have done all they could to divide us in spite of ourselves, in order to subdue us more easily. They succeeded in a great measure, thanks to the power they exercise over millions and millions of Slavs. But let us hope it will be for the last time.

To be able to emulate, in this fine quality of union, the Latin race, guided by France, beloved of all conscious and civilized humanity, and who in this war, as in so many other circumstances, has proved herself equal to her moral power, we must first of all know one another. Our enemies do not ignore the importance of this fact and endeavour at all costs to prevent our doing so. For years past they have done all in their power to create a gulf between Serbians, Croats and Slovenes and to divide them not only politically, but spiritually. Politically they have succeeded in dividing us but they have not been able to separate our souls and they will never be able to do so. One of the last attempts in this sense, made through the intermediary of the neutral press,

consists in stirring up the hatred of Russia against the Croats. Our enemies know very well that an attempt of this kind in relation to the Serbians had no result. The Serbians preferred to sacrifice the most sacred things they had in the world ; their houses, their homes, the beloved soil of their native land, and to disperse into the four corners of the world rather than betray Russia and her Allies. But they think it will be easier with the Croats, who, brought up in the culture of the West, for the most part Catholics and having no independent state of their own to give free access to their opinions, will not be strong enough to resist such attempts. The aim of our adversaries is only too clear. They wish to separate the Croats from the Slovenes and the Serbians ; the Serbians and the Southern Slavs in general would be weakened by it, and the weakening of the Southern Slavs would certainly not be to the advantage of Slavism, the most powerful rampart in the world against German Imperialism. But this manœuvre will not succeed either ; Russia, the great Slav sister, knows to-day what she has to expect from her little Slav brothers, and having known them, she will be able even after the war, to judge each according to his merits.

As to the Croats, our enemies believe that Russia knows the Croats solely from the fact that they are fighting to-day in the ranks of the Austro-Hungarian army. But they are hugely mistaken. Russia has had occasion to know the Croats well before this war. In the seventeenth century she knew the Croatian, Juraj Krizanic, who went to Russia, the country that symbolizes Slav dignity and strength, in order to work there for the well-being of the Slavs. Russia also knows Josip Jurje Strossmayer, the greatest Croatian of his time, who had numerous political relations in high Russian spheres and who went to Moscow, as Catholic Bishop, on the occasion of the millenary of the baptism of orthodox Russians, for which he was reproached later publicly, in a club, by the Emperor of Austria in person. Russia knows equally well the Croatian revolutionary Eugene Kvaternik, who, seized with the ardent desire to see Croatia delivered, solicited the aid of the Courts of France and of Russia. She also knows

the great Croatian poet, Petar Preradovic, who, though an Austrian General, composed odes to the Slavs and to Russia. She will remember the formal opening of the Session of Sabor, the national Croatian assembly, in 1906, when, for the first time, the Serbo-Croatian coalition had the majority. She will also remember its senior president, Dr. Erazmo Barcic, a lawyer of Fiume, who, in his Parliamentary opening address, pronounced these words: "As long as the tread of Cossack soldiers has not resounded on the pavements of Vienna, there will be no order in this country, in Austria-Hungary . . . !" And the present President of the Serbo-Croatian Coalition, Dr. Grga Tuskan, added immediately after: "And I, I will march rifle in hand, against Vienna." Russia also knows the Croatian, Antun Bubanovic, who left all his fortune to the Yugoslav Academy at Zagreb, so that the annual revenue derived from it might be given as recompense to the Croatian who had best learnt the Russian language. Russia knows very well that almost every year the Croatian literary society "Matica Hrvatska," the most important after the Yugoslav Academy, publishes some translations from Russian literature. Russia knows all that and many other things; she knows what she was and what she is for the Croats. From the dwelling of our greatest men down to the hut of our poorest peasant, the name of Russia is pronounced everywhere as a sacred word, as something that gives meaning and import to the national life of three million and a half Croats.

That is why this sentiment has never diminished, even in the course of this war into which the Croatian people has been pushed by the force of circumstances, though it has no place there. We can say with pride that no word has ever been pronounced in the Croatian Press against Russia during this war, during which was suppressed, in consequence of orders from the Hungarian Government and at the suggestion of the military authorities, among other Croatian papers, the *Hrvatski Pokret*, central organ of Serbo-Croatian Coalition, which has a majority in the Croatian Parliament; this paper was forbidden because it had published with too much "reserve" the news of the victories of the Austro-Hungarian army. They also suppressed the *Hrvat*, central organ of the

Startchevic party, which had "glorified" the Serbian Army.

Even now, in time of war, there is published in Croatia the new Croatian-Russian grammar, and besides lectures in the Russian language, "Russian evenings" are organized in the Croatian theatres. The Austro-Hungarian authorities dare not interfere for fear of provoking discontent among the population already exhausted by the sufferings of the war. And recently, in the Croatian Parliament, the national deputy, Stjepan Radic, President of the Croatian Agricultural Party, expressed himself thus: "Our intellectuals should learn Russian, as it is a world language. It is in this way that people grow to understand each other and that culture progresses, without being prejudicial to nationalism. The Russians supply us with proof of this and they can serve as a model. Although the *joupanies* (former Serbo-Croatian assemblies) are our ancient historical institutions, destined to be that which the *zemstovs* are in the Russian Governments and called upon to act politically, socially and economically, they are to-day corrupted by the misdeeds of *Kuhen Hedervary*. Through geographical conditions and through the influence of civilization, we are closely united to the West and with Russia by our racial sentiments; that is why we believe we are ripe for the future."

And all that was known to Russia; all the efforts of the enemies of the Slavs to do the Croats harm in the eyes of Russia, will be in vain. Since the orthodox Bulgarians, of their own free will, have stained their hands with the blood of the Russian liberator; since the Czechs, the Poles, the Croats and the Slovenes, of the Catholic Church, have manifested, within the bounds of their liberty, their wish to fight under the banner of the Czar of Russia or with their Serbian brothers, of the Orthodox church; since France, torch-bearer of European western civilization, has become the most intimate ally of Russia—all the manœuvres attempted by enemies to make use of the Catholicism and of the western culture of the Croats, are in vain. And it is for that that we Croats await with serenity the sentence that will be pronounced upon us by the holy Slav Russia, at the end of this war, from which, by natural logic, the allied States

of the Entente will issue victorious, of which there is no longer any doubt, even on the part of our enemies. And in agreement with Russia, on this question as well as on all the others, there is noble and powerful England, whose politicians and publicists, such as H. Wickham Steed and R. W. Seton Watson, have pleaded before European public opinion, even before this war, in favour of the Croatsians, and there is also heroic France, of whom the national deputy and member of the Starcevic party, M. Dragutin Hrvoj, said at the time of the first session of war of the Croatian national Sabor : " Whatever one may say of the French nation and in spite of the antipathies ready to be forced upon us in this time of war, it is yet undeniable that it is the nation which has always been the torch-bearer of European civilization. If to-day we are not the slaves of some "spahis," and if the whip of the feudal baron no longer lashes our shoulders, we owe this to the chivalrous French nation. It is France that has fought and shed torrents of her noblest blood for the rights of man, for individual liberty, for the right of re-union, for liberty of speech and of the Press ! " And it is upon this France that we Croatsians found our hopes and our most ardent desires : the union of all the Serbians, Croatsians and Slovenes into one and the same state, free and independent, under the glorious sceptre of the Karageorgevitch dynasty.

October 8, 1916.

THE SLOVENES : A PEOPLE WITHOUT CULTURE ?

In conformity with the German-Austrian method of representing a people upon whom they desire to dominate, as inferior and backward from the point of view of culture and civilization, the Germans have unceasingly depicted the Slavs as people without culture, living still under primitive conditions, and who ought therefore to be only too happy that the Germans with their great culture should reign over them, as this domination can only be beneficial to them. In employing this method, the Germans wished to make the world believe that their domination over the Slavs was justified from a universal point of view.

The Germans are, however, the hereditary enemies of the Slavs, especially of the Jugoslavs. And yet, when to-day a great number of newspapers of our friend and ally, Italy, employ the same method in order to justify their exaggerated claims on purely Slav countries by an entirely false representation of the conditions in which the Southern Slavs live, it appears to us rather strange. We cannot help protesting against these mistakes which are repeated daily in certain Italian papers, which depict the Jugoslavs as rude peasants without culture and without civilization, as people come down from the mountains, as simple tribes who rejoice when one tells them that Saint Mark is going to return among them to reign as in bygone centuries with justice and equity. It is hoped in this way to attribute to the imperialistic pretensions of the Italian Nationalists, a civilizing mission sent to a people that has such great need of being civilized. Though we are admirers of Italian culture, we cannot help replying to these affirmations by a simple assertion of the facts. That is our right, and can only serve as enlightenment on the Italo-Jugoslav question. Besides, when the true state of things is known, it will be understood why the Jugoslavs insist with so much tenacity upon the unity and indissolubility of their native land. It will be seen that everywhere where Jugoslavs live, they are so leagued together by indissoluble bonds of culture and commerce, that one cannot take it ill if they are not inclined to let themselves be divided up and separated, if they wish to live their independent life.

That is the state of things in the Slovene countries, which we wish to set forth here briefly, keeping to simple facts.

The Slovenes are the most western fraction of the Jugoslavs and their number is one million and a half. The great majority of the Slovenes lives in Austrian countries: in Carniole, Southern Styria, Southern Carinthia, Gorice, Trieste and Istria, where they number 1,252,334. Of others, more than 100,000 live in the Hungarian comitats touching Southern Styria; there are still 40,000 in the Italian frontier province of Udine¹; the remainder is dispersed over the

¹ That they exist in reality in this country, and that in compact mass, can be confirmed by consulting no matter what reliable

United States, Germany and Egypt. As illustration of the present state of Slovene conditions, we would state only a few facts, dry, but sufficient to give an idea of the characteristics of the Slovene nation.

According to official statistics of 1910, 85·34 per cent. of the Slovene population know how to read and write, while their neighbours of the East, the Magyars, can only reckon 62 per cent. and the Italians of the Kingdom, 62·40 per cent. There are Italian provinces where the illiterate amount even to 85 per cent. Rome, the capital of Italy itself, counts 65 per cent.¹ However, the Slovenes show, in their most neglected province, Istria, 46·61 per cent., and 23·26 per cent. in Carinthia, subjected continually to the severest Germanic rule, while in Gorice they only count 14·75 per cent., and in Trieste 12·86 per cent., in Carniole 12·46 per cent. and in Styria 11·54 per cent. These figures reveal a considerable superiority in this respect of the Slovenes over the Italians proper.

The standard of education, too, attains a relatively high degree. In Carniole there is one higher elementary school pupil out of 258 Slovene inhabitants, while in Italy (if one keeps to the figures furnished by Mr. Borghese) the proportion is approximately 1 out of 400.

In the economic domain also, the Slovenes have obtained appreciable results, and that in spite of the fact that they are for the most part farmers (60-70 per cent.) and that capitalism is not yet developed in the same measure as with the great European nations. According to reports of the Austrian Central Statistical Commission, there were, at the end of 1912, 952 Slovene co-operative societies (in Carniole 424, in Styria 254, in Carinthia 36, at Trieste and in the neigh-

ethnographical map, even Italian. We will quote here what is said by the Roman paper, *Il Messaggero*, in an article of its Udine correspondent: "How many people in Italy knew before this war that a Slav people lives under our tri-colour flag and under our laws, on our frontier? . . . This Slav population of 40,000 souls lives on territory that extends beyond the Nadisone as far as to the frontier and of which the soil is unfertile and unprofitable." In describing the heroic exploits of a battalion of Italian Slovenes, the article ends with these words: "Slovenia has given such sons to Italy."

¹ Giovanni Borghese: *Modern Italy*, Paris, 1913.

bourhood 47, in Gorice 135, in Istria 56). In this number there were in 1910, 543 co-operative banking societies, 512 of these having granted the same year 46,604,845 crowns credit and included 164,954 members (1-7th of the whole Slovene population). In 1910 one reckoned 274 Slovene agricultural societies, of which 200, who have published their annual statement, had 21,312 members. The principal agricultural society of Carniole was founded in 1767 and next year it will be able to celebrate the 150th anniversary of its foundation: its work has been so useful that it has increased the Slovene national wealth by a hundred and twenty millions. The Slovene co-operative societies belonging to four unions, one of which is at Laybach (Lioubliana) comprised in 1914, 591 co-operative societies (73 among them being Croatian, four in Dalmatia and 69 in Istria) with 79,544,415 crowns traffic in the same year. The other union, also at Lioubliana (Carniole) counted as members in 1910, 177 co-operative societies; 135 societies formed part of the third union, which has its seat at Tzelye (Cilli in Styria) and 80 belonged to that of Gorice. At Lioubliana there exists also "The Economic Union" with a traffic, during the year 1916, of 70,158,538,780 Austrian crowns.

The Slovenes possess besides a great number of savings-banks, with a considerable capital. Two of them are powerful banks which, by means of national capital, extend their operations over the whole Jugoslav territory of Austria-Hungary. The first of these is "The Credit Bank" of Lioubliana (Laybach), founded in 1900, with branches at Gorice, Trieste, Split (Spalato, Dalmatia), Tzelovetz (Klagenfurt, Carinthia), Tzelye (Cilli, Styria) and Sarayevo (Bosina). In 1905 there was founded at Trieste the second great Slovene and Croatian bank, the "Adriatic Bank," with branches in Dalmatia: at Metkovic, Split, Sibenik, Zadar; in Istria: at Opatija (Abbassia) and at Lioubliana (Carniole). The "Adriatic Bank" has been of special help to navigation on the cosats of Istria and Dalmatia, and has founded also the great Slovene forwarding and storage enterprise "Balkan," with seat at Trieste. Recently two large new Slovene banks have been founded at Lioubliana: the "Illyrian Bank" (Iluska Banka) and the "Co-operative

Bank." While the Slovenes have developed their economic life considerably at Trieste, and possess an important bank, the "Adriatic Bank," the Italians of Trieste have not a single bank and, in other ways also, their economic situation is inferior to that of the Slovenes.

As the Slovenes have attained, in spite of their small number, rather a high degree of economic development, so that they have been able to extend their sphere of activity beyond their own country, so also their economic schools are known to their neighbours. We would only point out that one single private commercial school at Lioubliana counted more pupils belonging to other Yugoslav countries (also Serbia) and to Italy and Austria, than Slovenes of the country itself. At Lioubliana there exists also an industrial school, where are taught all branches of ordinary and artistic industry, and which is counted among the most modern of Austria. At Trieste, the Slovenes have founded their own school of commerce with national funds.

In their tenacious struggle against the governmental system and Germanism, the Slovenes have been able to develop a relatively considerable material and spiritual strength. And it is especially in the field of literature that the Slovenes have shown a capacity and a vitality which can leave no doubt as to the future of the Yugoslavs to any one who knows them thoroughly. Though a nation of only one million and a half souls, they had, in 1912, 122 newspapers. Their principal daily papers (two of which are at Trieste) have each from 10 to 15,000 subscribers. These are papers which appear with 6 to 12 pages in the form of the *Corriere della Sera*. The weekly political paper, *Domolioub*, edited exclusively for the peasants of Carniole, is printed in 50,000 copies; the popular paper *Slovenski Dom* in 28,000; the weekly agricultural paper has 50,000 subscribers in Carniole alone, etc.

For Belles-Lettres also, the Slovenes have a series of publishing firms and societies, the chief being at Lioubliana, at Gorice, at Tzelovetz (Carinthia) and at Tzelye (Styria). The "Society of St. Hermangoras" at Tzelovetz (Klagenfurt in Carinthia), founded in 1860, is an example of the importance of certain of these societies: it edits annually six books

printed in 100,000 copies each ; it counted in 1910, 85,789 members. Each Slovene family receives the editions of this society.

This solidity in the development of culture among the Slovenes is of ancient origin. For Slovene literature is ancient. The first literary epoch of this nation dates from the sixteenth century (epoch of the Reformation) and the first Slovene books appeared in 1550, at the same time as the first printing press was founded at Lioubliana. The writer, Adam Bohoric, edited as early as in 1584 the first Slovene grammar, and in 1592 there appeared also the first Slovene vocabulary.

When in 1809 the French liberated, although it was for five years only, a part of the Jugoslavs from the Austrian tyranny by forming the Kingdom of Illyria (Carniole, a part of Carinthia, Gorice, Trieste, Istria, Croatia in part, and Dalmatia) with, for capital, Lioubliana, Slovene literature developed considerably, and has gone on developing up to our own days.

We have simply shown, in mentioning the high opinion the Italian Socialists of Austria have of Slovene literature and economic life,¹ why the Slovenes, like all the Jugoslavs, are of opinion that they have the right to live an independent national life.

November 12, 1916.

THE BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA FACTOR OF THE MONARCHY.

The Austrian Prime Minister, Dr. Seidler, declared recently before the representatives of the political parties "that he did not know whether the South Slav State would be born some day. It is not an impossibility, but it is not possible to speak of it here, because the matter concerns not Austria alone, but also Hungary and Bosnia. I do not wish either to consider the question of whether certain Austrian territories could be united to that State, but one thing is clear enough : it is that if such a State were created, one could not annex to it all the parts of Austrian territory separating that State from the Adriatic and closely united with regions speaking German."

¹ See *La Serbie* of 29 Oct. : "La Civilization Slovene."

One sees that Austria has learnt nothing in this war. She imagines that her former methods of deceiving the Slavs by offering them a few crumbs of autonomy and fictitious liberties and independence of government, could make our nation swerve from the road it has entered upon, fighting with all its might for its complete deliverance and for the integral union of all the Serbo-Croat-Slovenes into a single independent State, but not for a single instant will Austria succeed.

In order to amputate our national territory and compromise the Yugoslav unity by immoral means, so as to be able to keep our nation more easily in the Austro-Magyar bondage, Mr. Seidler has done his best to appeal to Bosnia and Herzegovina as an important factor in the creation of this Southern Slav State such as he imagines it.

We Bosnians are not accustomed and would never wish to be a factor of any kind in the Habsburg Monarchy. Our consent has only been asked when it was necessary to give up our national ideals and justify the twisting round of international treaties by Austria-Hungary. Instead of giving our approbation, we have always protested.

The Constitution granted to Bosnia has provided for the formation of a special body, a National Council, whose work was to negotiate with the Austrian and Hungarian Governments, with regard to the situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in relation to the Monarchy. However, the National Council of Bosnia has never been convoked, neither by the Government of Vienna, nor by that of Budapest. On the other hand, the Governments of Vienna and Budapest have never deigned to reply to the numerous enquiries addressed to them by the Council. The Minister Burian, attacked by the Delegations because of his policy in Bosnia, had declared: "In Bosnia there is no policy, there is only administration."

However, to-day, when it is desired to paralyse the national movement of the Yugoslavs, aimed at their deliverance from the Germano-Magyar yoke, they try to divide our nation, and, for that purpose, appeal to Bosnia-Herzegovina by pretending to ask its consent for a new combination of the dualist policy of Austria-Hungary.

We suddenly discover that we are an "important factor," this solely with the object of flattering us in order that we might betray our national cause. This division of the Jugoslavs and their servitude towards the Magyars have already been taken into consideration at the moment of the annexation.

In the Imperial Proclamation addressed to the nation, October 10, 1908, this is stated :

"But the first indispensable condition for the establishment of this provincial constitution lies in the preliminary creation of a juridical settlement for the two countries, quite free and concise from any ambiguity.

"For this reason and remembering the bonds of union which existed formerly between our glorious ancestors on the Hungarian Throne and these countries, we declare our sovereign rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc. . . ."

The Bosnians, by the intermediary of Tcherviche-beg Miralem, a notable Mussulman of very prominent position, have already protested to the Diet against any attempt at a constitutional annexation, as they knew that the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina formed part of the Jugoslav question and that partial solutions can only put the drag on our national unity ; they knew also that never within the framework of the Monarchy would it be possible for us to be free.

To-day also, in spite of the fact that the Bosnian Diet is dissolved, the Bosnians and the Herzegovinians are firmly united for the purpose of conducting, with their Southern Slav chiefs at the Parliament of Vienna, a vigorous action with a view to liberating their country. After the manoeuvre of Mr. von Seidler they have not hesitated to act in opposition, and their sentiments may be summed up in the words pronounced by one of their deputies: "We know very well," said he, "that a great Croatia, such as Austria offers us, would be from that moment at the mercy of the Austrians and the Magyars. We Serbians and Croats reply to Mr. Seidler with the same indignation and with the same energy as the Slovenes: 'Never!'"

Time will show whether the imaginary and ridiculous historical rights of the Magyars will get the better of the earnest will of a nation conscious of itself.

June 15, 1918.

CHAPTER III

THE STRUGGLE WITH AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN SUCCESSION.

THE question of the Austro-Hungarian succession found, from a theoretical point of view, a solution when a young prince of the House of Habsburg came to the throne and took the title of Charles I. The death of Francis-Joseph, with the World War in full swing, is nevertheless an important event of which the consequences will lose no time in making themselves felt when the fate of the Monarchy is to be decided. The Emperor Francis-Joseph had acquired a possessive title to the countries under his rule and during his long reign he had succeeded in strengthening his dynastic rights. The possession being purely a matter of fact, is not subject to inheritance, and the new Emperor, in calling on his dynastic rights, can only support them by the out of date argument of Divine Right or by the terms of ancient constitutional charters of doubtful value. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy remains therefore a fact and not a right and it is the long reign of Francis-Joseph which has helped to give it the appearance of a definitely formed State. During the reign of Francis-Joseph, the separatist tendencies of the subject peoples were repressed and one heard, even in disinterested circles, that Austria-Hungary was a political necessity. After the death of Francis-Joseph the respect due to his personality, the scruples which that might provoke, disappeared completely, and one can face more clearly the question of the conservation of the Monarchy.

That the Austro-Hungarian peoples demand their liberty and independence is a notorious fact on which it is needless

to insist. Even the Hungarians, those faithful servants of German imperialism, would be glad to be rid of the German embrace, on condition, it goes without saying,—and on that point all Magyars agree—that their power over the Southern Slavs and Transylvanian Roumanians is not touched. As to the Southern Slavs, Roumanians, Czechs, Slovenes and Poles, they are retained by force within the boundaries of the Monarchy and only await the first chance to escape from them. It is in the name of the principle of the liberty of all peoples that the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary demand their political independence. The great aims of civilization, for which the Allies are fighting, cannot be realized without the deliverance of the Southern Slavs, of the Czecho-Slovaks, of the Roumanians, and of the Poles from the Magyar-German power and their constitution as independent national States. The speeches on the liberty of the small nations, so often pronounced by the authorized representatives of the Allied Powers, are not just empty phrases, as our adversaries affirm, but the real political programme of the Allies. The present struggle of the nations is a struggle between two contradictory principles: the principle of liberty and right and that of force and domination. The victory of the Allies will therefore be the dawn of a new epoch in the life of humanity and it cannot be imagined without the preliminary settlement of the Austro-Hungarian question.

These moral considerations are not sufficient, all the same, to convince the masses and encourage them to struggle to the end, until complete victory is obtained. More concrete and palpable arguments drawn from the need of defending oneself from the German menace, have a greater influence on the mind; and if we consider the Austro-Hungarian question from this point of view, we arrive at the same conclusion, that is to say, that the break up of the Monarchy is essential if we really wish the German power to be broken. The evolution of Austro-Hungary has passed through different phases, but since 1866 she has been nothing more than a German province. Up to 1866, there were two German Powers: Protestant Prussia and Catholic Austria. In 1866, Austria, defeated by Prussia and main-

tained by her at the same time, lost her place as an Empire and became the faithful acolyte of Prussia risen to the rank of German Empire. Bismarck, instead of breaking up Austria, which would have meant liberating over twenty million Slavs, preferred to "save" the Monarchy, suggested to it the idea of dualism, and attached it bodily to the German Empire. In this way Germany obtained an allied power, heterogeneous in every way, except from the military point of view. This was precisely what Germany wanted, as has been seen during the present war. Germany makes great use of Austria-Hungary, of her resources in men and material, and has plucked the fruits of the policy so cleverly pursued for years and years.

Bulgaria and Turkey are the "little" friends of Germany. The principal Ally of the German Empire is Austria-Hungary, who adds a few million soldiers to the German power. If Germany is to be got at, Austria-Hungary must be separated from her and one cannot separate her otherwise than by the transformation of her political structure and the formation of independent States. Austria-Hungary, as she was after the war of 1866 and the Austro-Hungarian agreement of 1867, was a purely German combination, formed solely in the interests of Germany. This German combination must be broken up, in the interests of Europe, and reconstructed in agreement with the aspirations of its respective peoples and in accordance with the needs of a new Europe, pacifist and federal. As we have often repeated here, before thinking of Germany and the guarantees to be required from her, the Austro-Hungarian problem should be solved. It is the logical thing to do and political necessity demands that it should be done. The death of Francis-Joseph has simplified the Austro-Hungarian question and given it a more concrete form and the victory of the Allies will help the peoples of the Monarchy, its legitimate heirs, to claim the inheritance which belongs to them.

December 3, 1916.

REMEMBER AUSTRIA-HUNGARY !

Among the prejudices which Europe finds hard to relinquish, there is one of great significance and extraordinary

resistance. It is the Austrian prejudice. Thirty months of sanguinary struggle, originally provoked by Germany and Austria-Hungary, have not yet seriously shaken the international situation of the Danubian Monarchy, nor the deeply rooted fiction of its pretended moderate action and the historical necessity of its existence. And, what is still more strange, neither the answer of the Allies to Mr. Wilson's Note, nor their demands drawn up with absolute precision, have been able to produce an appreciable impression on the inert minds which persist in cherishing pre-war illusions. People whose sympathies are manifestly favourable to the Entente always refuse to face seriously the question of the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the liberation of its enslaved peoples. They consider the Allies' reply as a sort of platonic, if not utopian, desire. That the neutrals should remain under this illusion is perhaps comprehensible, but when the publicists of the Allies, especially those of Italy, base their political conceptions on an Austria shorn of a few Adriatic districts in favour of Italy, but maintaining her position as a great Power, it is a much more serious problem and reveals a really disconcerting state of mind. M. Gustave Le Bon, who applies himself so zealously to the lessons and psychological consequences of the war, would do better to give his attention to this Austrian obsession, the gravity of which should not escape the friends of a lasting Peace in a regenerated Europe.

Yet all the same, the truth about the part played in the German plans by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the danger which its actual constitution presents and will continue to present to European peace and liberty in the future, is very clear and easy to understand. The whole attitude of Austria-Hungary, since the foundation of the German Empire, proves indisputably that she is but the "brilliant second," as Emperor William II so rightly called her, in the German effort to conquer the world. In 1870, when some innocent people thought that Austria would seize the chance to escape from the power and dictation of Prussia, the Monarchy made no move. The Austro-Magyar Agreement of 1867, concluded under the auspices of Prussia,

produced already in 1870 its effects. Vienna and Budapest preferred to keep, with Germany's help, their usurped power over the Slavs rather than march against Prussia in order to defend France, a democratic country and the cradle of political liberty. In 1877-78, the fruits of the Germano-Austro-Magyar collaboration make themselves yet more apparent. Without receiving a blow, Austria-Hungary, supported by Germany and encouraged by England, insists on the occupation of the Serbian provinces, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and succeeds in securing even the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar and in preventing the union of the two Serbian States, Serbia and Montenegro. In Berlin they rubbed their hands with satisfaction, whilst the non-Germanic diplomats who had signed the Treaty of Berlin, imagined, in their blindness, that they had done useful work for the peace of Europe. In reality, they had only confirmed the Germanic Powers in their oriental aims, which constitute the first stage towards world domination.

The events of the last few years have brought many people to their senses and, to-day, public opinion is almost unanimous in admitting Austrian complicity in premeditating the war and Austro-Magyar servility to German designs. The Magyars and Austrians, who collaborated efficiently in the realization of German domination, do so with the conviction that they also will have a prominent place amongst the rulers of the world.

It is only with the help of the Germans that they can keep their present power over so many millions of Slav subjects, and their devotion to the German cause is consequently very comprehensible. What is not so clear is the illusion entertained by certain publicists and politicians of the Allies, who, seeing the German menace, imagine that a durable peace can be obtained by leaving Austria-Hungary as it is and with its present constitution. They prefer to shut their eyes to the fact that the Dual Monarchy exploits 30 million non-German and non-Magyar subjects and forces them to support a cause which is quite foreign to them. They do not want to see that the Austro-Hungarian question is the essence of the German question and that the whole edifice of German world politics will fall to pieces like a

house of cards the moment that Austria-Hungary, with its 50 millions, disappearing from the map of Europe, will have given place to the national states, animated with the democratic spirit and determined to oppose any German invasion.

We do not wish to speak of the principles of right, justice and morality. We do not wish always to invoke the sufferings of the Slav peoples whom the Germans grind under their heel. We do not appeal to sentiment ; we insist on the political necessity of finishing once and for all with this dangerous system. For there are moments when all principles lose their value for those responsible for the fate of the masses. Then self-interest, and self-interest only, decides their political action. And it is of vital importance to the Allies that the Austro-Hungarian problem should find a different solution to that suggested by the Germans in 1867, which only served their own interests. In place of the Dual Monarchy where the Germans and Magyars divide the power over the majority of the inhabitants, who are mostly Slavs, national states must be erected. They alone can guarantee Europe against a new German menace. It is illogical to think of Turkey and to forget her European sister, Austria-Hungary. The two patients should be operated on at the same time. The more radical the operation, the greater will be the security of the peace of Europe.

March 4, 1917.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE ENTENTE.

Diplomats and politicians are to-day in a better position than soldiers to know which are the weakest points in the enemy front. The most important and strongest points in the enemy fronts are in the north, in Central Europe. The Turkish and Bulgarian fronts certainly display tenacity. These fronts, reinforced by German detachments and supplied by the German war factories, still resist the attacks of the Allies. The force of these attacks is appreciably diminished not only by the immense distance which hinders the dispatch of necessary supplies, but also by other difficulties arising from the nature of the ground, the climate and the ethnical

element of these countries. Between these two extremities are the Austro-Hungarian fronts which possess a special character. The peculiarity of these fronts is the result, first of all, of the ethnical composition of Austria-Hungary and also of the conflicting aspirations of the nations composing that Empire. This is precisely what makes the Austro-Hungarian fronts the weakest of all the imperial fronts. From the military point of view this has already been incontestably proved several times during the present war. All the same, Entente diplomacy has not known how to back up the Allied armies in a useful way and to profit from this weakness in order to bring the war sooner to an end.

For those who have followed the course of political events in Austria-Hungary during the war, it is not difficult to find a plan of action. This way is still more clearly indicated by the Russian Revolution. In spite of this, Entente diplomacy has not shown, by any opportune act, that it intended to exploit the new state of affairs from its birth. It omitted, not only to solve but even to put the Austro-Hungarian question before the leaders of the Russian Revolution, a question which remains the Gordian knot of the peace of Europe and of the whole world.

The annihilation of Prussian militarism is preached, and Austria seems to be forgotten. Preparations are made to help those who do not wish to be helped and there is no hurry to give assistance to those who ask for it on every occasion. The question of the dethronement of the Hohenzollerns has been considered but the Habsburg question is not insisted on, though it is not only easier to solve but is to-day a flagrant anachronism. The truest Austrians and most ardent Austrian "patriots" have no other reason for defending the existence of Austria than that of the Habsburg Dynasty. These defenders of the Austrian Empire behave as if we lived in the Middle Ages and not in the twentieth century, in the period of modern democracy. The Russian revolution has proclaimed its firm intention to assure the decisive victory of democracy in Europe and the whole world. But the Entente diplomacy has omitted, up to now, to explain to the Russian revolutionaries that neither the victory of democracy nor a just and durable

peace is possible in Europe as long as absolutist Austria-Hungary exists and oppresses foreign nations.

The declarations of President Wilson and the United States coming into the war side by side with the Allies, should have stimulated even more energetic diplomatic action in favour of the liberation of the Slav peoples. It should have seized the opportunity and put the Austro-Hungarian question as clearly as possible, treating it in accordance with the principles announced.

The legitimist dynasty of the Habsburgs, and the oppressive peoples in Austria-Hungary, that is to say the Germans and the Magyars, are concerting in broad daylight, under the eyes of the whole world, and the Entente diplomacy gives them time to try all possible remedies in order to save dying Austria-Hungary.

The declarations of the audacious Czechs and intrepid Poles and Southern Slavs in the Austrian Parliament, the Polish declarations at Cracovie and those explained to the Croat Parliament at Zagreb, put the question of Austria-Hungary and the Peace of Europe with all the lucidity that can be desired. That was more than a month ago, and the Entente diplomacy has not yet found the opportunity to consider this question or to decide it in a manner that is in accordance with the great principles proclaimed by Mr. Wilson and the Russian Revolution. Their whole action at present confines itself to a few timid declarations by the press which are of little importance. Hesitation and nothing but hesitation, is not exactly compatible with the heroism of those who are fighting at the front for the great principles of liberty for all nations.

Should not the Allies attend more closely to the declaration of the Austrian Slavs? For one who understands the state of affairs and its consequences, it is clear that these same Slavs are the sincerest and the strongest Allies of the Entente because from it they expect their freedom. The Czechs have already declared that they will take no part in schemes for the reorganization of Austria and that they relinquish their demand for independence to the care of the future Peace. Why not support and encourage this movement of the oppressed peoples? Is it incompatible

with the principal war aims of the Allies ? A just and lasting peace with the victory of democracy in all States, such is the final aim of the declarations made by the Allies. But, neither democratic government nor a lasting peace is possible in Europe as long as absolutist Austria-Hungary and militarist and conquering Germany exist, the only European States which have not only subjugated foreign nations but have used them in order to trouble the peace of Europe and threaten the liberty of other peoples. A Germany, no matter how militarist, without the complicity of Habsburg Austria-Hungary, could never have gone back to her old trade of war. That is indisputable. So, this accomplice, this "brilliant second" of Algeciras, must be abolished. The Austrian question is of the first importance and no one can stop or suppress the only logical solution, that is to say the dismemberment and dissolution of Austria-Hungary with all its consequences resulting from the application of the principle of nationality.

July 29, 1917.

MORE LIGHT ON AUSTRIA-HUNGARY !

Even in these serious times, the British Parliament keeps to its historic traditions. It guards jealously its character of a free tribunal where the representatives of the democracy discuss and decide the policy of the country. The speeches of Messrs. Buxton and Dillon, M.P.'s, and Lord Robert Cecil's reply to the questions concerning Serbia, the Balkans and Austria-Hungary, which we reproduce elsewhere, confirm once again the high reputation of British parliamentarism and its frankness in the treatment of all political problems. This encourages us to comment on the declarations made by Lord Robert Cecil in the same frank and loyal spirit that has always distinguished Serbian policy towards the Allies.

The first part of Lord Cecil's speech deals more particularly with Serbia and Great Britain's policy towards our country. With a sincerity which impresses all Serbians, the British Minister repeats that all the agreements entered into by Great Britain with the Serbians will be respected

and that Serbia will receive the restitutions and reparations due to her valour and the sufferings which she has endured. As to the scope and extent of these reparations, Lord Cecil emphasizes the fact that just as it was Great Britain's duty to support France in her demands in respect of Alsace-Lorraine, so must Serbia make her claims and Great Britain will support them without reservation. One cannot do otherwise than congratulate the British Minister on these words which show clearly that those in London are ready to abandon the point of view, held up to now, according to which the Great Powers possessed the sovereign right to decide the fate of the small nations, without, sometimes, even consulting them. For Serbia especially it is a well-earned moral satisfaction, because the Serbian opinions and warnings, so numerous and logical, were rarely listened to, to the great disadvantage of not only the Serbian nation but the Allies' cause in general.

The second part of Lord Cecil's speech is of more general interest and concerns Austria-Hungary. Lord Cecil agrees with Mr. Buxton who condemns the policy requiring the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary, and repeats that he also considers Germany as the principal enemy. In one respect the British Minister is indubitably right. Germany is the principal enemy; that is agreed, but the others are her weapons and cannot only be termed secondary enemies. The Allies have only one enemy and that is the German block reinforced by the Turano-Turkish block, of which Germany is the head. To obtain victory, Germany must be conquered, because otherwise all the terms of the future peace are without value. But in order to disarm Germany, the Austro-Magyar-Turano-Turkish arm must be amputated. The question of Austria-Hungary, without taking into consideration any moral obligation to deliver its peoples from the oppression of its rule, is the question of Germany, and, as the *Frankfurter Zeitung* said on July 8th, "the present war was provoked and waged for the preservation of Austria-Hungary" (see *La Serbie* of July 29th), which means that the German defeat should bring about the dismemberment of the Monarchy and the check of the Pan-German plans. There should be no doubt on that point.

Any policy of the Allies tending to maintain Austria-Hungary would be a German victory, and Serbia would be the first to be delivered to the mercy of the Dual Monarchy. In spite of the greatest material reparation to Serbia, the state of affairs would be the same in the end, with this difference, that the resistance of the Serbian people to the German menace would be much enfeebled, the sacrifices made up to now in the struggle with Germanism having consumed our best resources. It would be a disastrous result not only for Serbia, but also for Italy, France, Great Britain and Russia. We refuse to think that Lord Cecil can for a moment have considered as acceptable such a solution to the present conflict.

August 5, 1917.

PRESIDENT WILSON AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

President Wilson's reply to the Pope's peace Note does not mention the Habsburg Monarchy, but, in its essentials, is directed as much against Austria-Hungary as against Germany. "Americans think that the future peace should be founded on the rights of nations, small or great, who should enjoy equal liberty and absolute security, and with whom no one may dispute the right of self-government. Such is the primary basis of all peace conditions. We have studied these conditions carefully with our Allies. We are determined to obtain their full application." These words condemn Austria-Hungary first of all. They are addressed to Germany because Germany represents the German peril, and with the destruction of German militarism, the obsolete edifice of the Habsburg Monarchy will fall to pieces of its own accord. Mr. Wilson has a practical as well as a logical mind which refuses to make a mountain of a mole-hill. Vienna and Budapest understood him without difficulty and in spite of the vague hope that America, in not expressly mentioning Austria-Hungary, thought perhaps to spare the Monarchy, it could not hinder a flood of insults being hurled at President Wilson and the whole of America.

President Wilson's Note contains, nevertheless, an equivocal passage which we insist on making clear: "punitive indemnities, the dissolution of empires and the

establishment of selfish and exclusive economic leagues, we do not consider to be a proper basis for a durable peace." We have wished to see in this passage, rejecting the idea of the dissolution of empires, an allusion to the eventual preservation of Austria-Hungary. Such an interpretation is nevertheless inadmissible, first of all because of the particular place occupied by the passage, which is devoted to vindictive, repressive and penal measures. President Wilson decides against the dissolution of an Empire simply for penal reasons and this passage can only refer to Germany. The Austro-Hungarian question has a very different character. There is no question, in this case, of the dissolution of an organism, but truly the deliverance of nations from a hated yoke. President Wilson, who is the author of a remarkable work on the political organization of the European States, and who knows Austria-Hungary very well, would not be capable, we think, of putting Germany and Austria-Hungary on the same footing as regards dissolution. Such a conception would be in contradiction with the general principles of his Note on the liberty of nations, small and great. How therefore, can the liberty of the Southern Slavs, the Poles, the Czecho-Slovaks, the Roumanians, the Ukrainians be obtained without the dissolution of the Habsburg's possessions?

All the same, our interpretation of Mr. Wilson's Note has two faults. To begin with, Mr. Wilson is influenced by American ideas and it is not impossible that he takes into consideration the eventuality of a transformation of the Dual Monarchy into a federal Monarchy, founded on the equality of nations. The example of the United States of America would count for something in such a plan. On the other hand, the fact that America has not yet declared war on Austria-Hungary seems to support this theory. We find two faults—apparent or real?—in the American policy, and without laying further stress we again repeat that the Allies must decide to abandon once and for all the bad policy of compromise with the Habsburg Monarchy. Those who speak of the rights, liberty and independence of all nations should not continually ignore a state which is the negation of all these principles.

September 9, 1917.

AN UNNECESSARY FUNCTION.

The decline of any individual or collective life is a melancholy spectacle. That of an ancient dynasty still more so. To the sudden realization of its uselessness is added the memory of its august traditions and the painful regret that it has failed in its mission. Austria has been dying ever since the dawn of her greatness. She was doomed from the beginning to decay, to future paralysis. Morgarten and Sempach appear at the very opening of her historical career. From the first, she has been a compromise. She is essentially a contradiction of the principles of liberty and independence of nations.

Apart from the visible reason for existence, the result of well-known treaties, another invisible and incalculable force supported this complex construction. On one side the slavery of the Christian East, on the other, all the young, unstaple nations under the protection of her imperial cloak, of no particular nationality or form, as if they were in an immense historical incubator.

The day that the nations of the Christian East took up the rudely interrupted work of their national spirit and the sap, benumbed by the Ottoman might, began to rise in the worm-eaten timbers, on that day a few far-seeing people discerned the first cracks in the Austrian structure, which, in its turn, restrained and stifled the new-born energies.

This structure had long sheltered young liberty. Grouped around a throne from which the Roman ideas had not yet been banished, these young nations expanded and their development was able to take place almost in obscurity and in oblivion. Without the protection of the Holy Empire, a powerful political organization, founded on a rapacious and conquering race, would inevitably have stifled these precious and indispensable elements of the social and harmonious progress of the civilized world. But unconsciously the incubator brought about its own destruction. Eastern revolution joined hands with Western evolution. It was no use Austria having built up a personal right on the foundations of the rights of her wards. It was no use Hungary, Latin in former days, Christian and international,

inventing a state right for her Touranian race on the remains of the liberties of the confederated nations. Austria and Hungary—the latter as a dynastic department—had seen their day. Henceforward the Monarchy fought only to perpetuate a falsehood, to substitute artificial conditions for life, to make a transitory function into a permanent one.

Ever since the immoral triumphs of Radetzky up to that other General who, after having offered his sword to Serbia (what a symbol!) uselessly attacked the avengers of the liberty of Democracy in the Alps, the whole history of the Austrian House is, at bottom, just a stubborn struggle against a historical fact as irrevocable as the regeneration of Europe after the monstrous hecatombs of to-day.

History would have followed her procession to the tomb, if it were not for the crimes of the present, the systematic destruction and emasculation of whole nations, the swinging of innumerable poor human beings from improvised gallows, the merciless destruction which she cynically accompanies by the pastoral concert of disarmament and arbitration!

The procession cannot be formed. History cannot trouble about that. She can only note that massacres, coldly ordered and savagely executed, are the paradoxical proof of the uselessness of a power. The spring is poisoned. In reducing the problem of her existence to the simple formula of the elimination of other healthy, young and vigorous organisms, she has cried aloud the confession of her uselessness. She has pronounced the fatal word: the one will kill the other. There is no room for two definite formations in a durable and pacific foundation. There are but two things in opposition: the cult of the State and life.

Federalism, that bait offered to those tired of the war, is, from now, converted into a sort of centralization of the gallows. When the veil is torn aside and a false frontage, erected by those same mean instruments of the past reign, shows up against the background of the general conflagration, it will be seen that a few nations have been crushed and that the axis of future aggressions has been altered. Artificial conditions will have abolished life, and falsehood, reality. The tumbril will have passed over youthful enthusiasm

which promised the regeneration of a world filled with joy and hope.

But I do not believe even in the frontage. I do not believe in any transformation, even one patronized by Lammasch or a Czernin. I firmly believe that Austria's existence is unnecessary.

Austrian federalism, if it could be realized, would only be a superfluity. A useless creation, an old machine patched up, an out-of-date force which might in other days have signified balance of power; to-day—after the terrible demonstration of 1914 unable to mean more than an hindrance, an obstacle, compression.

Austrian federalism could only be a *statu quo* aggravated by all the hatred, all the destruction, all the incompatibilities, all the blasphemies accumulated during this revolution which we persist in calling a war. Federalism was impossible in the best days of a divided Germany; it could not exist with a German nation that has given ample proof of vitality and aggressive power.

The systematic destruction of the Slav people between the Danube and the Adriatic, the ruins heaped up on the Save, the Morava, the Drave and higher on the Vitava and still higher on the Vistula, are they then the prelude of a new pacific incarnation of a House of which history has never recorded a single impulse of generosity, of liberality, of pity or greatness? Is the Imperial Byzantine cult transmitted from grand-uncle to grand-nephew, a symptom of democracy?

To think this is to insult the new forces appearing on the horizon proclaiming themselves ready to replace the fallen idol. To believe this, is to condone the vexations suffered by the Four Cantons, the horrors of Alba, the massacres of Hanau. It bars the road to the avengers of progress and the emancipation of the nations.

Disarmament? But Austria could not do without a large army! Can one imagine the House of Habsburg condemned to look helplessly on at civilian strife and the claims of irredentism, which, once the war over, would again take up their underground work which is but the inexorable result of a law of attraction.

No, the ancient Monarchy is no longer capable of directing the affairs of young democracies. Neither its personnel, nor its methods, nor the mentality of its princes, nor the prejudices of its magistrates, nor the pride of its aristocrats, nor the German oligarchy, nor the Magyar oligarchy, nor its past, nor its present, allow it to erect itself on the doorstep of the new epoch as a guarantee of equality, as a regenerating influence, as a mediator and tutor of the different nationalities.

It seems to me that the gravest danger of the present time—political and military—is precisely this attempt to galvanize a political organism which has had its day. The fatality of all purely accidental combinations overshadow the whole drama of the tragic reality of a struggle without quarter, of the sanguinary enterprise undertaken by the sworn enemies of Democracy, to save the “brilliant second.”

So, the partisans of a “regenerated Austria” owe us—after the experience of these tragic years—a clear and convincing answer to our question which embraces all the others: How do they intend to reconcile with the ruins of this war, with the gruesome manifestation of social and political powerlessness of the ancient Monarchy; reconcile, I say, the existence of a powerful Austria with the peace of Europe?

Austria has taken it upon herself to answer this difficult problem. To me, the preservation of an administration at the expense of the genius of its greater nations would be but an ominous gloomy armistice. Present endeavours tend merely to be ridiculous, based on an acknowledgment of the terrible futility of the sacrifices made.

October 28, 1917.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE ALLIES.

The Austro-Magyars are triumphant. The war, which was to end in the total dispersal of the artificial monarchical régime, takes on at the present time a very strange aspect. The Russian question is discussed at Brest-Litovsk under the presidency of an old Turk, whilst the fiftieth anniversary of the Austro-Magyar compromise is celebrated in Austria-

Hungary. After the elimination of the only Power that troubled it, the Monarchy prepares to breathe again and continue its policy of slavery and conquest. The hour of anguish at Vienna and Budapest, where the lying spirit of conciliation has already given way to the habitual arrogance, is past. Why not? The risky game played, first of all with the convocation of Parliament and then with the Delegations, seems to have succeeded admirably. Europe remains indifferent to all the declarations and all the terrible revelations made by the Slavs to Parliament and the Delegations. Such indifference surprises even the Germans and their Austro-Magyar friends. What is now more natural than to see them publicly mock the most legitimate aspirations of the enslaved peoples?

The Southern Slavs, the Czechs, the Poles, the Ruthenians, have declared to Parliament that they will no longer tolerate the Germano-Magyar domination and that they have only one desire: to free themselves from their present masters and form independent States. The Allies, who profess to be fighting for the liberties of all nations have accepted this significant declaration with extraordinary indifference. The Slav deputies then made violent accusations against the Monarchy, proving that it has treated its Slav subjects like slaves and that it has consequently lost all moral right to speak of its alleged civilizing mission. And the Allies? They do not even wish to entertain the idea of interfering in the internal affairs of Austria-Hungary and prefer to ignore the atrocities which really should be judged by an international court.

In face of this inconceivable attitude, the Austro-Magyars became bolder. They resolved also to convoke the Delegations and when the Slav delegates, with admirable courage, repeated their demands for liberty and independence, the Magyars, Tisza and Andrassy, were instructed to reply that the Monarchy knows only one nation and that no one will be permitted to attack the idea of duality. Count Czernin and Chevalier Seidler repeated this declaration; and the Emperor's speech from the throne to the Delegations contains the same assurance. The Slav deputies are not discouraged; they publicly denounce the falsification of the

Russian Maximalist Government's manifesto; they demand that delegates from the different nationalities should be sent to Brest-Litovsk and do everything in their power to prevent the continuation of slavery.

The Austro-Germans accuse them of working for the Entente, but the Entente remains deaf. It has not yet declared itself ready to grant political independence to the Slavs of Austria-Hungary! The Allied diplomats talk a lot about the people's right of self-determination but they have not reduced this noble principle to a concrete political programme. The Slavs of Austria-Hungary cry aloud in demanding liberty and independence, but there is no reply from the Allies to these courageous manifestations, no encouragement to persevere, no promise of help. One could almost say there is the reverse when reading the ambiguous phrases employed by the statesmen of the Allies when speaking of the Austro-Hungarian question!

How can this attitude be explained? We know very well that the German power is not yet broken and that without complete victory the Slavs cannot be snatched from the Germano-Magyar grasp. But we do not understand why the Allies do not wish to call to arms, in the struggle with the Germans, these same people on whom, according to the principles generally accepted up to now, they are going to confer liberty. Why do not the Allies state their war aims clearly in recognizing formally that they mean to establish a united and independent Poland, an independent Czecho-Slovakia, an independent Serbia united to her Serbo-Croat-Slovene brothers of the Monarchy, a Roumania united to her brothers of Austria-Hungary? Such a declaration would have immense effect and would put an end to all equivocal ideas. The peoples of Austria-Hungary would then know that the Allies were bringing them liberty and would redouble their energy in the struggle with the oppressors. Even the recent declarations of Lloyd George and Balfour are too vague to produce the desired effect. And as, once Prussian militarism is broken, the Allies will not spare Austria-Hungary, that principal pillar of Germanism, then why not say clearly that the Allied victory will bring liberty and independence to the oppressed Slav peoples? Vienna

and Berlin have the impudence to dispose of Serbia, Belgium and the other invaded countries. Why then should Paris, London and Washington shrink from telling the Czechs and Southern Slavs, for example, that they will be independent States?

Or else, do they wish to preserve Austria-Hungary at all costs, in spite of the opposition of its peoples?

December 30, 1917.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

Mr. Lloyd George has given to the delegates of the Labour Party a long explanation of the reasons for which Great Britain and her Allies are fighting. Speaking more particularly of war aims, Mr. Lloyd George, besides the general principles which guide the allied nations in their struggle with Germanism, also indicated a few concrete solutions without which a durable peace would be impossible in Europe.

The British Premier expressed himself, as usual, in firm and simple language. Great Britain, he said, is still resolved to prolong the war until these three essential objects are attained: (1) the re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties; (2) the territorial settlement founded on the people's right of self-determination, that is to say, on the consent of the inhabitants; (3) the institution of an international organism limiting the burden of armaments and diminishing the probabilities of war. In developing and justifying this policy of the Allied countries, Mr. Lloyd George insisted most of all on the second point, which is of paramount importance. "The times of the Treaty of Vienna are very distant," he said. "We can no longer leave the future of European civilization to the arbitrary decisions of a handful of negotiators trying to guarantee the interests of such and such a dynasty or of such and such a nation. The settlement of the new Europe must be founded on principles of reason and justice which guarantee its stability. That is why we think that government by the consent of the people should serve as the basis of all the territorial settlements which follow this war."

Yet passing from these principles to the question of their application, Mr. Lloyd George expressed an opinion on the Austro-Hungarian question which, although formally conforming to the principle of the liberty of peoples and their right of self-disposal, represents, in reality, a serious eclipse in the general policy of the Allies. Mr. Lloyd George's express declaration that the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary is not part of the Allies' war aims is in flagrant contradiction with the principle established at the beginning of his speech, i.e. that the territorial settlements in Europe must be made with regard to the wishes of the respective nations. What aggravates the disastrous effects of such a declaration respecting the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary, is that Mr. Lloyd George has made a very debatable distinction, saying that an independent Poland is a necessity for Europe, from which one would conclude that according to Mr. Lloyd George, an independent Czechoslovakia or Jugoslavia would not be in the interests of Europe !

It is also to be noted that Mr. Lloyd George has not taken into account the repeated manifestations of the representatives of the Slav races of the Monarchy, unmistakable manifestations concerning the ardent desire of the Slavs to be rid of the Austro-Magyar yoke. If Mr. Lloyd George thinks that the effective liberation of the Slavs is compatible with the preservation of the Dual Monarchy it is an error of which the consequences may be incalculable. To suppose that the Austro-Magyars will consent some day to put themselves on the same footing as the Slav people is to show a dangerous lack of comprehension of the true character of the Dual Monarchy.

What interests us Serbians most is the idea, which may also have suggested itself to Mr. Lloyd George, that, after the Russian defection, it would be possible to look to a regenerated Austria-Hungary as a likely Ally for the struggle against Germany. The error of 1870 would thus repeat itself and instead of aiding the birth of national States, young, vigorous, jealous of their independence and resolute adversaries of Germanism, it would only be giving new life to a decayed organism which is destined to perish. It would be

an absolutely useless attempt, because Austria, as she exists at present, is incapable of any sort of regeneration. She can only last as long as her bureaucratic and military organization lasts, founded on the absolute preponderance of two privileged races, the Magyars and the Germans. To touch these, the very foundations of the Austrian idea, means that the Monarchy is doomed to dissolution. The Serbians are not the first to see this. The Germans and the Magyars know it even better than we do. The eminent English publicist, Mr. Wickham Steed, after having studied the Austro-Hungarian problem on its own ground, insists above all on the artificial character of the bonds which unite the out-of-date edifice of the Habsburgs.

If Mr. Lloyd George wishes to negotiate with the Habsburgs and deliver the Slavs of the Monarchy to their mercy, his allusion to the preservation of Austria-Hungary would have a practical meaning. But as any idea of such a betrayal of the oppressed peoples is, we are convinced, completely foreign to the British Government, we fail completely to understand this passage, which reads so badly in the speech of a man in whom the enslaved peoples place all their hopes.

January 12, 1918.

THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES AND THE HOUSE OF HABSBURG.

From the latest speeches of President Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George, one would be inclined to believe that the policy of conciliation and understanding, which the two leaders recommend, could only be realized by sacrificing the Southern Slavs, to whom, this time, the "opportunity for a more extensive autonomous development" is promised. In reading those portions of the speeches relating to the Austrian Slavs one seems to live again through the nightmare of the days which preceded the conclusion of the famous Treaty of Berlin, when the former enemies came to an agreement at the expense of the Serbian people, to the detriment of its legitimate aspirations. Before the opening of the Congress, the fate of the two Serbian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina was sealed by the secret conventions passed between Great Britain and Austria (June 6, 1878)

and Austria and Russia (July 13, 1878). That was, after the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, which took place a few years before, the greatest injustice committed during the nineteenth century. This injustice weighed heavily on the destiny of Serbia and on the conscience of Europe, on whom it imposed the system of an "armed peace," in force ever since. It is in this injustice, as in that committed at the expense of France by the Treaty of Frankfurt, that we must look for the real causes of the war.

During a certain period of the present war, it really seemed as if the faults of the past would never be repeated in the future. But it would be, perhaps, easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for Western statesmen, even those the most gifted, to understand certain political problems of South-Eastern Europe and to comprehend their meaning and importance. That is why it seems useful to us to note here the danger of a policy of which the effects will lose no time in making themselves felt, and which imperils the very existence of the Southern Slav world. It is in fact the question of the future of all the Southern Slavs whom the Austro-Germans, before the war, intended to reduce to a sort of political isolation and whom the leaders of the Western democracies think good to abandon to their fate.

The latest speeches of the leaders of the Western democracies, compared with the preceding ones, shows a notable falling back in respect of their previous undertakings, regarding the Slav races of the Dual Monarchy.

To begin with, in treating the Polish question, Mr. Lloyd George speaks this time as if it were a political combination necessitated by the international situation: "A free and independent Poland must be created in order to maintain the balance of power between the West and Germany." The principle of nationality is, therefore, no longer invoked in favour of the restoration of this civilized country, but the out-of-date principle of the European balance of power, the same reason as is given for preserving the out-of-date edifice of Austria-Hungary!!

On the other hand, according to the same speeches, the fate of the Southern Slavs seems to be sufficiently guaranteed

by the autonomy which it is hoped to obtain for them. In reality, most of the Austrian Slavs have long possessed their autonomy. But, this word does not mean much in a state like Austria-Hungary which does not hesitate to tear up even international Treaties as soon as they become irksome.

Since 1868, Croatia possesses the famous "Nagoda" (agreement, contract) which the Magyars concluded with her immediately after the compromise with Austria, despite which, since that time, the history of Croatia is but a long series of illegalities and arbitrary acts. In spite of the Nagoda, Khuen Hedervary, who governed Croatia during twenty years (1883-1903) succeeded in making this "autonomous" country into a Hungarian province, the worst treated and most miserable of provinces.¹ The reign of oppression and violence which he inaugurated there was only surpassed by that of the government of Kallay in Bosnia.

The Serbians of Hungary also enjoyed an autonomy accorded them in 1848 at the time of the revolution.² But that autonomy only lasted as long as the House of Habsburg was in danger. The famous compromise (1867) in confirming the hegemony of the Magyars, put an end to the liberty of the Serbians in Hungary. That is why the Southern Slavs can place no faith in the attractive promises made to them on all sides.

And now, when they talk of freeing the small nations of Asia and Africa, and the provinces of Asia Minor from the Turkish yoke, it is proposed to leave the Serbians and Croats in the hands of the Magyars, friends and brothers of the Turks!

The Southern Slavs are now invited to re-enter the golden cage which Austria graciously offers them at the request of the Allies. Instead of freeing the oppressed

¹ E. Dennis: *La Grande Serbie*, page 155. Bibliothèque d'Histoire et de politique. Paris, Librairie Delagrave.

² See the edict of Francis-Joseph, dated Olmütz, 15th December, 1848. The Serbian Grande-Duchy "Voïvodina" whose administration, independent from that of Hungary, was directly under the control of the Imperial Ministry, was only created later, 18th November, 1849, and the Emperor added to his titles that of "Serbian Grande Voïvode" which he still enjoys, though the Serbian Duchy of Hungary ceased to exist long ago.

peoples by breaking their chains, these chains are to be lengthened and strengthened. What a strange sight it is to see the Western democracies trying to preserve the possessions of the House of Habsburg at the price of the liberties of the peoples of the Dual Monarchy !

To the principle of nationality, to the rights of race, they wish to oppose the old rights of the House of Austria, the principle of the balance of power and the "reasons of state" of the Magyars ! To the descendants of King Zvonimir and of the Ban Tvrdko, to the peoples with a glorious history, a past of several centuries and an advanced culture, is offered "autonomy" and "the opportunity of greater development." As if, in our times, national independence were not an essential condition of material prosperity !

As to the Kingdom of Serbia, which has lost more than a quarter of its population in this war, reduced to its old boundaries, separated from its brothers and surrounded by enemies, it cannot long exist as an independent State. On the road to the East, the German menace will now only find enslaved Bulgarians and tame Young Turks.

January 19, 1918.

CAN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY EXIST ?

Austria-Hungary is in a precarious position. She is struggling against a situation from which she cannot escape in the form in which she now exists. The peoples, conscious of their rights, are acting on her like a corrosive liquid, provoking a constant uneasiness which it is no longer possible to hide.

The question is to know whether the Habsburg Monarchy is able to prevent the complete development of the people's separatist tendencies and by what means it could satisfy the demands of its races. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the millions of inhabitants which compose the discontented races will be able to organize their national energy in order to oppose successfully their oppressors.

The policy pursued by the Germano-Magyars, all-powerful in the Dual Monarchy, has caused, for centuries, a general

discontent and has fomented the idea of the separation of the subject races. Reforms and innumerable promises could not smooth away the differences which existed between masters and oppressed. The autonomies so often promised no longer enter into the possible settlements because autonomy in any form could be abolished as soon as external dangers had disappeared as has already so often been the case in the history of the Monarchy. Any sort of Austrian federation would satisfy no better the clearly expressed desire of the peoples to live in absolute freedom.

Consequently, the Monarchy, that is to say the Germano-Magyar rulers, know very well that a constitutional arrangement, an internal reconciliation between the rulers and the oppressed, is impossible. It therefore only remains to employ coercive measures in order to bring the peoples to their senses. Nevertheless, something is missing if the reign of the bayonet is to recommence. That iron discipline, that organization which, at the beginning of the war, enabled the rulers to punish the suspected peoples in tyrannical fashion, no longer exists. Something is now changed. The physical and moral exhaustion brought about by four years of war have shaken to its foundations the artificial edifice of the Monarchy. The centrifugal forces of the oppressed peoples are awakened. To-day an immense chasm separates the oppressors from the oppressed. The will of the latter is unanimous and awaits the opportunity to escape from the embrace of the present ruler.

Effectively the organization of the national forces, especially those of the Southern Slavs and Czechs, is being pushed forward with feverish energy. In the Southern Slav countries the movement in favour of the union of all the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, including those of Serbia and Montenegro, is acquiring revolutionary proportions. An Austrophile paper in Croatia thus reluctantly admits the development of national sentiment: "The Southern Slav movement has spread everywhere with such force that one can no longer see or hear anything but Jugoslavism and again Jugoslavism. The Yugoslav wave rises like the tide and carries all before it."

In truth, the wave of Southern Slav nationalism has

moved those who, up till now, have remained inactive and even hostile to this idea, and is making progress in circles where this policy was not familiar. The whole mass of the people, from Catholic priest to international Socialist, are ranged in one camp, that of national independence, free from all authority, even that of the Habsburgs.

In Slovenia, 442 boroughs, 82,086 women, 15 departments and 35 societies have decided in favour of the national programme. The same national plebiscite exists in the other Southern Slav countries. Istria, Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and, above all, Croatia and Slavonia, raise their voices in its favour.

In Croatia, the university students and even the school-boys, throw themselves into the political arena and forward memoranda signed by them to the Southern Slav Club. The wounded in the military hospitals decide in favour of national union and assure the Southern Slav deputies of their unlimited confidence in the results of the struggle which they are waging for the independence of the Southern Slav people. The Catholic priests with their bishops at their head do the same.

The ranks of the Southern Slav combatants become thicker every day and constitute a formidable organization which defies the bayonets and the gallows of the Monarchy.

The following words, pronounced at a Slovenian assembly by the Mayor of the capital of Slovenia, Lioubliana, Dr. Ivan Tavtchar, president of the progressist party, show clearly the resolution of the Southern Slavs :

“ Although there have already been too many hangings and massacres in Austria, we fear that this state of affairs is beginning again. It is said that it is good to die for one’s country, it is not less honourable to die for one’s own people. We ask the Austrian Prime Minister to persecute only us, the old men, who have not much longer to live. In enduring all the persecutions, we shall think : What matters it if we fall, the people will live for ever ” (*Slovenski Narod*, February 4th).

March 2, 1918.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE ALLIES.

A few reflections after Campidoglio.

The formidable battle raging on the Western front will have in all probability immediate effect on the final result of the war. After the check of the German plans it will be the turn of the Allies, by combining all the means necessary for fighting German militarism and instituting, after much loss of blood, new international conditions, which will be more durable, more just and more normal. Eliminating Turkey and Bulgaria, whose fate offers no serious difficulty, these two States having to be punished, first of all, for the conscious aid given to Germanism, and then rendered harmless in the future, there only remains the question of Austria-Hungary which gives birth to serious controversy. The solution is much easier to find in that which concerns Germany. Having obliged her to give up Alsace-Lorraine, Prussian Poland and the Danish provinces, the coalition of the Allied nations has only to examine the particular conditions under which a purely German Germany could be admitted to the organized League of Nations. Here the fate of a purely German Austria and that of the federated States of the German Empire are intimately related, which renders possible a variety of combinations, all of which guarantee the peace of the world. The Austro-Hungarian problem is nevertheless more complicated and it is of it that we wish to speak here, always assuming that the Allies are victorious, which we not only consider a certain and useful event, but rather a logical necessity.

We do not hesitate to utter the plain truth that the Habsburg Monarchy, in spite of all that is happening, is still considered not only as an international unity possessing its rights and duties, but also as a political organization, having its particular reasons for existence which are much more important than the cries of the enslaved peoples, shouting aloud their desire for liberty and independence. A series of events known to every one is there to prove it. During the whole of 1917, America hesitated to declare war on Austria-Hungary and when at last President Wilson had decided to make war on Austria, the effect of this declaration was notably diminished by the formal assurance given

in his latest Note by Mr. Wilson himself that America does not intend to destroy Austria-Hungary.

That which Mr. Wilson has publicly proclaimed, to which Mr. Lloyd George also has given his assurance, are not merely opportune declarations limited in their importance because of the conditions existent when they were made and the particular person who made them. It is the emancipation of the general conviction firmly rooted in Old-European minds of Western diplomacy : that the existence of Austria-Hungary is a political necessity and that the whole problem of the Habsburg Monarchy rests in the question of how to arrive at a more modern organization of this complicated State. As long as Russia existed as a Great Power, France and Great Britain, because of the alliance, considered the Austro-Hungarian question as an affair which interested the Russians only. The idea of using Franco-British troops to destroy Austria-Hungary never seriously entered the heads of the Entente statesmen. When, in 1915, the Serbian Government drew the attention of the Allies to the necessity of fighting on the Save and the Danube and requested that Allied troops be sent to the Balkans, the principal reason for the opposition of France and Great Britain to the Serbian point of view must be looked for in the unwillingness to fight directly against Austria-Hungary. And Italy, did she not negotiate the Treaty of London with the idea, accepted it is true by the whole Entente, that Austria-Hungary would be preserved.

Not only the responsible leaders of the Allies but also, and above all, the vast circles of politicians and public men in all Entente countries possessed and still possess these pro-Austrian ideas. To doubt their good faith would be unjust and useless. In order to fight a political conception it is necessary first of all to know its source and extent. As to the latter, it is immense in the case of Austria-Hungary because the number of those who have declared themselves against the existence of Austria is infinitely small. In Great Britain, public opinion is generally favourable to the Habsburg Monarchy. The writings of Steed, Seton Watson, A. Evans, Taylor and others, in spite of the competence and incontestable authority

of their authors, have not yet shaken the conservative British psychology which is hostile to the destruction of an ancient empire with an ancient dynasty at its head. The great organs of the British Liberal press, are all favourable to the retention of the Habsburgs. The Conservatives, with a few exceptions, profess the same ideas. In France, is there, with the exception of the *Journal des Débats*, a single really anti-Austrian organ of the great press? Not one. The remarkable works on Austria of Chéradame, Gauvin, Jules Pichon, Pierre Bertrand, Ch. Loiseau, E. Fournol, E. Denis and others remain up till now without great influence on French public opinion. The French public makes a difference between German and Austrian from the political point of view and almost always considers the latter as a possible friend of to-morrow. As to Italy, neither has she shown enough energy in the struggle with Austria on the whole, and it is only lately that Italian public opinion has begun to see the Austro-Hungarian problem in its true light. I do not mention that small number of Italians who have understood since the beginning of the war how much is at stake and what are the forces in question; only history can judge their work which has unfortunately long remained without immediate effects.

The origin of the Austrian mirage is therefore deeply rooted and will not be easily destroyed. This mirage is founded on the idea that some day Austria will cease to be the ally of Germany and will become, more likely, her rival. The idea itself is not at all Utopian. It is based first of all on history, which shows, up to 1866, a determined rivalry between Prussia and Austria. It is supported also by the supposition that the ancient Habsburg dynasty could not in the end submit to the supremacy of the Hohenzollerns. The diversity of the nationalities who, being in majority anti-German, might some day end by throwing off the German influence, is also an argument in favour of this thesis. That it is in the interests of France and Great Britain to have as an ally in Europe an anti-German Austria is irrefutable, and since the Russian defection this interest has become even more visible.

To Germany, as a continental force, must doubtless be

opposed a new continental force and it is not surprising at first to see, in Austria-Hungary, this balance against German power. England, in spite of her present army, will remain a naval power in the future and instead of counter-balancing the continental power of Germany herself, will probably prefer, partly at least, to put a reformed Austria-Hungary in charge of that duty. As to America, besides the British reasons which she also shares, there is that political mentality favourable to the federation principle, which the Americans are ready to substitute for the principle of nationality. Federalism is regarded as a good means of reconciling the nationalities and bringing them all under the same roof. Just as nationality is a natural, psychological principle, so is federalism an artificial creation but its practical results are not to be disdained. That is why America seems to see in the federalization of Austria the best means of obtaining the liberty of the races and the separation of the Habsburg Monarchy from Germany.

There must therefore be no illusion. The Allied powers still count on the preservation of Austria and the manifestation of the last few days is powerless to change a line of thought that is as old as the whole European political system. An understanding of the nationalities is a necessary achievement but it will not move the Slav masses in Austria-Hungary. The non-Magyar and non-German people must receive formal assurances that their fate will no longer depend on Austria and that it will be settled according to their wishes. Public opinion in France, Great Britain, Italy, and America must also examine in a more critical spirit the arguments invoked in favour of the Habsburg Monarchy. On one hand, the official policy of the Allies must inscribe on its programme the deliverance of the peoples of Austria-Hungary so that they may decide their own fate. On the other hand, Allied public opinion must be cured of its illusion that the above-mentioned elements are sufficient to change the character of Austria, externally and internally. Austria will remain as she is or else she will disappear completely in order to make room for the national states who will be free to federate afterwards if they wish to do so. *Tertium non datur*. An intermediate solution of the Austrian problem

is an impossibility. That is why the Congress of Rome, which means a step forward in the Austrian problem, should serve as a warning to the Allies. The preliminary understanding realized between M. Torre's committee and the committees of the different oppressed nationalities, is too delicate an achievement to be able, alone, to change the pro-Austrian mentality of numerous official circles. And just as the enslaved races of Austria-Hungary will rejoice on learning that their representatives have proclaimed the unity of the views held by themselves and the Italians, so will their joy and resistance be multiplied ten times when they learn that Mr. Wilson and Mr. Lloyd George no longer consider the existence of a Habsburg Austria as being in the interests of Europe.

May 4, 1918.

THE FEDERALIZATION OF AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

In his article of August 16th entitled: "The Czech Nation," Mr. W. Martin, political editor of the *Journal de Genève*, explains his idea of the reformation of the Austro-Hungarian State. "The most favourable solution of the Austrian problem, as of the Russian problem, for all the European races is federalism. All the Allies and even those of their publicists who are most hostile to Austria-Hungary agree on that point but they think that, in order to realize the Union of the races of the Monarchy, the Monarchy itself must first be destroyed. On our part, it seems to us to be simpler, more logical, safer and shorter to invoke the aid of the man who is the greatest supporter of federalism in the Empire, the Emperor."

Mr. Martin forgets that in their conception of the Austro-Hungarian problem, the Allied leaders start from two principles: that of liberty which expresses itself by the recognition of the right of peoples to decide their own fate and that of justice which expresses itself thus: no negotiations with the enemy are possible before victory. One does not negotiate with the guilty, one judges and condemns him. As regards the Allies, Austria is as guilty as Germany. Therefore the fact, which seems so simple, so logical, so safe and so

expeditions to Mr. Martin, who, as a practical man, extols a policy of compromises—does not appear in quite the same light to the Allies and their leaders. They prefer their own principles to the Emperor even if he is, as Mr. Martin says, the greatest supporter of federalism.

Mr. Martin appears rather behind the times with his principles. They are really those of the fifteenth century. He even says that the Allies are fighting for the balance of European power! As to the principle of nationality, which is a modern principle, Mr. Martin hardly takes it into account or else he could not have expressed himself as follows, in the same article, on the Czech nation: "But, it will be said, in all this you are forgetting the interests of the Czechs? Not at all, we have them very much at heart. But races, no matter how valiant, can do nothing against geography." This is not only the contradiction of the principle of nationality but also of that of liberty and independence on which is founded the existence of Switzerland herself. If William Tell and the heroes of the Grütli had had the same ideas of liberty as Mr. Martin, Switzerland would be in the same condition as unfortunate Bohemia. Luckily, there were men in Switzerland who refused to accept "geographical" reasons without discussion.

The Austrian federalism about which Mr. Martin makes so much fuss is a pure Utopia because everything in the Dual Monarchy conspires against it. There is hardly any political factor of importance except, perhaps, the Emperor, that is not opposed to it. But the consent of the confederated is essential to federalism. Nevertheless all the peoples of Austria-Hungary, the oppressed as well as the privileged, resist with all their might the very idea of a federalist reform, none of them finding it to their advantage.

First of all there are the Germans of Austria, the same who, in other days prevented the first attempt at conciliation of the nationalities by overthrowing the Badeni Ministry in 1897.¹ Their House of Commons has just voted a protest against the federalist reform in view.

Secondly, there are the Magyars as Mr. Martin himself

¹ Count Badeni decreed the Laws of 5th April, 1897 on the equality of languages in Bohemia and Moravia.

admits in his article of August 12th, on *The Reformation of Austria-Hungary*. Thirdly, there are the oppressed nationalities : the Czecho-Slovaks, the Serbo-Croatians and Slovenes, the Italians, the Roumanians, and Poles. Mr. Martin should not ignore the resolutions of Prague, of Zagreb, of Loubliana, nor the speech of the Southern Slav deputy, Tressitch Pavitchitch, pronounced in the Austrian Parliament on February 22, 1918, and that of the Czech deputy, Dr. Stransky, made in the same place on July 22, 1918. There are not a "few emigrants" but the real leaders and most authorized representatives of the peoples who pleaded for the separation of the nations of the Austro-Hungarian State, and this in the middle of the Austrian Parliament. There can therefore be no doubt concerning the will of the peoples of the Monarchy to separate and constitute free and independent States. Their desire is also proved by all the resolutions of the above-mentioned Congresses where the whole organizations of the peoples loudly and clearly manifested their wishes. Mr. Martin's sophisms and paradoxes prove nothing against these facts. Here is one of the most noticeable : "The Czecho-Slovaks are fighting in order to restore an eastern counter-balance to the German power. It would be truly paradoxal if their efforts should end by depriving Europe of the counter-balance represented by the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy." Therefore, according to Mr. Martin, the Czecho-Slovaks are fighting in Russia against the Austro-Germans for the preservation of Austria-Hungary !

They would be forging their own chains if they fought for the Allies. That would be a paradoxical fact !

In treating the question of Austrian federalism, we have indicated the obstacles of an internal character. But there is one external factor which must be reckoned with, that is to say, the alliance of Austria with Germany. The latter's opposition should be taken into consideration because, whatever Mr. Martin may think, Germany will never resign herself to losing such an important ally by permitting the reorganization of Austria-Hungary, on the basis of a federalism founded on equal rights. All the theories by which Mr. Martin tries to suggest the idea of a secret desire of Germany to see her ally ruined, cannot hold good against the fact that an Austrian

vassal of 52 million souls would always be more useful to Germany than a dismembered Austria where she would only dominate a part of the Monarchy.

In rough lines, these are the principal characteristics of the Austro-Hungarian reforms. A federal Austria is therefore a political impossibility and that is why there is hardly an honest person, not even in Austria-Hungary, who still believes in the realization of this reform. The protagonists of this idea, as Mr. Martin justly observes, are recruited exclusively in the German part of the country. This is sufficient to put any sensible man on his guard against the plans made to the order of the official theorists. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Martin persists in lending a friendly ear to the federalist plans of the Lamaschs, the Renners,¹ the Redlichs, etc., and seems to believe in the sincerity of their theories.

A good Swiss and a good republican, he sings in praise of the Emperor Charles who, according to him, "has the great merit to have realized the gravity of the problem and to have seen a solution for it." In his enthusiasm for the young Emperor, Mr. Martin goes so far as to impute to the unhesitatingly young sovereign the merit of an intention which is dictated to him exclusively by the instinct of self-preservation. This is making a virtue of necessity.

In his article of August 20th, Mr. Martin sympathizes with the fate of the young Emperor and ends by these words: "Whilst Charles I defends at Spa and Strasbourg the integrity of his Empire and the balance of European power against the greed of Germany, while he suffers for what are, in reality, the interests of the Allies, he receives nothing on all sides but kicks and invective. This spectacle is one of the saddest and most moving in history when one thinks of the interests in question, compromised by a war prolonged

¹ The Federalism of Renner is a federalism which differs very much from that preached by Mr. Martin. Renner's federalist theories are expounded in his work entitled: *Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen mit Cesonderer Anwendung auf Oesterreich Ungarn*, 1918. He extols a federal system tending above all to assure in the future Austro-Hungarian State a predominance of the Austrian Germans. The Germans therefore would be the gainers from this federalism and not the Slavs as Mr. Martin thinks.

perhaps by stubbornness, and of what a Richelieu, a Talleyrand or a Bismarck could have made of such an opportunity." While Charles I sends his troops to fight the Allies, Mr. W. Martin says that the young Emperor "suffers for what are, in reality, the interests of the Allies." Whilst mangled France bleeds under the blows which she has received in a war provoked by Austria, and whole nations groan under the oppression of Germany and her Allies, Mr. Martin deplors the fate of the young sovereign because he "receives kicks and invective on all sides." Mr. Martin has a grievance against the Allies for having brought about the failure of the young Emperor's federalist plans. "If they have failed," he says, "it is because they met with two insurmountable obstacles: the hostility of the Hungarians and the Allies. The Emperor Charles hoped that the Allies would accept federalism as a formula of conciliation and a solution to the national questions. But these peace offers reached Paris a fortnight too late and this slight anachronism has compromised the whole work."

We do not share Mr. Martin's regrets because of the "compromised work" because we do not see what good it could be to humanity that the Slav and Latin races of Austria-Hungary, races who love and are perfectly worthy of liberty, should be under the domination of a foreign dynasty and governed by a sovereign, himself a vassal of another autocrat more powerful than he. Does not Mr. Martin himself say of him: "Truly, in being faithful, Charles I has no choice. It was the faithfulness of a prisoner to his gaoler."

How then does not Mr. Martin see that the young Emperor, being himself deprived of his liberty, can hardly give it to others?

The Austro-Hungarian problem is a Gordian knot impossible to untie, therefore it must be cut. Mr. Wilson will cut it, as his speech on Washington's tomb, July 4, 1918, proves.

September 14, 1918.

A NECESSARY SETTLEMENT.

The Magyar aristocracy bestirs itself, after having brought its people to the verge of a catastrophe of the worst order.

Artfully it distributes the different tasks. Carolyi against Tisza, Apponyi against Andrassy. Count Apponyi is a typical representative of these Touranian aristocrats, brought up by the Kalschberg jesuits, a master of French and English, very charming to the Europeans and who, if he were in power, would have thought of nothing more urgent than the suppression by an educational measure, *more turcico*, of the freedom of the educational liberties of the non-Magyar nationalities. It is profoundly deplorable to see the almost agonizing interest with which a certain portion of the press, with its eyes fixed on the latest news from Budapest, watches the speeches, the letters and the programmes of these oppressors of the people, in the hopes that something might come of them which would prevent the complete fulfilment of the destiny of a backward and dismal world.

But indeed Mr. Carolyi would like to shift his responsibility and that of his friends. "He and his friends," he says, "followed in their foreign policy" (note the eternal Magyar megalomania) "a line of conduct which would bring about the diminution of the antagonism between the European nations and a conciliation of the hostile groups of Powers."

You have read aright! Count Carolyi's policy "would bring about a diminution of the antagonism between the European nations!" It is difficult to keep cool in such a tragic hour! I find Count Carolyi a thousand times more dangerous than Count Tisza who, on his side, has but one idea: to step into the shoes of the German Emperor and go to Salonica. Count Tisza, who declares—to the frantic applause of the House—at the very moment when the Russian wave was breaking on Czernowicz—that after the war "one will see what the Hungarian nation has done for the position of the Monarchy as a great Power," and is therefore nothing but a docile instrument of German Realpolitik.

Carolyi, on the other hand, is a dangerous dreamer because he does not see that the war broke out simply because his efforts and those of his peers since 1868—immediately after Deak's momentary generous offer—have constantly tended not "towards a policy which would bring about a diminution of the antagonism between the nations" but to embitter these antagonisms by introducing a system of repres-

sions and conquests, by the supremacy of one race, by a closer co-operation with the block formed by the Central Empires and he and his colleagues, from whom he would like to separate *in articulo mortis*, have only accelerated the inevitable movement of reaction which was bound to be followed by the collapse of an edifice founded on violence and mystification.

Only the Slavs and Roumanians were in a position to judge this people. The inferior race, the "second class citizens," the political, social and economic pariahs—these are the only competent judges, the advisers to whom Europe would never listen, whom she has always refused. Ah! if one had only listened to the complaints of the nationalities, the only people who foresaw everything! But no. The ambassadors had smiles and considerations only for the hundred personages who occupied the front of the stage. Mr. Roosevelt, the great President of the great democratic and federal Republic, during his famous tour of 1907, had only flowers for "immortal Hungary," for the "virtuous," "chivalrous" generator of a great progress, at the very time when a funeral pall was spread over the liberties of the Croatians, Serbians, Slovaks and Roumanians entrusted by Divine Providence to the chosen people of St. Stephen's Crown. And who has forgotten the ecstasies of Mme. Juliette Adam, before the altar of the "Hungarian Fatherland"—there were no others!—repeating the old story of Kossuth and his international band.

These are the sources from which Europe has drawn her knowledge of Hungary! And that is why one fine day she was surprised by this new enemy who had only ingratiated himself with French and English Society in order the better to drown the cries of his victims.

And now? Ask Mr. Carolyi. How does he intend to regulate the future condition of Hungary? He will give you the same answer as Mr. Tisza, Mr. Apponyi, Mr. Polonyi, or Mr. Andrássy or any other Magyar politician, be he noble or plebian: he will talk about the right of the Magyar Orszàg, the reason of state of the Hungarian State, the supremacy of the Magyars, the only "political" nation of all the countries of the Crown of St. Stephen, and the absolute

supremacy of the Budapest Parliament. If he condescendingly consents—because after all the Russians, and to day the Roumanians, are knocking at the door—to promise concessions to the nationalists, to promise universal suffrage and other “liberties” do not believe him. They are but the promises of a Young Turk at bay, broken as soon as they are made.

Separation from Austria, the integrity and independence of Hungary stretching from the Carpathians to the Save and the mountains of Transylvania—that would be worse than the present dualism ! As long as she lived with Austria, the Slavs had to be given a little consideration, if only for the automatic reasons of the balance of power between two parts of a whole. Separated from Austria, mistress in all the countries which she has exploited so thoroughly, it would mean the reign of terror of the worst order. It would mean delivering the Slav populations into the hands of the centralizing system of the Young Turks, of those whom Gladstone has qualified by the scathing remark : “ the negation of God.”

Hungary must disappear as a hypertrophical formation founded on the supremacy of one race over all others, of a race of five millions over races of twelve millions. She must return to her ethnical boundaries since she has not known how to be just or benevolent to others.

Give her a purely commercial opening to the Sea, independent of her authority, and let her leave Europe in peace and be forgotten. As to the Magyar people we wish them the conquest of complete universal suffrage (not according to the recipe of Carolyi-Apponyi-Andrassy), and also deliverance from the yoke of an aristocracy, great and small, and from her grotesque imperialism which will fall to pieces with it and with the financial supports of its out-of-date power.

To refuse any proposition tending to separate Hungary from her accomplices, deport the leaders of the aristocracy, convoke the comices on a basis of universal suffrage, install, under control of the Allies, a Magyar government for the Magyars, after having liberated the non-Magyar peoples, that is the great social and political task which historical laws impose upon liberal Europe.

The alliance with the Turks and Bulgarians, the part played in the war, the fanaticism and cruelty of the Magyar troops, the long programme entailing the barring of the road to justice and liberty, should they not have opened even the most refractory eyes?

Tell us what are the fundamental reasons which compel us to treat Hungary with more consideration than the one founded purely and simply upon her national right. Tell us what reasons relating to the European balance of power dictate the re-establishment of this iniquity erected as a State! She has lived too long and has profaned only too greatly the principles of ordinary human liberty, and spoilt the life of so many innocent races who are nevertheless full of possibilities and productive forces!

In settling the political status of Hungary, the formation elsewhere of centres of disorders and decomposition, the reproduction of carriers of infection would have to be prevented by sacrificing, once more, a few nations to the appetite of others. We would therefore have endured the great war only in order to change one problem for another, to stop one hole and open another ten?

The disposal of Hungary as at present constituted appears to us therefore to be the rigorously logical crowning act of the war for justice and the liberty of the different races. To consent to maintain the integrity of Hungary, that is to say the integrity of an oppressive power in the central valley of the Danube and at the gates of the East, is to proclaim henceforth the failure of any really great combinations, the uselessness of any effort, the permanence of the causes which provoked from afar the Great War, and the permanence of the danger to all the small nations of Oriental Europe.

The Budapest Parliament, that parody on the Parliament of Westminster, should no longer shelter the Magyar deputies. A temple of iniquity and reaction whereas that other on the Thames has at all times fostered liberty and had the courage to confess its faults and make the necessary amends—it should no longer be a torture-chamber for the Aryan nations, obliged to look on—when condescendingly admitted—at debates where policy is decided on in a language which they do not understand.

The moral sense of the society engaged in this supreme struggle, the interests of Europe and future peace will only gain thereby.

October 29, 1916.

THE SPEECHES OF WEKERLÉ AND TISZA.

The speech which the new President of the Council, Mr. Alexander Wekerlé, made on September 12th, during the first session of the Hungarian Parliament, constitutes a veritable challenge to all those who demand liberty for the peoples and equality for all. By this speech, applauded by the whole Chamber and accentuated by the subsequent remarks of Count Tisza, the Magyars openly separate themselves from the rest of the world by taking a peculiar and purely Magyar point of view.

It is not, of course, the first time that the Magyars, whose mentality finds some difficulty in agreeing with European ideas, display manifest symptoms which are disquieting for the vitality of their race. Instead of being grateful for the fact that Europe, overlooking their Mongolian origin, has accepted them as equals, the Magyars wish to profit eternally from past historical circumstances and hold in their power millions and millions of non-Magyars. To this end they have invented the theory, taught to every new-born Magyar, that the Magyar power can only subsist by reigning over a dozen millions of non-Magyars. The other races ask nothing better than to free themselves from the foreigners, having confidence in their own powers and capacity, whilst the Magyars pretend that their people will perish if her power over the nationalities which she has enslaved for centuries is taken away. And whilst the other nations call their State national when it is exclusively composed of members of their own race, the Magyars employ a contradictory terminology. Their present State is national according to them because it is formed of several nationalities dominated by the Magyar nationality. If the non-Magyar countries were separated from Hungary, such a Magyar State composed exclusively of Magyars, would be, according to the theories current in Hungary, non-national, because the Magyars

would then have no subjects to oppress ! The recent speeches of Wekerlé and Tisza simply reflect this strange way of thinking which the Magyars, with unspeakable effrontery, constantly express by acts in every branch of their political life.

“ The aspirations of the Austria-Slav politicians,” says Mr. Wekerlé, “ in view of the constitution of independent Slav States within the Monarchy, these aspirations, I must reject as dreams, first of all because they cannot be applied to Hungary and then, above all, because we shall see that they make no progress. . . . The Austrian laws provide no penalties for the attacks on the integrity of Hungary, and it is a very grave fault which we are trying to eliminate in future negotiations.” Count Tisza, speaking after Mr. Wekerlé, went even further, mocking openly the national sentiments of the Austro-Hungarian Slavs. “ What is happening in Austria,” said Tisza, “ are strange grotesque displays of the ridiculous symptoms of the presumptuous mentality of people of no importance.” If to this one adds Mr. Wekerlé’s express statement that he has received the formal assurance of the Sovereign that he will not touch the fundamental basis of Austria-Hungary, one can judge what are the Magyar and Austrian dispositions in view of a peace by compromise. The Magyars are not so clever as the Austrians and far from talking about the conciliation of the peoples, they are prepared to request Austria to prosecute for high treason any Slav manifestation directed against the usurped power of the Magyar rulers. Whilst Austro-German circles spread rumours of peace, a new Austria and a renewal of the Monarchy, the Budapest Chamber qualifies the Slav demand to enjoy the most elementary rights of a civilized people as a “ grotesque phenomenon ” and a “ ridiculous symptom.”

One would really think we were dreaming when we read the speeches of Wekerlé and Tisza, in the middle of the twentieth century and in the very centre of Europe ! And to think that there are serious politicians in France and England who have still a warm corner in their hearts for the descendants of Arpad and their ancient régime !

September 25, 1917.

THE SOUTHERN SLAV UNION AND THE MAGYARS.

The question of the Union of all the Southern Slavs in an independent State is one of the essential questions which await their solution by the war. A people of 12 million souls, split up into numerous provincial administrations, deliberately divided by different legislations with the aim of preventing their natural national union, demands more than ever to-day, before the world, the right to live as an independent State, free from all foreign influence of any description.

The union of the Southern Slavs: Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, can only be realized to the detriment of the present rulers, Germans and Magyars. It is not surprising that the latter should throw all their forces in the balance in order to retain the Slavs whose exploitation affords them many advantages at little cost. They see in the constitution of an independent Southern Slav State an attack on their ancient privileges and that is why they lose their heads when they think of it.

The Magyars demand violent measures in order to stop the Southern Slav movement. For them the question is negligible, so easily do they think to get rid of it. Supported by their own idea of a national state, unitarian and Magyar, they repudiate any idea which could admit of any change whatsoever in the present relations. They consider the peoples of non-Magyar race as tribes incapable of a civilization of their own and who could only become advanced peoples by the aid of Magyar civilization. That is why they reproach the Austrian Government for its alleged feebleness in respect to the demands of its peoples. The Magyars say they are the pillars and supports of the Habsburg Monarchy and the defenders of the German supremacy in Austria. It is not unusual to hear the Magyars say that the centre of gravity of the Monarchy should be removed to Hungary who alone has still the necessary power for the violent repression, if it must be, of the pretensions of the non-Magyar and non-German peoples. This move is considered necessary because Austria, with her hesitations and indecisions, has created such internal troubles that it is difficult to put things in order. Austria ventured—the Magyars say—to promise

a few concessions to her peoples and this has provoked the painful disputes from which she suffers constantly. The Magyars, worthy disciples of their German masters, demand an iron hand for these criminal agitations ! No sentiment and no romance, when it is a question of governing the masses, " the peoples without history."

Such is the Magyar programme from government circles down to insignificant writers. In his programme which he submitted to the Hungarian Parliament a few days ago, the President of the Hungarian Council, Wekerlé, declares that the Hungarian Government will tolerate no attempt on the integrity of the territories of the Crown of St. Stephen, and that it will watch that no change should be made in the Dualist system of the Monarchy. On the other hand, he demands also the incorporation in Hungary of Dalmatia, a purely Slav country.

The manner in which public opinion received the ministerial explanation showed it to be in perfect agreement with it. There are only temperamental differences in the way in which this is expressed. According to some, the gallows should be the instrument for stifling the voices of impertinent crowds. Thus, the Budapest paper *A Nap*, speaking of this question, holds the following comforting prospect before our eyes : " We must perform the cruel duty of hanging on the nearest tree any person coming here from Austria in order to further this propaganda."

The *Pester Lloyd* on its side, although also severe, nevertheless does not recommend this sort of punishment for the agitators. " Korosec " (the leader of the Southern Slavs in Austria), says the paper, " has dared openly to demand the amputation of Jugoslavia from the Empire of St. Stephen, in order to form a great united and independent state, without the President of the Austrian Council having thought fit to protest violently against such audacity. Can the Hungarian Prime Minister remain inactive in the face of such manifestations ? We think that it is already high time to put an end to these extraordinary manifestations by energetic action."

In the face of this anti-national attitude, the Southern Slavs as well as the other peoples of Hungary know what

to expect. Never on any account can they expect the Magyars to realize their just national desires. The Magyars, too spoilt by Europe, are accustomed to dominate others and will not willingly renounce their "historical rights." That is why the abyss dug between Magyars and non-Magyars is only passable if all relations of subordination cease to exist between them. And the day that this takes place the foundations of a durable peace will be laid in this corner of bloodstained Europe.

October 14, 1917.

MICHEL CAROLYI AND OSCAR JASZI.

The Central Powers have recently sent to Switzerland two Magyar emissaries, one a friend of the Entente and the other a democrat, whose reputation should serve as a letter of introduction for eventual conversations with the Allied representatives. Count Michel Carolyi and professor Oscar Jaszi have been given by Count Czernin the mission of explaining to the Allies that honourable peace, without indemnities or annexations, which Vienna, Budapest and Berlin talk of, without ever stating its precise terms. In order to illustrate the task of these emissaries of diverse titles, we think it as well to explain once again their political creed which is such as to inspire the greatest suspicion.

Count Carolyi, the leader of a section of the independent party, is not a convinced supporter of the Austro-German Alliance. Many reasons, which it is useless to examine here, made him incline towards the Entente and he has never hidden his personal sympathies for the British and the French whom he preferred to the Prussians, considered by him as parvenus from the worldly point of view. These sympathies of Count Carolyi for the Entente Powers, have crystallized in the domain of foreign policy into a particular conception, which is not without originality. Like all the Magyars, Count Carolyi considers that the present Hungary, where a Magyar minority strangles a non-Magyar majority, should subsist in the future.

In order to assure for ever this power of the Magyars over the non-Magyars, Tisza, Lukacs, Andrassy, Fájervary,

Apponyi, Hedervary, Wekerlé and other magnates, have joined hands with the Germans. Dualism was the means which assured supremacy over Transleithania, leaving Cisleithania at the disposition of the Germans. Two minorities thus possessed themselves of all the power and, seconded by powerful Germany, governed by sovereign right in the Danubian Monarchy.

This state of affairs had nevertheless the inconvenience of placing the Magyars in international questions at the mercy of Berlin. Hungary was all-powerful internally and and no one opposed the reign of violence and denationalization which she practised towards the non-Magyars. Prince Bismarck, replying to the complaints of the Germans themselves in Hungary, recognized that Germany had a superior interest in not meddling with the internal affairs of Hungary. Because in return, in questions of foreign policy, Hungary was completely subject to the wishes of Berlin. Dualism has proved itself to be a very convenient instrument for winning over the Magyars to the pan-German plans. Nevertheless German influence weighed heavily on the Magyars, the more so because the road to Berlin passed by Vienna, and so, instead of one master, Budapest had two. This explains the hatred which the Magyars have always had for the Germans, hatred born of the powerlessness to separate from them.

Count Carolyi considered, nevertheless, that Magyar supremacy and hegemony in Hungary could be sold at a higher price to the Entente Powers. He thought that for reasons of foreign policy the Western democracies, France and Great Britain, would allow themselves to be persuaded into accepting and recognizing the Magyar power over the Slavo-Roumanian majority, if in exchange Hungary, alone or with Austria, would separate from Germany and join the Entente. The presence of a Czarist and absolutist Russia in the Entente, justified to a certain extent the idea of an integral Hungary entering the alliance of the Western democracies. To help the realization of this combination, Count Carolyi was inspired to promise a democratization of Hungary who, whilst retaining the Magyar supremacy, would have at least the appearance of a democracy. This was not a bad idea

from the Magyar point of view. Hungary would be preserved intact and German influence thrown off. The European war, suddenly provoked by Germany and Austria-Hungary, did not allow Count Carolyi to give a more concrete form to his political conception. It is only now, after the check to the original German plans, that Count Carolyi decides to return to his idea. The visit to Switzerland is evidently for this end. Before the war, Carolyi failed. Will he be more fortunate to-day?

The answer to this question is not difficult. First of all, the ideas concerning the independence and the right of all peoples to dispose of themselves have developed to such an extent that the Entente cannot, without dishonouring itself, conclude any sort of agreement with the Magyars which delivers the majority of the inhabitants of Hungary into their hands. Secondly, Germany has taken root more firmly than ever in Austria and Hungary and it seems impossible that these two powers can escape from the German embrace even if they wish to. That which was already difficult before the present war has become almost impossible to-day. Finally there is the question of the personal confidence inspired by Count Carolyi. Before the war he was not sufficiently well known. The war has obliged him to show himself in his true colours. There is no action in his political career which can seriously recommend him to the Allies. First of all, as Count Tisza says in his paper *Igaz Mondo* (see the *Journal des Débats*, September 10, 1917), Count Carolyi's party energetically supported the war with Serbia in 1914. During the war Count Carolyi has been as vague as possible in all his political manifestations. His famous speech to the electors of Czegled last December was in favour of the preservation of the Monarchy. Pressed for an explanation on the subject of the liberty and independence of the subject peoples, Count Carolyi, in October, expressed the opinion that territorial questions could be referred to the arbitration of a tribunal, adding that Austro-Hungarian diplomacy should in that case exploit the differences existing between the Allies! (see the *Neue Freie Presse* of October 4, 1917). And what is to be said about the demand for the annexation of Serbia made by Count Carolyi to the

Budapest Parliament on September 14, 1917? (see *La Serbie*, of September 24, 1917). And also his strange attitude after the fall of Tisza, an anti-democratic and reactionary attitude? Nor is the last visit of Count Czernin to Budapest nor his long interviews with Count Carolyi before his departure for Switzerland of a nature to increase his prestige. Count Carolyi would like to talk of peace, but this peace, which he offers, is, when all is said and done, but the Austro-Hungarian edition of the German peace.

Professor Oscar Jaszi is an amateur in political affairs and his convictions bear the stamp of his sociological theories. To the oppressed peoples of Hungary, Professor Jaszi says: National liberty is not of much value. What is essential is to live in a political and social democracy. That is why, instead of fighting the idea of the Magyar State, you should yield, remain Hungarian subjects and try to abolish the oligarchy of the great Magyar princes. Before the war, Professor Jaszi may have been popular. The great ideas which have appeared during the war transforming all our conceptions, have nevertheless not even touched the Magyar sociologist, which is regrettable. Jaszi does not understand the importance of the present struggle and remains just as he was before: a Magyar, uneasy as to the fate of ancient Hungary. His whole creed lies in his ardent desire to preserve the territorial integrity of his country! The visit to occupied Serbia and the correspondence published in the *Pester Lloyd*—what a fall!—have notably diminished his authority. His recent article which appeared in the *Vilag* of September 16th, juggling with the Southern Slav question by proposing the union of all the Southern Slav countries to Hungary, has succeeded in opening the eyes even of those who believed in this last and only Magyar democrat.

Such are the emissaries whom Austria-Hungary has sent to Switzerland to preach peace!

December 2, 1917.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLICY OF BULGARIA

I

THE SERBO-BULGARIAN AGREEMENT OF 1912 AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY.

THE Serbo-Bulgarian agreement of 1912 was considered upon the whole as a success for the Entente, which had been working for a long time at the constitution of the Balkanic bloc and the solution of all questions relating thereto, according to the formula: The Balkans for the Balkan peoples. Bulgaria had at last consented to this political combination which did away on one hand with the possibility of Bulgarian hegemony, by keeping Bulgaria's claims within just limits, and on the other hand made this fickle country go over definitely to the side of the Entente. Mr. Guéchoy, the former Bulgarian Prime Minister and one of the authors of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, has in his book, *The Balkanic Alliance*, given the history of the diplomatic negotiations which have resulted in the alliance of the Balkan peoples against Turkey. On reading this book, where one finds also the description of semi-dramatic scenes arranged by the Bulgarian diplomats, such as, for instance, when Mr. Risoff urged Mr. Milovanovitch not to let slip the favourable opportunity which presented itself in consequence of the offers of Sofia, we are inclined to believe in the sincerity of the Bulgarians and the loyalty of their intentions. The only object of the Bulgarians, according to this account, was to deliver Macedonia from the Turkish yoke and, to attain this end, Bulgaria concluded a treaty of alliance with Serbia and bound herself even to defend that country against any Austro-Hungarian aggression. In

diplomatic circles of the Entente they, in fact, believed in the sincerity of the Bulgarians, and in spite of all contrary signs and proofs, this faith has not ceased to be the guide of the Entente in its whole attitude towards the government of Sofia.

To-day, when we throw a backward glance on past events, we are astonished at so much confidence being shown towards a people who did not even take the trouble to hide their double game.

Mr. Milovanovitch, who conducted the negotiations with Bulgaria and who signed the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty, and his successor, Mr. Pachitch, have always had a certain feeling of distrust towards the Sofia government, which acted according to the instructions of King Ferdinand. An agreement with the Bulgarian nation was always possible and realizable as long as Bulgaria only wished to safeguard her own interests. But doubts existed as to the designs of King Ferdinand who was notoriously attached to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. However, Serbian statesmen did not hesitate to accept the Bulgarian conditions, which considerably reduced Serbian claims in Macedonia. In view of the Austro-Hungarian menace, Serbia estimated that Bulgarian friendship was worth the cession of certain Macedonian provinces. If we add further, that Bulgaria, before concluding the treaty of alliance with Serbia, had been carrying on almost simultaneously analogous negotiations with Austria-Hungary, which had, so it was said, no result in consequence of the exorbitant demands of the Danubian Monarchy, the Serbian hope of seeing the alliance with Bulgaria, cancelling all former differences of opinion and inaugurating a new era of progress and prosperity in the two allied countries, will be understood.

But this hope was vain. Bulgaria only wanted to make use of Serbia, and the treaty of alliance ought, according to Bulgarian plans, to have produced effects which were not expected on the Serbian side. This treaty, the clauses of which were also directed against Austria-Hungary, was concluded by Bulgaria with the definite assent of the Dual Monarchy.

We have only to recall to mind the situation in the

Balkans in 1911 and 1912, and especially Turkey's difficulties at home and abroad and the Austrian plans of expansion, which aimed equally at Turkey in Europe and Serbia, in order to understand the character of the secret negotiations between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. The Danubian Monarchy, wishing to get the better of her internal difficulties and the incessant trouble between the different nationalities under her protection, seriously thought that the best means of galvanizing the Empire was to obtain for it a few conquests. An Austro-Bulgarian agreement against Serbia and Turkey was not difficult to realize ; only a pretext was needed for going to war, and it was not to be found. The situation in the Balkans did not permit a straightforward game, because of Russia and even of Roumania. An ingenious method was therefore adopted. With the consent of Austria, Bulgaria would conclude a treaty of alliance with Serbia and attack Turkey. They would incite the Serbians against the Turks and this offensive would open the door to all other combinations. The Austrian General Staff had no great opinion of the Serbian army, and the politicians of Vienna, influenced by this opinion, were sure that the Turks would be easily victorious. It would be a splendid occasion for the Austrians to fly to the help of the Christians, to occupy Serbia and to pacify Macedonia. Once established in the valleys of the Morava and the Vardar, the Monarchy would very well find the means of maintaining its position there.

This game could not remain hidden. We find, indeed, in an article of Mr. René Pinon, which appeared in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (Vol. xiii, February 1, 1913), entitled "Austria's part in the genesis of the great Balkanic conflict," these presumptions expressed with almost absolute precision. Mr. Pinon affirms that an agreement between Vienna and Sofia for the partition of influence in the Peninsula, and even for a territorial partition, had been in the air for a long time, and that it is quite possible that it may be realized. However, in proportion as Serbia freed herself by stubborn effort, from economic dependence upon Austria, as she constituted an army and a government, another solution appeared, of which the formula was : "The

Balkans for the Balkan peoples." But it is not certain that the new combination was not mixed up with some remnants of the other combinations which just a short time before had been looked upon as possible. It would be hard to imagine that King Ferdinand had not made sure of the goodwill of Vienna as well as of Petrograd. It is difficult to know if there existed a written convention between Bulgaria and Austria. It must be remembered that in June, 1911, the great Sobranjé, of Tirnovo, convoked for revision of the Constitution, had decided, in accordance with the wish expressed by the sovereign, that the "king should represent the state in all relations with foreign countries," and that he can conclude treaties without the ratification of the Parliament. We do not know, therefore, what agreements may have been concluded by Ferdinand, but it is difficult to believe that the Balkanic alliance could have been formed and prepared for action without Austria's knowledge of it; and if she did not prevent it, it is because she believed it in her own interests to let things take their course.

Austrian diplomats believed in the victory of the Turks. The opinion most favourable to the little Balkan States was that the Greeks would do nothing, that the Serbians would be beaten, that the Bulgarians alone would cut a good figure and would have, perhaps, some success at the beginning of the campaign, but would be quickly exhausted and as soon as the Turkish masses of troops from Asia Minor would appear on the scene they would be driven back. Mr. Pinon presumes that the Bulgarians themselves feared this, and that they wanted to prepare a line of retreat. Austria-Hungary, therefore, believed in the defeat of the Allies or that, at the most, the Bulgarian successes would be fleeting. From that time her policy was decided upon: she intervened as mediator, she compelled the belligerents to make peace. In case of need her troops advanced in the valley of the Vardar. Peace would be concluded on basis of the autonomy of Macedonia and of Albania. Austria kept the Sandjak and communicated from there with Albania, of whom she obtained the protectorate. Macedonian autonomy was organized under the guardianship

of Bulgaria, who guaranteed to Austria the free disposal of commercial routes and of the port of Salonica. Serbia, eliminated from all combination, and squeezed up between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, should continue to vegetate. This plan corresponded practically to the proposition of Count Berchtold, on the decentralization of Turkey in Europe, that is to say on the formation of the Turkish provinces into an Albania embracing the whole of the old Serbia and placed under the control of Austria, and a Macedonia under the protection of Bulgaria.

Mr. Pinon, in writing this article, considered the Austro-Bulgarian agreement as a measure of precaution taken by King Ferdinand, in case of failure in the campaign against Turkey. After events have proved clearly that Bulgaria indeed counted upon a Serbian defeat, and the Serbian co-operation, which she obtained by the treaty of 1912, was necessary to her in order to facilitate the Bulgarian victory and give Austria occasion to interfere. The astounding victory of the Serbians at Koumanovo, the rapid march of the Serbian troops through the provinces of the former Serbian kingdom, the passage across Albania and the issue on the Adriatic, after the great victory of Monastir, have upset all the Austro-Bulgarian calculations and set at naught all their plans. What has Bulgaria done in presence of this new situation, which she did not count upon? This is what we shall enquire into in another article.

May 21, 1916.

AUSTRO-BULGARIAN COLLABORATION IN THE BALKAN WARS.

Our theory that Bulgaria concluded the treaty of alliance in 1912 with the consent of Austria-Hungary and with the manifest intention of making use of the Serbian co-operation in favour of her imperialistic aims and those of the Monarchy, is confirmed by the political and military events which took place in the course of the Balkan war. The Bulgarian diplomatic action contrary to the said treaty, was first revealed by the journey of Mr. Daney to Budapest, a few days after the battle of Koumanovo. Mr. Guéchoy,

questioned as to the object of this journey, explained that it had been ordered by King Ferdinand, with a view to averting Austrian opposition to the final settlement of Turkey in Europe and rallying Austria to the Bulgarian cause. This declaration of the Bulgarian Prime Minister does not quite explain the mission of Mr. Daney, which the Bulgarian Government had planned and executed without acquainting its former Allies of the whole truth. In fact, the Bulgarians gave to the Allies the difficulties created by Roumania as a reason for this journey to Budapest. To-day one knows that Mr. Daney had been commissioned to come to an understanding with the Austrian politicians on the new conditions of an Austro-Bulgarian collaboration. The Serbian victories had completely upset all the plans of Sofia and Vienna, and a new arrangement was indispensable on account of the great and quite unexpected change which had taken place in the Balkan Peninsula. One understands now why Mr. Daney avoided stopping at Belgrade on returning from Budapest; it was impossible for him to confide to the allied Serbian government the secret of his plot against Serbia.

What were the foundations of the new arrangements between the Austrians and Bulgarians? The situation of the Austrian Government was then very difficult. The Ballplatz was waiting for a fresh Serbian defeat which would give an excuse for Austrian intervention, and there were the Serbians driving back the Turks, occupying the whole of Old Serbia and Macedonia, the Sandjak of Novi Bazar and Northern Albania. The two Serbian kingdoms, Serbia and Montenegro, could at last join hands, the foreign barrier separating them being removed, and the Serbians reached the Adriatic, where they breathed the sea air and liberty gained at last. How to prevent the Serbians from reaping the fruits of their victories? A war against Serbia at a moment when all the Southern Slavs were rejoicing at the Serbian victories as if they were their own was not possible; it would have entailed the general war for which the Germanic Empires wished to have a better pretext. It was decided, therefore, to try to hinder the growth of Serbia by diplomatic means; on the one side, every possible obstacle

would be put in the way of the consolidation of the Serbian conquests, and on the other, encouragement would be given to Bulgarian aspirations.

At the beginning of the Balkan war, Austria-Hungary had carefully avoided complying with the proposal of Sir Edward Grey and declaring her territorial disinterestedness. The hopes of an eventual occupation of the Turkish provinces, fostered by Vienna in expectation of the Serbian defeats which were considered inevitable, prevented the Austro-Hungarian Government from making a declaration of disinterestedness rendering such combinations impossible. After the Serbian victories the Monarchy profited from this circumstance and made some objections to the Serbian conquests in the Sandjak and in Albania. All at once the Monarchy posed as defender of the principle of nationality, and put an absolute veto upon the Serbian occupation of Albania. As Albania had no fixed frontiers, the Austro-Hungarian Government traced out its boundaries in such a way that this imaginary Albania embraced nearly the whole of Old Serbia. One knows all the vicissitudes of that Albanian comedy, which ended at last, thanks to the loyal efforts of Sir Edward Grey to maintain peace, by an arrangement providing for the constitution of an Albanian principality with William de Wied as ruling Prince. The Serbians were turned away from the Adriatic and Albania received as sovereign a German prince. This was a success for Berlin and for Vienna.

The Austrian Government, however, attached much greater importance to the Bulgarian advance towards Constantinople. Bulgaria wanted to profit from the agreement with Serbia and the understanding with Austria-Hungary. The original idea of the Serbo-Bulgarian politicians in concluding the treaty of alliance in 1912, was to deliver the Macedonian provinces from the Turkish yoke. But, while the Serbians were thinking sincerely of an intimate collaboration with Bulgaria, which would lead later to more vast and more useful political combinations, the Bulgarians thought only of making use of the Serbian armies to conquer the whole of Turkey in Europe and share it with Austria-Hungary. The attitude of the Bulgarian Government and

General Staff in the Turkish campaign proves that King Ferdinand unquestionably wished to take Constantinople. The changes in the Serbo-Bulgarian military plans, carried out at the request of the Bulgarians, the dispensation from sending 100,000 men into Macedonia accorded to Bulgaria, the demand for two divisions and for Serbian heavy artillery for the siege of Adrianople, all that revealed the Bulgarian plans; namely, to leave Macedonia and the Serbians alone for the moment and finish with the principal adversary, Turkey. Once at Constantinople, King Ferdinand thought he would easily be able to settle matters with Serbia. If the Serbians refused to give up Macedonia, a means would quite well be found of forcing them to do so.

These plans were approved of by the Austrians. Bulgaria was encouraged by Vienna and Berlin, where they looked favourably upon the advance of these forerunners of the Germans, and in spite of the repulse received at Tchataldja and the impossibility of forcing the Turkish lines, she broke off peace negotiations at London and continued the struggle without taking into account Serbian or Greek interests. But the forces of Bulgaria alone were not sufficient to vanquish the Turks, and the Bulgarian army remained stationary, unable to advance further. Seeing the impossibility of reaching the goal so ardently desired, King Ferdinand profited from the capture of Adrianople, where the Serbian co-operation was of immense importance, and started new peace negotiations. On the advice of Vienna, Bulgaria decided to delay the Turkish plan and to turn her attention to her allies in order to snatch from them the fruits of their victories. All the efforts of the allied diplomacy, particularly of Russian diplomacy, to prevent the rupture and to arrive at a settlement of the question of sharing the conquered territories by means of the arbitration of the Russian Emperor, were in vain, because Bulgaria, after the failure of the Constantinople enterprise, wished to have at least the whole of Macedonia. Eagerly encouraged by Austria-Hungary, she attacked Serbia and Greece in the famous night of the 20th June, 1913, but the affair failed ignominiously. Threatened by Bulgarian aggression, Serbia, Greece and Roumania had come to an under-

standing in order to defend their common interests, and Bulgaria, vanquished and powerless, signed the Treaty of Bucarest, which put an end to the Bulgarian danger.

All these failures taught the Germanic Empires that, in spite of her devotion to their cause, Bulgaria alone could do nothing. It was therefore necessary to adopt a more serious plan, in which Germany and Austria would take a direct part. Italy was sounded (a revelation of Mr. Giolitti) in order to be sure of her co-operation, but Italy refused to take part in a preventive war. Then the Bulgarians were persuaded to become reconciled with the Turks, in order to first finish with the Serbians, because the two things could not be done at the same time. This time the Bulgarians were more prudent and, with the consent of the Austro-Germans, they attacked the Serbians at a moment when their military action had most chance of success.

As can be seen, the whole Bulgarian policy is really only the policy of Vienna and Budapest. The governors of Sofia adopted the Germanic plans, because these plans responded best to their political conceptions. Bulgaria has, therefore, for a long time been in the position of a servant of the Austro-Germans and her present attitude is simply the continuation of a series of acts for a long time ignored by Allied diplomacy.

May 28, 1916.

BULGARIAN IMPERIALISM.

The policy of Bulgaria revealed itself and reveals itself still to-day as a national policy, a policy of which the sole aim appears to be deliverance from the foreign yoke and the achievement of Bulgarian national union. During more than thirty years Europe has believed in the politicians of Sofia who, cleverly led by King Ferdinand, gave themselves out as the champions of liberty and the defenders of the oppressed Slavs and martyred Christians. The true Bulgarian aims remained hidden for a long time and it was only during the Balkan wars that the rôle of Bulgaria in European questions was brought to light. It was only then

that far-seeing people perceived the fundamental error of the diplomacy which had adopted the habit of treating Bulgaria as an independent Slav, and in the main, Russophile State. Bulgaria, however, revealed herself more and more as a satellite of Germany and Austria-Hungary, whose task, suggested by King Ferdinand and freely approved and supported by Bulgarian politicians, was to push, on the east side, towards Constantinople, in order to check the Russian tendency to have a free issue on the Black Sea, and on the west side, towards the Adriatic, in order to prevent Serbian national unity and lend assistance to the anti-Slav policy of Austria-Hungary. Far from being independent, Bulgaria was working wittingly and consciously for Germany and Austria-Hungary, hoping to become, with the aid of the Germanic Empires, a power in the Balkans. Instead of carrying on a Slav or Russophile policy, the Bulgarians acted rather in opposition to the interests of Russia and the Balkan nations, only taking into account Austro-German interests, which they were pleased to consider, at Sofia, in accordance with Bulgarian interests.

Such a disguised policy would, in order to succeed, have had to be carried out very skilfully, and one is forced to admit that the leader of the Bulgarian policy, King Ferdinand, failed neither in coolness nor in ingenuity in hiding his secret plans. The Macedonian policy, for instance, while serving anti-Slav interests, has contributed greatly to gain sympathy for Bulgaria, in giving a liberal and national character to Bulgarian tendencies. The Bulgarians, for the moment, humoured the Russians and were implacable only against the Serbians, while waiting for a favourable opportunity of showing their cards and attempting the great stroke. This opportunity presented itself at the time of the Balkan war, in the course of which Bulgaria did not even take the trouble of hiding her real designs. We have already stated what were the leading principles of Bulgarian policy during the Balkan war, and if we come back to the subject it is in support of our theory by evidence coming from a side where one has always shown sympathy for the Bulgarians and Bulgaria. This is the evidence of Mr. Milioucoff.

It will be remembered that the Carnegie Endowment for

international peace had organized, after the Balkan wars, an investigation in the Balkans in order to establish the causes of the war and the responsibility of certain acts contrary to the law of nations and to justice.¹ This investigation was, however, not a real investigation, because Serbia and Greece, having no confidence in the impartiality of one of the members of the Commission, Mr. Milioucoff, a notorious friend of Bulgaria, refused to take part in it, even indirectly. The members of the Commission of Investigation have only, therefore, used material provided by the Bulgarians and their work was, in any case, of a one-sided nature. That is why the conclusions arrived at by the Commission must be considered with the greatest reserve, especially as regards Serbia. But the report of the Commission, made out for the most part by Mr. Milioucoff, contains certain affirmations which it may be profitable to mention. We retain the right of speaking later on of the criticism which the authors of the report have kindly made on one of our articles, and the article of Dr. Novacovitch on the clause of international law, *rebus sic stantibus*, a clause which the Serbian Government had invoked in favour of its demand for the revisal of the treaty of alliance, and we content ourselves for the moment with quoting the opinion of the Commission, that is to say, of Mr. Milioucoff, on the general attitude of Bulgaria. Bulgaria's rôle will be more apparent after reading the declarations that Mr. Milioucoff himself has been obliged to make.

In affirming that it was the Serbian army that delivered Macedonia in 1912, the authors of the report wonder where the Bulgarian army was, and they continue thus (p. 38): "We have seen that on the eve of war the Bulgarian General Staff insisted that the 100,000 soldiers who, according to the treaty, ought to have fought side by side with the Serbians in Macedonia should be kept free. It was plainly, first and foremost, an imperious strategical necessity to defeat the Turks in Thrace, on the chief battle ground of the war. But, after the first victories, which drove back the Turks at

¹ Investigation at the Balkans. Report presented to the directors of the Carnegie Endowment, by the members of the Investigation Commission (Paris, 1914).

Kirk-Kilissé, at Lulé-Bourgas, at Tchorlou, at Tchataldja, there appeared another reason for continuing the war. Here again one might ask oneself, *whether it was a war of liberation or a war of conquest* that one was carrying on." Mr. Milioucoff wonders how "the Bulgarians did not see, or rather how their government did not perceive that the occupation of Macedonia by the Serbians and the Greeks during eight months, was going to prevent the attainment of the real object of the war: the unification of Bulgarian nationality?" In reply to this question we find in the report the following assertion:

"At the end of 1912 there were already two policies in Bulgaria: that of the Cabinet, and that of people who were in direct contact with the army. If the ministers wanted to keep strictly to the terms of the alliance, General Savov's circle troubled very little about all that. The Press spoke much of that circle, of the desire of the Czar Ferdinand himself to make his triumphal entry into Constantinople. What is unfortunately certain is that the claims went on increasing. It is evident that in thus widening our ambitions, we could not help losing sight of the principal aim of the war. To wish to take, cost what it might, Adrianople, meant risking Macedonia. To ask for an issue on the Sea of Marmara meant that the international situation was no longer understood."

The authors of the report have tried hard to explain and even to excuse, in a way, Bulgaria's policy. It was not a diversion on the part of the Bulgarians to try to take Constantinople: to succeed in that was their original plan and their principal war aim. With the consent of Austria-Hungary and Germany, Bulgaria sought to establish herself at Constantinople, hoping to drive back the Serbians and Greeks later on and take Macedonia from them with the help of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Ulterior events are too well known for it to be necessary to repeat them here. The Bulgarian policy, of first vanquishing the Turks in order to fling themselves afterwards upon the Serbians, was thwarted completely, and the attempt of Bulgaria, in June-July, 1913, first to put an end to Serbia and Greece, has not succeeded either.

The European war has, however, enabled Bulgaria to resume the struggle under much more favourable conditions, but it has forced the King and the Bulgarian politicians to lay aside the mask and side openly with the Germanic Empires. The Bulgarians have to-day the military support of the Germanic powers, but they have lost all contact with the Entente, which seems no longer inclined to let itself be duped by the trickery of Sofia politicians. That is why certain Bulgarian sections, more prudent and more circumspect, cannot yet entirely approve the policy of the present Government, since these straightforward situations, where one can gain all but also lose all, are contrary to their nature.

July 9, 1916.

THE LAST DEFENDER OF BULGARIA.

“Russian diplomacy has not been firm enough in the maintenance of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement of 1912, and thus it has prepared the ground for the present war and itself appointed Bulgaria to her place among our enemies” (*Rietch* of 25th July). It was on the occasion of the retirement of Mr. Sazanoff that Mr. Paul Milioucoff, one of the heads of the Russian constitutional-democratic party, pronounced these words, which sum up his criticism of Russia's Balkan policy and reveal at the same time his constant desire to exonerate Bulgaria, or at least to lessen her guilt and responsibility for the aid she has lent and is still lending to the Germanic Empires.

The personal sympathies of Mr. Milioucoff for Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people are so strong that they prevent him from properly judging the attitude of his Fatherland itself. Common sense refuses, indeed, to accept the theory of Mr. Milioucoff, to admit the possibility of the foreign policy of any country whatsoever being influenced solely by the faults and blunders of a third party. It is, therefore, a very superficial way of thinking to judge and understand the Bulgarian policy by the attitude and action of Russian diplomacy, even if it were confirmed that this diplomacy has committed the faults of which Mr. Milioucoff makes

allusion. In reality things happened quite differently, and the only fact impossible to deny respecting Mr. Sazanoff, is his goodwill towards the Bulgarians, his earnest desire to meet their wishes. One can think what one likes of the policy of Mr. Sazanoff, but no one can seriously pretend that he has neglected Bulgaria and her interests. And yet Mr. Milioucoff has the courage to reproach the former leader of Russian policy for having neglected Bulgarian interests! After all the Bulgarians have done in 1913 and 1915, and that which they are doing still to-day in putting themselves at the service of Germanism, one would be more right in reproaching Mr. Sazanoff with having been too indulgent towards Bulgaria. Mr. Milioucoff pretends on the contrary that he was not indulgent enough!

It is known that the Serbian Government had asked, in the spring of 1913, by reason of a radical change in the situation, for the revisal of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement of 1912. The Sofia Government showed itself hostile to any idea of revisal of the said treaty, and in presence of arguments so opposed to each other and so vigorously supported by the two countries, the only logical and reasonable way of arriving at a peaceful solution consisted in calling upon the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia. In the Russian diplomatic documents concerning the events in the Balkan Peninsula (August 1912 to July 1913), one finds such abundant proofs of this that it is sufficient to read them in order to satisfy oneself immediately that the affirmations of Mr. Milioucoff differ widely from the true state of affairs. Let us now see what these documents say.

Mr. Sazanoff, the 9th-22nd April 1913, addressed to the ministers at Sofia, Belgrade and Athens an identical telegram proposing to the allied governments a spontaneous demobilization. This proposal was not accepted by Bulgaria, because that country was thinking of an armed encounter with Serbia and Greece. On the 15th-28th April Mr. Sazanoff made known to Mr. Guechoff that "the Imperial Government appears very uneasy at the news concerning the extraordinarily strained situation produced by the question of the settlement of the frontiers between Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece. . . . The Bulgarians should by no means lose

sight of the fact that an armed conflict would entail the nullity of the treaty of 1912, which assured to the Bulgarians some rights in the question of the boundaries of Macedonia." He particularly recommended an interview between the Allied Prime Ministers, which would do away with all difficulties. Sofia replied to this sincere and earnest appeal with marked indifference. The 21st April-4th May, Mr. Sazanoff again gave instructions to the Russian Minister at Sofia to approach the Bulgarian Government with a view to arranging a peaceful agreement with the Serbian and Greek Allies, and to put it on its guard against the false friends of Bulgaria, who would like to make her forsake the straight path. The same failure as in previous cases! But Mr. Sazanoff was still confident and, on the 3rd-16th May, he addressed to the Bulgarian Government a long letter stating clearly the attitude of Russia in this conflict. This document proves Russian loyalty better than any other:

"Although in the present case our point of view corresponds completely with Bulgarian interests, we must acknowledge that Serbia's desires should not be entirely set aside and that they merit some attention because of the ideals and political interests which the Belgrade Government brings forward. . . . A narrow national egoism can keep Bulgaria within the domain of narrow and formal interpretation of the treaty. In this case she will be able to conquer a little more territory, but she runs great risk of compromising that which is the most precious in the alliance with Serbia: the fraternal solidarity which has been manifested and strengthened by the treaty . . . The false friends of Bulgaria are enticing her to follow one road, Russia invites her to follow another, thus sparing her a mistaken and perilous choice. . . . Bulgaria would act wisely if she accepted certain modifications to the treaty and granted a few trifling concessions. . . ."

This generous advice from Petrograd did not find a better welcome at Sofia, where preparations for an attack against Serbia had already taken concrete form. Mr. Sazanoff, however, renewed with his telegram of the 7th-20th May his proposal of demobilization or of reduction of the armies to a quarter or a third of the effective force.

Mr. Pachitch accepted, but at Sofia they refused. The situation became more serious through the conclusion of the Bulgaro-Turkish peace, and Mr. Sazanoff undertook a new step. On the 13th-17th May he sent to Sofia the following telegram :

" Russia, not wishing to admit the possibility of a war between allies and ready to put the responsibility upon that party who would have abandoned pacific means, invites the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek Prime Ministers to meet at Petrograd, in order to fix the general principles which will serve as basis for the re-establishment of peace and the consolidation of the Balkan alliance." Bulgaria, not wishing to agree to this proposal, put forward conditions which were not acceptable to the Russian Government. Finally, a supreme effort was undertaken by Russia, and the Emperor of Russia himself, on the advice of Mr. Sazanoff, addressed, on the 26th May-8th June, a pressing telegram to the reigning princes of the three countries, inviting them to have recourse to arbitration as provided for in the treaty. The evasive reply which King Ferdinand of Bulgaria sent to the Czar showed already by its almost arrogant tone, that Bulgaria wanted to hear nothing of the Balkanic Alliance and that she had chosen another path. The attack on the Serbian positions all along the line, in the night of the 29th June, without any declaration of war, was the Bulgarian reply to the advice of Russian diplomacy to come to an amicable understanding with Serbia.

The Bulgarian policy, followed during the reign of King Ferdinand, has to-day become clear to the whole world. It was with the support of Austria-Hungary and Germany that Bulgaria thought to create for herself a predominant situation in the Balkans and become the advance guard of the Germanic advance towards the Orient. The alliance with Serbia was only an episode, as confessed by the Bulgarians themselves. This opinion is also confirmed by the Bulgarian attitude in September 1915. Serbia was ready to sacrifice a part of her territory in the south and to give it up to Bulgaria if the latter would march against Austria and Germany. Bulgaria did not accept this generous offer because the ideal she followed was Balkanic hegemony, absolute pre-

dominance in the Balkans, extension to the three seas, and the possession of Constantinople. Mr. Milioucoff has, besides, himself affirmed it in his report on the investigation of the Carnegie Endowment, of which we have spoken here. And yet he does not hesitate to declare that it is through the fault of Russian diplomacy that Bulgaria associated herself with Germany! Fortunately, Mr. Milioucoff is the only one of this opinion; according to the general Russian opinion, the allied army, which is preparing to invade Bulgarian territory, will not find at Sofia innocent people forced into the arms of the Austro-Germans owing to Russian mistakes, but criminals who have acted with premeditation. The excuses of Mr. Milioucoff will alter nothing.

September 10, 1916.

EUROPE AND BULGARIA.

Concerning Mr. A. Gauvain's Book.

Mr. Auguste Gauvain has just collected in book form a series of articles published in the *Revue* before the European war.¹ In the introduction, Mr. Gauvain recalls to mind that before 1914, "positions had been adopted, intentions marked out, responsibilities undertaken. It is these situations which are described in this volume, with no additional touches, from the Agadir affair up to the declaration of war on Serbia. These studies have lost their interest as a warning, but they have kept their interest as enlightenment." One cannot too highly applaud the idea of the illustrious writer, who directs with as much competence as authority the foreign political chronicle in the *Débats*. For us Mr. Gauvain's publication has a particular interest as it reminds Europe of the two aggressions, Bulgarian and Austrian, of which Serbia was the victim in less than one year. The blows received by Serbia struck necessarily also at Europe, that is to say, that part of Europe which did not wish to accept Germanic domination. The conflict which resulted is not yet terminated and, in

¹ Auguste Gauvain: *L'Europe avant la guerre: L'Europe en 1911—Après la crise marocaine; France et Allemagne—La question turque—La ligue Balkanique—Autriche-Hongrie et Serbie* (Paris, Colin, 1917).

presence of an irritated Germany and a disappointed Austria, both seeking to throw the responsibility upon the Allies, it is well from time to time to remind those who forget them or feign to ignore them, of the various facts of the great Austro-German-Bulgarian premeditation. We expressly add Bulgarian, because Bulgaria has been from the beginning an active though secret associate in the enterprise prepared by Berlin and Vienna. The article of Mr. Gauvain on the Balkanic alliances, read by the light of subsequent events, makes it appear more than likely. As to ourselves, convinced as we are of the historical truth that great decisions are not taken without long preparation, we cannot agree that the Bulgarian complicity took place at the last moment only. Quite the contrary.

The history of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912 is very instructive and, for those who wish to penetrate into the mystery of Bulgarian policy, there are no surer methods than to proceed to a critical examination of this alliance and of the manner in which the Bulgarians wished to make use of it. The idea of the Balkanic Alliance, especially of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, was suggested and upheld by the Bulgarian Government from the moment when the Bulgarian General Staff had ascertained that the armed force of Bulgaria was insufficient to fight against the Turks. This is a fact proved by authentic documents. The Government of Sofia was, therefore, obliged to search for allies. What, then, more natural than to apply to Vienna? Since 1908 a distinct agreement united the two States, whose inclinations were in perfect harmony. Only Austria could not, without running the risk of provoking a general conflict, adhere openly to a policy aiming at the dismemberment of Turkey. Vienna's methods did not accord with the policy of showing one's cards openly. That is why, at Vienna, they advised King Ferdinand to go and make terms with Belgrade and Athens, and promised him all necessary support. However, the agreement with Belgrade was meant only to serve as a screen in provoking the conflict. When events would have taken a decisive turn, the Monarchy would intervene and then one would proceed to the execution of the principal plan. What was this principal plan? Clever

enough, one must allow, but very fragile at the same time, because it was supposed that everything would come to pass in compliance with the forecasts of the Ballplatz. Subsequent events have shown, however, that no forecast of Austrian diplomacy was realized and that in this affair, as in many others, the Ballplatz had been greatly mistaken.

In order to understand the Bulgarian plan, we must consider the facts which were at the root of the whole foreign policy of Bulgaria. One of these facts was ascertained beyond doubt at the time of the conclusion of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement of 1912; of the other there were only some indications, but these were serious enough. At first it was the avowed intention of Bulgaria to succeed alone to the Turkish Empire, to take all Macedonia, all Southern Albania, Salonica, Thrace and Constantinople. With one stroke or by degrees, alone or helped by her neighbours, Bulgaria aspired only to the realization of a Bulgarian Balkanic Empire, stretching to the three seas and having for capital, Constantinople. In order to realize this dream, King Ferdinand and the politicians of Sofia had to rely on one of the two groups of powers which shared the power in Europe: the Triple Alliance or the Triple Entente. The choice was not difficult to make, because Bulgarian aims, inspired by an imperialism of quite a Prussian nature and having for object the possession of Constantinople and the Straits, could not find a favourable welcome either at Petrograd or at Paris. As to London, the question might be doubtful, but England was not inclined to play the Bulgarian game. There remained only the Triple Alliance, that is to say Germany and Austria-Hungary which, on their side, were seeking allies in order to achieve the execution of their Oriental plans, and whose eyes were turned towards Sofia. That is the second principal fact, known to-day, but only suspected before the Balkan wars. An alliance of Bulgaria with the Central Powers was then logical from the point of view of Bulgarian Imperialism, and if the Bulgarians took too long in proclaiming it publicly, it was because they had to overcome a great many scruples, especially in regard to Russia. Of the fact that this alliance was concluded well before the Balkan wars, we have the

authentic confirmation given to the Hungarian Parliament by the Prime Minister, Count Tisza (see *La Serbie*, No. 23 of 1916, and the *Neue Freie Presse*, of the 22nd September 1916). It was kept secret until 1915, until Bulgaria openly joined with the central Empires.

Judged by the light of these two principal facts: the aspiration to Balkanic hegemony and the private alliance with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria's attitude, at the time of the conclusion of the Balkanic agreements in 1912, appears strange to superficial observers who cannot understand the eagerness of the Cabinet at Sofia to bring about the Balkanic alliance, so notoriously contrary to the interests of the German expansion in the East. Mr. Gauvain's book, written before the Balkan war, gives information that clears up this purely apparent contradiction. Others have supplied similar explanations, as, for instance, Mr. René Pinon in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (1st February 1913) and to-day one may look upon the secret plan of Bulgaria as completely laid bare, as regards the Balkanic agreements and their execution.

The agreement she had concluded with Serbia in February 1912 was immediately communicated by Bulgaria to Austria, asking for approbation. This was not refused because Austria hoped to profit by it. Every one in Austria-Hungary believed in a Serbian defeat in the war with Turkey, while every one counted upon Bulgarian victories. The Government of Sofia also speculated on a Serbian defeat, but it also considered the eventuality of Serbian victories and took, in consequence, measures to weaken the result of the same. Either the Serbians would be beaten and then the claims of Serbia would be unrealizable, or else the Serbian armies would drive back the Turks and then the Bulgarians would march upon Constantinople in order first to put an end to the Turks. The settlement of accounts with Serbia would come after and would present no great difficulty. With the help of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy it would be possible to paralyse the Serbian successes until the final issue.

The history of the Balkan war is known. It is the second hypothesis which was realized and the astounding victories

of the Serbians enabled the Bulgarians to advance towards Constantinople. Austria, disappointed in her hopes, did not hesitate to impede the Serbian successes by obliging Serbia to withdraw from the Adriatic and by calling upon Bulgaria to fulfil her engagements ; that is to say, to attack Serbia and deprive her of the glory of the victories gained in the Turkish campaign. Bulgaria hastened to obey and the famous attack of the 16th-29th June 1913 caused war between the two former allies. Bulgaria was beaten and the Austro-German hopes of destroying the vital force of Serbia were for a time thwarted. But Serbia was a serious obstacle, and what was not successful in 1912-13, was attempted again in 1914-15. Bulgaria again played her part, but this time under much more favourable conditions and, under the concentrated onslaught of the German, Austrian and Bulgarian armies, Serbia had to give in, paying with her best blood for her decision to live free and independent. Bulgaria obtained fleeting successes, but earned a by no means glorious reputation. The book of Mr. Gauvain reminds us of the action of the little country which has done so much harm not only to Serbia but to the common cause of all the Allies.

May 13, 1917.

BULGARIA AND THE TREATY OF SAN-STEPHANO.

The Sofia Press has just celebrated the thirty-ninth anniversary of the famous Treaty of San-Stephano, interpreting as usual the clauses of that purely artificial project in the light of the Utopian aspirations of the Bulgarian rulers. We beg to give here a summary of the international situation of that time and to present, in its real form, the political sentiment of the Bulgarian nation, based on a treaty adapted to circumstances, and which never went beyond the paper on which it was written.

In 1877, after vain attempts to get Turkey to make some indispensable reforms in her European provinces and to improve, as far as possible, the lot of the Christian population, Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire. In

this war the Great Powers remained neutral and, in the Balkans, out of four semi-sovereign States (Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, Roumania) the two Serbian kingdoms joined Russia and entered the war. Greece did not move, while Roumania, not being able to obtain the guarantees necessary for her neutrality, came to an agreement with Russia and allowed the Russian armies to cross her territory. Bulgaria did not exist as a State and the Bulgarian people, this famous people which the Bulgarian "historians" are discovering to-day even in the centre of Serbia, gave no sign of life. In April-June fighting went on in the proximity of the Danube and about the passages over the stream. The Russians succeeded in crossing it, in invading what is now Bulgaria and driving back the Turks in the defiles of the Balkans, where the fighting continued. The Turks took up a fortified position at Plevna and a war of siege began with the assistance of a Roumanian army corps which lost more than five thousand men, paying with its blood for the deliverance of the Bulgarian people. Then came, in December, the surrender of Plevna, the passage of the Balkans by the Russian armies and their arrival near Adrianople. At this moment Turkey asked for peace, declaring that she trusted to the generosity of the Russian Emperor. The protocol of Adrianople fixed the peace conditions: the independence and enlargement of Roumania, of Serbia and of Montenegro; creation of a principality of Bulgaria and the autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Alarmed at these Russian successes, England, whose policy at that time was not the same as it is to-day, fearing a considerable growth of Russian influence in the Balkans, decided to send, as a sign of displeasure, her fleet into the Dardanelles. Russia replied by threatening to enter Constantinople. The Anglo-Russian conflict was, however, averted, thanks to a temporary agreement. The Turks profiting from these disagreements, did not hurry themselves in the execution of the protocol of Adrianople, but sought to delay things. The Russian Generalissimo, the Grand-Duke Nicolas, transferred his Headquarters to San-Stephano, nearer Constantinople and through his plenipotentiary, Count Ignatieff, forced the Turks to sign the preliminaries

of a treaty, called later the Treaty of San-Stephano. By virtue of these preliminaries, based upon the clauses of the Adrianople protocol, the new principality of Bulgaria obtained, besides Bulgaria properly speaking, Oriental Roumelia, the whole of Macedonia and even a part of Serbia. In creating such a Bulgaria, Russia meant to thwart Austrian influence in the Balkans, believing that Bulgaria would pursue a Slav and anti-German policy. The Great Powers, England and Germany in the first place, would not accept this Turco-Russian treaty, seeing in its effects not a Bulgaria nationally united, as Bulgarian politicians would like to make ill-informed people believe, but an artificial creation destined to serve the interests of Russian policy. Russia was, therefore, obliged to go to Berlin where things were arranged otherwise. The prestige of Germany and the fear England had of Russia, added to the mistakes of Russian foreign policy, complicated the situation still more in the Balkans.

Instead of creating a great Bulgaria, necessarily Russophile, as one imagined her—one did not yet know the Bulgarians, or their "gratitude"—the Congress of Berlin assigned the two purely Serbian provinces, Bosnia and Herzegovina, to Austria and, as to Bulgaria, she was formed solely of Bulgarian territories situated between the Balkans and the Danube. Oriental Roumelia, having a mixed population, received a certain autonomy and Macedonia remained under Turkish domination. But the fact that Macedonia had figured in the preliminaries of a Turco-Russian treaty, as forming part of Bulgaria, has elated the demagogues of Sofia who, inspired by King Ferdinand, are proclaiming *urbi et orbi* that it is here a question of a purely Bulgarian province which ought to belong to Bulgaria. Taking as basis a wrong combination on the part of Russian diplomacy, the Bulgarians have made out a political programme which, under the guise of national aspirations, aims at larger objects and is in perfect harmony with Germanic interests. The first effect, ardently desired by Austria-Hungary and Germany, of this artificial manœuvre of Bulgarian policy, was the inevitable conflict with the Serbians for whom Macedonia represents the cradle of their civilization and

the most natural rampart of the political and economic independence.

The project of San-Stephano has, therefore, two interpretations: the one, historical, true and founded on facts only too well known; and the other, fantastical, invented by the Bulgarians in order to hide their real political designs. If the Bulgarians persist in demanding a Bulgaria according to San-Stephano, justifying this imperialistic claim by non-existent reasons, that ought not to prevent us from affirming that the so-called Bulgarian political creed, as reflected in the application of the Treaty of San-Stephano, rests upon fiction. The Treaty of San-Stephano was a Russian political combination which can be criticized or defended, but which has nothing to do with the Bulgarian national aspirations. This treaty gives Bulgaria no right, either political or legal, and above all no ethnographical right to the possession of Macedonia. When the preliminaries of San-Stephano were fixed, Bulgaria did not exist as a State, so that she could not take part in this treaty. It was not the Bulgarians who conquered the Turks in imposing upon them the San-Stephano treaty, but the Russians. The Bulgaria of San-Stephano was only on paper and, what is of most importance, it was not the Bulgarian hand but the Russian hand that had sketched it out. That the Bulgarians, to whom the Russians, after having delivered them at the cost of immense sacrifices, wished to give a predominant situation in the Balkans, and to entrust to them the guardianship of the door to the East in face of the Germanic advance, should dare to speak to-day, in the midst of war with Russia, of that Russian liberality and to hanker after it all the same, that is a Bulgarian psychological problem which it is beyond us to seek to understand.

April 8, 1917.

THE "INDISPUTABLE" BULGARIAN ZONE IN MACEDONIA.

The treaty of alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbia, of the 29th February 1912 contains no mention of fixing the boundaries of the terri-

tories. These boundaries have, however, been settled in the secret annexe of the 29th February 1912 of which Article 2 is composed as follows :

" All the territorial extensions which may be realized by mutual agreement in the sense of the first and second articles of the treaty and of the first article of the present secret annexe, will form a condominium of the two allied states. Their settlement will take place without delay, within three months at the maximum, after the re-establishment of peace, and on the following basis :

" Serbia recognizes Bulgaria's right to the territories east of the Rhodopes and of the river Strouma ; Bulgaria recognizes Serbia's right to those situated to the north and to the west of the Char-Planina.

" As to the territories between the Char, the Rhodopes, the Ægean Sea and the Lake of Ochrida, if the two parties are convinced that their organization in the form of a separate autonomous province is not possible in view of the common interests of the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalities, or for other reasons having to do with home or foreign affairs, these territories will be disposed of in conformity to the following stipulations :

" Serbia undertakes to raise no claim regarding the territories situated beyond the line traced on the attached map and which, starting from the Turco-Bulgarian frontier, at the Mount Golem (to the north of Kriva Palanka) follows the direction from the south-west as far as to the Lake of Ochrida.

" Bulgaria undertakes to accept this frontier if H.M. the Emperor of Russia, who will be asked to be the supreme arbitrator in this question, pronounces himself in favour of this line.

" It is, of course, understood that the two contracting parties undertake to accept as definitive the frontier line which H.M. the Emperor of Russia, within the boundaries indicated above, will find corresponds best with the rights and interests of the two parties."

We quote according to the texts published by Mr. Guechoff in his book, *L'Alliance Balkanique* (Paris, Hachette, 1915), as well as that by Balcanicus in his book, *La Bulgarie*.

Ses ambitions, sa trahison (Paris, Colin, 1915). They are the same in the two works and are universally recognized as authentic. Now, it appears from Article 2 which has just been quoted, that the indisputable Bulgarian zone embraces the territories to the east of the Rhodopes and of the river Strouma, while the indisputable Serbian zone stretches over the territories situated to the north and to the west of the Char-Planina, of the Mount Char. The words Bulgarian and Serbian are used here in the political sense, because the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was a purely political agreement concerning the sharing of the Macedonian territories.

The territories between the Mount Char, the Mount Rhodopes, the Ægean Sea and the Lake of Ochrida, formed, therefore, the real object of the Serbo-Bulgarian disputes, and one may call them disputed territories. Serbia, then, did not make any claim to that which is situated to the east of Rhodopes and of the river Strouma. Bulgaria relinquished all interest in that which is situated to the north and to the west of the Mount Char. The real object of litigation was the territory situated between Char, Rhodopes, the Ægean Sea and the Lake of Ochrida. This territory was divided up, by the terms of the aforesaid article, into two sections, by a line going from Mount Golem as far as to the Lake of Ochrida. The regions to the west of this line were assigned to Serbia, and those to the east to Bulgaria. Serbia declared that "she undertook to raise no claim" regarding the territories situated beyond the mentioned line; Bulgaria undertook to "accept this frontier" if the Russian Emperor declared his approval of it. Article 4 of the same secret annexe stated distinctly that any "differences which might arise concerning the interpretation and execution of any clause whatsoever of the treaty and of the secret annexe, will be submitted to the final decision of Russia." One knows that Bulgaria did not wish to act in conformity with this last clause of the treaty of alliance and that she has tried to oblige the Serbians by force of arms to yield up to her territories which should not by rights belong to Bulgaria.

The text of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement is, then,

clear. It was a political agreement and all its stipulations are of a political nature. The Bulgarians, however, do not hesitate to affirm continually—Mr. Radeff, himself, has just done so in his last communiqué—that: (1) The indisputable Bulgarian zone is situated to the east of the line traced from Mount Golem to the Lake of Ochrida, while in reality and according to the terms as clear as they are precise of the treaty of alliance, an indisputable Bulgarian zone, indisputable only from a political point of view and in respect to Serbia, is situated to the east of the Rhodopes and the river Strouma. (2) The Bulgarians repeat that Serbia has acknowledged, in this treaty, the Bulgarian ethnographical character of all the territories situated to the east of the line Mount Golem-Lake Ochrida, while, in reality, Serbia only undertook to accept, as political frontier, this line which has nothing to do with ethnography. But, admitting even that any Serbian Government should have declared in a political agreement that Macedonia is Bulgarian from an ethnographical point of view, such a declaration would have no value for the ethnography of the Macedonian regions. It is a notorious fact, however, that the Serbian Government, in signing the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty of 1912, in no way solved the question of the ethnographical character of Macedonia, which is a Serbian country, the cradle of Serbian civilization in the Middle Ages. When the Bulgarians speak of an "indisputable Bulgarian zone" and of the "Bulgarian character" of Macedonia, distinctly "acknowledged" by the treaty of 1912, they are fully aware that what they say is exactly the opposite of the truth.

March 18, 1917.

AN ARTICLE FROM *Mir* ON THE SERBO-BULGARIAN TREATY OF 1912.

The organ of the national party, *Mir*, of which the chief is Mr. Guechov, published in the number of the 23rd April a statement which defends the policy of the party at the time of the Balkan wars of 1912-13. Mr. Guechov is one of the authors of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty and it is not without interest to read the explanations furnished by *Mir*

on the attitude of the Bulgarian Government on the question of the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. These explanations show once more that the treaty in question was considered by the Bulgarians as an expedient and not as the basis of a new Balkan policy, inspired by sentiments of concord and of mutual concessions. *Mir* says :

“ As to the reproaches made that measures of precaution had not been taken against the Serbians, they are so ill-founded that it is astonishing that reasonable people should address them to us. We have made use of the Serbians in order to attain our object, that is to vanquish the common enemy and realize our own ideal, the revival of the Bulgaria of San-Stephano. From the beginning of the action nobody was ignorant of the fact that the Serbians were jealous of us. But what could one do? We were obliged to make war on Turkey, and we had no choice. Was a war against Turkey possible without the co-operation of the Serbians? Our military leaders had declared that it was not, and it would have been very unfortunate if people incompetent as regards military affairs would have imposed their will. It follows, then, that the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912 has not been the cause of the catastrophe which has overtaken us. On the contrary, thanks to this alliance we have been able to deliver Macedonia, because no state would have helped us in the war with Turkey, the former mistress of Macedonia, which we were not capable of delivering all alone. If Macedonia had not been under Serbian domination it would not have been possible to deliver it. We repeat, therefore, that it is not the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance, but the other, the Greco-Serbian alliance, which has brought about the catastrophe. This latter alliance would have prevented it, if all our adversaries, that is to say all the other political parties, had not joined together in order to render impossible the only salutary Bulgarian policy : arbitration with Greece.”

May 12, 1916.

THE RÔLE OF BULGARIA.

The tumultuous debates in the Hungarian Chamber and the explanations between Count Tisza and the Opposition,

with regard to the entry of Roumania into the war, have furnished one more proof that the confidence of our enemies in victory is quite shaken, and that even the most courageous among them are beginning to perceive the early collapse of the Austro-German-Magyar plan to bring Europe down on its knees and to dictate to it the Germanic will. These debates are of no particular interest and we must not attach any importance to the subject of Hungary's future attitude. As we have already had occasion to say here, Hungary is firm in her desire to support the German cause, the success of which can alone guarantee to the Magyars that domination over the non-Magyar nationalities which this noble nation of lords looks upon as the essence of the Hungarian State, as its justification, even. But though not attributing to them any political importance, we ought to read with curiosity the reports of the sittings of the Hungarian Chamber, where our enemies, striving against difficulties ever greater and greater, allow themselves to be drawn into compromising declarations. One knows that Count Tisza made some very interesting communications regarding the Austro-Italian negotiations, before the entry of Italy into the war. He has also, in keeping with his impulsive character, slightly raised the veil which covers the agreement of the Central Empires with Bulgaria, and it is to this declaration concerning the Bulgarians that we wish to draw the attention of our readers.

In the sitting of the 5th September, Count Tisza, defending the Austro-Hungarian diplomacy from the reproach that it had done nothing to avert the Roumanian danger, said, among other things, this (*Neue Freie Presse* of the 6th September, *Morgenblatt*): "We have reckoned with the Roumanian danger and the necessary measures have been taken in this respect. From a diplomatic point of view, the best means of meeting the Roumanian menace was the alliance with Bulgaria, and this whole action, by no means easy because of a series of delicate questions which had first to be solved, and which has led, in its final result, to the union of Bulgaria to Germany and Austria-Hungary and to the conclusion of the Turco-Bulgarian alliance, is to a great extent the work of our diplomacy. Roumania's

entry into the war signifies for us also an increase of strength, because the important Bulgarian reserves, which were rendered immovable by the undecided attitude of Roumania, have now become free, and that is why each of us must recall to mind with joy the negotiations which have led to our alliance with Bulgaria."

This declaration will open the eyes even of the most obstinate defenders of Bulgaria. One sees that all the Bulgarian phrases about a "national war" are only bluff, that Bulgaria has assumed the rôle of a servant of Germany, and that, after having played this rôle in the campaign against Serbia, she is about to play it, according to the words of Count Tisza, also in the Roumanian war. The Bulgarian cause becomes identified then with the Germanic cause, and to strike Bulgaria is to strike an arm of Germany. If there are people who do not wish to see it, so much the worse for them. In the authoritative circles of the Allies they know very well how much faith they can have in the Bulgarians !

September 24, 1916.

BULGARIA IN THE SERVICE OF GERMANY.

The Bulgarian Prime Minister has just returned to Sofia, after a prolonged journey in Austria-Hungary and in Germany. The circle of Germany's friends being very limited, Berlin finds herself obliged to have recourse to the Bulgarians and to ask from them special services. While Mr. Rizoff was sending offers of a separate peace to Maxime Gorki, Mr. Radoslavoff was granting to the Magyar-Austro-German journalists long interviews, full of optimism and confidence in the Germanic strength and in the happy issue of the war. Meanwhile, King Ferdinand was receiving in his castle at Ebenthal, in Hungary, the Emperor Charles, and the two sovereigns exchanged the highest compliments. King Ferdinand, who is very fond of decorations, obtained this time the Grande-Croix de l'ordre de Marie-Therese (the Grand Cross of the Order of Marie-Theresia) while he conferred upon his august ally and friend the Bulgarian Cross of Valour. The sudden changes in Greece and the

expulsion of King Constantine—a bad omen for the King of Bulgaria—had disturbed this intimate festival, and the Coburg, anxious at the new aspect of the Balkan question, was obliged to go and see the supreme chief of Central Europe, the Kaiser William, and to ask for new instructions, for encouragement and for promises of help, not only financial, but more particularly military. Reassured by the Emperor, he went off to Munich to pay a visit to the King of Bavaria and to make a great speech consolidating the unseverable bonds uniting Bulgaria to Germany and to Austria-Hungary.

Such is Bulgaria as she is officially and publicly known. The other side of Bulgaria, that is to say, that which works under the mask of a democratic and independent Bulgaria, is not inactive either. Its field of activity is not limited only to neutral countries where, as, for example, in Switzerland, the Bulgarian agents and emissaries talk of a pretended struggle of the Bulgarians for “national unity” because that is the fashion now—but it stretches even into the allied countries. The repeated efforts of some Bulgarophile Frenchmen to propagate the idea of the “two” Bulgarias, were suppressed by the French Press, so loftily inspired by justice and loyalty. The Bulgarians, however, were not discouraged, and it is in England that they are now trying to regain former sympathies. Mr. Noel Buxton has met their desires half-way and, with a candour rare enough with a politician, he is seeking to vindicate the descendants of Kroum and to make the English public believe that the Bulgarians are perfectly right in killing the French, the English and the Russians—not to speak of the Serbians—in Macedonia! We read all that and cannot recover from our stupefaction. Certainly, the Bulgarians, in spite of all the odious crimes they have committed, in spite of their peculiar sort of morality, must be for certain people a most congenial nation!

Anyhow, that is a matter of taste. What is more important is that all the Bulgarians, starting from the socialists, and finishing with the notoriously pro-German Stamboulists of Mr. Radoslavoff, not neglecting the “Russo-philés” of Mr. Guechoff and the “Democrats” of Mr. Malinoff, put forward as the essential war aims for Bulgaria

claims which are openly part of the Germanic thesis. According to the Bulgarians themselves, they entered the war in order to prevent the entry of Russians into Constantinople and the realization of Serbian national unity. These two aims are purely Germanic, because neither the question of the Dardanelles, nor Serbian national unity, affect the Bulgarian people in any way, and the possibility of its peaceful development, but only threaten Pan-Germanic plans. To-day, Bulgaria, by the mouth of her Prime Minister, declares that the essential war aim for the Bulgarians is to realize a common frontier with Austria-Hungary, to establish a direct and uninterrupted communication between Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Sofia, and Constantinople. While the other nations are fighting for their liberty, the Bulgarians declare themselves willing to hold out to the end in support of German imperialistic schemes. And they all say so, frankly, without embarrassment, without hesitation. Subjection to the Germans is an honour to them; the words "Balkanic Prussians" no longer express a vague comparison. That is why those who advise our great allies to come to an agreement with Sofia have no need to take the Balkan train and go to sound the little Germans of the Balkans; Berlin is much nearer!

July 1, 1917.

THE BULGARIAN SUICIDE.

In the *Revue des Deux Mondes* (numbers of 1st October, 1st November and 1st December, 1916), Mr. Ernest Daudet has published a study of diplomatic history highly interesting, entitled "The Bulgarian Suicide." Under the modest form of "Notes and Souvenirs, 1878-1915," Mr. Daudet has sketched out the whole history of modern Bulgaria, since the Congress of Berlin, to which the Bulgarian State owes its existence, up to our own days, up to the union of Bulgaria to the Central Empires. The first period embraces the reign of Alexander of Battenberg, from 1878 to 1886, until his abdication, and the second extends from 1886 up to the present day, the time occupied by the reign of Ferdinand of Coburg. This second period can be divided into two

epochs: the régime of Stambouloff, from 1886 until 1894, and the régime of the Prince-King Ferdinand himself. Mr. Daudet has tried to show in a few lines all the changes, so numerous, which have taken place in the Kingdom of Bulgaria, and his account, though compact and limited to the most important events, holds the interest of the reader to the end. The book contains some unpublished documents and there is no doubt that this work will represent a valuable contribution for a more detailed history of modern Bulgaria.

That which has interested us particularly in the work of Mr. Daudet, is the outline of the Bulgarian policy pursued during the latter years, since the proclamation of Bulgaria's Independence in 1908, up to our own days. In this part of his work Mr. Daudet, although relating events, has not failed to devote his special attention to King Ferdinand, the sole director of Bulgarian foreign policy, and to give his opinion of his doubtful attitude. But, and it is here that we do not agree with the illustrious French historian, this opinion of King Ferdinand, formed, apparently, too much under the influence of pre-war ideas, does not take sufficiently into account the attachment of Ferdinand of Coburg to the Germanic cause, which is the basis of his whole policy, in appearance changeable and hesitating and, in reality, most decided and perfectly consistent. We find that Mr. Daudet attributes more importance than need be to a pretended "independent" policy of King Ferdinand, and there, where one can clearly prove collaboration with Austria-Hungary and Germany, Mr. Daudet sees only the King Ferdinand hesitating, uncertain what to do. An instance of this is presented by the proclamation of Bulgarian Independence, consented to no doubt by Austria-Hungary and which ought to facilitate the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Monarchy. The account of this event, given by Mr. Daudet, is in direct opposition to information drawn from other sources and which confirm positively the Austro-Bulgarian design of cancelling certain clauses of the Treaty of Berlin of their own accord by creating accomplished facts. Mr. Daudet maintains, however, that King Ferdinand, at the time of his visit to Budapest, the 23rd September 1908, and at the moment when

Francis-Joseph had already composed his autograph letter announcing to all the sovereigns of the great powers the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina—proclaimed 29th September—has avoided making even an allusion to his own project of proclaiming the Bulgarian independence!

Nor can we share the opinion of the eminent French writer on the action of King Ferdinand before and during the Balkan war. Although the Balkanic alliance was under the patronage of the Entente, King Ferdinand had revealed the secret of it and communicated some details to Austria and Germany. It was Mr. René Pinon who first unveiled this Bulgarian trick, designed, in his opinion, with the object of deceiving Austria and obtaining her neutrality in the conflict which was in preparation.¹ In reality, King Ferdinand wished to deceive his Balkan allies and all his plans were manifestly laid with the consent of Vienna and Berlin. The proof of this lies, moreover, in the fact, remarked and mentioned also by Mr. Daudet, that the Bulgarian army, instead of marching into Macedonia, immediately took a direction which was not intended, the direction of Constantinople. And it was not "the fever of conquest," as Mr. Daudet supposes, which urged the Bulgarian King towards Constantinople, but just the desire to open up for Germany the road to Bagdad and Asia Minor and to forestall the Russians at Constantinople. Germany and Austria wished to feel that Constantinople was in safe hands, and they sent King Ferdinand, their faithful servant, to take in "his" name but for "their" account possession of the Dardanelles. He found, however, that he had taken too large a bite, even for the immense appetite of the Bulgarians.

The final judgment of Mr. Daudet is borrowed from a diplomatic report made out by a man who was well acquainted with King Ferdinand. In this report it is maintained that the head of the Bulgarians abstained from declaring himself for the one or the other group of belligerents, waiting to see which side would have the victory. This opinion is evidently the outcome of previous prejudices with regard

¹ See in *Revue des Deux Mondes* (vol. xiii, 1 Feb. 1913) article of M. Pinon: "The rôle of Austria in the genesis of the great Balkan conflict."

to King Ferdinand and it is indeed necessary to combat it and not to let it gain ground. There is nothing more prejudicial than errors in the appreciation of the political acts of our adversaries. It is known to-day that King Ferdinand was always the ally of Austria-Hungary. We have authentic confirmation of this in the declaration of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, made before the Hungarian Parliament, in the sitting of the 21st September, 1916, and in which stress is laid upon the ancient date of the Austro-Bulgarian alliance (see in the *Neue Freie Presse*, of 22nd September, *Morgenblatt*, the report of the sitting of the Hungarian Parliament). But there is another proof, still clearer, of the inaccuracy of this opinion. King Ferdinand made Bulgaria march against Serbia and the Allies precisely with the object of preventing a victory of the Allies. He chose the most favourable moment for the execution of this plan and succeeded, in 1915, by falling upon Serbia from behind and, in 1916, by attacking Roumania under the same conditions, in helping the Austro-Germans in an appreciable manner. We have no reason either to diminish or to enlarge the value of the Bulgarian co-operation, but it is true that the Bulgarian intervention, coming at the moment when Germany called for it, has considerably facilitated the Germanic plans and designs. And King Ferdinand did not decide upon this intervention just at the last moment. It had already been decided upon, in principle, at the beginning of the war; they were only waiting for the most favourable moment for helping Germany and Austria-Hungary in the realization of their plans.

Mr. Daudet speaks of the "Bulgarian suicide" and we cannot but approve of this very just opinion. The Bulgarian nation is clearly working for Germany, who is in favour of the little nations only when she can make use of them for her own ends. Such is the case with Bulgaria. But we must state that the Bulgarian nation is not conscious of acting against its own interests in supporting Austria-Hungary and Germany. On the contrary, it is persuaded that it is fighting against "enemies" in attacking the Russians, the French, the English and the Serbians, and

this is a fact that must never be lost sight of. Bulgaria is an enemy of the Allies and, what is most serious, a convinced enemy.

January 14, 1917.

THE KAISER AT SOFIA.

The German and Bulgarian sovereigns have just exchanged at Sofia toasts which the political world, surprised at this sudden visit of the German Emperor to Bulgaria, has read with particular interest. One can hardly understand why the German Emperor, if he wished to confirm in a solemn fashion the solidity of the Germano-Touranian compact, needed to make the journey to Sofia, instead of going to Vienna or else to Budapest, which would have been more natural. The toasts pronounced in the Bulgarian capital have shown, however, that the visit of the Kaiser had a defined object. It is meant for Bulgaria alone, and one will look in vain among the words of the Germanic chief for any mention whatsoever of general war aims. There is only the vague affirmation that there will be peace again "in a short time," which is also intended for the Bulgarians. As to these last, they may be satisfied. The Emperor William has renewed the promises he made to them in 1915. In presence of this generosity, Messrs. Guechoff and Malinoff, those so-called "Russophiles," were anxious to express to the Kaiser their gratitude and their unalterable devotion. If it only depended, then, on Germany, Bulgaria could be sure that her treachery would be largely rewarded. That is probably the reason why the Bulgarians, in spite of their repeated efforts to draw nearer to the Entente, still believe in the Germanic victory. The speeches of Sofia are there to prove it.

King Ferdinand referred to the imperishable memory of the visit paid by His German Majesty "to the Bulgarian town of Nich, recently delivered." He affirms that "the alliance sealed on the fields of battle by precious blood shed in common" will bring to the two nations lasting blessings for the epoch of peace, for which Bulgaria is determined to "fight until the decisive victory." "I particularly wish to give the assurance that all the Bulgarian soldiers will remain

faithful to their allies and will do all in their power to obtain the decisive victory. . . . The brilliant example of the German people will always serve as an example to its faithful Bulgarian allies." These words, pronounced in presence of the chiefs of all Bulgarian political parties and approved of by all the Bulgarians, certainly satisfied the Kaiser. That is why, in his reply, he laid special stress upon the fact that for a long time he has been the astonished witness of the "indefatigable and conscientious activity of the Bulgarian nation in attaining the object in view, under the direction of King Ferdinand."

"Remembering our own past, we feel ourselves closely related to the young and strong nation. This sentiment of close relationship has had its finest confirmation when Bulgaria adopted the just cause of the Central Powers. . . . There results from this brotherhood in arms a steadfast fidelity, against which all the efforts of the enemy break themselves in vain. We are marching hand in hand, closely united. I hope, "concluded the Kaiser," to see Bulgaria happy and re-uniting under a single sceptre, in a single powerful union, all her sons."

These speeches reveal nothing new to us Serbians. A long time ago we knew that Bulgaria was nothing other than a branch of Germany and if we have had to suffer most from the treachery of Sofia, it is not we who were deceived by the Bulgarian politicians. The allied diplomacy, blinded by complete ignorance of the real tendencies of Bulgaria, has let itself be made a fool of by the Orientals of Sofia, and we have paid the cost of its errors. Again, to-day, Bulgaria is repeating the same game with the United States, and she is going to carry it on until the moment when Germany will order her to take off her mask. Washington is far from Sofia and it is not surprising that President Wilson, confused by the display of Bulgarian false nationalism, hesitated to put an end to an ambiguous situation.

After the visit of Kaiser William to Sofia we may expect that the Bulgarian Minister at Washington, the same who declared just recently that the Bulgarians do not like the Germans, will receive his passports. Morality, in the name of which Mr. Wilson has succeeded in uniting around

him all the American people, demands it. When one has quarrelled with the master, one does not speak to the valet.

October 21, 1917.

THE CONFESSIONS OF MR. RIZOFF.

Mr. Demetere Rizoff, Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, published in the *Vorwaerts* of 8th August, a new reply to the articles of Mr. Wendel, member of the Reichstag. After having referred to his previous arguments in favour of the Bulgarian claims, the Bulgarian Minister has judged it necessary to set forth the whole foreign policy of his country. His article is very important, not for his repetition of the usual Bulgarian phrases and the one-sided and incomplete statement of those learned men who, it appears, have recognized the Bulgarian character of Macedonia—Mr. Rizoff refers even to a testimony of Prince Bismarck!—but simply because of the political declarations which it contains. In face of the repeated efforts of certain allied political personages to procure for Bulgaria a particularly favourable treatment, now or else at the end of the war, the declarations of Mr. Rizoff as to the motives and tendencies of the Bulgarian policy constitute valuable evidence upon which great stress should be laid.

"Regarding Bulgaria," says Mr. Rizoff, "we must not forget that she did not enter the war in order to defend her previous possessions, which no one threatened. On the contrary, we know that the Entente had promised to Bulgaria some territorial concessions as the price of simple neutrality." Here are two important statements. When, in October, 1915, Bulgaria attacked Serbia, King Ferdinand, in the proclamation he addressed to the Bulgarian people and to the army, said that Serbia had threatened and attacked Bulgaria, and that he, King of the Bulgarians, called upon his faithful subjects to defend the country. Last year, on the occasion of the anniversary of the Bulgarian mobilization, the same King Ferdinand said the same thing in a manifesto addressed to the nation: "Bulgarians to-day Bulgaria, with the aid of allied troops, has succeeded in forcing back the Serbian aggression against our territory; she has beaten

and broken the latter power." A vulgar falsehood, affirms Mr. Rizoff. Nobody has threatened Bulgarian possessions. But the other declaration is still more delightful. The Entente has promised to Bulgaria, as the price of her neutrality, some territorial concessions, namely, in Macedonia. May our French, English and Italian friends take note: as price of neutrality, and not as Bulgarian land! That is quite different. The Bulgarians still declare that the Entente, by this offer, had acknowledged the Bulgarian character of Macedonia. Mr. Rizoff now assures us that it was only an affair of political bargaining. Only the price was not sufficiently large for Bulgaria. Listen to the following:

"But Bulgaria could not remain neutral, nor join the Entente powers. She felt the imperative need of solving the two essential problems: to realize her national unity and to prevent Russia from installing herself at Constantinople." Fine phrases, which ring false when one compares them with the facts and the confessions of Mr. Rizoff himself. First as regards Constantinople. It is to-day notorious that Bulgaria acted as a tool of Germany in wishing to prevent the Russians from entering Constantinople. If Russia, as mistress of Constantinople, could have been a menace to any one, it would have been more likely Roumania. Bulgaria, in spite of her treacherous attack, had obtained by the Treaty of Bucarest, a wide access on the *Ægean* Sea, and this made her completely independent of the Dardanelles and of Constantinople. The establishment of the Russians at Constantinople represented no danger for a Bulgarian policy. But for the Germanophile and Germanic policy, such a solution of the Constantinople question was the death blow. From this point of view Mr. Rizoff is undoubtedly right.

As to the famous Bulgarian "national unity," Mr. Rizoff himself tells us in what it consists: "These two problems," he continues, "could not be realized in company with Russia, Serbia, Roumania and the Greece of Mr. Venizelos. That is precisely why Bulgaria has united herself sincerely and loyally to her present Allies. She understood that otherwise she would see herself, at the end of the war, surrounded by Russia, Serbia, Roumania and Greece, all vastly enriched,

which would have signified for her in future the position of a vassal." There, is then the key of the "Bulgarian national unity," there, is the explanation of the fantastic claims of the Bulgarians on Serbian Macedonia, on the Eastern part of Serbia, ingeniously called "country of Morava," on Greek Macedonia, on the Doubroudja and the mouths of the Danube. Bulgarian national unity consists simply, according to the authoritative opinion of Mr. Rizoff, in preventing the realization of Serbian, Greek and Roumanian national unity. The Bulgarians who are, next to the Albanians, the least numerous in the Balkans, would like to enlarge their country artificially at the expense of their neighbours, and they call that their "national unity!"

Mr. Rizoff has carried frankness to the uttermost limits. "A peace by compromise is impossible before one of the great powers is crushed. . . . Each Bulgarian is aware that the present war is the last great European war and that Bulgaria is here playing her last trump."

Sapienti sat!

September 2, 1917.

GUSTAVE WEIGAND AND THE BULGARIAN CLAIMS.

The articles of Mr. H. Wendel on Macedonia have produced a great sensation among the Bulgarians, and provoked numerous replies. One of these replies, the author of which is Gustave Weigand, professor at the Leipzig University, is particularly interesting. Mr. Weigand is a typical Bulgarian agent and a long time ago he put himself at the disposal of Bulgaria. His speciality is the study of the Macedonian Roumanians (Zinzares, Aromounes). As soon as the Bulgarians saw G. Weigand come into the Balkans, they immediately won him over to their cause and charged him to propagate, as a so-called eye witness, Bulgarian interests. Now that Mr. Wendel has shown the absurdity of the Bulgarian claims on Macedonia, G. Weigand feels himself obliged to uphold the adverse theory. As reply to Mr. Wendel he has written in the *Vossische Zeitung* of August 7th, an article entitled "Who are the Macedonians?" We can judge of this reply in view of what follows.

Mr. Weigand says: "Although the Macedonian language may contain different dialects to the Bulgarian language, as well as certain vocal phenomena which resemble more the Serbian than the Bulgarian language, the character of the Macedonian language is none the less Bulgarian." Now, the Macedonian language can in no way be taken for a Bulgarian language. The best proof of this is the following argument: Under the Turkish régime the Bulgarians and the Serbians had their colleges in Macedonia. The Bulgarian colleges had preparatory classes, in which the children had to pass at least six months, in order to be able to follow the college courses in the Bulgarian language. The Serbian Colleges had, however, no need of these preparatory classes. Can there be, with regard to the Macedonian language, a more striking argument in favour of the Serbians than that?

Mr. Weigand endeavours also to demonstrate the Bulgarian right to Macedonia because of the foundation of Bulgarian schools in Macedonia since the middle of the nineteenth century. The value of this argument is very well shown by the fact that the Bulgarian schools were introduced into Macedonia only since the middle of the nineteenth century, while Serbian schools have never ceased to exist in Macedonia since the Middle Ages up to our own days. The essential thing is that the Bulgarian schools were created by Bulgarian propaganda while the Serbian schools were created and kept up by the people of Macedonia itself, inspired by its Serbian convictions and not subjected to any external influence.

Mr. Weigand refers also to the result obtained by the Bulgarian schools in Macedonia. He would have done better to have shown the effect of the Bulgarian propaganda and rule of terror, which have not only created Bulgarian schools, but have converted pure-blooded Serbians to the Bulgarian nationality. The following example shows very well to what a point Bulgarian propaganda and terrorism were carried in Macedonia: Some time before the creation of the Bulgarian exarchate, there came to Macedonia, as Serbian master, Djordje Miletic, brother of Svetozar Miletic, representative of the Serbian nation in Hungary. The Bulgarian propaganda and rule of terror forced him to declare himself Bulgarian. To-day his son, Ljubomir Miletic

(both Serbian names), professor at the Sofia University, is one of the most implacable enemies of Serbia ! It is this same Ljubomir Miletic whom the Bulgarian Government has appointed to organize in Germany a series of conferences in favour of the Bulgarian interests in the Balkans, and whom Mr. Weigand knows only too well. And so, if it is like this among the intellectuals, we can imagine the attitude of the common people.

As to the last argument of Mr. Weigand, there is no need to make any comment regarding it ; it consists in saying :

“ We Germans have least of all right to contest the Bulgarian rights. Was it not the Bulgarians, who have been the only ones and the first, in the course of this terrible war which we are carrying on together with Austria-Hungary and Turkey, to unite themselves with us and to show thus before the whole world that we shall issue as conquerors from this struggle ? It is for this reason that we must endeavour to join Macedonia to Bulgaria, even in the event of a peace without annexation ! ”

If Mr. Weigand had put this argument first, the object of his reply would have been much clearer.

November 26, 1917.

II

THE BULGARIAN LAW OF NATIONS.

Every nation, says Montesquieu, has a Law of Nations ; even the Iroquois, who eat their prisoners, have one. They send and receive embassies ; they know the laws of war and of peace ; “ the evil is, that this Law of Nations is not founded on true principles ” (*L'esprit des Lois*, page 8).

If Montesquieu in his book, by which he has become immortal, takes the Iroquois as example, it is because at that moment he probably did not know of the existence of the Bulgarians, the latter being at that time the slaves of their friends and allies of to-day, the Turks. Otherwise, the great French philosopher would not have taken the trouble to seek examples beyond the continent in which he lived.

It is, however, true that the Bulgarians do not eat their prisoners, which does not prove that they would not like to do so. It is probably because they, when waging war, scarcely ever give quarter, that is to say, they kill their prisoners and put an end to the wounded. And that is still the best that their adversaries can expect of them, as it oftener happens that they mutilate the wounded without killing them, leaving them to their fate after having robbed and completely stripped them. In the previous number of *La Serbie* we gave the names of unfortunate Serbian soldiers whom they had subjected to such tortures.

We Serbians are not particularly astonished to see the Bulgarian soldiers transformed into butchers, killing off their adversaries after the combat in a cowardly and cruel manner ; for it was these same soldiers who, during the war of 1913, dealt bayonet thrusts to their Bulgarian comrades seized with cholera, so as to leave them afterwards as wounded on the battlefield, where the Serbian stretcher-bearers came to seek them and carry them to our ambulances, which, in consequence, became hot-beds of epidemic.

These innate instincts of cruelty in the Bulgarian soldiers are cleverly exploited by their leaders. According to the stories of prisoners, related in *La Serbie*, they take great trouble to recount to the Bulgarian soldiers all sorts of falsehoods regarding the manner in which the Serbians treat the Bulgarians who give themselves up as prisoners. The leaders of the Bulgarian army do not cease to repeat to their soldiers that the cruellest fate awaits those among them who may be taken prisoner by the Serbians. In stirring up the hatred of their soldiers by means of lies, they then try to enrage them and render them vindictive and cruel. And it cannot be said that they have not succeeded in their design. It is, therefore, the Bulgarian leaders whom we make chiefly responsible for these misdeeds ; for they, at least, cannot be ignorant of the essential rules of the Law of Nations. These rules, proclaimed more than a hundred years ago by the great French philosopher whom we have just quoted, are to be found now in all law manuals in use in the army. One of these rules states as follows : " The Law of Nations is founded naturally upon the principle that the

different nations ought, in time of peace, to do each other the most good, and in time of war the least harm possible, without injury to their real interests."

Seeing what the Bulgarians are doing at present, one can say that one gains nothing by being born nearly two centuries after the great philosopher proclaimed these principles ; it is true, however, that we must not forget it was a French philosopher who proclaimed these principles, which the whole world has since adopted as its own, and that the Bulgarians, the successors of the Turks from whom they have inherited manners and morals, do not consider themselves in consequence bound down to the doctrines of their enemies. In fact, seeing that they are the disciples of the Germans, and that they take pride in the title of "Prussians of the Balkans," they care very little about anti-German principles. It is not, therefore, Montesquieu who should be their idol, but rather Nietzsche, for it is not in the cause of right that they are fighting to-day, but for domination. And they are not seeking to conquer in order to preserve, but in order to destroy and ruin the conquered countries. Might and cruelty ; these are the two ruling principles of their policy and of their life. Bad faith and falsehood do the rest to justify all their misdeeds and all their abuses. It is sufficient to recall to mind the reason given by their Government in order to justify the plundering indulged in by the population of their capital at the time of the sacking of the Serbian Legation, after the invasion of Serbia. It was, according to the Bulgarian Government, because this country had ceased to exist that the Bulgarians thought themselves authorized to plunder the Legation. There is a new theory which would make even their allies blush. The Germans themselves, when they carried off the treasuries of the Belgian banks, did not dare to give such a reason. But the Bulgarians have never been afraid of dishonour when material advantages were found to be the result of their dishonest actions. "Traffic in honour enriches no one," that is another French proverb with which they have nothing to do.

It is probably in conformity with these principles that the Bulgarian Government ordered the enrolment of Serbian subjects in the Bulgarian army, as well as the confiscation

of the property "left without owners," which is again a Bulgarian formula for the appropriation of the property of enemy subjects absent from the country.

Given the special character of the Bulgarian Law of Nations, which is shown clearly by the facts we have just related, we are curious to see how their new Minister at Berne will succeed in his relations with the honourable members of the Federal Council, by whom he has just been accredited, and who, in reference to the Law of Nations, still hold to their old principles proclaimed by their Jean-Jacques and by Montesquieu.

November 5, 1916.

THE SLAVISM OF THE BULGARIANS.

To the Editor of the "New Europe," London.

DEAR SIR,

The doubtlessly interesting article of M. Milan Curcin, on the Bulgarians and Slavdom, published in No. 48 of your estimable review, contains some important points which, although expressed in a general form, represent only the personal opinion of the author and, I may add, a false one.

I do not speak of the certainly highly inspired author's desire for a "close union between the South Slavs and the Bulgarians"—a merely platonic wish devoid of all practical value both in itself and also as regards the person of M. Curcin, who is, I may state, no politician but a man of science.

As Lecturer of the German language and German literature at the University of Belgrade, he never took any part in political matters nor contributed in any way to the forming or determining of public opinion in Serbia. From the responsible political circles in Serbia he was as distant as any simple citizen, and his present profession of faith in the Bulgarian problem is consequently a purely dogmatic one.

I also wish to place M. Curcin's appreciation of Bulgarian qualities on its true level and to state that the "progressive people" as M. Curcin describes the Bulgars—who possess

all these positive qualities, some of which are lacking in the true Slav races and which the latter should have learned from the Bulgarians, such as: perseverance, an industry that does not disdain small things, discipline and—as a result—the faculty of organization—enjoyed a very different reputation before the revelations of M. Curcin.

The assertions of M. Curcin are neither to be confirmed by history nor by the testimonies of great numbers of travellers who have studied the psychology of the Bulgarian people. It is indeed a notorious fact that the Bulgarians remained under Turkish serfdom long after the liberation of the other Balkan peoples, just because they totally lacked the qualities attributed to them in M. Curcin's article. Apathetic, obedient, respectful of brutal force—they did not move to free themselves from the ignominious Turkish domination.

When in 1877-1878, Russia at the price of great human sacrifices liberated the Bulgarian provinces, the Bulgars showed no excessive enthusiasm and even now they do not realize the magnitude of the Russian sacrifice.

Russian officers and officials laid down the first foundations of the political and economic organization of the new State, and if Bulgaria has been able to make some cultural progress, it is mostly due to the work of the Russians. Modern Bulgarian legislation is another proof of the lack of any specific Bulgarian idea for the organization of the State. What the Bulgars excel in, is docility to all German suggestions and models, and the mastery of dissimulation of their real characteristics.

It would take very long to recount the testimonies of all those who have had the opportunity of penetrating into the mystery of Bulgarian psychology and I am content to quote only two names of great authority. M. Curcin probably knows the very instructive book by Panoff, *The Psychology of the Bulgarian People* (Sofia, 1915, in Bulgarian), a masterly work on the applied national psychology. In this book, written by a Bulgarian of repute, no mention is made of the high qualities quoted by M. Curcin. The other competent testimony is that given by the Bulgarian poet, Konstantinoff, in his famous book, *Baja Ganje*,

adduced by M. Curcin as the only true Bulgarian literary work of great value which vividly portrays the Bulgarian with his Tartar characteristics. But M. Curcin will vainly have to seek in *Baja Gange* for confirmation of his statements on Bulgarian qualities.

M. Curcin has made another political statement which is likely to be misinterpreted: "During the Balkan wars, before the unexpected attack on the Serbian Army by the Bulgarians in June, 1913, I had to endure angry discussions and to live through bitter hours in Skoplje, then the Serbian Headquarters, because of this heretical opinion. Still worse was it at the beginning of this war, in Kragujevatz, when I urged, contrary to the opinions of my best friends, that it was necessary to meet the demands of the Bulgarians to the utmost limit, if only it would prevent them from taking armed action on the side of the Central Powers." This statement may seem an accusation against the attitude of the Serbian Headquarters, and it must be explained—not only in the interest of M. Curcin but especially for the sake of truth. In doing so, we will pay homage to the loyalty and readiness of Serbia in 1913 to accept the arbitration of the Czar and to her willingness in 1915 to make some important territorial concession to Bulgaria in Macedonia, only in order to secure the intervention of this country against Turkey.

If M. Curcin now speaks of his "angry discussions" and "bitter hours," they have nothing to do with the Serbian policy. Mr. Curcin abuses the ignorance of the English public as regards his personal position, by representing things as if he had been a participator at the Serbian Headquarters in the decisive hours of June, 1913, and August-September, 1915. The fact is, that he was in Skoplje attached to the Provisioning Department, and in 1915 he served as interpreter and guide to the English and American missions where he rendered valuable services; but his duties excluded any contact with the responsible factors at Headquarters.

It must also be remembered that the Serbian policy was determined by Belgrade in 1913 and by Nish in 1915, where the Government and the Parliament in plain agreement

had declared themselves in favour of an "entente" with Bulgaria. In both cases, after these votes, the Bulgarians attacked Serbia treacherously and behaved like true Huns.

M. Curcin personally may hope for a "close union" with Bulgaria, but it is left to be seen whether there would be any more Serbians who would agree with him in this *herostratic* attitude.

Your most obedient servant,
L. MARCOVITCH.

January 19, 1918.

THE BULGARIANS DESCRIBED BY THEMSELVES.

Of all the belligerent nations it is incontestably the Bulgarian nation which, from a psychological point of view, presents the greatest variety. There is no nation about which such diverse and contrasting opinions and judgments circulate as the Bulgarians.

The most impartial observer finds himself quite confused before the heap of contradictory manifestations, of opposing tendencies and of varied sentiments which he encounters at each step in Bulgarian political life. The world war, bringing about the open union of the Bulgarians with the Germanic powers, has shattered many doubts and corrected many judgments as to the character and intimate aspirations of this Balkan people. But former presumptions still exist, and even recently very discerning minds have been seen to fall into the errors of the past and accord belief to the declarations of circumstances made by certain Bulgarians. That is why the book of Dr. Victor Kuhne¹ is of particular interest, as he entirely succeeds in establishing the fact that the famous Bulgarian cunning exists only in the moral sense of the word, and that from a political point of view, the Bulgarians have always pursued and are still pursuing the same object: the realization of Bulgarian hegemony in close connection with the Germanic plans of Central Europe, in which Bulgaria has also a share.

¹ *Les Bulgares peints par eux-mêmes*, documents and commentaries collected and edited by Victor Kuhne. Preface by Aug. Gauvain. (Paris-Lausanne, Payot 1917.)

The Bulgarian nation speaks a Slav language, but the physical and psychological features which are the essential elements of the ethnical character of a nation, show, without a doubt, its Touranian or Mongolian origin. Having shunned intercourse with Byzantine and Latin civilizations, from which the Serbians have profited so greatly, the Bulgarians have been too slow in making up their minds politically. They let themselves be freed by the Russians, Roumanians, and Serbians, practice at first a policy frankly Russophile, and later on, under the influence of King Ferdinand, form most intimate relations with Austria. An era of policy apparently wavering between Vienna and Petrograd follows, during which the Bulgarians achieve, thanks to this intentional duplicity, some appreciable gains. The world was, nevertheless, shocked at the tricks played by Bulgaria upon European and Balkanic diplomacy. In 1897, to the suggestion of a Serbo-Bulgarian alliance directed against Turkey, Bulgaria replies eagerly in the affirmative and . . . informs the Sublime Porte of the project for the price of three Bulgarian bishoprics in Macedonia, which the Turkish Government immediately granted. In 1905, the plan of a Customs Union between Serbia and Bulgaria is made public by Sofia in order to give pleasure to Vienna. In 1908, Sofia and Vienna come to an understanding for the simultaneous declaration of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the independence of Bulgaria. In 1912, Bulgaria communicated to Austria her treaty of alliance with Serbia and followed the advice of Vienna for frustrating the policy of Balkanic solidarity, because the Bulgarians do not wish to collaborate with Balkan nations and prefer to work for Vienna and Berlin. During all this period the Bulgarian Press does not cease to assert its Russian sympathies, its Slav sentiments and its devotion to the great democracies of the West.

When the European war obliged her to drop the mask, Bulgaria unwillingly accepted this new situation, so little compatible with her customary practices. That is why the Bulgarian Government decided to continue the game. In 1913, by treacherously attacking the Serbians, who, however, accepted the Russian arbitration, the Bulgarians gave as

reason for their conduct the Serbian "treachery!" In 1915, in falling from behind upon the Serbian armies, attacked in the north and the west by the Austro-Germans, they proclaimed that the Serbian attack obliged them to take up arms and defend Bulgaria! In 1912-13, in spite of the explicit text of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, designating as "disputed zone" all the territory situated between Mount Char, the Lake of Ochrida, the Ægean Sea and Mount Rhodopes, the Bulgarians styled "indisputable" territory all that which the Serbians had granted to them, and "disputable" all that which they had granted to the Serbians! The treaty of 1912, a purely political agreement, provided for a political division of country, but the Bulgarians constantly repeat that, by this agreement, the Serbians recognized the Bulgarian character of Macedonia! In 1915, the Allies had offered Serbian Macedonia to Bulgaria if she marched against the Turks. The Bulgarians have marched against the Allies, and yet they pretend that the Allies have promised them Macedonia!

All these facts, and many others, have decided Dr. Kuhne to apply a special method to the examination of Bulgarian psychology, and in his book there is an imposing collection of Bulgarian testimonies and arguments. How could he, indeed, proceed otherwise, seeing the Bulgarian audacity in denying everything, absolutely everything. The forced recruitment of Serbians is a typical example of this. The Bulgarian papers have published recruiting orders. The Serbian Government protests and the Bulgarian Legation at Berne replies that the Bulgarians have every right to recruit the Serbians, the latter not being Serbians but Bulgarians. (*Journal de Genève*, March 28th). When Geneva and Lausanne, indignant at these inhuman proceedings, protest, the same Bulgarian Minister declared in the paper of Mr. Debrit that it would be abominable "if it were true that the Bulgarians had recruited Serbians, but," he adds, "it is not true!" We refer him to his avowal in the *Journal de Genève* and, thereupon, the *Echo de Bulgarie* replies that it is a question in Serbia of an administrative measure and not of recruitment! The Prime Minister, Radoslavoff, declares, however, in the *Neue Freie Presse* that the Bulgarians are

indeed recruiting Serbians, but that in Serbia there are no Serbians, but only Bulgarians !

Mr. Kuhne's book should be read. It was the duty of a neutral to dispel the artificial clouds with which Bulgaria loves to surround herself and to present the Bulgarians as they really are, as they show themselves to be, by their thoughts and by their acts. This book is a remarkable document on the psychology of an unbalanced nation.

July 15, 1917.

A MANIFESTO OF THE KING OF BULGARIA.

King Ferdinand of Bulgaria has addressed "to the Bulgarian nation" a war manifesto which would not interest us in the slightest if it did not contain one very characteristic passage, savouring remarkably of German origin. "Bulgarians," says King Ferdinand to his subjects, "to-day Bulgaria, with the help of allied troops, has succeeded in driving back the Serbian aggression against our territory, she has beaten and broken this latter power and realized the unity of the Bulgarian nation, for Bulgaria is mistress of nearly all the territories to which she has historic and ethnical rights." As the Germans pretended and still pretend that they have been attacked and that it is a defensive war they are carrying on, so the King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, who, in April, concluded a formal alliance with Germany and Austria, with the sole object of attacking Serbia, affirms in his turn, publicly, that the Bulgarian army has repulsed the aggression of Serbia ! That a sovereign should say, in a public proclamation, a thing which is distinctly contrary to the truth, shows an individual psychology which will not escape the notice of historians, but is for the moment of no particular interest. The matter is much more serious, however, when one looks at it from the point of view of the "Bulgarian nation," to whom King Ferdinand addresses himself in his manifesto. This nation will accept "the Bulgarian truth" of the manifesto, of that there is no doubt, and it will do so because it possesses the same mentality as its King, or because it is not capable of forming an independent judgment and always lets itself be guided by its

rulers. A third explanation is not possible. Many people admit the second cause, while we, on the other hand, give preference to the first, which is more logical and more probable, and in character with all that the Bulgarians have done during the last few years.

September 10, 1916.

THE BULGARIAN SUMMER, 1915.

The recent work of Mr. Dunant: *L'Été Bulgare*, 1915 (*The Bulgarian Summer*, 1915), has lately been the object of numerous and varied commentaries in political circles in France. In view of the conversations which Mr. Dunant had at that epoch with representatives of the different political groups in Bulgaria, one is really tempted to believe that the Allied diplomacy had not done all that it might have done, in order to bring Bulgaria over to its side, that the state of mind which was prevailing there before its intervention was already propitious—if one had known how to deal with it—to a sudden change in favour of the Entente.

In 1915, Mr. Dunant was at Sofia, as special correspondent of the *Temps*. The doors of Bulgarian statesmen were opened wide to him, and Mr. Guechoff, head of the Narodniaks, and Mr. Malinoff, head of the democrats, and the Progressists and the Radicals, and the Agrarians, all these people were eager to communicate to Mr. Dunant the ideas which the groups, of which they are the authorized representatives, had formed regarding the question of war and peace, which was at that time agitating the whole Bulgarian nation. Mr. Dunant presents these ideas to us in his remarkable work. All the Bulgarian statesmen belonging to the Opposition appear to have expressed to him their horror of the proposed alliance with the Central Empires.

We do not intend here to examine thoroughly Mr. Dunant's book, but we cannot refrain from making at once the observation that Mr. Dunant has not had the necessary time for studying the psychology of the Bulgarian people, of its chiefs and leaders. When Mr. Dunant transmitted faithfully the words of a Guechoff, of a Malinoff, or of a Tzanoff, he had no idea that behind each word and behind each act were

hidden hypocrisy, falsehood, the desire to attain their own particular political aims, that is to say, power, The Bulgarian Opposition, for years under German influence, was imbued with the Germanic spirit to the same degree as the Government itself. It is inherent in the Bulgarian people to adapt themselves easily to the Germans, as the Bulgarian and German people live and move among the same ideas of domination, of conquests and of oppression. In my book, *Bulgaria at War*, I have written the following lines (page 22) : "In Bulgaria, any Government, were it the very best, is resisted stubbornly by the Opposition with the sole object of overthrowing it in order to take its place. The Opposition is always fighting against the ideas of the Government, whatever they may be, and adopts without hesitation contrary ideas. In 1915 the Bulgarian Government was Germanophile ; the Opposition declared itself Russophile. If the Bulgarian Government had been Russophile, all the Opposition would have been ardently Germanophile."

In our opinion, that is the exact expression of the sentiments which have guided the Bulgarian Opposition in the struggle against the Government of Mr. Radoslavoff. Besides, the Bulgarian Opposition, when it saw itself incapable of attaining its ends, threw aside the mask. And since the Bulgarian intervention we have never heard of one word, one act, tending to prove that in Bulgaria there are people who do not look favourably upon the alliance with Germany. On the contrary, Mr. Guechoff and Mr. Malinoff, as well as Mr. Tsanoff and Mr. Sakysoff, the right as well as the extreme left, profess sentiments of sympathy and devotion towards Prussia. The entire Bulgarian Opposition supports to-day the policy of the Czar Ferdinand and his Government, and has no other desire than that of seeing the French and English democracies overthrown, in order that it might accomplish unopposed its designs of domination and conquest.

In speaking of crushing Prussian militarism, we should not forget Bulgarian militarism, equally dangerous and equally fatal for the security and tranquillity of Europe. The Prussia of William II and the Prussia of the Balkans deserve the same fate.

February 9, 1918.

FERDINAND REPLIES TO THE POPE.

For my part, I find the reply of the Czar Ferdinand to the Pope quite delightful. His Bulgarian Majesty pretends to uphold any proposal that is not in opposition to "the vital interests of Bulgaria and its unity." Finally, "animated with the desire to live in peace and in harmony with all nations," His Majesty hopes that the work undertaken by the Holy Father "may be crowned with the most brilliant success. . . ."

And while the truly Christian reply of Coburg is being transmitted to the Press by all the telegraphic agencies, the propagandists—come expressly from Sofia in order to enlighten this good Swiss people and proclaim, like Mr. Alexandre Kiproff, the truth about Bulgaria—are setting forth through the medium of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* of September 30, 1917, what the Bulgarian nation means by its "vital interests and its unity." This is, first of all, the cession to Bulgaria of the whole Dobroudja, the direct junction with the great railways of Western Europe, which necessitates a common frontier with Hungary, then, the whole of Macedonia, the Greek towns of Cavalla, Seres and Drama, which in case of need would be returned to King Constantine, but not to Venizelos, finally Salonica internationalized. There is what one calls applying law and moderation. In short, it is only in the East that Bulgaria has shown moderation and there only because it was impossible for her to annexe . . . the Black Sea!

The Bulgarians, as I have shown in a recent work,¹ have a mentality which it is difficult for Western peoples to grasp in its entirety. Thus, according to circumstances, national aspirations increase or diminish; and so the Bulgarians affirm sometimes, that they are Slavs, sometimes Touranians, related to the Hungarians and Turks. Periodically they shower the most filthy insults upon France, England and Russia, or else declare sadly: "Why do not these powers leave us in peace? Why, they have done everything possible to extend their front as far as our country?" (*Mir*, September 7, 1919). Sometimes the Bulgarians proclaim as their national

¹ *The Bulgarians described by Themselves.*

ideal the Bulgaria of San-Stephano, and storm against Bismarck, who opposed its creation; sometimes they declare that "it is a real good fortune for Bulgaria that the realization of the San-Stephano project was prevented by the intervention of Germany," and that "independent Bulgaria has come to life again at the Berlin Congress, thanks to the defeat inflicted by Bismarck upon Russian diplomacy" (*Narodni Prava*, February 15, 1916). Sometimes Russia is considered as the liberator and protector of the Bulgarians; sometimes they write: it is "a legend that Russia has liberated us. . . ." Shall I speak of their fraternizing with the Turks, those hereditary enemies, or of their flirtation with the Greeks, or of the attitude of that press which, after having covered with abuse "Constantine, the enemy of Bulgaria, the ridiculous arch-strategist," glorifies this same Constantine, whose "chivalrous action, of antique splendour, has earned for him the admiration of all high-minded men" (*Echo de Bulgarie*, September 4, 1916).

The same spirit presides in all the Bulgarian home policy. Radoslavoff, Tontcheff, Ghenadieff, Goudeff, Liaptcheff, General Savoff, and so many others have all passed through the classic ordeal, which, from a high post, leads to the dock with or without hard labour, and which, by the grace of Ferdinand, results in reinstatement in some lofty situation of those absolved sinners become thus the most faithful servants of Coburg. In a country where an Opposition party can, by one ballot,¹ make the number of its members go up from 4 to 170, one is not sure of remaining Minister for any length of time . . . therefore one must make the most of it, must fill one's pockets! However, these functionaries of capricious morality do not wish to show a "sinful tolerance and mercy towards the criminals" (the Roumanians), they wish "to justify their reputation of being the champions of the ideals of humanity" (*Narodni Prava*, September 13, 1916) and "purify the Roumanian State by establishing there civilization, real civilization, resulting from work, honour and virtue . . ." (*Balkanska Pochta*, September 15, 1916).

¹ The Government of Radoslavoff, which to-day possesses the majority, only disposed of six votes before it came into power in 1913.

They pull all the strings indiscriminately, they play all games . . . without ever paying, they employ the most diverse means provided they can obtain the most they possibly can. It is on the whole the Germanic official mentality adopted by a whole nation, for, alas ! it is not only the rulers who think and act thus, the whole Bulgarian people is unfortunately sanctioning their designs and subscribing to their actions ! The two following sentences have seemed to me marvellously characteristic of certain aspects of the very peculiar mentality of those who have enriched our language with the word "blackguard" (*boulgre*) : "To us, the good aunt is the one who gives us the largest cake" (Corresp. of Sofia to the *Vossische Zeitung*, January 7, 1917), and "All means are justified as long as we are not vanquished" (*Preporetz*, April 27, 1917).

That the Bulgarians desire peace, cannot be doubted by any one. After the annihilation of Serbia, they considered their national unity as realized. "The armed Bulgarian nation has finished its task," wrote the semi-official *Narodni Prava* of March 20, 1916. Then came the campaign against the Roumanians and, as Dame Fortune deigned to smile upon the Bulgarian arms, the realization of national unity included then the annexation of the Dobroudja, "which was formerly the cradle of the Bulgarian Empire," the Dobroudja of which, previously, they did not speak at all. And now that the Greeks are a fresh enemy, the Bulgarian national unity cannot be realized without the annexation of a part of the Hellenic territory, with Salonica, "Bulgarian Bethlehem !" The most curious thing is that there are to be found Bulgarians, ethnologists, historians, geographers, who affirm, proofs in hand, that Macedonia, the Dobroudja, or Salonica, or any other coveted territory likely to be obtained at a certain moment, is the cradle of Bulgarism. It must be said that these learned men have a dose of scientific spirit inversely proportional to their incommensurable Chauvinism. In the same way as many Germans sincerely believe that their country is carrying on a "defensive war," most Bulgarians, brought up in this conviction, are sincere when they serve out to you these "official truths." As to the real scientific proofs in support of this Bulgarian con-

viction, there is no conclusive one in existence. Recently, the socialist member of the Reichstag, Hermann Wendel, a man who knows the Southern Slav languages and who has travelled in Macedonia, published on the Macedonian question four remarkable articles in the *Vorwaerts* and the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, entirely setting at naught the arguments of the Bulgarian Minister at Berlin, Rizoff.

The official ethnical patrimony (on which Sofia bases its peace conditions) is therefore only a conception of fossilized and greedy minds, a conception which science will never be able to justify. "Law, moderation, Bulgarian unity" are only hollow words without definite signification. It is comprehensible that Ferdinand, "animated by the desire to live in peace and harmony with all nations," hopes that the work undertaken by the Head of the Church "may be crowned with the most brilliant success," since in the Note of the Pope no allusion is even made to the restoration of Serbia!

October 14, 1917.

BULGARIA AND HER WAR AIMS.

In the last number of *La Serbie* we gave a report of a sitting of the Bulgarian Sobranje, in which we spoke of the war aims of Bulgaria. We see from it that Mr. Radoslavoff proposes nothing less than to reduce Serbia to one-third of her territory, keeping two-thirds for Bulgaria—and all that under the pretext of achieving the unity of the Bulgarian nation, a ridiculous and imaginary unity, seeing that Bulgaria in taking possession of eastern Roumelia in 1885, and of Thrace in 1913, had not only put the finishing touch to her national unity, but had exceeded greatly her ethnographical limits, since in Thrace and in eastern Roumelia the Bulgarians form a tiny majority.

We do not wish to deal here with these lusts for hegemony, we limit ourselves simply to proclaiming once more Bulgarian duplicity, which would not affect us at all if, unfortunately, some politicians of the Allied world had not let themselves be taken in by it.

Every time the Germanic barometer falls, the Bulgarians

set about pretending to be against the Germanophile policy of King Ferdinand. With this object they leave nothing undone in order to produce the desired effect. The "Opposition" especially, begins to work in conformity with the instructions from above. And artless people let themselves be duped to the extent of pitying this poor Bulgarian nation, which is not allowed to pursue a policy dictated to it by its "true" sentiments!

But as soon as this same barometer rises, it never fails to produce its attractive effect on the Bulgarians. Thus the success procured by the Bolshevists for the Germans has had its effects upon the Sobranje. The heads of the "Opposition" had, before the official Council of the Sobranje, a prolonged interview with President Radoslavoff, who distributed to them the rôles to be played in the official Council when the war aims would come under discussion. Pastouhoff, socialist; Malinoff, democate; Theodoroff, of the popular party; Blagoeff, Marxist socialist—all the chiefs agreed to support the Germanophile policy of the Government. But while waiting for the German preparations on the western front to end in a second Verdun, the Allies should frankly abandon all idea of separating the Bulgarians from their masters, as the only means of separating them is to beat the latter.

February 23, 1918.

III

THE QUESTION OF BULGARIA.

At the moment when the great American Republic is entering the war, placing at the service of the Allies its immense material and moral resources; to speak of Bulgaria and the Bulgarian canker, seems indeed attributing to this nation, bursting with Prussian pride, a value and importance which it does not possess. However, the Bulgarian problem has not ceased to occupy people's minds these last days, especially since Mr. Milioucoff, a notorious friend of the Bulgarian nation, rose to power. The inveterate prejudices of certain diplomats and journalists regarding Bulgaria and her foreign policy, continue to agitate public opinion in the

Allied countries. This incomprehensible weakness, while seriously prejudicing the moral authority of the Allied powers, is made use of by the Bulgarians and their protectors at Berlin, with the object of raising the spirits of their own nations. But we can do nothing to change it. If we decide, nevertheless, to refer again to the Bulgarian question, already solved for us in October 1915, when Bulgaria, in spite of the offer of the greater part of Serbian Macedonia, fell upon Serbia from behind, at the most critical moment of the struggle of the little kingdom against the Germanic invasion, it is because the more or less open allusions to the Serbian opposition to the idea of a separate peace with Bulgaria, oblige us to recapitulate shortly some facts established long ago. This recapitulation, let us hope, will cause even the most incorrigible Bulgarian sympathizers to consider the idea of a sudden change in Bulgaria with more prudence and more dignity.

The true policy of Bulgaria was clearly delineated after 1903. Until the accession of the Karageorgevitch in Serbia, Germany and Austria thought they could, without difficulty, subdue the little Serbian kingdom and win it over in one way or other so as to fit in with the Germanic plans. The firm attitude of Serbia and her energetic opposition to the modern form of bondage proposed to her upset the German projects. These found, however, in Bulgaria, a most warm welcome. Bulgaria easily came to an agreement with the Germanic empires, as King Ferdinand had brought with him the ambition to contribute to the creation of a vast Germanic world empire, where he, also, would have an honourable place. As grounds for the agreement were not missing, Germany and Austria-Hungary could show themselves all the more generous in their promises to Bulgaria, since it was a question of the only defender of their cause in the East. In the Balkans, in fact, only the Bulgarian nation, cleverly led by King Ferdinand, seemed disposed to support Germany's oriental aims. All the other Balkan nations were less sure, and as to Serbia, far from wishing to agree to the German plans, she was thinking rather of the deliverance of her brothers, obliged to submit to the Austro-Hungarian yoke. The Bulgarian friendship was, therefore,

valuable to the Central Powers, and they did not bargain over the price, especially after the numerous proofs of sincere devotion Bulgaria had given to the Germanic cause.

The political events of the last few years, considered retrospectively, show the Germano-Bulgarian solidarity, manifested more than once under circumstances which exclude any idea of a mere occasional and passing occurrence. In 1905, Bulgaria, after having concluded a secret treaty of customs union with Serbia, revealed it suddenly before the date agreed upon, providing Austria with the opportunity of exercising an economic and political pressure upon Serbia. In 1908, Bulgaria approved the Austrian project of annexing Bosnia-Herzegovina and proclaimed at the same time her independence in order to mitigate such a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Berlin, committed by the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1912, King Ferdinand signed the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement, but did not delay in communicating it to his masters at Berlin and Vienna, and obtaining their consent by persuading them that Bulgaria alone would profit from it. When the Serbian victories thwarted her plans, Bulgaria, urged on by Austria and by Germany, attempted the great stroke of the 16th-29th June 1913, which had a lamentable issue. But all these failures only stimulated the ardent desires of Bulgarian politicians to realize the dream of a Balkanic Empire, so temptingly depicted to them by the Germans. The offer of Serbian Macedonia, made by the Entente in the summer of 1915, was, therefore, a much too meagre present for the Bulgarian appetite, grown accustomed to the idea of a large slice, consisting of the whole Balkan Peninsula.

The Serbians, after so much suffering, would have no wise objected to a peace with Bulgaria, concluded according to the general principles contained in the common reply by all the Allied Governments to the Note of President Wilson. This formula, accepted by the Serbian Government, is very clear and corresponds entirely with Serbia's desires. Let Bulgaria, therefore, repair the harm she has caused to us and to our Allies; let also the verdict be uttered with regard to the crimes committed by the Bulgarians and let necessary guarantees be demanded against further aggressions. Such

must be the basis of a peace with Bulgaria. Serbia has never thought of annihilating the Bulgarian nation. She has given numerous proofs of her peaceful and even friendly intentions with regard to this semi-Slav and semi-Mongolian nation, which proceeds, at the very moment when she is weaving intrigues for peace, to the systematic destruction of the Serbian population. It is, therefore, not the fault of Serbia if Bulgaria is working with all her might for Germany and if she represents a dangerous thorn in her path. Gentle methods are here out of place ; it is rather by a radical operation that one must pull out this thorn and get rid of a troublesome enemy.

April 15, 1917.

BULGARIA AND THE SERBIAN POINT OF VIEW.

Vain would be the victory if the German leaders should go unhung or unshot . . .

Letter of Mr. Richard H. Edmunds, Editor of the
Manufacturers Record, in the *Times*, 4th July, 1918.

The change of ministry at Sofia has given rise to the supposition that Bulgaria's policy has been completely reversed. From a practical point of view it is an understood thing that Bulgaria will never separate from Germany, and that any discussion on that subject would be superfluous. But as in certain circles they persist in calculating for a fresh Bulgarian treachery, it seems worth while to us to state clearly the Serbian point of view. The material advantages of a Germano-Bulgarian rupture would be appreciable, but the moral side of the question is a very delicate matter. If we leave out Greece, there is the question of Roumania and Serbia to be considered, these two States having been attacked by Bulgaria without any provocation and at a moment when they were making very favourable offers to these same Bulgarians with a view to getting them to decide to march against the Turks and the Austro-Germans. The Bulgarian case with respect to Serbia is made still worse by two special circumstances ; first, the Bulgarians are old offenders, the attack of 1915 being a new edition of that of 1913. Then, the Bulgarians are not satisfied with invading the Serbian territory, they have set about assassinating

systematically all that which is Serbian, and in this rage of destruction and de-nationalization, have shrunk neither from what is ridiculous nor from what is monstrous. The Bulgarians have rendered themselves ridiculous in proclaiming that not only Southern Serbia, the old Serbia, or Macedonia, was Bulgarian—an affirmation that might be maintained seeing the laborious and skilful propaganda of the numerous Bulgarian agents—but that the whole of oriental Serbia, as far as the Morava, was a Bulgarian country, inhabited by Bulgarians! That which is, however, more important is that they have committed monstrosities in wishing to kill not only the name, but the soul of the Serbian population in the occupied regions. A pure and simple return to the *statu quo ante* appears therefore a moral impossibility.

The *New Europe* said the other day that Great Britain in the arrangement of the Balkans will be guided neither by sentiment nor by resentment. Justice for all. This formula does not affect the principal question, that of the responsibilities. One cannot say as much of the opinion of certain American circles, where it is admitted that the realization of her Southern Slav aspirations might decide Serbia to yield up to Bulgaria vast territories in Macedonia. In 1915, one might consider the question from such a point of view; in 1918 the problem presents itself in a different fashion. It is no longer a question of atoning for interference, but of deciding the mode of making amends for a crime already committed. The fact of repentance alone does not acquit one of the crime committed. "There is no legislation which assures impunity to robbers by the simple restitution of that which they have stolen," said Mr. Louis Barthou, alluding to Bulgaria, in his letter of September 1, 1916, addressed to the *Journal des Débats*! This truth still preserves its value and it indicates the direction to follow for the solution of the Bulgarian problem, on condition of course, that the Bulgarians furnish proofs of their repentance. International penal law is also searching for the real culprits. The restitutions demanded by Serbia must not necessarily deal a blow at the Bulgarian nation. They apply only to the real culprits.

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In 1912, Serbia had to sacrifice to the ideal of Balkanic solidarity an important part of the former Serbian Empire. The deceptions of 1897, 1905 and 1908 have not destroyed our hopes of seeing Bulgaria come to her senses. This has been facilitated for her by large concessions, which ought to decide her to practice a Balkanic and Bulgarian policy. The events of 1912-13 have shown afresh that Bulgaria did not abandon her own aims and that she was anxious to serve Germany. In 1915, a last attempt was made, but it, also, was of no use. Voluntarily and deliberately, Bulgaria had taken the part of Germany, in basely attacking Serbia from behind. "Nobody threatened us, and nobody forced us to fight," wrote Mr. Guechoff in *Mir*, of July 3, 1918. We know what followed, and we know the tragedy of the Serbian retreat, a heroic retreat, imposed by the Bulgarian attack. Where is the man who could, in presence of these facts, return simply to the state of things in 1915? Where is the man who would dare, in presence of violated Belgium, to think of a peace with Germany that would not insist upon the necessary restitutions and reparations? Who is the statesman who would accord to the Bulgarian crime a pardon without conditions?

The Serbian point of view in the Bulgarian question is not of a territorial order. The words of Lord Northcliffe that "the Allies would lose all right to be considered the champions of human liberty, if they did not support Serbia, if they did not see to it that justice is done to her," are exactly our programme. First of all punishment for the massacre of the Serbians, for the atrocities committed in Serbia, and then terms of compensation. This is the primordial condition of any agreement with Bulgaria. On this point all Serbians are unanimous.

August 3, 1918.

THE TWO PEACE TREATIES OF BUCAREST. (1913 and 1918.)

On June 22, 1913, the Bulgarian Government, directed by Mr. Daneff, had a communiqué published, saying that the Bulgarian Cabinet had decided to submit the disagree-

ments with Greece and Serbia to the arbitration of the Czar of Russia, and that the Prime Minister Daneff was going to Petrograd with this object.

On June 27th, in the Serbian Parliament, Mr. Pachitch had made a long statement saying that the Serbian Government accepted the arbitration of the Czar of Russia. Just three days after this declaration, the Bulgarian army, by order of its commander-in-chief, attacked Serbia and Greece, in the night, treacherously, and without any declaration of war. The fight was violent but short, and the Bulgarian aggressor, after the failure of his plan, asked for peace. The four Balkanic States, equally threatened by the pro-German policy of the rulers of Sofia, hoped that Bulgaria, after the failure of this servile policy, would come to her senses, and that she would cease to serve the interests of Vienna and Berlin, to adopt instead, like her neighbours, the policy of Balkan solidarity, a policy which essentially excludes the hegemony of any one power. In order to facilitate this change of policy, the four allies had at once accepted the demand of the King of Bulgaria that hostilities should cease, not wishing to expose, by a triumphal entry of their armies into Sofia, the Bulgarian nation and its king to a humiliation, which might afterwards render more difficult the reconciliation desired.

Guided by the same considerations, the Balkanic allies during the peace negotiations at Bucarest, displayed towards Bulgaria remarkable clemency and indulgence. One asked from the Bulgarians no indemnity, no reparation. Serbia did not even ask for the Serbian parts of the Kingdom of Bulgaria. The Greeks consented to southern Thrace, with the port of Dedeagatch being attributed to Bulgaria, although these territories are inhabited by Hellenes. Obtaining nearly all eastern Macedonia, with a wide outlet on the Ægean Sea, Bulgaria could, without difficulty, support the rectification of the frontier in Dobroudja in favour of the Roumanians. In an economic sense, independent of the Dardanelles, considerably enriched by the fertile Thrace, Bulgaria, in spite of her treacherous attack, issued with an increase of territory, and the obtainment of other still more important advantages depended only upon herself. All that Serbia

and democratic Europe asked of the Bulgarians was that she should practise a Bulgarian policy, that is to say, should oppose the return of the Turks to Europe as well as the Germanic advance towards the East. The Bulgarians preferred, however, to do the contrary.

In 1914 the Government of Mr. Pachitch had not lost hope of winning Bulgaria over to the policy of Balkanic unity, and his overtures to the Bulgarians, in autumn, 1914, of which the *Echo de Bulgarie* itself spoke the other day, had manifestly this object in view. In 1915, Serbia, cured of this delusion, did not cease to warn the diplomacy of the Allies, so that it might not believe in the promises of the Bulgarians, but consider rather the acts of Sofia. It was wasted effort. Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria at the most critical moment of her history, when the two Germanic Empires were assailing her on the north and west, in order to break down the Serbian barrier which closed to them the route to the East. Serbia succumbed, but, astonishing fact, the delusion regarding Bulgaria remained still as strong. The events preceding the Roumanian intervention in August, 1916, have shown it in a convincing fashion.

While Simon Radeff at Bucarest, and Radoslavoff at Sofia, were fostering the credulous Roumanian diplomacy in the delusion that Bulgaria, in exchange for the promise of a few advantages, would look on unmoved at the advance of the Roumanian army in Transylvania, the Bulgarian General Staff was preparing, according to the instructions of the German General Staff, a sudden attack against Roumania. The same trick unfolded itself as in 1915 with Serbia, with the only difference that the Bulgarians succeeded this time in deceiving not only the Allies but also, and particularly, the Roumanians themselves. Roumania, in spite of all the reverses she had undergone, might have rallied if the treachery of the Maximalists had not obliged her to capitulate.

The Bucarest document of 1918, compared to the Bucarest Treaty of 1913, is very instructive. In 1913, the Balkanic allies, settling their own fate, sought to establish equilibrium among them and thus satisfy the vital interests of each nation. In 1918, it is the Germanic powers who impose a state of things in conformity with their own interests. Bulgaria

herself, in spite of all the joyful cries of the Bulgarian press, has played a by no means enviable rôle at Bucarest. The port of Constanza is declared German, the Danube will receive the German war-ships, not to speak of the German commercial penetration; Austria-Hungary reserves the right of constructing a canal through Bulgarian territory; Bulgaria yields up to Germany the two rich mines of Bor and Pernik (to be noted that this latter mine is situated in Bulgaria proper, and not in the conquered Serbian regions !) and over and above this, the Bulgarian Government undertakes definitely and unconditionally to pay, whatever may be the issue of the war, the price of the orders placed in Germany, of which the value amounts to two milliard levas, as well as for those placed in Austria, amounting to four hundred million crowns. When we add to this the scandalous clauses concerning Roumania and her exploitation, we can see without difficulty that the whole Bulgarian policy is animated by a sole desire, by a sole principle: to work for Germany, to work for Austria-Hungary.

The Bulgarian fables of their "national unity" are all the more odious on seeing the servility with which the Bulgarians sell their own skin to the Germans. The Bucarest Treaty is, for Roumania, a forced capitulation, but a capitulation which is by no means final, still less dishonourable. For Bulgaria, however, the deed of Bucarest signifies a moral surrender, a decline from the rank of an independent State to become an Austro-German province. At the time of the final settlement of Balkanic questions Europe and America will certainly take into account the facility with which the Bulgarian nation accepted the mercenary rôle. It is to be hoped also that the Balkanic nations, having learned a lesson from what happened between 1913 and 1918, will be able to avoid in the future the errors for which they have paid so dear !

May 18, 1918.

BULGARIAN CANOSSA.

The Touranian collapse is almost complete. Bulgaria has already capitulated, soon it will be Turkey's turn. The pen

of the journalist has hardly been able to follow the impetuous march of the Allied army on the Salonica and Palestine front. Each day we learn some new success against the routed Bulgarian army. From Prilep to Veles, from Veles to Ystip and to Kotchané, from there to Scoplie and to Kustendil! From victory to victory the Allies are arriving triumphally at the gate of the Bulgarian capital. The sound of the triumphs of the Allied armies has made the culprits of Sofia tremble. The prisons opened to let out Stamboliski, the only one who dared to brave the anger of the "Czar," and the Bulgarian delegates immediately set out for Salonica—the Canossa of the Bulgarians. Ferdinand of Coburg fled to Vienna. Never was punishment so prompt, never justice so triumphant.

We Serbians will be the last to be surprised at the sudden collapse of the Bulgarian "power." Knowing its character, we have never exaggerated its value. The sudden collapse of the Bulgarian army is due not only to military causes. A country's force of resistance depending not upon its extent, not upon the strength of its army, not upon the number of its population, but upon the moral qualities which a nation ought to possess, we never attributed an excessive importance to the momentary successes of Bulgaria, whose approaching end we awaited with certain assurance. For it is by its force of character, by the purity of its moral ideal, by the attachment of its citizens to this ideal, in short, by its degree of conscience, that one estimates the value of a nation, and it is upon all these conditions that its destiny depends.

The new Bulgaria, born from the Russian victories of 1876-1877, completed by the territories since taken from its neighbours, represented only an agglomeration of varied ethnical elements. These diverse elements had neither a common conscience nor the moral affinities indispensable to the formation of a durable governmental and national unity.

And so the collection of elements constituting the recent Bulgarian "Empire," like that which formed the former one, carried in itself the germs of disintegration. As long as success lasted, the heterogeneous elements of which Bulgaria was composed, held together—and yet at the price of what

efforts! But with the first reverse of fortune, everything gave way as at the touch of a magic wand.

Bulgaria, at the time of its origin, was only a barbarous State, whose domination was purely political and military, so she never took root in invaded countries, leaving behind her only desolation and ruins. Her position as a State was always provisional, and never anything more than temporary. It is known that the Bulgarians, who got a footing in the Balkans at the end of the seventeenth century, were a Turkish tribe. This element was reinforced by three successive migrations of Mongolian tribes (Petchegnagues, Koumanes in the eleventh, and Tartars in the thirteenth centuries).

These elements, which succeeded in conquering the territories of Bulgaria by penetrating as far south as Macedonia, subjugated the native Slav populations, without ever succeeding in getting these elements to resemble them. They came rather to resemble those whom they had conquered, the latter being superior in culture to their conquerors.

The edifice of the Bulgarian State, built upon sand, trembled from its foundations. The character of the Bulgarian people was not of the sort to increase confidence in the solidity of this edifice. Far too materialistic, it lacked moral basis. The Bulgarians, who have always been lacking in principle, looked upon politics as a game, as a speculation, never as a mission. Again this time they have played high and they have lost. They staked nothing less than their honour. It is now a question of withdrawing the stakes.

The only thing the Bulgarians cared about in this war was to find themselves on the side of the strongest. As soon as they perceived that Germany was no longer the strongest, they decided to capitulate in order to obtain the right of appealing to the generosity of the Allies.

Their latest ambition was to betray Germany, making a separate peace at least six months before the latter. Events took them by surprise and upset their plans. Beaten hollow and obliged to capitulate, they now congratulate themselves upon having at least concluded peace six days before their Turkish allies and six weeks before the Austro-Germans. On the whole, that is always so much gained.

Pillage and massacre was their way of making war, just

as duplicity, hypocrisy and falsehood were their political aids and means of governing. The Bulgarians were never sincere, except when they were telling lies, and the Allies have done well to take real precautions against a possible "change" of opinion.

The fall of the Bulgarian "Empire," brought about by the latest victories of the Serbians and the Allies, is the symbol of a new life of liberty and progress in the Balkans.

October 7, 1918.

SOME REMARKS ON THE FUTURE SERBO-BULGARIAN RELATIONS.

The Balkanic question only presents difficulties in regard to the Bulgarian problem. The solution of this problem will, however, be easier if one keeps to realities and abandons for ever the illusion of being able to do in the Balkans what has up to the present been impossible to accomplish in other parts of Europe, those parts which are not Balkanic and which call themselves civilized. In the same way as the "Civilized" are not all so in the same degree, so the Balkanic people present themselves under different colours. Employing the happy formula of Mr. Jean Finot who has divided Europe up into two different camps: "Civilized" against "Germans," the Balkanic nations claim, also, to differ in a marked fashion from the Bulgarians, with whom they have nothing in common, except geographical frontiers. This truth, so simple and so natural, does not suit the political amateurs who wish to apply the same measure to all the peoples in the Balkans, and who admit no distinction. There are even in the Allied countries a few Bulgaro-maniacs who are inclined to make a distinction in favour of the Bulgarians. The Balkanic problem cannot, however, be treated in uniform fashion. In the Balkans, as everywhere else, there are nations with whom one must be very careful and whom it is well to keep at a certain distance. That is the case with the Bulgarian nation. The general sentiment of the Serbians with regard to the Bulgarians is not hatred, but rather a sort of aversion. The Serbians refuse to become friends with a nation which has known so well how to exercise

its calling of butcher. Those who have suffered in Belgium, in the North of France and in Alsace-Lorraine will understand us. It is for them to understand us, and with that we are satisfied.

In the political domain we notice a tendency to conform to actualities as they stand after these four years of war. The Serbian relation to the Bulgarian question is, indeed, exactly the same as that of the Allies in regard to Germany, Austria and Hungary. That is to say: first the winding up of the war and then the reconstruction of the world. Before speaking of our future relations with Bulgaria, we must, therefore, take measures in regard to that country for atonement, restitution and reparation, corresponding to the acts committed during the war. The question of atonement is the first which comes up. First of all, atonement for the premeditated attack against Serbia in 1915. Bulgaria's attack against Serbia and the Allies is, in our opinion, one of the most odious acts of the war. Deliberately and guided solely by the desire to destroy and assassinate, Bulgaria, whom nobody was threatening, threw herself into the furnace. She also has had her war, not "fresh and joyful," but cunning and treacherous. She was offered Serbian territories in Macedonia in order to win her over to the Allies' cause; it was useless. Bulgaria, body and soul, formed part of the Germanic block. And she has shown herself worthy of her masters in Berlin.

It is quite natural that we should put first the question of atonement. The Germans have molested Cardinal Mercier; the Bulgarians have assassinated the Serbian Archbishop Vitchentie. The Germans have ill-treated the Allied prisoners; the Bulgarians have designedly starved the Serbian prisoners. According to the testimony of the Balkanic correspondent of the *Times* (number of September 29th), "without the shadow of a doubt the most abominable type of slavery known to modern or ancient history has been practised extensively during this present war by Bulgaria."

The Germans have deported the Belgians; the Bulgarians have deported the Serbian population, and 53,000 deported Serbians have never returned to their homes.

The Bulgarians have recruited the Serbian population,

have delivered up young Serbian girls to the Turks, have razed to the ground entire villages. All these acts must have been ordered by some one. Whether he is called Ferdinand, Radoslovoff, Tontcheff, Guechoff, or any other "off," does not alter the moral obligation, the absolute and imperative obligation of the Allies to demand atonement. Let all the culprits come before the High Court, all, without exception, the great and the small! Let us seize the archives of Sofia and discover the criminals. It is surprising that this has not already been done. As to the reparations and restitutions, impartial commissions will see to the details. Bulgaria has enriched herself at the expense of Serbia. It is a question of taking back from her that which she has carried off and of making her pay for that which she has destroyed.

A few Bulgarians launched, immediately after the capitulation, the idea of a Balkanic Confederation, in the hopes of saving that which could be saved after the failure of the pro-Germanic policy. Knowing that the Allies will no more oblige Serbia to yield up to Bulgaria a part of her national territory, Bulgaria has changed her tactics: she now asks for a Balkanic Confederation and she will certainly demand that a part of Serbia and Greece may be constituted under the name of Macedonia, a name purely geographical and dating from the epoch when there were no Slavs at all in the Balkans. Bulgaria hoped also to prevent, by this arrangement, the union of the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, and to contribute indirectly to the conservation of Austria-Hungary; a game as childish as transparent. Propose to a Belgian a confederation with Germany, and you will see what he will answer you. A confederation entails always a certain community of a moral and psychological sort. Is a confederation between France and Germany possible? There is everything to separate the Serbians and the Bulgarians and it is a cruel irony to speak of a Serbo-Bulgarian confederation at the very moment when we are in the act of finding out all the horrors committed by the Bulgarians in occupied Serbia. What blasphemy!

Before the Balkan wars and before the European war, we had two interests in common with the Bulgarians:

the first common interest was to deliver our unredeemed brothers from the Turkish yoke. The second was to defend ourselves together from the Austro-German penetration in the East. To-day Turkey is set aside and Austria-Hungary no longer exists. The Germanic danger is not completely abolished, but the Bulgarians are the last who could help us against the Germanic advance. The Balkanic wars and the world war have proved this in an indisputable fashion. We concluded with Bulgaria, in 1912, a treaty of alliance in order to deliver Macedonia from the Turkish régime. While we acted loyally, the Bulgarians, who wished to make use of the Serbian co-operation for her imperialistic aims and who did not expect our victories, had done everything in order that we might be beaten by the Turks. It is proved to-day that the Bulgarian Government had acted in full accord with Austria and according to the instructions received by her from Berlin and from Vienna. The treacherous attack of the 29th June, 1913, against the Serbians and the Greeks, was decided upon and executed by the Bulgarians on the advice of Austria-Hungary. And in 1914 Bulgaria tried to enter formally into the Triplice as has been revealed by the Lerchenfeld report to those simple people who believed still in the "national" character of the Bulgarian policy. When we shall have seized and published other documents, especially those of Sofia, we shall then have a clear conception of this servile nation who worked for the King of Prussia. Then it will be better understood why we Serbians have no wish for any but the most strictly necessary relations with Bulgaria. Nothing unites us and everything separates us. Which means that our future relations must be regulated in the same fashion as with any other State to which we are indifferent.

That which is essential is to preserve the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes from a fresh Bulgarian attack. The same measures of precaution as will be taken in regard to Germany, must be taken also in regard to Bulgaria. A Bulgaria rendered incapable of attacking her neighbours, that is what the Balkanic States must demand in the first place. Any reconciliation beyond the strictly necessary relations is to-day impossible between Serbians

and Bulgarians. New generations may think otherwise. But for us who have witnessed the massacre of our innocent population, we cannot defile the memory of our dead by arrangements, not only contrary to our sentiments, but perfectly useless. Bulgaria has chosen her path, we have chosen ours. We are Serbians and intend to remain so. They are Bulgarians, let them remain so.

January 20, 1919.

CHAPTER V

SERBIA AND ITALY

I

ITALY AND THE SOUTHERN SLAV QUESTION.

THE article by M. Torre on the Southern Slav question, published in the *Corriere della Sera* and reproduced in extenso in the fifth number of *La Serbie*, deserves, because of its moderation and academic style, a reply from the Serbian side. M. Torre speaks as a public man and independent politician and his moderation is the more remarkable because Italian official personages have not always shown the same reserve in their speeches and political declarations. While to the honourable Mr. Barzilai, a present minister, for example, the free representatives of the Southern Slav nation are "irresponsible agents," the honourable M. Torre expresses, on the contrary, his admiration for "the energy, activity, ardour and faith of the Southern Slav patriots." This difference of tone, in spite of the resemblance between the political views of the two statesmen, renders possible an objective discussion which is in the common interest both of Serbians and Italians.

In M. Torre's article there are two distinct parts: the explanation of the actions of the Southern Slav Committees and of French and English friends in favour of the union of all the Southern Slavs in one independent State, and the reservations on the principle of this movement made on the Italian side. In that which concerns the first part of the article, we will confine ourselves to saying that M. Torre's argument gives the impression that in Italy the Southern Slav movement in favour of union is considered simply to be the work of the Southern Slav Committees in

Paris and London. It is the habit, in Italy, to put in the first place the Southern Slav Committees and to insist on their action in favour of the Southern Slav aspirations. This way of thinking and of treating the Southern Slav problem generally leads the Italian leaders and politicians to unjustifiable conclusions on the subject of the alleged Italophobe propaganda. The Southern Slav Committees working for the deliverance of the Croats, Slovenes and Serbians from foreign power and their union in an independent State, only express the unanimous desire of all the Southern Slavs to be some day free from all foreign influence. Their patriotic action could not but be approved of in Italy, a liberal and democratic country which has passed through similar crises and difficulties before realizing its national union. Therefore, if the Southern Slav movement is judged from this point of view, the only one which is just and objective, the misunderstandings which can seriously harm Italo-Slav relations to the great detriment of both peoples would be avoided. We are under the impression that M. Torre has not been able to avoid entirely the Italian errors on the subject of the character and true nature of the Southern Slav desires and that he also attributes to the action of the Southern Slav Committees the tendencies which, in reality, are but the reflection of the movement of the Southern Slav populations in favour of liberty.

"The problem of Italo-Slav relations in the Adriatic cannot be solved on the simple basis of statistics, on the basis of external facts. It is a deeper and more profound problem which cannot be solved without taking history and Italian culture into account and seriously considering the future peace of the Adriatic.

"The problem is essentially political in the widest conception of the term. The French and English public men who exert an influence on public opinion cannot hope to solve it by comparison with one-sided standards which do not take into account the aims for which Italy went to war and by virtue of which she will be an important factor of European peace."

We also consider the problem of Italo-Slav relations to be a political problem in the general sense of the term,

but we cannot approve of the point of view adopted by the honourable Italian publicist that the whole question is an essentially political one. On the contrary, for the Serbians and Southern Slavs as a whole, it is a question of their national liberty and political independence. The realization of Southern Slav union and the creation of an independent Southern Slav State in the immediate neighbourhood of Italy, must necessarily attract the attention of Italian politicians but, in order to conciliate Italian and Slav interests and ensure their complete harmony, it must not be thought that the best way would be to prevent the union of the Southern Slavs. That union is our political creed, and, supposing that it can be realized, it must be arranged in such a way that it harmonizes with the legitimate interests of Italy. The future peace of the Adriatic will depend on the development of Italo-Slav relations. If these relations are founded on an amicable entente, on respect of the principle of nationality and the protection of the vital interests of both countries, there should be no reason to fear an Italo-Slav conflict. If, on the contrary, the new arrangement depends on purely political considerations, in contempt of the principle of nationality and the express will of the Slav population, it would be an artificial solution which would inevitably be the cause of new conflicts.

A policy of friendly relations is based not on words, but on certain material facts which constitute its firm foundation, and on what facts can an Italo-Slav friendship be founded if not on the absolute respect of the independence of both nations and the agreement of the principal leaders of their respective policies? These are the essential conditions of Italo-Slav harmony, and we do not see any other means of ensuring a perfect understanding between the two peoples who have every advantage to gain by understanding and helping one another. The Italian and Southern Slav theses are not necessarily opposed to one another. We hope for our national unity, and we expect from Italy not only the recognition of this desire, but also effective help in view of its realization. The Italians have not yet clearly stated their programme, but there is one point which may be considered as essential, that is the establishment of abso-

lute Italian maritime supremacy in the Adriatic, which would also help to guarantee the economic interests of Italy. To compare these two tendencies and examine them conscientiously and fairly, is to arrive at the conclusion that Southern Slav national unity does not necessarily affect Italian maritime supremacy and that, vice versa, the establishment of Italian supremacy in the Adriatic can be guaranteed without prejudice to Southern Slav unity.

M. Torre says that it appears to him that the English and French public men look upon the future Jugoslavia as a Power which will limit and act as a brake on the power of Italy, and which, in fact, will substitute itself by right to the Habsburg Monarchy as regards his country. M. Torre says that this is a mistaken idea; to be correct he should reverse the question and consider as a mistake any Italian plan which would lead to the substitution of Italy to Austria as regards the Southern Slav countries. If the Allies succeed in breaking the Austro-German power, and in reconstructing Europe on the basis of equality and liberty of the nations, we will not be able to speak of "substitution" of power either on the Italian side or on that of the Slavs, but of the attribution to Italy, Serbia or Jugoslavia of the provinces which ethnically and morally belong to them, that is to say by the wishes and express will of the inhabitants. This basis of Italo-Slav agreement is, according to our idea, the only one capable of starting the future relations between the two countries on the road to perfect harmony.

June 18, 1916.

THE NATIONALISTS AND THE LAST ITALIAN CRISIS.

Among the groups which have brought about the fall of the Salandra Ministry, the Nationalists occupy a prominent position, and their grievances were specially directed against the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was blamed for not having insisted on the legitimate wishes of the Italian people as represented by the Nationalists. It is known, however, that the Italian Nationalists have lost all touch with true nationalism and have become the most ardent of imperialists. Their aims go almost beyond the limits of political common

sense. But it would be a great mistake to treat their Press campaign as a negligible quantity. It is sufficient to cast a glance on the Italian Press in general and, more particularly on the political literature, which by itself is worthy of respect because of the number of its publications, in order to acquire the certitude that their arguments are accepted and quoted everywhere.

One cannot but admire this handful of representatives in the Italian Parliament, aided by a few authors and clever propagandists who, spurred by the ambition to accomplish the impossible, wish to regenerate their country by giving it the power of which they dream. Neither can one but admire the frankness and courage with which one of the most celebrated Nationalist writers, Mr. Francesco Coppola, tells the Italian people a very disagreeable truth: "Really," he writes, "to our great misfortune, our resurrection has been very easy, and, except for a small but heroic Italian aristocracy, we owe it more to others than to ourselves. We got Northern Italy through the French war, Southern Italy through the cowardice and weakness of the Bourbons; Rome through the Prussian victories over France in 1870; Venice, to the shame of our defeat, through the victories of the Prussians over the Austrians. To these means of formation of our unity and independence is doubtless due the moral, cultural and political decadence of the Italian nation during the last few years." Italian patriots are therefore approaching great problems of all descriptions, and are struggling "to free their country from the morbid sentimentality which made it fear war and the humility which made it doubt the possibility of waging it." It is notorious that it is the Nationalists who have largely contributed to making Italy break with Austria in order "to wage the war of her redemption and regeneration." But the Italian Nationalists cease to inspire admiration as soon as they make their demands for compensation for the first real Italian effort.

Before Italy declared war on Austria, the Italians explained the reasons which the Italian people had for taking up arms, in these words: "the sacred egoism of Italy cannot and must not confine itself to irredentism, to the

taking of Trent, Trieste, Istria and Dalmatia. Beyond the problem of irredentism is that of the Adriatic ; beyond that of the Adriatic is the Mediterranean problem ; beyond the Mediterranean problem is the question of world policy which will find its solution at the end of the war, which Italy cannot and must not allow to be solved in her absence. Italy is, and must be still more so, a world Power. . . . The egoism of Italy is neither more nor less than Italian imperialism."

The Nationalists' appetite for vast conquests did not diminish after Italy declared war. They were still occupied with the great Mediterranean, African, Asiatic and world problems. That of the Adriatic is out of the question. Supremacy in the Mediterranean is the starting point. But, seeing that events do not promise them much hope of an early realization of their imperialistic desires, they began the struggle with the Salandra-Sonnino Ministry. Although Italian irredentism was represented in this Ministry by Mr. Barzilaï, the Nationalists accused it of want of energy and even of having betrayed the sacred interests of the Italian people. In the meeting of the representatives of the Nationalist Party at Rome, on June 14th, the president declared " that the old Ministry was not capable of accomplishing the task given to it, that is to say of attaining all the national and imperialistic war aims. . . . Also the Salandra Cabinet's international policy appears to be the perfect antithesis of the concrete programme which the Nationalists had announced to the country and in the Chamber." A motion was unanimously passed approving the conduct of their Parliamentary representatives in voting against the Ministry and its foreign policy.

In Italy everybody does not share the Nationalist opinions. There are some politicians who try to moderate their excessive desires, in particular with regard to Italian supremacy in the Mediterranean, which hurt both the feelings and the interests of the other allied nations. But as regards the question of the Adriatic and the possession of its eastern coast, those who oppose the Nationalists' ideas are so few in number that their voices are drowned by those who agree with the Nationalists on this point. Also, very often even

in those quarters which depreciate the excessive greed of the Nationalists, the arguments invoked in their publications and in the Press are quoted in order to justify the Italian claims to the eastern Adriatic coast. These reasons have also been evoked in publications which have appeared outside Italy and which, at first sight, do not seem to have been made with a view to propaganda.

Absolute supremacy in the Adriatic with the tacit possession of its eastern coast, is the point on which all Italians and all Italian political parties agree: the soldiers claim them in order to ensure the security of Italy against peoples who are already worn out and weak; those who imagine that Italy is going to take the place of Germany and Austria in the Balkans, from the economic and commercial point of view in order to assure their economic conquests; the Catholics in order to make them a barrier against the alleged orthodox Russian and Serbian avalanche which threatens Catholicism already shaken on the Adriatic coast. Albania has already been appropriated, the coast of Epirus is disputed by the Greeks and Italians. Dalmatia and Istria are considered as future provinces of Italy. The leader of the Republican Party, M. Barzilai, is, in this matter, in complete agreement with the Republican party. The leader of the Reformist-socialist party, M. Bissolati, a member of the present Cabinet, fought against the Nationalists in 1914 and, by his articles in the *Secolo* on the Dalmatian question, raised a storm in the Italian Press. All the same, it is precisely in his party paper, the *Azione Socialista*, after he joined M. Boselli's Cabinet, that some articles on Dalmatia appear, referring to her as a future Italian province and not differing in the slightest to those of the *Idea Nazionale*. Quite recently the Rome correspondent of the *Journal de Genève*, usually well informed, speaking of the Boselli Ministry, said: "Union of all the national energy in order to pursue the war to the end, that is to say the complete realization of all the national claims in Europe and the East."

But according to the most recent declarations of Italian politicians, the possession of Dalmatia is no longer a national aim but a political weapon against the new Serbian State,

founded on the alleged necessity of re-establishing political equilibrium in the Balkans which would be broken by the excessive development of Serbia after the war.

An Italian deputy, the Duke Giov. Ant. Colonna Di Cesaro, has just published in *L'Ora della Antologia* (June 1, 1916) an article entitled "L'ora della Quadruplici nei Balcani," in which he asserts the necessity, for Italy and Russia (!) of avoiding the formation, in the Balkans, of a homogeneous nation; that is to say Greater Serbia which, as a consequence, would throw the other small States into the arms of Austria! He preaches in favour of a separate peace between the Allies and Bulgaria whose friendship in the future is necessary. It would naturally follow that Bulgaria would keep what she has conquered in Macedonia because that is the way to prevent Serbia from becoming "dangerously powerful."

July 9, 1916.

ITALY AND THE ADRIATIC QUESTION.

The historical reasons in favour of an Italian Dalmatia, so often quoted by an abundant Italian literature, are well known. In spite of their constant repetition, we esteem them to be far from a serious proof that the Italian aspirations to Dalmatia are justified. They all try to arrive at the conclusion that Italy possesses a historical right to Dalmatia. At the same time, it is forgotten that the principle by virtue of which a historical right to a country, without regard to its national character and the will of its inhabitants, is not a right but a fiction, a creation of the Middle Ages, due to historiographical courtesans who invented the genealogy of their sovereign and the theories as to the origin of the peoples, in order to justify the conquests and aspirations founded on might and not on right.

Why should this historical right of Italy to Dalmatia exist?

If it is because, in days gone by, the Romans reigned over Dalmatia and the Italians of to-day consider themselves to be the legitimate heirs to all that Rome possessed in ancient times, why only claim Dalmatia? Why not

claim, in virtue of the same right, three-quarters of the Balkan Peninsula, the whole of the borders of the Mediterranean, and more still ?

If it is because the Romans in a few centuries succeeded in Romanizing the ancient Dalmatian population, the Romans as well as all this Romanized population, have disappeared in virtue of the great law of gradual historical evolution.

If it is because the Venetians, up to the beginning of the fifteenth century, protected a few Dalmatian towns and islands and the Doges had the title of *Dux Dalmatiæ*, why not accord the same right to the modern Greeks, the successors to the Lower Empire, and to the modern Hungarians, the successors to ancient Hungary, who reign effectively over Dalmatia ? Why not accord this right to the Italian provinces, to all the Princes who, in the list of their titles, possess that of ruler of these provinces, formerly states ?

If it is because Venice, an aristocratic and conquering republic, profiting by the misfortunes of the monarch, Ladislas of Naples, who was not very happy in his claims to his historical right to Dalmatia, supplanted him in this right by buying from him a few towns and islands for the sum of one hundred thousand ducats, why not recognize the actual possession of the countries outside the kingdom peopled by Italian elements, by those who are their owners by right of purchase, by treaties or by marriage ?

If it is because the Venetian Republic had under its domination Dalmatia peopled by a non-Italian population and reigned over it as if it were a colony, against the will of its people, why not recognize this same right of Spain to Lombardy and Southern Italy, of the Popes to the States of the Church, of the Turks to the Balkans, including Roumania and Hungary up to Pressburg, etc.?

If it is because many stones, the remains of Roman monuments and ruins are to be found in Dalmatia—Joseph Lavallée gave the answer a hundred and fourteen years ago, speaking of the palace of Diocletien at Spalato : “ I do not recognize the titular ownership which such and such a people claims to the monuments of antiquity. No, the monuments which it has bequeathed to us do not belong to any one people in preference to another ; a nation whose

due it is to satisfy the eternal law that everything has an end, does not appoint privileged heirs to its glories at the time when it finds itself about to disappear from the face of the Earth ; it leaves the ground which it occupied either to the conquerors who have taken it, or to Nature who claims it ; it is repopled, or remains a desert, as human interests ordain ; but whatever the fate reserved for the position which it occupied in the world, the monuments which it founded are a heritage which belong to no one, because they belong to all. . . . It is to posterity that the nations who quit the lists leave the records which survive them ; and, for the nations which have ceased to exist, posterity does not mean one people but all people." ¹

As much can be said for the Customs offices, barracks and prisons established by the ancient Republic of Venice in the Dalmatian towns.

As to the nobility and bourgeoisie in Dalmatia, they were not Italian in the last few centuries either as a whole or by majority. The native Dalmatian nobility has been precisely the greatest opponent of Venetian policy and the vehicle of anti-Italian and Slav political ideas, this causing the government of the Republic to attempt to exterminate it systematically. We are able to show irrefutable proof of this by the official acts of the ancient Republic of Venice.

But why continue to enumerate other facts of no importance on which the Italians try to found their historical right to Dalmatia, when the Italian people themselves have denied the value of this fictitious right and realized their unity by fighting against it ? The national risings and the wars of the years 1848, 1859, 1860, 1866 and 1870 are nothing but a struggle against this fictitious right to which the Italian people opposed their will. And again to-day, the Italians deny its value when it concerns countries situated outside the kingdom, inhabited for the greater part by an Italian population. To this right they oppose the will of the Italians oppressed by the foreigner, to be united to the mother country. Why do they now invoke this right as regards Dalmatia, inhabited by a non-Italian population ?

¹ *Voyage pittoresque et historique de l'Istrie et de la Dalmatie*, etc. Paris an X (MDCCCII, pp. 177-178.)

This fictitious right, invoked in the interests of countries, without regard to the character of their populations, may be harmful to the Italians, even from the point of view of practical policy. To mention an example : if it were regarded as the principle governing all questions of this sort at the future peace conference, Italy would be deprived of Trent and Trieste, the direct cause of her participation in the war. For, from the historical point of view, Austria has a better right than Italy to the possession of Trent and Trieste.

* * * *

Another right, the right of nationality, should serve as a basis for the solution of this question. The same right which the Italians invoke for Trent should also be invoked for Dalmatia. This right does not issue from the Middle Ages but from the French Revolution. The Middle Ages knew this principle : the people belong to those who own the soil. It was the epoch of right founded on genealogy and supported by brute force. The great Revolution gave first place to the man and made him the sovereign of the ground on which he lives. If this principle has not become general and has not been able to be realized everywhere where it was applied to the masses it is because right has not been able to vanquish brute force. All the same, the principle remains : the soil belongs to the people by whom it is inhabited. And the people, become the principal factor, have succeeded, after a great struggle, in gaining the right to choose by themselves and for themselves the régime which they desire. The unity of the Italian people is founded on this principle, which now permits them to claim the countries where Italian is spoken which are still under foreign domination in virtue of historical right supported by force. Italy used this first right in 1860, and by the people's will, by plebiscite, she obtained the countries over which others possessed a historical right, but she did not get Savoy and Nice for which she invoked her historical right.

To put the Dalmatian question on the basis of the principle of nationality is to demand justice for the people who live there, the Serbo-Croatian people. And that is not since

yesterday but since twelve hundred years ago, without a break. During this time they had their national states and they were under foreign domination. With a national and political conscience already very strongly developed in the tenth century, this being in advance of all other people, they undertook the struggle for the nationalization of the Catholic Church, demanding that divine service should be held in the national language. From the fifteenth to the twentieth century they suffered under the most difficult political and economic conditions, keeping their national conscience and setting the example to the other fractions of the divided people. Their native land is Dalmatia for which they have struggled against non-national régimes and external enemies ; and their enemies gained more from this struggle than they did. It is in this land that they created their local and historical traditions, bound to the soil, traditions which the Italians do not possess. The whole country is steeped in their blood, and in their blood they have written their history. They have been tortured and persecuted, deprived of justice and instruction. In spite of this they have created their own national literature which has become the common property of all the Serbo-Croatians, and which forms one of the finest chapters of the Serbo-Croatian history and literature. They have given to humanity savants and artists, whom people have tried to steal from them in this time of heroic struggle for Dalmatia. It is true that these savants employed the literary language of the epoch, which was Latin, as did other savants of the same period ; as to the artists, they made their living abroad but not one renounced his Slav nationality. The Serbo-Croatian people lived under the most difficult conditions but became numerically stronger and stronger, absorbing even its opponents. They became stronger because of the vigour of their race and by force of events which no one had the power to prevent. To-day the Italians who live on Dalmatian soil are in the proportion of 35 to 1, whereas the Italians in the purely Italian countries outside the kingdom, at Trent for example, are in the proportion of 27 to 1 as regards the Germans. They do not impose its historical right which the Middle Ages created for it, but the right which results from their

uninterrupted existence on this soil during twelve hundred years and its continuous development.

The principle of the people's will is also indicated for the solution of questions of this description by Professor Giuseppe Ricchieri.¹ The application of this principle to Dalmatia is justified by all the above-enumerated facts.

It is in the interests of the two peoples, Italian and Southern Slav, to put this question in a justifiable fashion and to solve it impartially. The two peoples will gain equal advantages from its just solution, and that at a not distant date as well as in the remote future. An unjust solution would cause more harm to the Italians than to the Southern Slavs. At first, the Italian Nationalists—who deny the principle of nationality by professing imperialism—would think their wishes were satisfied; but the future will show that the far-seeing Italians, who base their reasoning on historical and sociological laws and on the principle of right and justice and who consider the solution desired by the Nationalists as harmful to the State and to the Italian people itself, are right. Professor Ricchieri expresses himself thus: "And the aspirations which must be opposed are the infatuations of the so-called Nationalists who declare every extension of their nation to be legitimate, no matter by what means it is obtained, even if it is prejudicial to the rights of other people. The liberal democratic principle of nationality has justice for foundation and peace and common welfare as its supreme aims; the nationalist aspirations, exaggerations and deviations of national feeling, are but the old instincts of oppression which perpetuate the causes of strife between nations."²

August 20, 1916.

ITALY AND SERBIA.

To the Editor of "La Serbie."

SIR,

In the number of *La Serbie* which appeared on July 9th which I had not previously seen, I note the following state-

¹ Biblioteca della Università Popolare Milanese, *La Guerre Mondiale* Milano 1915, pp. 121, 123, 124).

² *La Guerre Mondiale*, pp. 123-124.

ment: "The leader of the Socialist-reformist party, M. Bissolati, a member of the present Cabinet, opposed the Nationalists and the Jingos in 1914 and, by his articles in the *Secolo* on the Dalmatian question, raised a storm in the Italian Press. At the same time it is precisely in his party paper, *l'Azione Socialista*, after he joined M. Boselli's Cabinet, that the articles on Dalmatia which differ in no way from those of the *Idea Nazionale*, appear."

If the author of this statement was better acquainted with Italian political life and read the *Azione Socialista* regularly, he would know that it did not only publish articles in favour of the conquest of Dalmatia, articles which, for that matter are due to a journalist of no reputation, but that it has also published articles which are contradictory to the Nationalist thesis, signed by a well-known authority, M. Gennaro Mondaini, professor of Commercial History at the Ecole Supérieure de Commerce at Rome. Besides, the *Azione Socialista* adopted an attitude favourable to M. Mondaini's thesis in its edition of July 1st, that is to say a week before *La Serbie* published the statement made by its correspondent.

Here is the declaration made by the editor of the Socialist-reformist paper:

"We wish once more to affirm the belief of our Party, which condemns any territorial conquest which, without justification by geographical or ethnical reasons, would hurt the legitimate national aspirations of other peoples. This particularly in the case of the Adriatic which should neither be a lake, more Austrian than Italian, as it is at present, nor an Italian lake from which the other peoples of its borders would be politically excluded, but a sea over which Italy, guaranteed against all danger, can exert her economic and civilizing influences in full agreement with all the populations of the eastern shore.

"We insist on this point of view not only that the contrary opinions expounded in this same paper, in signed and personal articles, may lead no one to mistake the opinion of the great majority of the party, but also in order that our party's line of action when peace is restored, may appear as the fruit of our party's convictions."

As to M. Bissolati, no one has any right to accuse him gratuitously of having changed his programme.

His articles in 1914 on the necessity of recognizing the rights of the Slavs in Dalmatia only provoked a storm in the teacup of the Imperialist Press. The *Secolo*, the great Milan democratic paper, since November, 1914, pronounced itself distinctly in favour of M. Bissolati's thesis ; and since then it has never wished to change its views. And the supporters of M. Bissolati's thesis are far from being so few as *La Serbie's* correspondent states.

The truth is that there is in Italy a group of Imperialists which covets Dalmatia just as the extreme Nationalists amongst the Southern Slavs claim Trieste, Gorizia, Pola and even Udine ! *Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra*. But this excess on the part of Italian nationalism meets perhaps with more energetic opposition in Italy than the excess of Southern Slav nationalism meets with amongst the Southern Slavs.

General public opinion in Italy leaves it to the government. The best proof of this state of affairs is given by the great national paper of Milan, the *Corriere della Sera*, which has a circulation of 600,000 copies and which has never taken up arms for or against the Adriatic imperialistic thesis. Under these circumstances, the Serbian moderate party and the Italian moderate party should agree to take common action.

False information of the kind furnished by *La Serbie* of July 9th, can only serve one end : render this common action impossible, by making the Serbians believe that all Italians have lost their heads, by paralysing the action of the Serbian moderate party and by bringing about, as a reaction, the weakening of moderate Italian tendencies to the advantage of the imperialistic agitations.

La Serbie, which, if I am not mistaken, does not belong to the Southern Slav extreme Nationalist group, should apply itself to the prevention of these misunderstandings which can only render the greatest services to Germany and Austria.

Thanking you for your hospitality, please accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest esteem.

G. SALVEMINI,

Professor of History at the University of Pisa.

PISA, September 11, 1916.

The reply of the Editor of "La Serbie."

Professor Salvemini may rest assured that his declaration with respect to the small amount of influence which the Nationalist imperialists possess in Italy, will be received with great satisfaction in Slav circles. The perfect harmony between the two neighbouring and allied nations, for which we are loyally working, will be all the more easily realized if the chauvinistic elements are deprived of all serious consideration. The whole attitude of *La Serbie* in this delicate question proves that it will do nothing which might compromise Italo-Slav relations. And I may add that the efforts made by M. Salvemini, in view of a Serbo-Italian entente, from the publication of his pamphlet *Guerra o neutralità*, of which I have spoken to the Serbian public with the greatest gratitude (see the Serbian review *Delo*, of April 1, 1915) down to his latest articles, are not forgotten by the Serbians. They are valued all the more by us that the number of those in Italy who share M. Salvemini's opinions is unhappily still relatively small.

That the majority of Italians leave the solution of these questions to the government is all very well. But in order to arrive at an *entente cordiale*, the respective governments must be assisted to find a way to perfect reconciliation and to banish pernicious influences which could be brought to bear on their members by exclusive minds. The victory of the Allies will create a new situation and in order to make the two peoples appreciate the value of their mutual friendship and understand the grave prejudices from which they would both suffer in case of separation—we must talk and talk reasonably like Professor Salvemini, or M. Mondaini, in his remarkable article on "Adriatic Imperialism" which we will discuss in our paper without delay.

September 24, 1916.

L. MARCOVITCH.

ITALY, SERBIA AND THE ADRIATIC.

(A Southern Slav reply to M. Salvemini's letter.)

The letter of the distinguished Professor of Modern History at the University of Pisa, M. Gaetano Salvemini,

published in No. 21 of *La Serbie*, though showing the highly conciliatory and healthy spirit of moderation of its author, contains, nevertheless, certain statements which are inaccurate and which should be noted and rectified. M. Salvemini writes: "The truth is that there exists in Italy, a group of Imperialists which covets Dalmatia just as the extreme Nationalists amongst the Southern Slavs claim Trieste, Gorizia, Pola and even Udine! *Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra*. But this excess on the part of Italian nationalism meets perhaps with more energetic opposition in Italy than the excess of Southern Slav nationalism meets with amongst the Southern Slavs."

But it seems to us that the distinguished professor, in expressing this opinion, is not well enough aware of either the extent of the Southern Slav aspirations or the character of the territories of reciprocal competition between Italians and Southern Slavs. Even the most extreme of extreme Southern Slavs have never claimed Udine. Here is evidently a misunderstanding caused by certain Southern Slav ethnographical maps, in which a small corner of the Kingdom of Italy, to the north of Udine, has been included in the territory where the Southern Slav language is spoken. But this only affirms an actual fact which is universally known, that there is also a small group of Southern Slavs, composed of 34,000 Slovenes, within the actual frontiers of Italy. This fact is recognized even in Italian statistics, and is also marked in all the Italian and German ethnographical maps of any scientific value. But there is a difference between the objective recognition of the existence of a small centre of Southern Slav population in the Kingdom of Italy and a claim to the territory which it inhabits. And I may say, defying any statement to the contrary, that no Southern Slav party or politician has ever dreamt of claiming any part whatever of Italian territory, even if it is inhabited by Southern Slavs.

In that which concerns the other aspirations of the two races, there is no comparison between the Italian desires as regards Dalmatia and the Southern Slav claims to Trieste, Gorizia and Pola. The Italian element in Dalmatia includes 2·8 per cent. of the population (610,669 Southern Slavs as

against 18,028 Italians), whilst the Slav element at Trieste includes 29·81 per cent. (118,959 Italians as against 59,319 Southern Slavs), at Gorizia 37·11 per cent. (14,812 Italians as against 10,866 Southern Slavs) and at Pola 25 per cent. (25,043 Italians as against 8,417 Southern Slavs). It is to be noted that this numerical relation between the Italians and Southern Slav populations at Trieste, Gorizia and Pola reflects only the ethnographical conditions in the towns themselves and not in the districts of the same names. Further, the Italians, in their claims do not restrict themselves to coveting the towns alone but also wish to possess the districts and even the whole provinces. And here the numerical proportion changes in favour of the Southern Slavs. Thus, in order to ensure possession of the town of Trieste which is surrounded on all sides by Southern Slav territory, the Italians claim not only the Slovene coast from Monfalcone to Trieste, but also the whole plateau of Karst (Carso), including two purely Southern Slav districts with a population of 45,000 souls. If these 45,000 Southern Slavs are added to the 59,319 of the town of Trieste, a population composed of 104,319 Southern Slavs and 118,959 Italians is contained for the whole territory. For Gorizia, the result is still more favourable to the Southern Slavs, for its district, which is also coveted by the Italians, contains a population of 70,061 Southern Slavs and only 2,765 Italians, which gives for the whole territory a population of 80,927 Southern Slavs and 17,577 Italians in all. For Pola, in adding the district population to that of the town, the following result is obtained : 38,108 Italians as against 24,697 Southern Slavs. It should be remarked that the Southern Slav population is composed in the majority of peasants, that is to say small proprietors of land, who are the steadiest element in the region.

What is the consequence of these figures and facts if not that these regions are inhabited by almost the same numbers of Italians and Southern Slavs, and that the two races have equal right to claim possession? It is for the representatives of the two peoples, Italian and Southern Slav, and the respective governments, to settle the question by an amicable and equitable agreement. But before this

agreement is concluded, before even the first exchange of views between the representatives of the two peoples takes place, the Italians cannot take possession of the regions of Trieste, Gorizia and Pola, treating the Southern Slavs, who claim the same rights to these territories as extreme Nationalists, equal to the Italian Imperialists who covet the possession of Dalmatia, a province where the Southern Slav and Italian populations are in the proportion of 97 to 2·8 per cent.

But as it is a question of comparisons, we also could make one which, better than any other, shows by what kind of moderation the two opposing parties are animated in their territorial disputes. M. Salvemini, in his interesting letter, quotes as an example of moderation, Professor Mondaini's article, published in the *Azione Socialista* of July 1st. In fact, this article, written with remarkable competence and knowledge of the subject, is animated by such a spirit of justice and conciliation, that one could easily believe that the agreement between Italians and Southern Slavs would soon be arranged if M. Mondaini's opinions were also those of Italian government circles. But M. Mondaini, who is nevertheless one of the most moderate Italian publicists, insists that the future frontier of Italy, Serbia or Jugoslavia should be that of the Roman Empire of Augustine's time. It would follow the Arsa, a small river of eastern Istria and would include within the Italian frontiers the town and province of Gorizia, that of Trieste (with the surrounding territory) and three-quarters of the province of Istria, which would consequently mean the annexation of a Southern Slav population of 364,000 souls by Italy. That is the smallest programme proposed by moderate Italians, Professor Salvemini among others. Let us now consider the proposals made by the Southern Slavs whom M. Salvemini, in his letter, calls "extreme Nationalists." These Southern Slavs, as the utmost of their aspirations, claim the Southern Slav section of population of the province of Gorizia with the town (leaving the Italian section with Gradisca and Monfalcone to the Italians), Trieste and the whole of Istria, that is to say, a territory which, besides a population in majority Slav, contains also 284,325 Italians, which they also wish

to include in the future Southern Slav State.¹ In comparing these two programmes, it is seen that the moderate Italians covet 364,000 Southern Slavs whilst the "extreme Southern Slav Nationalists" wish to include only 284,325 Italians in their State. This leads to an astonishing conclusion: that the extreme Southern Slav elements, in their greatest claims, are more moderate than the moderate Italians in their most limited programme.

M. Salvemini also names the Milan *Secolo* in his letter as one of those papers which do not approve of the Italian imperialistic aims in Dalmatia. "It adopted from 1914," he writes, "M. Bissolati's thesis and since then has never wished to change its views." We regret that we are unable to say the same of the controllers of the great democratic paper of Milan, because we have found, since the month of November, 1914, and more particularly in the edition of the *Secolo* of May 8, 1915, some remarks which are anything but friendly to Serbia and the Southern Slavs. This is what the Milanese paper wrote: "If the Serbians succeed in including the Croats within their frontiers, they will become too powerful and we should consider every possibility. It is better for us to support two other nations (the Croats and Albanians) and thus divide the imperialistic Serbian block and reduce it to its proper dimensions, for it is better to have two small States as neighbours than one State which includes them both. With an Albania, anti-Slav *par excellence*, on one side, and a Catholic and anti-Serbian Croatia on the other, we would establish advantageous equilibrium in the eastern Adriatic, dividing the Slav forces, which have too many tendencies to grow, but few to unite." Since then, we have not been able to read anything in the great democratic paper of Milan, excepting M. Salvemini's articles, which could make us believe that it does not approve of the aims of Italian Imperialists as regards the possession of the Adriatic provinces.

M. Salvemini writes that in Italy it is "an imperialistic group which covets Dalmatia." If it is so, if it is really only the Imperialists who make this claim, why not proclaim it in full daylight? Such a fact could only produce the

¹ See the *Southern Slav Programme*, p. 24, Paris, 1916.

most desirable consequences. We do not doubt that there are great numbers of reasonable people in Italy who recognize that it is not possible, in the twentieth century, in the very heart of Europe, to found colonial dominations in opposition to the rights of humanity and nature itself, because that would be doubting the common sense of the Italian nation. We regret only that these just and sensible people, except for a few rare exceptions—M. Salvemini is one of them, and we are willingly grateful for his noble efforts—remain silent, not daring to express their opinions aloud. Thus the field is left clear for the political dilettanti disguised, to quote M. Mondaini's expression, in "national clothing," who benefit greatly from the fact.

To struggle against the imperialistic agitations, that is the great and difficult task imposed on all Italians who have any common sense. The Southern Slavs ask for nothing better than to find, on the Italian side, men who see things in their true light and who would be prepared to discuss with them the questions which interest the two peoples, without preconceived ideas and *parti pris*. The Southern Slav representatives did not begin their action in Rome by accident, and it is not their fault either that an agreement between Italy and Serbia was not concluded before Italy entered the war. Many questions which at present agitate Italian and Southern Slav public opinion, would not even have presented themselves and M. Salvemini would not have had the chance of reproaching the Southern Slavs with always preaching the programme of their most exaggerated aspirations. In any case, what has been neglected in the past can be accomplished now or in the near future. That depends solely on the Italians and their government. The Southern Slavs did not open the debate and it is not for them to close it.

October 8, 1916.

THE ILLUSIONS OF AN ITALIAN.

Facts relating to the Southern Slav Union.

One of the great obstacles to the settlement of the Serbo-Italian difficulties consists in the superficial or else false

conceptions of numerous Italian publicists relating to the tendencies of the Southern Slav Union. The notorious fact that the three sections of our nation, although politically divided, form an inseparable whole, animated by the same feelings and aspirations and the same will to develop without restraint—this same fact is not yet recognized by many Italians. It is therefore not surprising that Italian publications are full of alleged disputes between Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, whilst the Southern Slav national conscience, unique and inseparable, gives evident proof that our people may be politically dismembered but can never be ethnographically divided.

What is most curious is that it is always foreigners who want to persuade us that we, the Serbians, Croatians and Slovenes, do not form a single ethnical group but rather three different peoples. Until the great European war, it was Austria who refused to admit the national Southern Slav union, and who employed geographical or historico-political terms in order to dissimulate the truth about the union of our race. And when one reads the Austrian newspapers and publications, one finds Bosnians, Montenegrins, Herzegovinians, Croatians, Dalmatians, Serbians and Slovenes and by this diversity of names the illusion of diversity was formed. To-day it is the Italians who try to convert and separate us. Austria had a special interest in dividing her races in order to subjugate them all, but Italy, nationally united and democratically organized Italy, what interest can she have in trying to divide a people conscious of its national unity? That is what we cannot understand.

A grotesque example of the strange conceptions which certain Italian publicists have about the Serbians, and the Southern Slavs generally, is given by M. Francesco Bianco in his article "Serbia and Jugoslavia," published in the *Tribuna* of October 31st. We would have to write a whole book in order to reply to this mass of inexactitudes, of falsifications of facts and false representations of Southern Slav aspirations. But that is unnecessary. It is sufficient to quote a few statements of this Italian publicist in order to show the absurdity of his arguments and the conclusions to which they lead.

M. Bianco finds—what indulgence!—that no one could contest the existence of Serbia as a special national unit with its own traditions, but that Yugoslavia is only a fantastic combination devoid of the elements of union. For him, Serbia is the product of “oriental civilization, whereas the Croats and Slovenes are old ‘European’ peoples, brought up on western civilization. The Serbians are a young nation full of vitality and if they effected their union with the Croats and Slovenes they would run the risk of being ruined by Yugoslavia! That is why,” Mr. Bianco concludes, “Yugoslavia is ‘a harmful and impossible thing.’”

It is not a case here, this noble Italian tells us, of the principle of nationality but of the “superior interests” of the whole of Europe. If the Southern Slav union were realized, Serbia would be sacrificed to Zagreb and Ljubljana; she would become a “hinterland” of Croatian and Slovene oligarchies! The “good” Serbian people, composed of “shepherds and ploughmen,” would be exploited by the Croatian and Slovene bourgeoisie and would represent a “danger to Europe.” On the contrary, if Serbia remained in the Balkans and continued to exist as an “oriental State” possessing “another kind of civilization,” she would progress and the peace of Europe would be preserved!

After this introduction, M. Bianco passes to his essential arguments. “Yugoslavia,” he says, “is the means of uniting Serbia to Austria-Hungary, of attaching her to the Habsburgs.” That is the essence of the Southern Slav problem! Serbia, as a Balkan country, would gravitate towards the Entente Powers, but Yugoslavia would try in any case to obtain the support of the Central Powers! And that would be the end of Serbia. According to this strange theory, it would follow that the Allies should prevent the union of the Southern Slavs and oblige Serbia to remain in the Balkans and turn her eyes towards the Ægean. That is the only way, M. Bianco assures us, of assuring the peace of Europe!

There is one point in this theory which is not very clear, to which we draw attention without comment. If Serbia must remain in the Balkans and renounce the fundamental idea of her whole evolution: to realize the union of her

oppressed brethren, what is to be done with the eight million Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary? Must they be left in the Magyar-German power or must they be given to another power, Italy for example! Even when it is a question of such extraordinary things one should be thorough and develop one's idea fully. M. Bianco would therefore do well to explain himself on this point in order to allow us to understand exactly what are his ingenious ideas.

December 3, 1916.

A REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEAGUE
"PRO DALMAZIA ITALIANA."

To the Editor of "La Serbie."

My DEAR EDITOR,

Does it not seem to you that, in his declarations to the *Matin* the excellent Duc Colonna di Cesaro appears to have forgotten a fact of some importance: the war? . . . Because this war—even if it is a defensive one—which was imposed on us by a purely feudal and territorial conception of the Teutonic race, has, in the mind of the Allies, the liberation of nations and not the division of territories for its supreme object. For, if it were otherwise, we should all, instead of fighting, acclaim the Emperor William and, in agreement with him, throw ourselves into the slaughter. "To imitate Germany to-morrow, is it not to absolve her of yesterday?" It is a member of the French Cabinet, M. Marcel Sembat, who, even to-day, asks this question in a masterly article on Belgium. And, in our turn, we ask it of all those who—and it is another of M. Sembat's definitions—against the Germans, wish to act as the Germans.

This "Ligue pro Dalmazia" in Italy is very pretty, what I, for my part, would call an institution founded for the culture and propagation of venerable historical customs. Moreover, it should be known what the principal party concerned think of it, the Dalmatian people—that is to say, 600,000 democratic Slav souls, of which a small minority of about ten thousand souls, of which hardly a thousand are of Italian origin—would like to dispose, after the fashion

in which the Russian proprietors disposed of the "dead souls" in days gone by!

Because, I fear greatly for the "Ligue pro Dalmazia" and its excellent president, that this people, which well deserved that the Italian Premier should bow to its blue and gold flag at Milan, I fear lest this people should think that the "Ligue pro Dalmazia" is directed against its soul and that it carries in the folds of its flag, inscribed in characters *di colore oscuro* the device "Ausrotten!" which Bismarck hurled against the Poles. For the Dalmatian people follow another track to that of the gentlemen of the Ligue, and means to conquer its own liberty after this war and not to part with it for the benefit of a new foreign master. It means—I regret it for the sake of M. di Cesaro—to imitate the Roumanians of Transylvania and the Slovaks of Hungary, who, caring little for the foreign cultural and geological strata, the orographical altitudes, the flora and fauna which separate them from their co-nationals, are trying to unite with them and to breathe open air, after so many centuries of territorial, political and dynastic gaol.

Ah! if Italy would only remember her own pain, her intolerance of the injurious term "geographical expression!" If she would say to the Dalmatian people, in unison with the other great liberal peoples: "*Tolle grabatum tuum et ambula!*"—Take up thy bed and walk!" the Dalmatian people, as you know, my dear Editor, would not have to be told twice, that people which on its Procrustian bed was the first to circulate the idea of union which inspires the battalions in the Dobroudja and in Macedonia.

Dalmatia does not pay much attention to the leagues for the resurrection of the old régime. She does not wish to be a subject for industrial and archæological vivisection. She is not Tripoli or any other colonial territory to be cut up and served hot on the table of the imperialists à la Treitschke or à la Reventlow. She is a Slav province, proud and conscious of her national personality. She also wishes to enjoy the right to live. And it is the only right which she will invoke on the morrow of the Allies' victory.

Yes, of the victory. For we only dream of that great day, of the harmony of that great coalition which

has bled for the last thirty months in the supreme struggle against a hegemony which has a territorial and dynastic basis.

And we will be delighted, yes, delighted I say, if our differences, which, for that matter could only be on questions of detail, were adjourned till that radiant to-morrow.

But, as this "God's truce" is not wanted, it is permitted to oppose, modestly but energetically, to the "right" and "necessities" of the Duc di Cesaro, the right and necessity of our movements, free of all restraint, in close union with the other martyrs of our race!

I will take good care not to imitate the Duc di Cesaro in his arguments of the Bethmann-Hollweg type. I only ask how the terrible vision which he evokes of the dangers which menace Italy from a coast belonging *in spe* to a young and weak State can be reconciled with a new political status of Eastern Europe *without* Austria, and if his ideas are not slightly out of date since the great war, or if, perhaps they believe in the existence of an Austrian Empire even after our victory!

To this fundamental need of satisfying our national egoism even the "carbide and cement industries" must bow! Industries—be it simply remarked, for the analysis of M. di Cesaro's declarations would lead me too far—which are only Italian for a small part, and have been partially ceded by the Italians themselves to the Viennese capitalists in order to assure the flow of the profits into the coffers of the Austrian Navy, whilst the only independent and richly developed industry in Dalmatia—conveniently forgotten by M. di Cesaro—is the industry of navigation, the great resource of the country, of which the capital is entirely Slavo-Dalmatian (the Rismondo Company is not Dalmatian but Istrian, and the Rismondo who fell on the Carso, was not a Dalmatian but an Istrian of Rovigno) in close commercial contact with the British and independent of all Austrian influence.

The Duc di Cesaro wishes to invoke the testimony of Talleyrand and Napoleon in support of his thesis.

Very well, neither the Emperor nor his Foreign Minister ever aspired to the possession of Dalmatia as a means of

assuring the existence, purely nominal for that matter, of the "Kingdom of Italy." On the contrary, Napoleon occupied Dalmatia in order to conquer Constantinople, to settle, for France's benefit, the Eastern question, to subjugate the Balkans, a far-seeing policy of which Dalmatia was the first military and even diplomatic stage.

M. di Cesaro's evocation gives a striking proof of this fact, that Napoleon always considered Dalmatia as a politically oriental country. By the formation of the "Illyrian (not the 'Italian') Provinces," he only accentuated this policy of which Dalmatia was to be both the bridge and the pivot. Later on, Illyria was effectively part of the "Kingdom of Italy"—to satisfy the inherent need of Napoleon's genius for administrative simplification—but the Emperor never ceased, up to 1813, to see in Dalmatia the road to the East, the road to Byzantium.

This road is no longer sought by way of Dalmatia.

Constantinople's fate is decided; we heard it yesterday from the mouth of the Premier of the Russian Empire himself. As to my country, it is another question altogether: the realization of the Serbian federal union, preached in Italy by Mazzini and Tommasco with such enthusiasm and incomparable lucidity.

The Duc di Cesaro has only his illustrious compatriot to blame for it, he who was one of the great—perhaps the greatest—architects of Italian union. Mazzini, for his part, did not believe that leagues for the conquest of Dalmatia were necessary for Italy's welfare. On the contrary, he attributed to her the moral presidency of a Jugoslavia embracing the whole Adriatic coast from Fiume to Cattaro. Therefore it is not we who have preached this programme in Italy. But it is very true that, at the present time, Mazzini would be strongly suspected of pro-Austrianism and even accused from the Ministerial benches in the Italian Chamber of having illicit relations with the secret funds of Vienna and Budapest!

I beg you to accept, my dear Editor, the assurance of my most devoted sentiments.

LOUIS DE VOÏNOVITCH.

PARIS, *December 6, 1916.*

ITALY AND SERBIA.

The causes of disagreement between Italy and Serbia lie in the difference of point of view relating to the division of the territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ; also, partly, in the position and fate of Albania and, consequently, in the position which Italy wishes to take in the future in the Adriatic.

The Serbian's view of this question is clear and simple. Serbia desires and insists that all the countries inhabited by Serbians, Croats and Slovenes, people of the same origin, the same sentiments and the same tongue, should unite in one free State. Such is also the desire of the whole Serbo-Croat-Slovene people, and they have given indubitable proof of it through the mouths of its authorized representatives. The Serbo-Croat-Slovene people desires to unite in a single State, not because of Imperialistic tendencies, but for psychological, cultural and economic reasons, being convinced that it is able to develop fully its intellectual and economic aptitudes only in its own State in which will be united all the members of our people of three names.

As the principal reason of her participation in the world war, Italy invoked the principle of nationality and of all her nation in one State. But it appears that she had still two other reasons which also dominate her policy in the present war. The two facts which, besides the principle of nationality, appear to decide Italian policy are the imperialistic leanings of a certain number of politicians and the illusion of a future Serbian danger.

When the Italian Government decided on action, popular feeling in Italy was not everywhere unanimous. That is why it was necessary to show the people the greatest possible results which the war could bring and prove to it, by actual facts, the guarantees which the war would furnish to Italy for her economic progress and, above all, for her future political and military prestige. In Italy it was thought that these results could be attained only if Italy, in her treaties with the Allies, made sure of, beyond the purely Italian regions of Austria-Hungary, other regions which did not ethnically belong to Italy. For this Italy had, above

all, to think of Istria and Dalmatia. The reason why Italy specially claimed these two regions is not doubtful. Besides the desire of expansion which would naturally find satisfaction in the near future, the Italian Government let itself be guided in this direction by the nationalist and chauvinistic current in Italy, which believed that the fact that the Venetian Republic had reigned there in other days and that Italian civilization has always exerted a great influence on this region, was a justification for Italian aspirations to Istria and Dalmatia.

Besides these nationalist and chauvinistic tendencies, there was the opinion that such a solution of the Istrian and Dalmatian question would also satisfy Italian interests in another direction, perhaps the more important. Such a solution would have very appreciably weakened the future Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and would have assured, according to the Italian military and political experts, not only excellent strategical bases and frontiers in an eventual conflict between Italy and Jugoslavia, but also Italian supremacy in the Adriatic for all time.

Mr. Seton-Watson, the well-known English publicist and politician, has on several occasions called attention in his articles to the fact that the battle of Kumanovo has created a different view of the new history of Europe. Mr. Watson explains that the battle of Kumanovo has shown Austria-Hungary the extraordinary power of Serbia which nobody, and above all, not the Austro-Hungarian military and political specialists, suspected. It was then, for the first time in Austria-Hungary, that the danger represented by the unexpected strength of Serbia was seen, principally because of the Serbian national aspirations to the countries included in the Habsburg Monarchy, whose peoples themselves hoped for the realization of the Southern Slav Union. All that happened after the battle of Kumanovo only served to confirm, in the minds of the Austro-Hungarian military and political specialists, the certitude of Serbia's strength and the great danger which could threaten the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy from this direction. That is why authorized Austro-Hungarian factors were determined to suppress this danger as soon as possible.

But if the battle of Kumanovo, and all that followed has, so to speak, betrayed the Serbian danger to Austria-Hungary, it appears that Italy also was much astonished by the Serbian strength. Italian political and military circles seem to have arrived at the conclusion that Italy also could at some time be threatened from this direction. But this Serbian danger appeared to Italian statesmen to be still very far away, and when Austria-Hungary, immediately after the peace of Bucarest, wished to make a cowardly attack on Serbia, Italy chivalrously refused to become the accomplice of such a crime. But the phantom of the Serbian danger already existed in the imagination of Italian soldiers and statesmen. This fear of the Serbian danger to Italy is completely without foundation, not to say ridiculous. Italy, who will come out of the war nationally united and greater than ever, will be so strong on land as well as on sea, that she will have nothing to fear, with her fifty million inhabitants, her powerful fleet and numerous army, from Jugoslavia, a State which under the most favourable conditions will only have twelve million inhabitants, broken by war and persecution, with whole regions destroyed and uncivilized, a State with almost no army and completely without a fleet.

Political combinations are not and cannot be established for a hundred years, but for half a century at the most. During such a lapse of time circumstances change the usual order of things in so many different ways, that it is impossible to make any serious and probable combinations of longer duration. For that reason, it is not done. All the same, I am convinced that there is not a single person in Italy who seriously believes that the Southern Slav State, because of the position in which it will inevitably find itself after the war, could become a serious rival to Italy under any circumstances, for several decades to come. But even if we admit this eventuality, although it is impossible, will Italy, who would then be seriously threatened by Jugoslavia, be unable in this case to find allies in sufficient numbers among the neighbours of Jugoslavia, who would see in her a danger greater than Italy and who will always be disposed to assist whoever should wish to contribute to the weakening of Jugoslavia?

For Italy should understand that in taking the Slav regions she would necessarily make us her opponents. Under such circumstances, friendship between our peoples could never be established. In this case Italy, without being obliged, would have an enemy who, otherwise, could always be her friend and sincere and faithful ally. Italy would betray the principle of nationality for which she herself has fought and which she has also inscribed as a device on her banner in the present war.

Strategical positions cannot serve as an argument. I admit that, in certain exceptional cases, the possession of particular places having a universal character, may be accorded to a foreign power for strategical reasons; these concessions can only, in this case, relate strictly to certain places but these strategical positions can in no case include whole regions. In this case, it is no longer a question of strategical positions but of imperialism and colonial and imperialistic policy. Such a policy would make Italy a new Austria in the Balkans with all the attributes possessed by the latter and which have gained for her a position and a fate which nobody should envy and Italy less than any other. For that matter, the value of strategical points in general has been shown to be nil in the present war, because the States which demanded and obtained strategical positions lost them in a few days, while other non-strategical positions resisted much better.

The principal enemy of the Italian people is in the north, and this enemy no matter how much he is weakened by this war, will always be strong enough to constitute a danger to Italy. In the struggle against this enemy, Italy will not easily be able to find Allies. In this question, nevertheless, the interests of the Italian and Serbian people are identical and will always be identical. If Italy succeeds in understanding that, by abandoning pretensions without foundation to the Serbo-Croatian and Slovene regions, all disputes with Jugoslavia would be avoided, she will be laying the sure foundations of a firm and lasting alliance with the Serbian people. For friendship and alliance with the Serbian people will be Italy's most important strategical advantage.

February 23, 1918.

II

THE CONGRESS OF THE OPPRESSED NATIONALITIES.

The Congress of the nationalities oppressed by Austria-Hungary which was held at Rome has just completed its labours. The results are all the more important because they are obtained at a moment when the Habsburg Monarchy threatens the Czecho-Slovaks and Southern Slavs internally, in order to break the will of the martyred peoples, resolved to conquer their liberty and independence by any means in their power, whilst externally it tries to sow confusion and holds up the illusory possibility of an Austrian peace. To all these intrigues the Rome manifestation is a counter attack, worthy of the peoples who repulse with disdain the fallacious suggestion of a national autonomy in the framework of the Monarchy.

The importance of the congress of Rome is doubled by the fact that Italy has placed herself at the head of the oppressed peoples, and organizes a new struggle of which the motto is: liberty for all peoples, respect of their right of self-disposal and close alliance for the struggle against the common enemy.

The Congress of Rome adopted the following resolution: "Private relations between Italians and Jugoslavs will be founded henceforth on the recognition of the Southern Slav union and independence, of vital importance to Italy, just as the achievement of Italian national union is of vital importance to the Southern Slavs. The two nations undertake to settle any eventual territorial controversy on the basis of the right of peoples to decide their own fate, in such a way as not to oppose the vital interests of both countries, as they are defined when peace is signed. The minorities which remain included in foreign territories will obtain freedom of language and of culture and the safety of their moral and economic interests will be assured."

The importance of the resolution which was adopted is illustrated by the words spoken by Mr. Orlando at the reception of the Delegates. Mr. Orlando said that the Italo-Slav understanding is founded on common suffering and that

there exists no serious cause of disagreement when the respective conditions necessary for the existence of each of the two nations are honestly and sincerely examined. As to the ethnical groups who shall be included in foreign territory, it is right that indispensable guarantees should be given for their development within the bounds of the State, to which they are assigned by the reciprocal necessities of existence. This declaration by Mr. Orlando signifies the formal adhesion of Italy to a new policy, founded on the principle of the liberty of nations, and even without a closer examination, it can be said that the basis of the agreement to be concluded by the competent governments and submitted to the Peace Conference, is found. In this direction we must work more energetically—this first stage which is to serve as the starting point for more intimate relations and contact between the Italian politicians and publicists on one side, and the Serbo-Croat-Slovenes on the other.

All the same, one should not stop at these generalities. The courtesies exchanged—necessary as preliminaries—are not sufficient. It is desirable that the questions interesting the two nations should be treated in an amicable fashion and with the help of all men capable of contributing to a successful result. The Congress of Rome was a happy improvisation of international importance, but its decisive results depend on a loyal and intensive effort.

As to our paper, its editors and collaborators will be glad to see realized that which they have preached since the month of May, 1916. They will greet with joy the beginning of a new era for Italo-Slav relations, hoping that the present action will develop and become more concrete, in order to cut the roots of any new attempt at vain discussions of useless controversies.

In closing, we wish again to state that Serbia, who has always rejected separate peace offers and refuses thus to sacrifice her brethren of Austria-Hungary, sees with satisfaction that her national policy is in complete agreement with that of Italy. The revelations recently made by the Emperor Charles eloquently prove a high and heroic ideal the Serbian people pursues, in refusing all offers of an egoistic character.

The Congress of Rome infuses new and more luminous hopes within the breasts of all Serbians.

Long live Italy ! Long live Serbia ! Long live the future Jugoslavia !

April 20, 1918.

LA QUESTIONE DELL'ADRIATICO

A cura della *Libreria della Voce*, di Firenze, nella collezione *La Giovine Europa*, recentemente è uscito un pregevolissimo volume di 300 pagine su *La questione dell'Adriatico* di G. Maranelli e G. Salvemini, con prefazione di Umberto Zanotti-Bianco.

Sulla questione adriatica, sul problema della Regione Giulia, sui rapporti italo-slavi, che è sempre lo stesso problema, studiato e prospettato a seconda dei gusti individuali, di passioni politiche, di cognizioni, soprattutto di prevenzioni, furono scritti tanti volumi da formare una biblioteca.

Però, la maggior parte di simili pubblicazioni, contribuirono ad arruffare anzichè chiarire il problema dell'Adriatico. E, seppure in Italia da tempo si sentisse l'urgente necessità di pubblicazioni che informassero e illuminassero, non solo l'opinione pubblica, nel senso più largo della parola, ma anche pubblicisti ed uomini politici, che vanno per la maggiore, nessuno ha saputo, voluto od osato assolvere questo difficile compito, perchè implicava studi sereni e virtù civiche, per affrontare l'ostilità dell'opinione pubblica educata e cullata nell'errore.

In Italia, non conoscevano, e le cose si saranno di poco migliorate, le nostre questioni. Gli studiosi di cose nostre erano pochi, più letterati che uomini politici. Nel folto della mischia delle lotte nazionali, si vive, ardenti, appassionate, spesso cruenti, mai serene, le preoccupazioni dei contendenti erano di dare colpi più spessi e più sodi, o di pararli, e di gridare forte alla reciproca sopraffazione, angheria o persecuzione, per cointeressare alla lotta gli spettatori di oltre confine.

In Italia la questione nazionale era conosciuta, all'ingrosso, dal motto: "Trento e Trieste," e della divisa: "L'italianità martire da Trieste a Cattaro." Il grosso del pubblico italiano venne sorpreso dalla guerra con mentalità

piena di preconcezioni, di errori e purtroppo ignara dello stato delle cose. La guerra pose la questione adriatica, più complessa, più difficile, più delicata che mai, sul tapeto, indissolubilmente legata alla questione nazionale jugoslava, vale a dire, ad un grosso problema di politica europea, al quale ben pochi sono preparati, e dal modo in cui verrà risolto dipenderà la pace dell'Europa e l'avvenire d'Italia.

Non è più in discussione il mal conosciuto problema che riguardava soltanto l'Italia e i suoi immediati vicini, gli slavi di Treste, del Goriziano, d'Istria e di Dalmazia, bensì un problema che interessa e coinvolge la fortuna avvenire, in uguale misura, dell'Italia da una parte e degli jugoslavi dall'altra: dalle Alpi all'Egeo, dall'Adriatico al Danubio. Il problema s'ampia e si complica, e non va trattato nè con metodi, nè con mentalità da periodo elettorale, nè come una questione di priorità linguistica sulle tabelle delle stazioni ferroviarie o in pretura urbana.

I ferravecchi dei diritti storici, i luoghi comuni delle pigrie mentali, i gesti eroici da adolescenti devono cedere il posto a serene, reali ed eque valutazioni, a concetti superiori e a interessi ben vagliati e ben compresi. Il momento è grave, le risoluzioni assennate che si prenderanno dovranno attestare la maturità dei due popoli che, nell'intesa sincera, cordiale e fraterna, dovranno inaugurare un'era nuova non solo per sè ma anche per l'Europa. L'accordo non è impossibile, nè dovrebbe essere difficile, tanto più che non vi sono interessi materiali in giuoco, ma sentimentalità e suscettibilità da assicurare, errori ed artificiosità da eliminare. L'Italia o cederà alle passioni e tentazioni imperialistiche, o agevolerà il parto doloroso di un popolo martoriato per averlo amico e all'avanguardia, in difesa della propria e comune esistenza.

È con questi concetti e sincera disposizione d'animo che abbiamo scorso le pagine de "La questione dell'Adriatico."

"La Voce," ancor prima della guerra, si distingueva nello studio coscienzioso dei problemi che interessavano l'avvenire d'Italia. Scoppiata la guerra, gli uomini, certo un'eletta schiera di studiosi, chiaroveggenti, con squisito spirito d'equità e senso di responsabilità, perseverarono nell'invidiabile tradizione, e, con civismo superiore, seppero

mettersi in opposizione a più popolari fini di guerra, opporne di meno popolari, ma nobili, equi e più coisonni alle tradizioni del Risorgimento italiano.

Parallela all'azione giornalistica fu l'azione della *Libreria della Voce* che diede lavori di alto pregio come *L'irredentismo adriatico* del mite e compianto Angelo Vivante; come il volume, modesto di molle, ma denso d'idee e di fatti, ma vibrante di fede patria e d'equità nazionale, *La Dalmazia*, del valente direttore Giuseppe Prezzolini, e, infine, come *La questione dell'Adriatico* di Maranelli e Salvemini, sempre minuti e coscienziosi indagatori storici e patrocinatori di cause sante.

La questione dell'Adriatico è libro che non si può decentemente presentare al pubblico che scrivendone uno di eguale molle, nè di tanto ci sentiamo. E non è nemmeno nostra intenzione di farne una recensione. Oggi abbiamo voluto soltanto, in affrettati cenni, dar espressione ai sentimenti che ci suscitò la lettura di questo, e in appresso diremo il pensier nostro su ciò che potrebbe ostacolare o agevolare l'accordo nostro con la grande Nazione italiana. Frattanto sentiamo l'obbligo di esternare la sincera nostra riconoscenza a nome di tutta la nostra Nazione, per lo spirito che su tutte le pagine aleggia e perchè i compilatori del libro si diedero fatica di studiarci senza preconcetti per conoscerci bene, e perchè i risultati delle proprie indagini e il libero convincimento che ne trassero, vollero portare a conoscenza del pubblico italiano.

Il libro contiene inevitabili lacune e defficenze che noi accentueremo e vi si soffermeremo, non per passione polemica, bensì per amore di maggior luce, più completa conoscenza dell'essere nostro, e per partecipare e invogliare alla discussione quanti sono compresi della necessità di gettare basi sane e perciò durature al fraterno accordo italo-jugoslavo.

Il libro è un'ottima fonte d'informazioni per i digiuni e per i politici che da orecchianti trattano i rapporti italo-jugoslavi; contiene un'analisi di tutti gli aspetti—notizie, dati e cifre—del problema jugoslavo e delle questioni a questo connesse; ma soprattutto contiene un programma, si mette sulla via maestra che conduce alla meta prefissasi e offre una base alla soluzione del problema che agita e preoccupa

gli animi dei due popoli, cointeressati e conviventi sull'Adriatico.

È per questo pregio capitale del libro che noi deploriamo che—come avverte lo scrittore della prefazione—*delle idee esposte intendono essere responsabili i due soli autori.*

Juillet 27, 1918.

THE TREATY OF LONDON AND THE PACT OF ROME.

The Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, like all treaties in general, affects the contracting parties only. In what measure this treaty could be modified in the light of events which have taken place since its conclusion, according to the principle of international law *rebus sic stantibus*, we cannot judge. It is a question which directly concerns the powers who have put their signature to the treaty in question. What concerns us, whose territories are also the object of transactions contained in the Treaty of London, is to know precisely what is the exact meaning of this diplomatic document to which almost all Italy, official and non-official, clings to-day. The recent Conference of the three contracting Powers probably occupied itself also with the question of the application or non-application of the Treaty of London, but nothing definite is known of its results. The Italian Press appears lost, which is the result of the bitter discussion waged round these two antipodes: the Treaty of London, which is a secret treaty, concluded behind the back of the most interested nation, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene nation, and the Pact of Rome, a public treaty concluded not by the governments but by the authorized representatives of the public opinion of the respective peoples.

The Treaty of London has no authority over Serbia or the recently constituted Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes. This Treaty has no authority over America, or Japan, or Greece or any other Allied country except France and Great Britain. If there were not America, Mr. Sonnino's position at the Peace Conference would be very simple. The presence of America with the whole weight of her principles and her material influence, takes away all its creative force from the Treaty of London. In

virtue of this Treaty, Great Britain and France are obliged to support the Italian claims, as stated in the Treaty of London, at the Peace Conference. But the war has raised other questions even more important than territorial ones, and it will certainly not be to Italy's advantage to do without the help of America, of Great Britain, of Japan and of France simply in order to realize the Treaty of London. Arguments of this nature will not fail to be opposed to Italian firmness.

On the other hand, if, as regards the Italian Government, the Treaty of London is not officially replaced by the Pact of Rome in respect of the Southern Slav territories, neither is this Government free of all obligations to the nationalities, more particularly to the Serbo-Croat-Slovene people. In the first place, the action for the convocation of a congress of the nationalities in Rome was personally directed from behind the scenes by the President of the Italian Council. Mr. Orlando's Government saw signs of a serious movement in Italian democratic circles against Mr. Sonnino's policy which had led to concrete negotiations with a few Serbians and Croats who were sincere friends of an *entente cordiale* with Italy. Moreover, England and France exerted all their influence in Rome in favour of a change of front in respect of the Southern Slavs. This, and other considerations of a military character, decided the Italian Government to place itself at the head of a new movement favourable to the Southern Slavs. Mr. Albertini in agreement with Mr. Orlando and supported by his old collaborator, Mr. Torre, and by his present Rome correspondent, Mr. Amendola, succeeded in a few days in starting the work of conciliation which the Italian democrats wished to accomplish without delay and without considering the Government. The Albertini-Orlando initiative created a new situation, and the prospect of seeing Italy extricated from the blind alley to which Mr. Sonnino's policy invariably led her, decided the Italian democrats to accept this arrangement and leave the official politicians the task of completing the work which they had begun independently of the Government. Professor Salvemini alone could not reconcile himself to seeing the people who treated the Southern Slavs as Austrian agents, and who, only a few months before, had prevented the

Marquis of Viti di Marco from speaking in the Chamber, drowning his voice with furious cries of "Jugoslavo! Jugoslavo!" put themselves at the head of a movement in favour of the Italo-Southern Slav Entente. Mr. Salvemini, with his usual courage, did not shrink from stating almost publicly his distrust of these "convertiti." He was right, as the recent declarations of the Duc di Cesaro in the *Giornale d'Italia*, saying that he, the Duc di Cesaro, would never have taken part in this movement if it had meant abandoning Italian claims in any way, show. That at least is sincere.

All the same, the Congress of Rome, with its intelligent decisions, produced an enormous effect in Austria-Hungary. The Prime Minister, Orlando, at the reception of the delegates, had expressed his approval and satisfaction at the decisions arrived at. And in order to clear the situation, Mr. Orlando declared, in a conversation with Mr. Pierre Quirielle of the *Journal des Débats*, textually as follows: "The famous Treaty of London? Oh! That is very simple. When it was negotiated and concluded, it was aimed at an enemy, Austria, against whom it was necessary for Italy to be guaranteed as fully as possible. As regards a friendly Southern Slav State, the situation is changed" (see the *Journal des Débats* of April 25, 1918). Exactly the same assurance was given to the author of these lines when he visited Rome in February and April. And it was added that the Treaty of London represented for Italy and us Southern Slavs a safeguard against the eventuality of a British and French policy friendly to Austria. "If Italy, we were told, renounced the Treaty of London, France and Great Britain could make peace with Austria-Hungary." Theoretically, the argument was not without value at that time. To-day it is turned against Italy.

All those who took part in the Congress of Rome, understood that the Treaty of London had no longer any value, and that the future relations between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes would be regulated on basis of the Campidoglio resolutions. Messrs. Albert Thomas, Franklin-Bouillon and Wickham-Steed, who are not directly interested and who took part in the Congress of Rome, are ocular witnesses of this fact. That Italy should

still insist on the Treaty of London is a grave mistake from the Italian point of view. This throws a very strange light on the whole Italian policy and obliges us to take precautions in our turn.

The Peace Conference may accept the Italian claims, but we very much doubt that this will be for the benefit of the Italian people. Our land can be taken by force, but we cannot be prevented from treating Italy as a usurper in the future. In the economic and cultural as well as in the political domain, we are strong enough to counteract the wrong which would be done to our people. We cannot allow strategical safeguards against us, a pacific people; neither do we allow the annexation of our territory on the pretext that Great Britain or some other power had at one time occupied such and such a country.

Southern Slav public opinion approves the Pact of Rome. It thinks that the Italians would be acting more loyally if they openly declared that they do not wish to adhere to it, as the *Giornale d'Italia* has done, instead of supporting the inadmissible thesis that the Pact of Rome and the Treaty of London can both retain their vigour. We do not doubt that Mr. Orlando and Mr. Sonnino personally can very well agree on the subject of Italian policy. But the Treaty of London and the Pact of Rome are at opposite poles. One or the other, but not both at the same time! Italy must choose, and choose as quickly as possible. Any misunderstanding compromises the moral situation and irremediably threatens our future relations, to the great disadvantage of Italy and the Serbo-Croatian Slovene Kingdom.

December 16, 1918.

QUO VADIS ITALIA ?

The occupation by Italy of the Southern Slav sea coast in Istria and the Dalmatian coast is more than a crime, it is a mistake.

In order to understand Italy's present attitude and the mentality of her leaders one must follow the evolution of Italian mentality during the last fifty years. Even before

entering the Triple Alliance, Italy had strayed from the path traced by the founders of her union.

Those in power ceased to be inspired by the spirit of Mazzini, Cavour, Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi and turned towards other idols representing in Europe the imperialistic policy, the policy of brute force which was wrongly named the "realist" policy. Bismarck and Kalnoky, Tisza and Andrassy, were then taken as models by Italy. And thus Italy, the country of Cavour and Mazzini, only a few years after Magenta and Solferino, watched with indifference the crushing of this same France which had helped her to realize her union. But this policy of sacred egoism only attained its climax when Italy entered the Triple Alliance. Imperialistic madness then took possession of this Southern country, which, following the example set by Austria after 1848, astonished the world by its ingratitude when Crispi's plan was known. It was a question of a sudden attack on France in order to bleed her once more for the benefit of Germany and her allies. This plan was denounced by Bismarck himself, who profited from it to compromise Italy definitely and thus obliged her definitely to take up a position on his side.

Crispi's deplorable policy ended sadly with the Abyssinian defeat, which nearly ruined the country, morally and economically.

The Tripoli expedition was one of the last vestiges of this imperialistic policy. Thanks to the efforts of the new generations, Italy abandoned the Triple Alliance and went over to the side of the Powers which were supporting the principles to which Italy owes her birth. But then, even in this supreme hour, the attitude of this country was wanting in nobility, action being preceded by a bargain known as a "parrechio," and followed by another known as the Pact of London. Thus, Italian action lost much of its moral value.

An alliance with predatory powers during thirty years is not to be practised with impunity. . . . One generally borrows the mentality of those whose society one frequents. It was so in Italy's case. It is also her just punishment. The principles of Mazzini and the time of the Risorgimento

were forgotten in order to remember that of the Rome of the Cæsars and the republic of His Serene Highness of Venice.

The bad faith of certain Italian politicians recalls that of the Austrians and Germans. The theories, doctrines and methods are the same. Our readers will remember the doctrines professed by the younger Andrassy in respect of the "necessary" annexations, a doctrine of which we have spoken in recent issues of *La Serbie*. Andrassy made therein a distinction between so-called political annexations, which are made in view of domination, and those called strategical, which are made with a view to "conservation." Andrassy concluded that the latter are not at all imperialistic! In this way he justified all the Austrian annexations and conquests before the war. For we others who, with President Wilson, recognize the principle of the people's right of self-disposal, we consider as illegitimate all annexations contrary to this principle, no matter what their object may be. According to us, only what is just is legitimate, and there is no justice in oppression. The Italians now evoke against the Southern Slavs the same reasons which their own oppressors advanced in other days (reasons of strategical necessity and historical right) in order to justify the occupation of the Adriatic sea coast, which is inhabited by Southern Slavs. In short, they treat the latter as enemies against whom "it would be as well to assure and to secure guarantees!" How can this strange phenomenon be explained?

It must be recognized, however, that everybody in Italy does not approve of this policy. A group of intellectuals, few in number, but strong in faith and in the sincerity of their convictions, have opposed the disguised imperialism of the new Italy since the beginning. They understood that to make enemies for one's country where one could make friends is not rendering it good service. They implored the leaders in Rome not to create a new Carthagina beyond the Adriatic. No attention was paid to them. An absurd campaign was undertaken against the oppressed nations of Austria-Hungary while war was being waged against the Monarchy. The Southern Slavs were accused of having sold themselves to Austria. Everybody was slandered,

even the editor of *La Serbie*, who was pretty roughly handled in the Italian Jingo Press. This policy was one of the causes of the Caporetto disaster. Then there was a change of tactics, and the Congress of Rome and the brilliant manifestations of Campidoglio were arranged. On that occasion Mr. Orlando gave his explanation of the real meaning of the Treaty of London, of which the integral execution would not be insisted upon, according to him, if Austria were dismembered. The result was not long delayed. It was the victory of the Piave won partly by the help of Austrian Slavs. For it was the latter who furnished information respecting the movements and positions of the Austrian army. A Czech division even fought in the Italian ranks. And when this policy had borne its fruit, the Italian leaders, taking advantage of their country's patriotic delirium, encouraged it to conquer the Southern Slav territories in contempt of the principle of nationality. But one cannot advertise certain principles and at the same time work against them. And do not tell us that it is in virtue of the principle of nationality that the Italians have occupied Fiume, Abazzia and other Southern Slav localities.

Everybody remembers how the Mayor of Abazzia greeted the two Excellencies of the Triple Alliance at the time of the Marquis of San Giuliano's interview with Count Aehrenthal. Was it in Italian, in German or in Magyar? No, it was in Serbo-Croatian. That was the best way to show them that they were not at home in that country.

If the Italians wish their flag to be honoured as a symbol of liberty they must not plant it where it could symbolize violence and injustice.

December 9, 1918.

THE ITALO-SLAV PROBLEM.

The Italo-Slav problem is far from being as simple as our contemporaries of the Allied and neutral Press are pleased to imagine.

In order to understand it thoroughly, it must be considered as a whole and from different points of view : political, ethnical and economic.

At the present moment the Italian irredentist movement is in conflict with the ethnical factor: the co-existence in the Julianne region of two races, either of which can invoke the principle of nationality in opposition to the other. In the future as in the past, Italian Adriatic irredentism will be in conflict with, and may be dominated by, the economic factor. "The policy of territorial conquest towards which neo-nationalism would drive Italy," Angelo Vivanto judiciously wrote, "is but a political absurdity as regards the Adriatic. The annexation of a very small zone on the eastern coast (the Julianne zone only represents a quarter of the whole eastern coast) would provoke consequences as bad for the Julianne region as for the Italian State."

Leaving on one side for the time being the ethnical and economic factor, we will consider only the political side of the question.

In Italy, the irredentist conception concerning the Julianne region has always been wanting in clearness and precision. Ever since the beginning of the movement in favour of union, the Italian aspirations respecting the Adriatic frontier appear uncertain and contradictory. Sometimes it is national reasons which are invoked and sometimes geographical and military reasons. This confusion of opinion has been manifested whenever there was question of indicating the limits of these aspirations. In 1848, the "Italian Federative Union's" manifesto prescribes very narrow boundaries for Charles Albert. "Italy," says the manifesto, "can never be happy or secure until she reaches the banks of the Isonzo." Emilio Solitro, in the *Journal de Trieste*, proclaiming his father in the union, also alludes to the Isonzo. In 1864, an official map published in the new kingdom fixes the Italian frontier on the Isonzo. Mazzini also is neither affirmative nor consistent in regard to this question. In 1831, he places the frontier in the direction of Trieste, without saying exactly where. (General explanation for the members of the "Giovane Italia.") In 1857 (Slav letters), he writes on the subject of the frontier in the direction of the Julian Alps: "Europe of the future will include an Italy reaching from Sicily to the amphitheatre of the Alps at Trieste." In 1860 (Doveri dell'Uomo), the boundaries are marked at

the mouth of the Isonzo ; finally in 1871, the great apostle of nationality goes beyond the limits marked by national law, by including in the peninsula Adelsberg, the Carso, administrated by Laibach, and the Tyrol beyond Bruneck.

Visconti-Venosta and Lamarmora indicate that the Isonzo is the real Italian frontier in the direction of Frioul. The second of these two statesmen gives the following explanation of the Italian aspirations (October, 1865) : " I should say that by the denomination of Italian possessions, I only meant, besides Venetia, the really Italian part of the Tyrol. I have never thought of Trieste. This town is surrounded by Slav populations. If, by any chance, Trieste belonged to Italy, this possession would be a source of difficulties and very grave dangers to our kingdom."

" One man only," says Angelo Vivante, " has ideas of his own : Camilio Cavour." In a speech on foreign policy in the Subalpine Chamber (October 20, 1848), Cavour proves that he has clearly understood the Austro-Hungarian problem as well as the Italo-Slav problem. He sees the national nature of the Slav movement led by Yelatchitch. He blames the Magyar oligarchic oppression of the Slav nationalities. He foresees the victory of Slavism in the eastern part of the Monarchy. " The Slav race," he says, " energetic, numerous, oppressed during several centuries, approaches its complete emancipation. Its cause is just and noble ; defended by hardy and energetic troops, it should triumph in a not far distant future." These were prophetic words, which to-day have become reality ! As a Minister, Cavour appreciates the ethnical factor, the co-existence of two races (Italian and Slav), at its proper value. He is, it would seem, profoundly conscious of the Slav power and the future of Slavism, and the necessity of making it a friend of Italy. He may thus be justly considered as an opponent of annexation and assimilation by force. But Cavour seems to be the only person possessing a proper comprehension of the problem. " The Kingdom's irredentism at that time," says A. Vivante, " springs from a superficial, tumultuous, oratorical state of mind of poor intellectuality, very often even mixed with ignorance." The irredentist territories are the subject, sometimes of forgetfulness, sometimes of manifest renunciation on the part of the politicians of the Kingdom.

During the discussion in the Chamber (April, 1867) of the peace treaty with Austria, not a single voice was lifted to recall the existence of the Julianne region or to protest against the renunciation of the eastern frontier.

Mr. Sonnino himself writes a few years later, in the *Rassegna Settimanale* of May 29, 1881, the following words : " The question of irredentist Italy must first of all be resolutely put aside. In the present condition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the possession of Trieste is of the greatest importance to it. Also, Trieste is the most convenient port for German commerce : her population is mixed as is, in general, that which is spread along our eastern frontier. To claim Trieste as a right would be an exaggeration of the principle of nationality." This disavowal of the irredentist idea on the part of the politicians of the Kingdom is not an isolated fact. The unionist idea has been disapproved almost as often by the politicians of the Kingdom as the separatist idea was by those of the irredentist provinces.

Mancini, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in March 1883, at Montecitorio, took all the trouble in the world to prove that Adriatic and Triestin irredentism is not in keeping with the principle of nationality. The Crispian régime, during a period of about ten years (1887-1896), repudiates any claim to the Austrian possessions. He even opposes the candidature of the Triestin Barzilai in Rome. In spite of all, irredentism did not disarm ; on the contrary, it became more and more imperialistic. Nevertheless, after the defeat of Adua, irredentism seems to regain a clearer vision of the actual state of affairs, influenced by the ethnical and economic factor. It is probably this vision that later suggested to Mr. Sonnino the proposition of April 8, 1915. The solution of the Adriatic problem then proposed by him consisted in autonomy for Trieste, which was to become an autonomous and independent State and was to be declared a free port. This proposition, made on the eve of Italy's entry into action, inflicted a cruel disappointment on the irredentist pretensions claiming Trieste and Gorizia in virtue of historical right ; Fiume, a Croatian town, in virtue of strategical law ; and Dalmatia in virtue of her artistic and intellectual life in the past.

At the time of the Treaty of London, Italian policy returned to its old imperialistic aims. The irredentism of our time is nothing but imperialism disguised. That is because present day politicians are obsessed by two fixed ideas or rather two illusions. The first is the result of an erroneous conviction: the possibility of the absorption of the Slavs by the Italians, by means of a violent and forced assimilation. But, from this point of view, the culture of the Southern Slavs has proved itself superior not only to that of its enemies but also to that of the Italians. Also, all the attempted efforts at forced assimilation by our enemies in the past have been without success. Those which the Italians attempt in the future will not be more successful, because the individuality of a nation is only accentuated by collision with another. Camillo Cavour thought so, too. That is why he advised his compatriots not to go too fast. According to him, the absorption of Slavism, to be successful, should develop as freely and spontaneously as possible; it should be the work of time, of a progressive Italian development of moral force.

Another of the Italian politicians' illusions is their belief that the imperialistic penetration of the Italians in the Balkans would be possible without causing prejudice to the future economic relations between the Balkan countries and Italy. After having despoiled their neighbours of their legitimate possessions, the Italians think it would be possible to do an advantageous trade with them and throw their products on the Southern Slav markets. But that is a mistake in perspective, a fatal error for Italo-Slav relations. Italians should understand that they will be received in the Southern Slav countries in the same spirit in which they penetrate there. If they come as friends they will be received as such. If they come as conquerors and plunderers, annexing Slav provinces and towns, their reception will be very different. Once confidence is lost, it will never be recovered. The Customs-Tariff war which Serbia waged against Austria-Hungary twelve years ago, is there to prove that it is possible to struggle successfully against those who would oppress us in one way or another.

December 23, 1918.

ITALY AND THE BALKANS.

The principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan people" was directed against Austria-Hungary and Russia. The Austro-Russian rivalry in the Balkans for a long time prevented the solution of the famous problem known as the Eastern Question. For different reasons, Austria-Hungary and Russia took an interest in the Balkan peoples, interfered in their internal affairs, excited them one against the other and thus maintained an uncertain and troubled situation which best suited their desires for conquest.

While Russia's action was, on the whole, defensive, doing her best to help the Christian peoples as much as possible in their struggle for independence and liberty, Austria-Hungary pursued a different policy. By the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, the Dual Monarchy inaugurated a policy of expansion which completely disorganized the peninsula. In 1912, thanks to Russian efforts, the Balkan peoples agreed on common action against Turkey and eventually Austria-Hungary, but this Balkan coalition did not last long. Bulgaria, far from dreaming of following a policy of Slav entente and solidarity, had entered the Balkan block in 1912 with the idea of defrauding her neighbours after having exploited their military assistance. When events took an unfavourable turn for Austro-Bulgarian plans (the Serbian victories of Koumanovo and Monastir, the Greeks' entry into Salonica, the arrival of Serbian troops on the Adriatic), Bulgaria threw her cards on the table and attacked her erstwhile allies. But the second Balkan war was the cause of new deceptions for her. In 1915 Bulgaria drew the sword for the third time with a view to destroying her neighbours and thus smoothing the road for the Germanic advance in the East. The momentary successes gained with German help made the Bulgarians lose their heads, and they committed brutalities worthy of their great Touranian leaders, Krum and Assen, in the occupied Serbian territories. The victorious battle of the Vardar came in time to put an end to the puerile Bulgarian dream of the conquest of the whole of the Balkans. The collapse of Austria and the crushing of Russia cleared the ground in their turn of

the old imperialistic combinations, so that the principle of "the Balkans for the Balkan peoples" appears to have every chance of being fully applied. Wilson's points had given even greater vigour to this principle. Also, one cannot help being irritated by the thought that all the benefits of victory may be menaced by the sudden apparition of Italy burdened with all the ideas of the blessed period of the Triple Alliance.

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The question of Italo-Southern Slav relations is in close connection with Italy's position in general as regards the Balkans. Delimitation of the frontier will be all the more difficult if Italy goes any further with her plans for penetration in the Balkans. Such a policy could only excite the greatest uneasiness amongst the Balkan peoples, and unfortunately Italy has done nothing up to now to reassure us on the subject of her intentions; on the contrary, she has done everything to arouse our suspicions.

During the period of Italian neutrality, August 1914 to May 1915, Italy continued her negotiations with Austria on the basis of compensations in the Balkans in virtue of Art. VII of the secret treaty of the Triple Alliance. This was not of a nature to gain our sympathy. In the meantime Italy was also in negotiation with the Entente, negotiations which remain secret and of which neither the Italian Green Book nor any Allies' diplomatic book makes the slightest mention. Above all Serbia must know nothing. The Treaty of London of April 29, 1915, has never been communicated to the Serbian Government. When the terms of this agreement were published by the Bolsheviks, everybody understood why Italy had remained silent. For the Treaty of London had for objective, not only the territories inhabited by Italians, but also Serbo-Croat-Slovene territory.

Since then, the Italians have manifested the same attitude to the great detriment of her international position.

Nevertheless, in a moment of weakness, Italy seemed to be about to change her policy. The Congress of Rome in April 1918, solemnly inaugurated the so-called policy

of nationality. But, on that occasion, the Southern Slav representatives made the mistake of not claiming as a preliminary condition of their participation, the formal renunciation of the Treaty of London inasmuch as it affected the Southern Slav territories. The Armistice Treaty with Austria would have had a different appearance if the Italians had been asked to declare the Pact of London to be void, leaving to the Peace Conference the task of fixing our common frontiers. The attitude of the Italian occupation troops in Dalmatia and Istria is not any better calculated to inspire confidence. All the same, there are numerous grounds for an understanding between us and the Italians, and all hopes of an entente are not lost.

The first condition for an entente between Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes is that they should consider themselves reciprocally as good friends and neighbours and abandon all thought of aggression or domination, that is to say, that the idea of strategical frontiers, naval bases and solid guarantees must be abandoned by both sides. The Serbians, Croats and Slovenes are a pacific people, they have never threatened Italy; they have therefore the right to make the most formal reservations in respect of the Italian claim to strategical guarantees. If any one has the right to ask for guarantees it is rather the Southern Slavs, who are much weaker and whose political and economic development could be threatened by Italy, a great Power.

The second condition is the reciprocal guarantees to be given by all the Allies and the League of Nations to the Italian and Slav ethnical centres, which by force of events would remain within the boundaries of the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes respectively. If both were persuaded to give effective guarantees on the subject of language, culture and the preservation of nationality, without detracting from the authority of the respective States, the Italians would have no need to claim Dalmatia, a purely Slav country, in order to save 18,000 Italians; neither would they make the mistake committed by the *Corriere della Serra* in claiming the extension of the Italian frontier to Fiume in order to

include Fiume ! The Southern Slavs, on the other hand, would be more easily resigned to accept the necessary sacrifices of those of their compatriots who inhabit the regions of Western Istria, which possess an Italian majority and should consequently belong to Italy.

The third condition is that Italy should adapt her present Balkan policy, which strongly resembles the old Austrian policy, to the new conditions in the Balkans and the whole world. In other words, Italy should treat the Balkan States as fully developed people having a right to equality. What is most important is that Italy should not follow the example of Austria by trying to benefit from Serbo-Bulgarian, Greco-Bulgarian or Serbo-Roumanian differences. We are not reassured in this respect either. What we hope for is that Italian policy in the Balkans, in order to obtain useful results, should be inspired by the same principles as those of France and Great Britain. Let there be absolute caution in the political department and unlimited activity in economic and cultural departments for the real benefit of the two nations.

It is true that the Serbians, Croats and Slovenes are unanimous in claiming the respect of the principle of nationality and that they do not agree that great portions of their nations should be attributed to Italy in virtue of alleged geographical, strategical or other reasons. An entente with us is equivalent for Italy to the loss of an illusion because we only ask for the territory inhabited by our people ; but on the other hand this entente constituted for the Italians the greatest gain which a country can realize, that which gives absolute security and firm friendship with a young and vigorous neighbour. It should not be forgotten that Italy has won her war alone by the fact of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. All territorial questions are secondary in comparison with the greatness of this victory, which assures peace and security for Italy. On the other hand, we offer Italy, because of her proximity, the best market for her industrial products. The smaller cost of transport on one hand, the peculiar taste of the Balkan consumers, the prices, generally lower than those of Anglo-French goods, on the other hand, would allow Italian commerce to occupy a preponderant economic situation in comparison with the

other Allied Powers. Lastly, surplus Italian labour, which used to emigrate, could find work in our country, for we are in need of engineers, constructors, contractors and skilled labourers. That the frontier to be fixed should be the means of communication and not a barrier is the indispensable condition for the development of economic relations. The peoples' welfare is the supreme reason of any policy. May our Italian friends sincerely think over what the Italian people will gain by following one road or the other.

February 10, 1919.

CHAPTER VI

SERBIA AND GERMANY

GERMANY IN DISTRESS.

ON June 5th the German Chancellor said in the Reichstag: "I have told an American journalist that Peace negotiations could be successful only on condition that the statesmen of the belligerent Powers took the real military situation into consideration. These proposals have been rejected by the other side. Recognition of the war map is refused; it is hoped to improve it. Meanwhile, it has been transformed in our favour. The enemy refuses to recognize these facts, that is why we must, we wish, and we will continue the struggle until we obtain a definite victory." On December 28th, nevertheless, Bethmann-Hollweg did not insist on the "war-map," which was very characteristic of him. In June the Chancellor of the German Empire had recalled the surrender of the British army at Kut-el-Amara, the defeat (!) and losses of the French at Verdun, the check to the Russian offensive in March, and the powerful Austrian offensive against Italy. In September he should have enumerated the brilliant results of the Russian offensive in Galicia and Bukovina, the complete failure of the German plans at Verdun—immortal and invincible town—the victory, the great Anglo-French victory on the Somme, the taking of Comblès and Thiepval, the partial invasion of Transylvania by the Roumanians, and the constantly increasing pressure of the army of Salonica exerted against the Bulgaro-German lines in Macedonia. All the same, without directly recalling the military successes of the Allies, the Chancellor showed by the whole tone and spirit of his speech that he is acutely conscious of the fact that it is no longer Germany who does the attacking. The parts are changed and at the time when

the Chancellor made his speech the German Empire was staggering beneath the blows received on the Somme, blows which will not be long in increasing their number and in becoming decisive. Germany in distress! What a disquieting spectacle for her leaders, and what a joyful spectacle for the civilized world!

For Germany wanted the war, and it was she who provoked it at a moment which she considered favourable for a rapid and complete victory of her arms. The mentality of modern Germany is the result of various influences of a political, economic, psychological and social description and sees nothing abnormal in this. According to German psychology, war is a means of preservation and progress and it is by it, by international strife, that the question of the organization of the world should be decided. The doctrine of brute force is the essential element of modern German psychology, and if the experiment she tried in 1914, by provoking the Great War, had succeeded, the German savants would have seen in it the justification of German world supremacy. The German philosophers and historians have explained the part played by Prussia in the realization of German unity in 1866 and 1870 by this theory of brute force. Prussian militarism is destined to break with German particularism and compel, by brute force, all the small German states to unite in one powerful political body. To superficial observers, Germany was the example of a people realizing its own national unity; to more clear-sighted people, the events of 1864, 1866 and 1870 were far from confirming this point of view. At its birth the German Empire committed a grave breach of the principle of nationality by appropriating Alsace-Lorraine, not to mention the Polish and Danish provinces which Prussia had already annexed. The motive which led to the creation of German unity was not the principle of nationality which is essentially a principle of liberty, but the idea of the domination of weak political bodies by the strong. And the ensuing development of Germany has justified all the fears of those who prophesied that nothing good could come of this new Power "of blood and iron."

The direction taken by the development of the Empire

after 1870, fully proved the danger of a materialistic conception of history such as was very widely spread in Germany. The ideal of a strong and invincible Germany preached by the German philosophers and intellectuals, was realized by the Berlin Government in practice, by means of formidable armaments on land and sea and by the constant increase of military measures of all descriptions. The realism of the German leaders, who had but one desire—to increase the armed forces of the Empire and prepare for the inevitable struggle—corresponded perfectly therefore, with an ideal founded on the cult of brute force and military power. When the time came, the German armies, symbols of the cultural standard of the Empire, in obedience to the orders of their Chief, advanced and began the task which was assigned to them by invading Belgium.

A lasting agreement with a people possessing such a mentality will never be arrived at. The German people must be radically cured of the obsession of its civilizing mission, of the Empire's "invincible power," and its "vocation" for organizing and dominating the whole world. And the only possible remedy is to prove the contrary; this proof can only be furnished by the decisive victory of the Allies. The latest speech of the Chancellor of the Empire, pronounced after the first Anglo-French victories on the Somme, is the best proof of this fact.

Such a victory only will be able to assure our independence and national unity. We do not often mention Germany in *La Serbie*, but that is not to say that we Serbians do not consider her to be our principal enemy. On the contrary, we are well aware of the fact that the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as well as Turkey and Bulgaria are simply acolytes, instruments which Germany uses in order to realize her dreams of world-conquest. If we occupy ourselves with the secondary adversary, Austria-Hungary, it is simply to divide the task. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which holds in its power about twenty million Slavs, who cannot be liberated unless the power of Germany is broken, is nearer to us and we realize this better than our great friends do. While our Allies, in their Press, fight principally against Germany, we pay much more attention to Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria

who must also be beaten if a lasting Peace is to be obtained. And if we try to dissipate our friends' illusions in regard to these secondary opponents, Germany's allies, we do not lose sight of the principal enemy, already shaken by the Allies' vigorous blows, but who will not be rendered inoffensive before he is "knocked out," as Mr. Lloyd George said the other day.

October 8, 1916.

GERMANY AND THE BALKANS.

The general lines of the German expansionist policy have for a long time led to Constantinople and Asia Minor. German "Weltpolitik" is both continental and maritime. While she was building a powerful navy and an imposing merchant fleet—Germany planned the railway to Bagdad, the achievement of which should put the German Empire in direct communication with the coveted territory of Asia Minor. Therefore, if we wish to know what concrete ends Germany proposed to attain by the present war, we have only to recall the two pre-war aspirations which have remained the principal aims of German foreign policy: expansion in the East, the famous "Drang nach Osten," and the destruction of British command of the sea. All the other points of the German political programme are in relation to these two fundamental ideas. The Serbian question, for example, when regarded from this point of view, loses the local character which the Central Empires wished to give to it, and becomes a European question of the greatest importance. In order to reach Constantinople, Germany must pass through Serbia, and as the Serbian question also interests the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy because of the attraction exercised by the Serbian Kingdom on the Southern Slavs of Austria-Hungary, the agreement of the two German powers on this point was not difficult to realize. In order to clear the road to Constantinople, Serbia must therefore be got out of the way. The Austrian ultimatum of July 23, 1914, purposely couched in terms which rendered all discussion and any pacific solution impossible, betrayed the pan-German plans to every one. Europe opposed their

realization, and Germany, instead of drawing back, provoked the Great War, hoping to reduce Europe by force and compel her to submit to her will.

The German military successes, important as they were during the first two years of the war, have nevertheless failed to produce the desired effect. The third year has begun badly for Germany, who has had to submit to reverses of all descriptions, but that does not prevent the German statesmen from pursuing their original programme as regards the extension of German political supremacy as far as the Persian Gulf. We have already spoken of the efforts of Dr. Friedrich Naumann in view of the realization of the close union of Central Europe with Bulgaria, and one cannot repeat too often the warning against the danger which would threaten Europe if these plans of conquest were one day realized. This time we wish to call attention to an article which appeared in the *Berliner Tageblatt*, and which should not pass unnoticed. In the number of October 21st, Mr. Hans Vorst, political editor of the paper, treats the question of the Straits from the German point of view, and on this occasion speaks with a frankness not often exhibited by German publicists. The German Eastern plans appear therein in all their splendour.

Mr. Vorst's argument may be reduced to this : for many centuries Russia has wanted Constantinople, but to-day, more than ever, this desire is unattainable, because Germany mounts guard with Turkey on the Bosphorous. In recalling the Russian professor Mitrofanoff's letter referring to Russian policy, published in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* a few months before the war, and the categorical reply of the German professor, Hans Delbruck, the editor of the above-mentioned review "that Germany considers it her duty to oppose all Russian expansion," Mr. Vorst finds that this German political principle still remains in force, and that Russia must definitely abandon her plans for taking Constantinople. "If Russia," he adds, "still hopes to possess Constantinople and the Straits, Germany can never give her consent, not only because of the alliance with Turkey, but because our route passes by Constantinople." The solution which Mr. Vorst proposes for the Straits is therefore very simple.

Constantinople and the Straits are to remain in German hands, but free passage must be allowed to Russian merchant ships and the economic needs of Russia must be satisfied.

We leave aside the German publicists' other arguments, by which he tries to show, firstly, that Great Britain has political reasons for preventing the Russian entry into Constantinople; and, secondly, that it would be in Russia's interest to demand the liberty of the seas, to return to the principal point, Germany's intention of cutting a road through the Balkans and installing herself permanently in Constantinople. Bulgaria has been won over to this plan and has already employed all her moral and material resources to help its realization; there remains, therefore, only Serbia and Roumania, but especially Serbia. It is upon Serbia that the Austro-Germans throw themselves and it is she whom they wish to put out of action. We can understand from this the importance which Germany attaches to the Balkan front and what a considerable advantage the Allies gain by preventing the success of this German plan. Pressed on all sides by the Allies' armies, it is only on the Balkan front that Germany possesses any liberty of movement. This German opening must be closed. What the Allies did not do in 1915, they must accomplish in 1916. The fall of Monastir is a good sign. But it must not stop there.

November 26, 1916.

GERMANY AGAINST SERBIA.

German world policy, because of the impossibility of obtaining decisive successes on the principal fronts, has recently assumed a more modest form and appearance, in reality no less dangerous. Thus Germany announces that she is willing to abandon the realization of all her war aims, and that she is inclined to be content with a part of her objectives only. To this end, she tries on one hand to appear pacific, inoffensive and fair, and on the other she pursues her Eastern pretensions, hoping to meet with less resistance there. As Serbia is in her way, Germany simply wishes to suppress her. Not only pan-Germans such as Count Reventlow, but also German democratic circles consider that

an end must be made of the independence of Serbia and the Serbian people, so that the Germans may invade the East. In order to show the persistence with which they work for this plan of the conquest and annihilation of a whole people, we will reproduce a few extracts from documents relating to the efforts made by the Germans to create amongst the Allies a general atmosphere favourable to peace. We will afterwards explain the German plans which aimed at the destruction of Serbia.

"Germany is waging a defensive war. . . . We have repulsed our attackers and as Germany does not wage war for its own sake, consideration for the common interests of humanity regains its whole value. An agreement concerning the war aims of the belligerents can be reached by negotiation. . . . We do not speak as conquerors, we only make suggestions and await the reply"—(*Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 13). "Germany does not beg for negotiations, but she recommends them in the general interest of Europe"—(Dr. L. Haas, M.d.R. in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 13). "The German Note is the serious expression of the desire to end a war which threatens to ruin Europe if it continues. Germany honestly wants peace and her conditions will prove to the Entente that she wishes to live in peace with the other nations"—(*Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 15). "We have found that the rule 'if you want peace, prepare for war,' was not a justifiable theory. To-day, pacific conventions and ententes are demanded in Germany also"—(Dr. Bernhard Dernburg in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 17). "One may dictate terms of peace to the vanquished, but Germany is not vanquished. She stands for moderation and all such arrangements as could prevent other massacres in the future. She does so, not through weakness, but inspired by a sincere love of peace"—(Theodor Wolff, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 20). "What Wilson wants is a peace which does not require too great sacrifices by any group of belligerents, a just agreement and a real reconciliation. Germany would like such a peace"—(Theodor Wolff, in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 20). "We have never preached the crushing of our enemies, we have never proclaimed the annexation of

our opponents' territory to be our war aim"—(Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, in the article "The Bells of Peace," which appeared in the *Berliner Tageblatt* of December 22). "Germany is for an honourable peace which would take her claims and pretensions into consideration"—(The Berlin correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 24). "The Central Empires only desire to live in peace with the other nations"—(*Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 27). "Nothing could prevent another war more than a reasonable peace on a basis of compromise"—(Friedrich Meineke, in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of December 31). All these articles are by people who find their information in the most well-informed German circles.

But now look at the other side. In the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, which is the most important German newspaper, and has intimate relations with the Chancellor of the Empire, this peace "loyal," "just," and "by compromise," is explained as follows: On the sea the war has not furnished a decision and this must be come to by negotiation. Germany is not beaten on the sea, and the question of her future relations with Great Britain must be solved by compromise. On the Continent, the Western front is stationary, and in the East Germany is brilliantly victorious. *Mittel Europa* has become the centre of German war policy. Germany will re-establish order in the Balkans"—(Extract from a remarkable article entitled "The Decisive Question," published on December 19). Another article: "The Situation in the South-East" (December 21) says the same thing: "Up to now the war has resulted in the suppression of the inconveniences of the continental situation of the German Empire because Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey have joined Germany in order to help her to accomplish her historical mission. . . . Two consequences ensue, two German claims which are in complete agreement with the war map: the maintenance of Turkey as a great Europo-Asiatic Power and the constitution of a Greater Bulgaria including Macedonia and parts of Serbia and Roumania." "The situation does not permit us to obtain all that many of us hoped for, but if we make our greatest efforts in the most opportune direction we can obtain from

the Entente a good and profitable peace, a peace which would be favourable to the principal Entente countries. . . . Our programme to-day is *an inflexible attitude in the East ; negotiations in the West* "—(December 22). And in the article "The Policy of the Balance of Power" (January 7, 1917), the same thesis is mentioned, only it is given a more general character.

Germany demands a free hand in the East, and as regards the rest of the world she consents to conclude an agreement on the basis of the balance of power and the division of world supremacy.

The German plans are therefore clear. Having failed to conquer, Germany is looking for a compromise in order to prepare for another struggle. And she looks for this compromise on a basis which represents unspeakable danger for the Allies, and means the end of Serbia. A glance at any map will show what a formidable Power a Germany stretching from Hamburg to beyond Bagdad and controlling all the peoples inhabiting these vast territories would be. In virtue of such a compromise, Germany would become in reality the mistress of the world, and all peoples would be obliged to accept German supremacy without a fight and without resistance. But all these German plans for world supremacy will remain sterile. The Allies now know how to appreciate the political value of the East, which represents, not a secondary front, but one of the principal ones. In their own interests, they will not allow the German helmet to show itself for long in the Balkans.

January 14, 1917.

SERBIA AND THE GERMAN PLANS.

Herr Hermann Wendel, a member of the Reichstag, has written an article on Serbia which is worthy of attention, and which we reproduce in extenso in *La Serbie*. This reply to one of our articles in *La Serbie* obliges us to reply in our turn for the good reason that it is the first time that a serious German publicist publicly treats the question of Serbian national unity in a way that renders an objective discussion possible. The justice of the Serbian national

claims, the immense sacrifices made by the Serbian people toward its absolute liberation and complete independence, preserve us from any accusation of exaggeration and from any feeling of nervousness. We stand firm in our right for an independent national existence, and we are capable of speaking in moderate language as is possible, but all the more determined and resolute are we as to its real object, that is to say, the question of our political and economic independence.

We have a great esteem for Herr Wendel personally, and as we have already mentioned in the article to which Mr. Wendel was so good as to reply, the Serbians have no reason to be ungrateful to a man who, although German, has had the courage to publicly denounce the premeditated Austrian attack on Serbia. If we have nevertheless affirmed that Herr Wendel's ideas as regards the Serbo-Austro-German economic community mean practically, in a less rigid form, the economic slavery of Serbia and her inclusion in German Central Europe, it is the truth to which we still hold and can easily prove. The pan-Germanists simply wish to compel us to be a part of Central Europe, whereas Herr Wendel tries to persuade us that her economic interests oblige Serbia to sell her products to the Central Powers and buy from them the things which she needs; that through this traffic she would inevitably be subject to German influence in other departments and that any Serbian resistance to such a solution would be useless. Therefore the result, in the end, would be the same as that recommended by the pan-Germans, obtained in another and more prudent way which would avoid hurting national susceptibilities. We do not doubt Herr Wendel's honesty, it is rather his simplicity which astonishes us. Does not Herr Wendel tell us that he knows nothing about the official German programme in the Balkans, whereas the whole German expansionist policy is founded on the axiom that the Balkans must be under the complete and exclusive domination of Germany?

But we formally contest Herr Wendel's statement that Serbia is a part of Central Europe from the political, economic or any other point of view. The peculiar circumstances in which our country found itself before the war, without any outlet to the sea and without free communication with

Western Europe, had necessarily made her turn towards Austria and Germany. All the Serbian products went to Austria-Hungary and Austro-Hungarian industries had many customers in the Serbian market. Nevertheless political imperialism aiming at the possession of Salonica and the political subjection of Serbia had blinded the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. It thought itself all-powerful and by closing its frontier to Serbian products it hoped to break Serbian resistance to its plans in the Balkans. This blindness caused it to go as far as to declare a tariff war on the Serbian Kingdom. Pressed by Austria, Serbia did not fail to ask for Germany's assistance, as Herr Wendel knows. Very well, but she met with the coldest of receptions in Berlin. In spite of the great advantages which German industry would have gained by replacing that of the Monarchy in the Serbian market, Berlin was not at all disposed to counteract an action in which she also was directly interested. The zeal of a few Germans, such as Herr Schlieben, the German Consul at Belgrade, for example, was soon suppressed, and Serbia was told that the road to Berlin was through Vienna. Serbia's difficult position was evident. All the same there were people in our country who did not understand the German policy, and refused to see what its consequences would be. The author of these lines was one of these credulous people. The brutal ultimatum of 1914 and the cordial support which Germany gave to the Monarchy's sanguinary enterprise have opened our eyes since then, and all the fine speeches in the world will not be able to alter our feelings.

It is not true that Serbia, once united to her Serbian, Croatian and Slovene brethren, should necessarily belong to Central Europe because of her geographical situation and economic structure. If the conditions of our economic development are to be changed—and something is already being accomplished in this direction—a change in the direction taken by Serbian commerce will follow of its own accord. Better railways and the proper organization of river navigation, will put Serbia in direct communication with Western Europe. The Paris-Milan-Fiume-Zagreb-Belgrade-Salonica line will make us independent of Vienna and Budapest. A canal joining the Morava to the Vardar, another joining

the Danube and the Save to the Adriatic will complete our definite liberation from German influence. The Danube-Adriatic Railway is the great line of the future which will also assure the emancipation of Roumania. Serbia will always be able to find markets for agricultural products, and France and England will lend us capital at easier rates than Germany did.

All these considerations and many others, give us the right to say that there is no common bond between us and Germany. We want our independence and national unity, and that is precisely what Germany does not wish to grant us. Herr Wendel himself recognizes that the fairest and more just solution of our national question would be the union in one free and independent national State. But instead of advising Germany and Austria not to oppose our legitimate desire, Herr Wendel advises us to abandon our legitimate aspirations because their realization is impossible without more bloodshed ! But why do the Germans prefer to sacrifice their sons rather than consent to the liberation of the enslaved Serbian people ? Such Germans have no right to remind us of Goethe, Schiller or Grimm. Hindenburg is their idol and Mackensen personifies contemporary Germany. These modern leaders of the German nation have ruined and ravaged the beautiful country which the German thinkers of other days have celebrated and sung about. The tomb of a million Serbians, innocent victims of criminal aggression, separates Serbia from Austro-Germany. The living Serbians would rather be buried there too than dishonour their people by an unworthy agreement.

June 3, 1917.

GERMANIA LIBERATRIX.

The Germans are fighting for freedom. At least they say so. First of all for their own freedom because they are threatened with suffocation between their narrow frontiers. Then for the freedom of the seas because England rules them. This British supremacy on the sea exists, it is true, but it is also true, and the Germans themselves cannot deny it, that it is precisely during this British supremacy

that the German merchant fleet has attained its greatest development. But, the Germans reply, in case of war? This constant thought, "in case of war," has never left the Germans for the last fifty years; haunted by this idea, they can no longer imagine the sea to be free unless it is under the "protection" of Germany. Besides the sea, Germany also intends to deliver the land, the fertile land, as well as that which could become fertile thanks to "German intelligence, industry and honesty," as they are fond of saying, the land of Champagne, Poland, as far as Pripete, the Balkans and Asia Minor. The German mission is "to organize energy." Those who oppose them must be destroyed, no matter at what cost! Lastly, the Germans have found also some people to whom they wish to devote a portion of their liberating efforts. The Flemish are to be protected from the Wallons; the little brothers of German race and language (according to German science) must be saved from Latin domination; the Dutch, also a German tribe, would be glad to be protected by Germany on the sea and in their colonies from the rapacity of Great Britain and Japan. . . . The Poles, the Ukrainians, the Letts, the Finns, all the thirty "nations" of Caucasia, the Bulgarians of Roumania, the Roumanians of Serbia, the Mohammedans of the French, British and Russian colonies, there are oppressed people everywhere who only wait to be freed by the German sword. . . . And even if the Polish peasants in Russia have enjoyed a more favourable position than that occupied by the Polish peasants in Austria, it is then the Jews and the nobles who are ground beneath the Russian heel; in Roumania, on the other hand, it is the peasants who deserve Germany's attention. Only in Turkey are there no suffering natives; in Hungary everything is for the best; in Austria the peoples are content without an exception (the exceptions are in the prisons and concentration camps); in Germany, the perfect organization of energy assures to every one the fullest development of his capacities. Those who do not wish to believe it are compelled to.

The Germans are never able to understand that there are other things besides organization, order and economy of energy in the life of a nation. They have formed a

mechanical and selfish conception of human life. They do not recognize the independent moral ideas of all systems and material organizations; they do not understand that it is the economy of moral energy which should take first place in the hierarchy of different forces. They always start from the external realities, from riches and military power. Their ideal of civilization is the best possible organization of all energy, of human beings as well as land and water, in order to assure the greatest possible revenue from material riches and because it is thanks to them that humanity has attained this object, they should also enjoy the "contractor's commission." As receivers of this revenue, they will leave in all countries their agents and confidants in the persons of monarchs, great and humble employees, bank managers and managers of industrial enterprises . . . The German mind is too curiously limited to-day in this mechanical and, in the long run, economic conception, that they do not even see the illusion of their aspirations as "contractors of civilization," that they do not understand that moral liberty can serve as the foundation for the particular brand of civilization of each nation.

History shows how irrational are events: the agents undertake an action with certain intentions but they do not know where their action will lead them. Germany wanted the "contractor's commission" of the civilized world, but this war can bring about nothing but the participation of Germany in modern evolution in the direction of international democracy, equality and liberty of the peoples on a basis of right and justice.

Yes, paradoxical though it may appear, Germany is fighting for liberty and even for her own liberty, but she does not know it and she does not want to. On the day that the German people is delivered from its militarist caste, its Germano-maniacal publicists and its entire egoistic and materialistic outlook, on that day we shall have a free Germany in the League of Nations, but it will never be forgotten that she was not her own liberator. It is the tragic destiny of the Allied peoples to be obliged to fight for the freedom of the German people also.

January 28, 1917.

THE GERMANS OF FORMER DAYS AND THE SERBIANS.

To Germany and the German intellectuals, the Serbians are a small, barbarous people, a horde of frantic revolutionaries, a nest of murderers and regicides, or a half-savage tribe which must be civilized by German kultur before being granted autonomy and political independence. It is sufficient to hear once the disdainful remarks of the Germans on this "small barbarous people" in order to form an idea of the general opinion in contemporary German intellectual circles regarding Serbia and the Serbians.

Nevertheless, the Germans of former times were not of the same opinion. A little book on Serbian national songs, recently published in the German collection *Insel-Bücher* (*Serbische Volkslieder*, Leipzig, 1916), which contains a remarkable collection of Serbian songs translated into German by the great German writers of the beginning of the nineteenth century, gives us a very instructive example. The greatest German poet, Goethe, had, in 1775, translated into German "The lament of the noble women of Assan Aga," for Herder's collection of *National Songs*. Wilhelm von Humbolt and Jacob Grimm took the trouble of learning Serbian at Vienna during the Congress of 1814-1815, and it was Grimm who wrote for the *Wiener Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* a very judicious article on the first collection of Serbian songs prepared by Vouk Stephan Karadjitch. It is also to two eminent Germans that Karadjitch, the regenerator of Serbian literature, owed the honour of receiving from King Frederick William of Prussia in 1852 the Order of the Red Eagle. Speaking of the Serbian songs, Grimm said that, since Homer's time, no epic literary production in Europe provided so much information and material relating to the source and nature of this type of literature. Grimm also advised Mademoiselle de Jakob (Talvy) to study Serbian songs and translate them into German, and if the old Goethe, enthusiastic once more about Serbian songs, published a good number of them in his *Review*, praising them highly, the credit for it belongs to Grimm.

When one thinks that romantic circles in Berlin in the first half of the nineteenth century passed their literary

evenings in reading Serbian songs, the ardour and hate with which contemporary Germans threw themselves upon Serbia to annihilate her, is really astonishing. The Serbian people, whose nobility of soul and feelings is admirably reflected by the national epic and lyrical poetry, and who, having been more than sympathetically received by the romantics of the nineteenth century, represents for modern Germany to-day a pitiable people who must be broken and whose natural evolution must be stopped. In presence of these facts, it is pertinent to ask why the Insel Library of Leipzig thought it necessary to publish this collection of Serbian songs, and remind the public that old German opinions of the Serbians differed diametrically from those expressed by contemporary German political and literary personalities. We do not see what interest the German public can have in knowing the character of a people to which it denies the right to live and develop ! And we also ask why a professor of Belgrade University thought it was an opportune moment to collaborate in this publication at a time when the German guns were demolishing at Belgrade the only Serbian university, and when the Austro-Magyar-German emissaries were emptying the libraries, museums, and scientific collections in the schools and seminaries and all other institutions of Serbian intellectual life !

August 6, 1916.

GERMANY AND LITTLE SERBIA.

“ I am, therefore you are not.”

(Epigraph applied by MM. Lerolle and H. Quentin to the egotistical theory in German philosophy.)

The first rule of international law establishes the equality of all States before the law, without taking into consideration the extent of their territory or their economic and military power. Equality before the law internally and equality before the Law of Nations externally. This elementary notion of right, borrowed from morality, has never met with much sympathy in Germany where the theory of degrees or of the ladder is preferred. Far from being

equal, the peoples, according to the German philosophy, are placed one above the other. At the bottom is Luxembourg, which can be conquered on a pleasure trip; after her comes States which are a little stronger and so on. At the top of the ladder towers "Germania invincible." Germany and her neighbour, Austria-Hungary, have practised this doctrine for a long time. Long before the European war, the small States felt the full weight of the German theory of brute force, and Serbia could claim to have peculiar experience in this respect. Austria-Hungary could never consider little Serbia as an equal, from the judicial point of view, of the Great Power, Austria-Hungary! The daily history of Austro-Serbian relations is nothing but that of the struggle between a Power, puffed up with pride and material power, and a small State, resolved not to let itself be crushed.

Here are a few examples. When the commercial treaty of 1906 between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was being negotiated, the Serbian delegates asked that the discussion should be conducted on basis of the principle *do ut des*, give and take. The Austrian delegates thought this demand—which was very natural—incompatible with Austria-Hungary's rank as a Great Power. At the time of the crisis provoked by the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Count Forgach, the Austrian Minister in Belgrade, repeatedly reminded Milovan Milovanovitch, who was then the Serbian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he could not treat with him as an equal, Serbia being a small country. Milovanovitch naturally protested energetically against such a distinction, and when, on July 23, 1914, Austria sent the famous ultimatum to Serbia which disgusted the whole world, Germany and Austria-Hungary could not hide their disdain for those who took such interest in a small country.

German psychology is therefore confirmed on this subject and the new manifestations of this unhealthy state of mind are not surprising. But the brutal form taken by the latest specimen of this pathological psychology is too characteristic, too German, to be ignored.

The *Frankfurter Zeitung* of June 3rd published a long editorial article on Germany and Belgium, relating to a

report by the ex-military governor of Belgium, General Bissing, on Belgium's future. In this report which has just been published by the pan-German review *Das grössere Deutschland*, the German general explains all the reasons in favour of the annexation of Belgium by Germany. The great Frankfurt newspaper, knowing very well that the annexation of Belgium is impossible without a German victory, and that this is absolutely beyond the bounds of possibility, tries to convince its fellow citizens that the territory in question is large, and that a simple annexation of Belgium would create difficulties for Germany. It would be better to choose a less brutal way in order to respect the principle of nationality! Because, when all is said and done, this principle is not to be disdained! Only, its application to Germany or Austria-Hungary must not be demanded. Whoever has the audacity to attempt to do so will receive the proper punishment. "Thus the little Serbian people who dared to oppose a Great Power like Austria has received an exemplary punishment." The quotation is textual and is an authentic document for the study of the mentality of the pan-Germans and also of the so-called German "democrats."

June 24, 1917.

MISPLACED COMPASSION.

The reconstitution of the Serbian army and its transfer to Macedonia have given rise to different commentaries in our opponent's Press, especially in the Austro-Hungarian Press. But the German Press has also mentioned several times the "remnants" of the Serbian army, as it is in the habit of expressing itself, in order to make the public think that the Serbian army no longer exists. Lately, nevertheless the German papers have changed their tone and opinion, and instead of disdain and indifference, are anxious—*visum teneatis*—about the valiant Serbian nation which must again begin the struggle for its political freedom and independence! Thus the *Leipziger Nachrichten* have published on June 17th, in its No. 166, an article on Serbia and the Serbian army, full of pretended compassion and friendship for the Serbian people.

The author of the article says that the Serbian army, by fighting valiantly, has made enormous sacrifices in the present and preceding wars. Sickness and epidemics, especially cholera and typhus, have also considerably weakened it. The retreat through the inhospitable mountains, in rain and snow, finally undermined the health of the hardest soldiers. The most elementary humane feelings should have insisted on sparing this so sorely-trying nation the sufferings of a new struggle in order to preserve it from complete ruin and leave it the possibility of forming a new people, a State! But this cruel Entente, which has neither heart nor pity, asks more sacrifices from the Serbian people, and compels it to fight on!

The Leipzig paper really exaggerates its uneasiness as to the fate of Serbia and the Serbian people; but supposing it to be honest—rather a risky supposition!—we will show a very simple way of saving the Serbian people. Let the German and Austro-Hungarian armies evacuate Serbian territory and thus spare the brave Serbian soldiers, as to whose fate the Saxon paper is so uneasy, the trouble of driving them out. But before making such a proposition, the German paper should ask itself why Germany attacked Serbia against whom she had not even the imaginary causes for complaint which the Dual Monarchy invoked in order to justify its war of destruction. We have no doubt that the conclusion at which it will arrive, will prevent it from ever again mentioning the Serbian people, whose present truly tragic position is solely due to German aggression.

July 2, 1916.

CHAPTER VII

SERBIA AND RUSSIA

THE EXTRAVAGANCES OF THE LENINIST KAMARADES

THE consolidation of the interior situation in Russia is not being carried into effect without some rather violent changes. Though no doubt inevitable, they cause a certain uneasiness in the countries of all Russia's friends and allies. The last manifestation of the committee of workmen and soldier delegates, demanding a peace "without annexation and without indemnities," comes certainly within the category of dangerous extravagances which can do immense harm, not only to the Russian nation, but to the whole of democratic Europe. As to ourselves, who do not yet know exactly who are these mysterious and anonymous delegates, whose ideas are in perfect agreement with German and Austrian desires, we have the right to protest against these manifestations made in favour of the servitude and oppression of our nation under Austro-Germano-Bulgarian tyranny. The indescribable sufferings of the Serbian nation and its steadfast faith in international justice and morality, should have at least caused the "Leninists," "Maximalists," and associates, to abstain from insulting a whole nation by styling its struggle for liberty and independence, "policy of conquest." The cruel irony of it is shown by quoting an Austrian paper, the *Zeit* of Vienna, which said the other day that the Entente does not wish for annexations, but that it asks for "abnexions," that is to say the annulling of all the annexations effected in the past against the will of the respective nations. How could the Petrograd committee be ignorant of a fact well known even to our enemies?

We have been fighting for exactly one year in *La Serbie* for the liberty of our people and for the victory of right

and justice. Any annexation signifies violence for us, and is profoundly repugnant to us. But is there a single sensible man who can speak of annexations when it is a question of France being united with her provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, which Germany snatched from her in 1870? And how do Mr. Lenin and his friends dare to style "policy of conquest and annexation" the ardent desire of the Serbo-Croat-Slovene people to be delivered from the Austro-Magyar yoke? How can they so mistakenly misinterpret a truth so simple, so elequent and so clear to the narrowest minds, as to speak of annexations and conquests when it is simply a question of liberty and the most elementary rights of existence?

As to the peace without "indemnities," the manifestation of the committee is, if possible, still more inconceivable. The Serbians, the Belgians, the French and the Poles have been victims of a premeditated aggression, and the aggressors, if they had conquered, would have forced these same nations to pay to them the costs of the "operation." But the enterprise has failed, and Lenin and his associates now demand that the criminals should be pardoned and not asked to repair all the damage they have caused! What mental aberration, or how German, to ask pardon in advance for the authors of so many crimes committed among the populations of the devastated Allied countries! We do not need to invoke the picture of tortured Serbia, of which the Bulgarians are at this very moment completing the pillage and devastation. Let the Leninists throw a glance on the "glacis" contrived in France by the Germans at the time of their retreat on the Somme, and may they spare us the sorrow of seeing messages come from Petrograd, the centre of the liberation of the Russian people, so celebrated in the democratic world, messages bearing the Germanic stamp. May our great Russian friends, after having driven out the Germanic agents from the palaces, also clean out the attics a little, where these people seem to have comfortably installed themselves. That would have a salutary effect upon Russian democracy.

May 13, 1917.

THE TERROR OF THE FOUR BASTARDS OF THE
RUSSIAN REVOLUTION.

No one is so disillusioned and overcome by the peace negotiations between Maximalists and Centrals as the Serbian nation, oppressed by Austria-Hungary. The Russo-Serbian relations throughout history are singular: nine times since Peter the Great, Russia has risen up as the protectress of the Serbians, and each time some catastrophe has forced her to leave her protégé in confusion, delivering her up to extermination, either to the Sultan of Constantinople or to Vienna. Each time Russia said: "This time we were not sufficiently prepared, but next time you will see." And now, the last of these "next times," some bastards of the Russian revolution sell the Serbian nation shamelessly to the capitalist-imperialists of Vienna and of Budapest, deliver it up to be taken advantage of by Magyar feudalists.

However, it would be unjust to deny all efficacy to Russian protection; without it, the Serbian nation would probably have been completely destroyed a long time ago; it is this that inspired the celebrated Czech poet, Jan Kollar, with the idea that the mission of Russia was the integral liberation of all the Slavs from the Germano-Magyar-Turkish yoke. The Magyar dictator, in 1848, Lajos Kossuth, has seized upon this poetic expression of an ardent desire for liberty, in order to turn it into the scarecrow "pan-Slavism," and he succeeded so well that the proud and temperate Albion herself was afraid of it, and that Beaconsfield-Disraeli consented to Bosnia-Herzegovina not being united to Serbia, but given up to the Austrian occupation. It mattered not at all that the number of Serbians subjugated to the double Monarchy should increase, provided the "pan-Slavic danger" was avoided. How they must have laughed in their sleeve these clever rogues of Budapest and Vienna! Now, England is expiating the false step of Beaconsfield, and Lloyd George racks his brains in order to paralyse the consequences of it.

In Russia even, pan-Slavism had representatives scarcely capable of exercising a profound influence on the Russian nation: the too famous Katkov was more a sort of plotter than a sincere pan-Slavist. With more enthusiasm, though

with less judgment, the Serbian nation adhered to the different anarchist theories, whether those of Peter Kropotkin or those of Tolstoi, which moreover are distinguished from all the others in that they disapprove of any violence, either on the part of the revolutionaries or of the government. All these tendencies, sometimes noble in themselves, have this in common, that they are at least indifferent, if not hostile, in regard to the Russian and Slav national ideal. These tendencies had no effect on the vigilant enemies, but only gave them the means of disaggregating Russia.

Only one among the great sons of Great Russia cherished the idea of an indivisible Russia and of a free confederation of all the Slavs, based on friendship and affirmed Russia's right to Constantinople. That was Dostoievski. But hardly any one understood his ardour ; the loyalist of his adversaries treated it as an aberration pure and simple, while for the most part, Russians and non-Russians, slandered him as the valet of autocracy, of orthodoxy, of pan-Slavism, of imperialism. Alexander II followed his coffin to the grave ! Everywhere else one would have praised a monarch for such an action ; rendered by a Russian Emperor, even though it was the Czar liberator, this homage only served to ruin the reputation of him to whom it was rendered. No one has described with such lucidity the maladies of the Russian mind ergo : it is Dostoievski who is ill, a maniac who takes his doctor for a madman and considers himself perfectly normal !

In a word, one did not recognize Dostoievski's right to speak in the name of the Russian nation. And now, four bastards of the revolution, Oulianov-Lenin, Bronstein-Trotsky, Apfelbaum-Zinoviov, and Rosenfeld-Kamenev, are considered worthy to represent this nation !

It is the whole intellectual class of Russia that is responsible for the tragi-comic development of the revolution. Everywhere else, from the time of the Hindoo philosophers down to our own days, a thinking man is idealist or positivist, materialist or metaphysician ; with the Russians that does not follow ; for them the point of view, the starting point, the root of all things, is the social instinct. The Russian man is so absorbed in society that he has no time to reflect

about himself. He is social-revolutionary or agrarian anti-revolutionary; he is socialist of no matter what shade, and as such, anti-capitalist; or else he is of the reactionary creed, that is to say an adherent to the present social order. But always his "credo" is the social instinct. And the man guided by instinct, no matter which, is always eager, busy, but without ever perceiving clearly his aim. The Russian intellectuals are all socialists-instinctivists acting for the future happiness of humanity—especially that of the planet Mars. The greater part of the leaders of the proletariat-intellectuals is composed of men of incomplete education, of semi-scholars and semi-students of the Khazare race, known generally by the name of Russian Jews. The ancient chronicle, called that of Nestor, mentions the Khazares on the Dnieper, who embraced the religion of Moses, while the Russians were baptized according to the Greek rite. There was later an immigration of real Jews of other countries; but up to our days the Khazar type can be easily distinguished among the Russian Israelites. And while the German and Austro-Hungarian Jews uphold German and Magyar imperialism, the Russian Khazar Israelites work with all their might against the Russian State. They prefer a sordid existence to any hard work, but as far as possible they transform themselves from poor men into parasites of the poor, into "organizers" of the working classes. Pogroms organized by the secret police and encouraged by generals with German names (for example Kaulbars) served to pollute the name of the Russian people and to tighten the bonds between the Jews of Vienna and Budapest and their co-religionists in Russia, and this assured to many Khazars the means of leading, in the colonies of Russian emigrants, an eternal student's life with eternal chatter based upon the socialist catechism. Thus there was formed a strong contingent of fervent Austrophiles.

At the social-democrate congress at Innsbruck, a few years before the war, Bronstein-Trotsky publicly thanked the Austrian social-democracy for the financial aid extended to the Russian social democracy, directed by the Khazar Israelites!

Every one is asking to-day whether Lenin, Bronstein and

Co. are madmen or German agents. I have already spoken of the secret bonds of union between the Russian revolutionary committee and the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, starting from 1879, when Kalnoky was ambassador at Petrograd. The Soukhomlinov lawsuit threw some light upon it, in clearing up the death of Stolypine. The latter has transferred Miasoiedov from Verjbohvo to Samara, saying that it was absolutely necessary that this man should be removed to thirty meridians from the German frontier, and he wanted to ask the Czar for the resignation of Soukhomlinov. That is why the "revolutionary" Bagrov, a Khazar, fired on Stolypine and not on the Czar who, however, was only a few steps away. It is significant that Bronstein-Trotsky should have spoken of this assassination in the same speech in which he thanked the Austrian socialist-democrats. But, of course, he did not tell the truth about it, namely, that Stolypine was assassinated not for being an autocrat-reactionary, but because he had said to the Khazar revolutionaries: "It is in your interests to see Russia shaken; for my part, I want her to be great!"

The bastards of the Russian revolution are intimately related to Austria by a long past, and they know that Austria could threaten them with the publication of the "secret treaties," compromising in a different way to those published by Bronstein-Trotsky in betraying the allies of Russia.

They are neither madmen, these bastards of the revolution, nor essentially agents of Germany: they are in the first place accomplices of Austria-Hungary, forced to save her let it cost what it may. For this reason they must:

1. Demoralize the Russian army down to utter defeat.
2. Dissolve all authority down to perfect anarchy.
3. Prepare the national bankruptcy.
4. Dishonour the Russian people in making it responsible for an international treason.
5. Ruin Russian industry so as to make Russia into a simple Austro-German colony.
6. Assassinate all Russian patriots by means of lynching.
7. Destroy all hope, with the Slavs oppressed by Austria-Hungary, of Russia ever being able to protect them.

That is what the real treaty of peace between Lenin and Czernin consists in.

All the rest is only a farce made up beforehand, disguised in phrases of the socialist catechism.

Now that the secret treaties with the former allies are published, it is incumbent upon Russian intellectual classes, as their strict duty, to ask the present despots of Russia that they may at least obtain justice, though too late, by publishing the source of all the funds of the revolutionary Committee during the course of these forty years, and the use made of these funds. That is the first point.

January 6, 1918.

THE DEATH OF NICHOLAS II.

The Emperor of all the Russians has just been executed by a band of irresponsible persons having no right whatever to speak or act in the name of the Russian nation. But the Emperor Nicholas II happened to be in their hands, and they shot him in a manner that may be called repugnant. The people who have sold Russia to Germany, and who hold their power only by force and by German favour, are so little qualified to judge the ex-Czar that their act bears rather the mark of common murder.

In spite of all the faults committed by the Emperor Nicholas, the news of his tragic death has been received in Serbian circles with a sentiment of profound compassion. The ex-Czar was a friend of the Serbian nation, and if for no other reason than for his personal intervention in favour of Serbia, his sincere and friendly promise to protect the Serbian nation against the premeditation of the Austrian aggressors, we owe him our eternal gratitude. At the most critical moment of the existence of the Serbian nation, July 14-27, 1914, the Emperor Nicholas telegraphed to His Royal Highness the Prince Alexandre of Serbia, these historic words: "Your Royal Highness in applying to me at a particularly difficult moment, has not been mistaken as to my cordial sympathy for the Serbian nation. . . . Your Highness can rest assured that under no circumstances will Russia lose interest in the fate of Serbia." We know

what happened. At the last moment, the Emperor Nicholas urged the Kaiser to accept the arbitrage, but Berlin refused. And so it was war, a frightful war for which the responsibility does not fall upon Nicholas II.

In Russia certain democratic circles have a grudge against Serbia for her attachment to official Russia, to the Court, to the autocracy. But could we do otherwise? Serbia had only one policy, the policy of liberty, of Slav solidarity, above all an anti-German policy. She sought the support of Russia and applied to the quarter from which this support could be obtained. An ultra-democratic country like ours would have greeted with the greatest joy a democratization of Russia, but before thinking of that, it had to take precautions against its own bondage, against the Austro-Germano-Magyar menace. We could not do like the Bulgarians, who wavered between Austria and Russia, and whose politicians divided their rôles so as to adapt themselves to Russian home affairs. Some moved with the Imperial Court, others sought contact with the democratic centres. But while the Serbians loved and respected Russia and were ready to help her within the limits of their strength, the Bulgarians only looked upon their deliverer as a milch cow from which one must endeavour to extract the last drops. In this way the difference between the feelings of the Serbians and the Bulgarians can be explained on learning the death of their mutual protector. The Serbians will not fail to pray for the soul of the ex-Czar, who was sometimes unjust towards them, but who was their benefactor. The Bulgarians, according to the minister Madjaroff (see the *Vossische Zeitung* of July 12), are preparing to erect to the Kaiser a monument much finer than that of the Czar liberator at Sofia!

August 3, 1918.

CHAPTER VIII

THE POLITICS OF ROUMANIA

ROUMANIAN HESITATIONS.

THE attitude of Roumania remains stationary. The Government of Bratiano still keeps an enigmatic silence, and in spite of the numerous article of the Press about "l'heure roumaine," it appears that Roumania will not give up her policy of expectation. The Roumanian leaders prefer to remain neutral and to leave to future events the determination of their final politics. But these events, as far as the offensive of the Allies is concerned, and especially the Russian offensive, have not yet in the eyes of the Roumanians, led to such a change in the military situation, that a Roumanian intervention should impose itself as an absolute necessity. As long as everybody is doubtful as to which side will be victorious, Roumania remains quiet. The causes of this purely negative policy are very diverse. On the one side they depend on the politics pursued by Roumania for the last thirty years, and on the other side on the general situation of the country.

Up to the last Balkanic wars, up to the Treaty of Bucarest of 1913, Roumania has practised an openly Germanophile policy. A secret convention with Germany and Austria-Hungary has even put her in the rank of the powers of the Triple Alliance. In this combination Roumania was taken for a sort of Austro-German *avant-garde* opposite to Russia, and thanks to the efforts of King Carol Hohenzollern, the policy based on the hypothesis of a Russian danger was practiced until 1913, up to the intervention of Roumania against Bulgaria. The Treaty of Bucarest in 1913 signified a new orientation of the Roumanian policy in the sense of an emancipation from the Central Powers. But this new

policy could not be pursued to its end, the European war not having left time for Roumania to pass through the transitory phase and prepare the ground for a definite *rapprochement* with the Allied powers, friends and protectors of the liberty of the small nations. The European war has so much surprised Roumania that she does not know on which side to turn. The principal reason for the Roumanian situation must be looked for in these oscillations between the two groups of Powers.

The Balkanic policy of Roumania was clearly drawn up in 1913, and if the European war had not broken out so suddenly the Roumanian statesmen would have had time to accommodate the general policy of the country to the new situation created by the Treaty of Bucarest. There were in the first place the relations with Russia and all the questions so concerned, the importance of which Roumania could not leave without consideration. Yet there is no doubt that the happy results of the new Roumanian orientation would have facilitated the conclusion of a definite understanding between Roumania and Russia and would have rendered possible the continuation of the policy inaugurated by the Treaty of Bucarest. But the German diplomacy did not remain inactive. As it had lost the Balkanic party in 1913, it redoubled its efforts not to lose the European party in Roumania. By an unexpected movement, the Emperor William approved of the Treaty of Bucarest, and let them know in Athens and Bucarest that the two countries still enjoyed in Berlin the old sympathies. In the short interval between the Treaty of Bucarest and the European war, Germany had worked for the strengthening of the ancient ties of friendship, and when war broke out Roumania, uncertain of her position, showed herself friendly to both sides. She did not want to ally herself to the Central Powers, which practically signified that she was abandoning the secret convention with Germany. But Roumania would not either range herself on the side of the Entente, in order to continue the policy based on the Treaty of Bucarest.

There was a time when Roumania tried to distinguish between the Balkanic and the European situation. A Roumanian diplomat explained to us at the beginning of

1915 that neutral Roumania implied the passivity of Bulgaria, and that Serbia was not to demand anything more of Roumania, who was obliged also to reckon with her European interests. This diplomat assured us that the Roumanian neutrality towards the Germanic empires was conditioned by the Bulgarian non-intervention, and that Roumania would come on the scene at the moment when Bulgaria would attack Serbia. That attitude of the Roumanian Government signified in reality the maintenance of the state of things created by the Treaty of Bucarest. But unfortunately the military defeats of the Allies in 1915 had weakened the Roumanian resistance against the Bulgarian intervention. When Bulgaria mobilized in September 1915 Roumania did not stir, sacrificing her own work, the Treaty of Bucarest. This was a great deception for Serbia, who found herself abandoned by a country on which the Serbs had never ceased to count. The deception was all the more painful, and the Roumanian neutrality all the more to be regretted, as the policy of the Serbo-Roumanian entente was alone capable of assuring the Roumanian interests *vis-à-vis* to Hungary and Bulgaria, and of facilitating the conclusion of a satisfactory understanding with Russia. Yet Roumania stood by unmoved at the crushing of Serbia, and German influence triumphed at Bucarest.

Nevertheless, Roumania has never had the intention of remaining definitely neutral, and especially has never ceased to think of the realization of her aspirations in Transylvania. The last word has not yet been spoken at Bucarest, and there is still some hope that Roumania will, in spite of all her hesitations, end by associating with the Allied Powers and contribute to their decisive victory. The chief obstacle to a Roumanian intervention is to be found in the person of King Ferdinand, who, as a Hohenzollern, cannot march directly against Germany and the Hohenzollern who are leading her. As long as Germany is not beaten by the Allies, King Ferdinand will find means to keep the country neutral. Once Germany and Austria-Hungary are beaten, Roumania will offer her military participation in order to have the right of taking part in the distribution of the Monarchy. To attack Austria-Hungary and Germany

directly, and to help materially in the breaking of their forces is a thing that Roumania will in all probability not do. "L'heure roumaine" has not yet come because the end of the war is not yet near. It is a regrettable fact, especially for Roumania, but it is a fact with which we must calculate.

July 30, 1916.

ROUMANIAN INTERVENTION.

The Roumanian intervention will certainly have a double result: a moral and a material one. A neutral power, rich, flourishing, governed by a prince of the House of Hohenzollern is associating with the Allies to fight for the same ideal of right and justice, and to contribute materially to the realization of a new Europe, constructed on the basis of the liberty of nations, organized democratically and inspired with a humanitarian pacifism. The immediate motive which has determined Roumania to give up her neutrality was the wish to liberate her Roumanian brethren from the foreign yoke and to complete her national unity. The fundamental cause of the Roumanian intervention is to be found in the conviction of the Roumanian statesmen that the allied cause is morally finer and materially surer, and from the political point of view nearer to the vital interests of Roumania. Such an appreciation does honour to the perspicacity of the Roumanians, and we are very happy to state that the doubts expressed in *La Serbie* on the possibility of a Roumanian intervention have not been confirmed.

As Serbians, we wish to state that the Roumanian action is greeted in the Serbian circles with the same enthusiasm as in 1913, when Roumania took up her position against Bulgaria, and contributed to crush the Bulgarian plan of a Balkanic hegemony in its germ. Serbia and Roumania are natural allies, because both being of a pacific character, they aspire to the same ideals of equality and pacific development of their liberated national forces. Roumania returns to the policy inaugurated by the Treaty of Bucarest, and the Allies, after many hesitations and indecisions, are admitting

now that only this policy was just and that they ought to have practised it to the end. The plan of a Balkanic bloc, of which Bulgaria would be also a party, in spite of all its beauty and idealism, could not be realized because the Bulgarian people, led by King Ferdinand, pursued a contrasting ideal—the absolute domination in the Balkans under the auspices of the Austro-Germans. Roumania saw clearly that her place was not at the side of Bulgaria, and very nobly she associated with those who are fighting for the liberty and independence of small nations. Thanks to her large and fresh army, she will soon obtain, in collaboration with the Allied forces, decisive successes.

September 3, 1916.

THE FALL OF BUCAREST.

A Success but not a Victory.

The Austro-German armies entered Bucarest and this German success, of which we do not wish to diminish the importance, will not fail to produce a certain despondency in the ranks of all the Allies. But in spite of the appearance of a German victory, the occupation of Bucarest is but a simple success, one of those strokes which the Germans are such masters of, and which have become their speciality. Not having been able to obtain the victory on the principal fronts, there, where the Allies have the same possibilities of bringing reserves and concentrating a sufficient quantity of great guns, the Germans are attacking the eccentric points of the Allied front. They have invaded Serbia and now are proceeding to invade a part of Roumania. Of these momentary successes which will incontestably procure to the Germans many economic and military advantages, they will probably make a great fuss. But in fact, it is not a German victory, it is only an unpleasant incident which puts off the time for the Allied victory. Materially and morally the Allies are stronger, and they will win the war despite all the reverses, despite the fall of Bucarest. Only—yes there is an “only.”

At this point we wish to mention only two Roumanian errors which are the principal cause of their reverses. Roumania, by abstaining from intervention at the moment when Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria, has weakened her political situation, in rendering it possible to the Germans to reduce separately the two countries which should, on the basis of the Treaty of Bucarest, have remained united. It was the initial mistake. The other which followed it was the belief in the possibility of a war limited to the Austro-Hungarian front, the same mistake committed by Italy at the beginning of her intervention. Bulgaria has played her rôle of seducer well. At the moment when the Roumanians, over-confident, penetrated into Transylvania to liberate their brethren, the Bulgarians fell on them from behind. Attacked on two sides, the Roumanians, to whose aid the Allied forces could not come in time, have been obliged to retreat and even to abandon their capital.

We are firmly convinced that this misfortune will not shake the will of the Roumanian people to continue the struggle with still more force and endurance, with the clear consciousness of the necessity of a victory which should render impossible a new Bulgarian aggression and would lead to the Roumanian national unity.

December 10, 1916.

SERBIA AND THE ROUMANIAN DÉBÂCLE.

The tragic situation of Roumania and the shameful peace the Central Powers are imposing upon her have produced in Serbian circles a comprehensible feeling of discomfort. The betrayal of the Russian maximalists forcing the Roumanians to capitulate, is apt to have in the Balkans a still more disastrous effect. After the Serbian retreat, the Roumanian catastrophe seems to be the greatest diplomatic and military reverse of the Allies, which could affect the whole issue of the war. If the Allies do not decide on reinforcing the Salonica front in time there would be a great risk of losing definitely the party in the Balkans just as it had almost been lost in Russia.

Independently of this military consideration it must be

stated with regret that Roumania also has her part of responsibility in the actual disaster. We may be allowed to reprint on this subject what we have written in our paper on Roumanian politics.

"The Treaty of Bucarest in 1913 marks the first step of a new orientation in the Roumanian policy. The Roumanian politicians did not fail to perceive the danger of a Bulgaria extending as far as three seas, and the Bulgarian plans of a Balkanic hegemony awoke suspicion at Bucarest. The Bulgarian attack of June 16-29, 1913, found the three States united in the defence of their common interests. The allied victory was sealed by the Treaty of Bucarest, which ratified the Serbo-Roumanian friendship and re-established in the Balkans a state of just equilibrium.

"The German diplomacy has worked well and obtained an almost incredible success. When the European war broke out, the politicians of Bucarest declared, under the influence of German suggestions, that the Treaty of Bucarest did not form any more the basis of the Roumanian policy. They considered that the political aims of Roumania had to adapt themselves to the new circumstances created by the European war. It was, we think, a grave mistake of Roumanian diplomacy, which abandoned suddenly a reasonable and consistent policy to start interminable discussions with all the belligerents.

"Germany and Austria-Hungary obtained in that way a diplomatic success, which compensated them largely for the non-execution of the secret alliance concluded with King Carol. Roumania had become free and ready to enter into discussions. Her obligations to Serbia lost their value, and the Central Powers had the chance to separate Roumania definitely from Serbia and to render possible Bulgarian action against her.

"Entente diplomacy knew of these plans, but it hoped to spoil them by advances to Bulgaria. The Allied diplomats were making great efforts to conciliate the Balkanic States and to re-establish a perfect understanding among them, not wanting to resign themselves to see Bulgaria definitely range herself on the side of the Germanic Empires. This was a noble task, and one is forced to admit that the attitude

of the Entente really represented a policy of incomparable unselfishness and idealism.

"But all these efforts seemed futile, as Bulgaria had very different political ambitions. What has the Roumanian Government done in presence of this situation, full of indecision and dangers, even for Roumania? It has continued to negotiate and discuss, removing itself farther and farther from the programme inaugurated by the Treaty of Bucarest. Its resistance of the idea of an armed Bulgarian intervention against Serbia was diminishing rapidly. In September 1915 when the Bulgarian mobilization was proclaimed, the Bulgarian Premier, Mr. Radoslavoff, was able to declare to the leaders of the opposition that, if Bulgaria was obliged to enter into the war, the Bulgarian army would fight only on a single front. Germany had succeeded in assuring herself of Roumanian neutrality in the case of a Bulgarian aggression against Serbia. In guaranteeing this neutrality Roumania definitely abandoned the Treaty of Bucarest" ("The Treaty of Bucarest and Roumania," No. 2, May 14, 1916).

"There was a time when Roumania tried to distinguish between the Balkanic and the European situation. A Roumanian diplomatist explained to us at the beginning of 1915 that neutral Roumania implied the passivity of Bulgaria, and that Serbia was not to demand anything more of Roumania, who is obliged also to reckon with her European interests. This diplomatist assured us that the Roumanian neutrality towards the Germanic Empires was conditioned by the Bulgarian non-intervention, and that Roumania would enter the scene the moment when Bulgaria would attack Serbia. That attitude of the Roumanian Government signified in reality the maintenance of the state of things created by the Treaty of Bucarest. But unfortunately the military defeats of the Allies in 1915 had weakened the Roumanian resistance against the Bulgarian intervention. When Bulgaria mobilized in September, 1915, Roumania did not stir, sacrificing her own work, the Treaty of Bucarest. This was a great blow for Serbia, who found herself abandoned by a country on which the Serbs had never ceased to count. The deception was all the more painful and the Roumanian

inactivity all the more to be regretted as the policy of the Serbo-Roumanian entente was alone capable of assuring the Roumanian interests *vis-à-vis* to Hungary and Bulgaria, and facilitating the conclusion of a satisfactory understanding with Russia. Yet Roumania stood by immoved at the crushing of Serbia, and German influence triumphed at Bucarest " (" Roumanian Hesitations," July 30, 1916).

" As Serbians we wish to state that the Roumanian action is greeted in the Serbian circles with the same enthusiasm as in 1913, when Roumania took up her position against Bulgaria and contributed to crush the Bulgarian plan of a Balkanic hegemony in its germ. Serbia and Roumania are natural allies, because both being of a pacific character, they aspire to the same ideals of equality and pacific development of their liberated national forces. Roumania returns to the policy inaugurated by the Treaty of Bucarest, and the Allies after many hesitations and indecisions, are admitting now that only this policy was just, and that they ought to have practised it to the end. The plan of a Balkanic bloc, of which Bulgaria would also be a party, in spite of all its beauty and idealism, could not be realized because the Bulgarian people, led by King Ferdinand, pursued a contrasting ideal—the absolute domination in the Balkans under the auspices of the Austro-Germans " (" The Roumanian Intervention," No. 18, September 3, 1916).

" At this point we wish to mention only two Roumanian errors which are the principal cause of their reverses. Roumania, by abstaining from intervening at the moment when Serbia was attacked by Bulgaria, has weakened her political situation in rendering it possible for the Germans to reduce separately the two countries which should, on the basis of the Treaty of Bucarest, remained united. It was the initial mistake. The other which followed it was the belief in the possibility of a war limited to the Austro-Hungarian front, the same mistake committed by Italy at the beginning of her intervention. Bulgaria has played her rôle of seducer well. At the moment when the Roumanians, too confident, penetrated into Transylvania to liberate their brethren, the Bulgarians attacked them from behind. Attacked on two sides, the Roumanians, to whose aid the

Allied forces could not come in time, have been obliged to retreat and even to abandon their capital" ("The Fall of Bucarest," No. 32, December 10, 1916).

Painful as the memory of these errors may be, it is not useless to remember them. The lesson implied will serve as a basis to the future policy of Roumania, after the Allies have cancelled the treaty of peace which the Germano-Bulgaro-Magyars are imposing at this moment on our gallant neighbours.

March 16, 1918.

ROUMANIA AND HER "TREATY."

The statement of the Roumanian delegation concerning the claims of Roumania on the Banat is based, excepting the ethnical arguments, which are applicable only to the eastern part of this province, principally on the secret treaty of 1916 concluded with the Entente. To the Serbian objection that the treaty does not take into account either Serbia or the United Kingdom, the Roumanians have replied with arguments which have astounded us.

In a memorandum handed over to the conference, Mr. Bratianu defines the situation of Serbia relative to the said treaty. The Roumanians affirm that Serbia was not in a position to treat at the moment when the pact was concluded. Considering her unhappy situation it would have been cruel to impose on her conditions of any nature. Moreover, Serbia was represented by Russia, who agreed in her name to the acquisition of the Banat by Roumania. The Serbians, if they did not know the text of the treaty, have benefited by the effects of the Roumanian entrance into the war. It made it possible for the Allies to hold Salonica, which consequently assured the liberation of Serbia.

All this controversy is painful and contrary to the true interests of the Roumanian people. Roumania has the unexpected chance of re-uniting her racial brethren. This right of nationality will go a long way to assure the happiness and greatness of the Roumanian people. But as the Roumanian delegation invokes particularly the treaty of 1916, we do not hesitate to tell them what we think of it.

First, we may call to mind that the European war surprised Roumania in an ambiguous position. On the one side she had formal engagements with the Triple Alliance, on the other she was obliged to defend the Treaty of Bucarest of 1913. This dilemma was solved by abandoning the Treaty of Bucarest. Bulgaria would not have dared to attack Serbia if Roumania had not promised to keep quiet. Radoslavoff could state with pride one month before Bulgaria's intervention that her army would fight only on a single front. This proves that he had received formal assurances concerning the Roumanian attitude. The Serbian disaster was greatly due to this Roumanian policy, which did not follow the line adopted in 1913, that is to say, the policy of Balkanic solidarity. We do not recriminate, we only state facts.

In 1916, after the reconstitution of her army, Serbia impatiently awaited her revenge. At this moment Roumania was negotiating her treaty—imitating Italy—meaning that she stated as a preliminary condition that Serbia should know nothing of a treaty which was going to be concluded to her disadvantage—Serbia, who once already had been abandoned by Roumania, contrary to the spirit of the Treaty of Bucarest of 1913. How then the Roumanian delegates have the courage to say to-day that the treaty of 1916 was concluded with Serbia represented by Russia we cannot understand.

We may add that Russia had no mandate to represent Serbia. Still less could she sign, in our name, a condition directed against us and having our lands as its object. Roumania knows it very well. That is why in 1913 she negotiated with us directly, without any intermediation, a military convention in the eventuality of a Bulgarian aggression.

The Roumanian delegation considers that Serbia has profited by the effects of the treaty of 1916. We admit that we could have taken advantage of the Roumanian intervention, but unfortunately it was not the case. On the contrary, it was the voluntary divisions of Serbs, Croates and Slovenes, commanded by officers of the Royal Serbian army, whose exploits the Roumanians themselves celebrated,

declaring that they had fought like heroes, and have contributed in Dobroudja to save Roumania from a complete disaster. The Roumanian intervention has been paid for by the blood of Serbia's best soldiers and officers. This intervention, terminating by a downfall only six weeks later, has rendered the task of the Oriental Army singularly difficult. In 1918, thanks to the Serbian heroism, this Oriental Army delivered Roumania from German bondage. The Roumanian delegation ought not to have forgotten it.

Such are the facts which weigh more than any secret treaties. Roumania, in signing the peace of Bucarest in 1918, cancelled the treaty of 1916. According to the testimony of the special correspondent of the *Petit Parisien*, everybody in Roumania approved the signature of this peace. But may we be permitted to remind the Roumanians that Serbia was in the same situation in 1915. Betrayed by King Constantine's Greece, abandoned by Roumania, in spite of the Treaty of Bucarest of 1913, Serbia preferred her Calvary of Albania and wandering in exile to the acceptance of a shameful peace.

The peace of 1918 was imposed on the Roumanians: we recognize that readily. But in the same way the treaty of 1916, as well as the Treaty of London in 1915, were also imposed on the Allies. One coercion balances another, and our Roumanian friends, well aware of the principles of law and equity, cannot deny it.

February 10, 1919.

THE QUESTION OF THE BANAT.

The Roumanians are making a supreme effort to complete their unity; their aim is to take possession of the Banat, a Serbian province, as it may be seen in the article of Mr. Ursu ("Genevois," February 17). Like true conquerors they add to Wilsonian principles geographical and strategical considerations. Basing their excuse on the geographical unity of Great Roumania, the Roumanians want to snatch away the Banat, but there are some Roumanians who do not employ these Balkanic methods of false reasoning and do not deny the fact of the existence of 300,000 Serbs in the

Banat. Mr. Ursu, the learned professor of the University of Jassy, commits therefore a culpable, blamable error in pretending that the Serbians cannot invoke any reason "neither ethnical, historical nor geographical." The Peace Conference would certainly have refused our aspirations if we had not ethnical arguments. As regards the history, excepting the time of the Emperor Trajan—which was with the professor's permission rather Roman than Roumanian—what part have the Roumanians ever played in the Banat? Even the works on Roumanian history are mute on this point. On our side, to speak only of recent facts, we can inform the Professor Ursu that the great Serbian Assembly of 1791, held in Temesvar, claimed the autonomy of Serbian territory, including the Banat, which of course the Magyars did not grant. In 1848, the Serbian Vojvodina, englobing also the Banat, had Temesvar as her capital. The Habsburgs, up to the last emperor, who has just descended from the throne, have always had the title of Serbian Vojvode. Yet history absolutely ignores the corresponding position of the Roumanians in the Banat for the simple reason that, as a historical element, they did not exist there.

The geographical reasons insisted on by the learned professor, are incomprehensible at a time when the principle of self-determination of the people should decide the future frontiers. Besides, the Banat is not a sea coast nor a natural outlet for Roumania. But it is an extremely rich province, and our friends, the Roumanians, certainly think it worth while to fight for it, without even having any ethnical title to it. The Roumanians have taken Bessarabia from the Russians despite the fact that there are many Russians and Ukrainians there. After the collapse of the Dual Monarchy the Roumanians occupied Bukovina, which parts are claimed, not without reason, by the Ukrainians, and the Dobroudja. Now Roumania also claims the Banat as well as Transylvania, i.e. 26 departments containing 2,900,000 Roumanians and 3,900,000 foreign people, among whom there are 300,000 Serbians. We understand the necessity for Roumania to take in masses of Magyars and Germans, because they are confined to districts impossible to divide; besides, they are plunderers who would keep on menacing the Allies and the

entire world. But we Serbians do not understand why we should be forced to share the fate of the Magyars or Germans. Have we failed in keeping our engagements towards the Allies? Have we bowed down before the superior strength of the enemy and concluded a separate peace? Have we ever been the members of the Austro-German Alliance? Has there ever been found in Serbia any politician who traffics with the enemy? Has the enemy ever been able to organize new elections in our country and to make the Parliament condemn the government? Even our "Austrophiles" of pre-war time were interned by Austrians because no Serbian of any political conviction whatsoever would ever have consented to bow down before the conqueror. Is it the Serbians who, before intervening in the struggle for the right of the nations, made a very profitable trade with the enemy of to-morrow, and later who cheapened their part in the war? Have we not conducted an internal campaign in the Habsburg Monarchy which ended with the dissolution of this empire? Our sons have been hunted like fallow deer in Austria, and numerous gibbets were erected for them. In the fights in Dobroudja, the Southern Slav volunteers, many of them from Banat, have fought so heroically that the Bulgarians themselves could not deny the Serbian success even in the midst of the general confusion. In fine, they were Serbian soldiers who, aided by our admirable Allies, led that terrible offensive, "brave as fiends and ruthless as judges." They liberated Serbia and dealt the death-blow to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. When our troops had crossed the Danube and occupied the Serbian Banat, Roumania found it convenient to declare war a second time, but really it was only executing the conditions of armistice.

But in spite of all this, and notwithstanding the religious fidelity of a peasant people who, though wounded, did not utter any complaint, the Roumanian friends and allies are not willing to recognize the right of liberty to a Serbian province, to the Banat for which we have shed our blood. With what argument are the Roumanians opposing our right? With geographical reasons.

Finally, they add the objection that a great number

of Roumanians live in the valley of Timok, in Serbia. It is true, but these Roumanians or these Roumanianized Serbians or immigrated Serbians, obliged by want to leave Roumania, have never manifested any wish to be incorporated by Roumania, for reasons which are very well known by our Roumanian friends. Serbia is a profoundly democratic country where all peasants are landlords and masters of the fruit of their labour. As a free and contented citizen, the Roumanian from Serbia looks to regard the Roumanian from Roumania with disdain and pity, which the well-to-do people have for the poor, and incapable of shaking off the yoke.

The learned professor is going still further. He is advancing the prospect of a new war if we should dare to violate "these secular and well-defined frontiers." Such words are afflicting to us, but we are obliged to abandon for a moment our reserve. We abhor war, but conscious of our right and enamoured of our liberty, we are not the men to be intimidated by such a menace. During seven years we have contributed with all our power to the annihilation of two despotic empires, because we were not willing to be slaves of anybody. It would be an unpardonable crime to tolerate our brethren becoming, after so many struggles, the prey of the Roumanian "boyards." This is our answer to Mr. Ursu.

February 24, 1919.

CHAPTER IX

SERBO-GREEK RELATIONS

THE SERBO-GREEK TREATY.

WE have already had occasion to set forth here the Serbian point of view with regard to Greece and her attitude in the European conflict. Without insisting upon the juridical side, namely, as to whether Greece was or was not, according to the treaty of alliance with Serbia, under the obligation of interfering in the event of a Bulgarian attack, we have maintained, and we maintain still to-day, the theory that the vital Hellenic interests called for Greek intervention on the side of Serbia. Even if no treaty of alliance had existed, Greece, conscious of her Mediterranean and Balkanic situation, should not have abandoned the policy of union with Serbia, inaugurated in 1912 and 1913 and crowned with the best results. The Serbo-Greek treaty not having been published, any discussion as to its bearing and its terms appeared to us useless and without practical value. Indeed, what advantage could Greece have in declaring, juridically, that she was not obliged to take action ; if, in consequence of her passive attitude, all the fruits of the Balkanic campaign were snatched from her ; if the Bulgarian menace, averted in 1913 by the Treaty of Bucarest presented itself under a fresh aspect much more serious ; and if the most legitimate hopes of the Hellenic world regarding the liberation and union of all the Hellenes were destroyed ? The difficult situation in which Greece is struggling to-day, speaks better than any other argument against the harmful policy of Messrs. Gounaris and Scouloudis. But this is not all. These same politicians, who have brought Greece into the fix in which she now finds herself and compromised her most elementary interests, have also caused most serious moral injury to their

country. It is they who have prevented Greece from meeting a formal obligation towards her ally, Serbia. This accusation, so often repeated in the foreign Press and refuted with indignation by honest Greeks, can no longer be questioned, because new documents have appeared which support it in an incontestable manner. That official Greece has failed to keep her word is therefore a fact ; it is only too true !

The Greek and Serbian Governments have abstained up to now from publishing the treaty of alliance which united the two countries, and all hypothesis as to its terms and contents were permitted. What was said about this treaty in the Greek Parliament at the time of the discussion on foreign policy, and what Dr. Platykas communicated regarding it in his study on Greek policy, was not, however, sufficient to create a definite judgment. Only two weeks ago the *Temps* published in its number of August 15, the principal clauses of the Serbo-Greek treaty. The treaty has, according to this information, two parts. The first deals with the political situation at the moment when the agreement was concluded and conjecturing a Bulgarian attack. We can read there the engagements entered upon by the contracting parties to help each other mutually, in order that Serbia and Greece should obtain a common frontier. In the event of failure in coming to an agreement with Bulgaria and of the latter trying to impose her claims upon them by force, Serbia and Greece undertook to render each other mutual assistance to the utmost of their armed strength. The second part is of a general nature. It stipulates that in case of war between one of the two contracting parties and a third power, or in case of important Bulgarian armed forces attacking the Greek army or the Serbian army, Greece and Serbia enter upon the reciprocal engagement that Serbia will help Greece with all her armed forces and that Greece will help Serbia with all her forces of land and sea.

These two parts of the treaty affect two different situations : (1) the situation in 1913, before the Bulgarian attack, and the eventuality of such an attack ; (2) the general situation of the two countries, after the crisis, in their relations with Bulgaria in 1913. If the published text is exact, the Greek obligation to interfere in case of a Bulgarian attack

or of an attack coming from a third party, is set forth in an irrefutable manner. The affirmation of Messrs. Gounaris and Scouloudis that the treaty had only provided for the hypothesis of a Bulgarian attack alone, and that it was not applicable in the case of a complex war, would therefore be denuded of any foundation, because the treaty provided distinctly for the case of war between one of the contracting parties and a third power and the obligation of the other contracting party to lend military co-operation.

We are then in a position to confirm the exactitude of the information of the *Temps*, which corresponds in its general lines to the text of the Serbo-Greek treaty. We will quote, however, another article of the same treaty, which is not reproduced in the *Temps*, and which is of capital importance. It can be applied to the situation of Serbia in September-October 1915, at the time of the Austro-German offensive and the simultaneous Bulgarian attack, and its text fully confirms the bearing of the preceding article which speaks of the obligation of the contracting parties to afford each other mutual military assistance. This article provides, in fact, for the case of Greece being at war with another power other than Bulgaria, and of Bulgaria attacking her, in which case Serbia is obliged to come to her assistance, even if she herself is engaged in another war; only the military assistance would be in this case inferior to the figures provided for in the preceding case. And on the other hand, if Serbia is at war with a power other than Bulgaria and if Bulgaria attacks her, Greece is obliged to give her military assistance, even if she herself is engaged in another war, always with forces inferior to those provided for in the preceding case.

The juridical obligation, a solemn and formal obligation for Greece to interfere in favour of Serbia, can therefore no longer be questioned. The Serbo-Greek treaty of alliance imposed upon Greece the duty of interfering in the case of a Bulgarian attack, even if Greece was already at war with another power! The Serbo-Greek treaty established such a solidarity between the two countries, that it required of them mutual assistance in all possible situations. That Messrs. Gounaris and Scouloudis should have been able to

maintain the contrary theory, in face of such clear and precise texts which were well known to them, is a thing that does not concern us. But, as Serbians, we must say that in 1913 Greece had nobly fulfilled her obligation, and the heroic resistance of the Serbian army and of the army of her Greek allies, had put an end to the Bulgarian plan of reducing the two countries to impotence. In 1915 Serbia counted upon Greece and her alliance, but the Greek support provided for in the treaty of alliance has not been given. One cannot deny that Greece, in consequence, bears part of the responsibility in the Serbian disaster. This mistake on the part of Greece, the work of a small number of misled politicians, can still, in our opinion, be made good, and the desperate resistance of the Greek detachments to the Bulgarian advance into Greek territory, shows by what way Greece can return to the path she momentarily forsook.

September 3, 1916.

CONSTANTINE I OR VENIZELOS.

There are names which symbolize an idea, an epoch or else a nation, and have for that a singular power of evocation.

Who speaks of Nero speaks of tyranny, while the names of Aristides and of Marcus Aurelius are synonymous with justice and equity; those of Tell and of Washington, with independence and liberty.

The name of King Albert I will stand as the symbol of fidelity to a given word, just as the name of a Balkan sovereign, which it is not necessary to mention here, will remain the symbol of ingratitude and treachery.

But here are two names which are at this moment arousing passions to the highest degree in Hellenic centres, and causing much ink to flow with the publicists of all countries—those of King Constantine and Venizelos.

The one represents indecision, incoherence, mystery; the other integrity, firmness, perspicuity.

The first by his undecided and irresolute attitude, reminds one of the classical individual in the fable—a being as simple as irresolute, who ends by dying of hunger for want of being able to decide between two foods.

Venizelos, on the contrary, shows himself resolute in marching boldly towards the object which he has set himself to attain.

A preceding article, speaking of the departure of Venizelos for the Islands, insisted on the quasi-providential rôle which this man is called upon to play in these critical moments of the history of his country. Since the commencement of her existence Greece has hardly ever traversed a similar crisis. It is no longer her future that is at stake, it is her very existence. It is the dismemberment of an entire kingdom that is taking place slowly and methodically before the eyes of the nation that looks on as an indifferent spectator. For to a great part of the Greek nation the question of knowing who will be called to-morrow to the presidency of the Council, seems to be of more interest and importance than the question of the future and of the very existence of the country. All that reminds one greatly of the situation of the ancient Byzantine State when, under the Lower Empire, linguistic and other quarrels roused the passions of the people to the highest pitch at the very moment when the enemy was knocking on the door of Constantinople. It is, allowing for the distance of time, a situation nearly identical, with the sole exception that the enemy this time is in greater numbers and is threatening the country on several sides.

After Serres and Drama, Demir Hissar and Cavalla ; after Cavalla, Arguyrocastro, not counting the scission produced within the country by the adhesion of the Isles to the national movement represented by the provisional government. And if that continues, before long the Kingdom of Greece will have ceased to exist.

According to the present sate of things, it seems to us that it is rather to the Government of Athens that the title of provisional government now belongs. The resignation of the Callogeropoulos ministry has just proved it in a remarkable manner. The new ministry, have at its head an archæologist, Mr. Lambros, just discovered at the last moment from under the white and venerable dust of the Acropolis, who, seeing its absolute incompetence in the matter of politics, gives no reason to hope that its duration will exceed that of its unfortunate predecessor.

In order to save the country from the state of agony in which it is writhing, Venizelos is desperately endeavouring to shake it into an awakening. It would be necessary for the Greek nation to accomplish a veritable feat of strength, something similar to the effort of the French nation in 1789, in order to become capable of issuing from this situation with honour.

They must risk much and act quickly. They must besides be ready to sacrifice many things on the altar of the Fatherland.

The Greeks have not much longer to decide. If the operation is not performed this very day, to-morrow it will perhaps be too late, as the country is completely falling to pieces.

Between the two chiefs there is not much to choose. It is not Pausanias who has rendered Hellade immortal; it is Leonidas.

October 15, 1916.

CHAPTER X

AUSTRO-GERMANO-BULGARIAN ATROCITIES

THE LAST STRAW.

"Besides, it is a right of the inhabitants of the enemy countries that the invader shall be authorized to restrict their individual liberty only when the necessities of war absolutely require it, and that all molestation that is useless and that exceeds these necessities is to be spared them."—(*Les lois de la guerre continentale*, Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege. Publication historique du grande étatmajor allemand. Traduit par P. Carpentier, page 105).

DURING this war our enemies have done everything to cause the retrogression of humanity. They have removed from war all that former wars might have had of beauty and of nobility. It is now a sly and brutal struggle, with personal bravery almost excluded and warriors transformed into automatons destined for hecatombs. This new method of making war was inaugurated by the Germans. It substitutes numbers for genius, quantity of material for bravery, matter for mind, and it is marvellously adapted to the character and the capacities of our adversaries.

Corresponding to these scarcely refined methods employed at the front by the military forces, are the still less refined methods employed behind the lines by the civil authorities which govern the invaded countries. Thus it is that the Austrians and the Bulgarians vie with one another in their inhuman behaviour toward the Serbian civil population obliged to submit to their provisional domination. They act without consideration, without scruples and without fear of bringing themselves into disrepute in the eyes of the neutral nations, to whom they will, in all probability, be obliged to apply, asking their good offices in view of the peace for which

they are already beginning to sigh. They have a singular tendency to believe that neutral nations and places, in order to remain neutral, have become incapable of perceiving what is going on about them. They do not see that these neutrals, precisely because they are impartial and out of court, are in a better position to see and judge clearly the actions of the belligerents. All the measures that the Germanic empires and their allies are taking to prevent the neutrals seeing through their game will be of no avail. The Chinese wall with which they would like to surround Serbia by cutting off her communications and by jealously guarding her frontiers, cannot prevent the cries of distress being heard outside the invaded country, nor can it succeed in hiding the horrors of a tyrannic rule.

When they entered Serbia, the Austrians and the Bulgarians commenced by interning almost the entire male population of the country. The only crime of this population was the stubborn belief that our enemies intended to wage war like civilized men, respectful of the rights of the peaceable and loyal civil population. That is why a great number of our compatriots refused to leave the country at the time of the invasion. But how greatly were these honest people deceived, and how dearly they paid for their illusions regarding the enemy, to whom, in fact, all ideas of law and justice were foreign. For, in spite of the irreproachable attitude of these victims, they were treated like convicts, and were sent to the most remote localities in Hungary and Bohemia, to obscure unwholesome holes, the names of which are not even marked on the most carefully prepared geographical maps.

But it was not enough for our enemies that the Serbian civil population literally died of hunger, thanks to their masters who swept away all the food the country possessed ; they did not leave the Serbs even the sad consolation of dying at home on their native soil. To add the last straw, the military government of occupied Serbia has just imposed upon the population an enormous war tax which will complete the ruin of the country.

These cruelties, which have for their object the annihilation of an entire nation and which are not justified in any way,

will at last fill the cup to overflowing and rouse indignation even in those places best disposed toward our enemies. The supreme head of the Church, in the name of the sacred principles of the Christian religion ; the sovereigns and the governments of neutral countries, in the name of the higher rights of humanity and of the moral solidarity of civilized peoples, ought, in view of these misdeeds, to raise their voices and intervene as soon as possible, both to save a people from annihilation and to prevent our enemies from debasing themselves morally to such a degree that at last they will be ashamed of themselves.

October 29, 1916.

GERMANY AND THE DEPORTATIONS IN SERBIA.

" *Hypocrisy*, from the Greek *hypokrisis*, a vice which consists in affecting a virtue or a praiseworthy sentiment which one has not " (*Petit Larousse*, p. 484). As an example of the true application of this formulæ we quote the recent speech of the German Chancellor in the debate on the submarine war. The phrases most frequently heard were those of indignation against the " unheard-of violations " of the law of nations committed by the Allies ! The Imperial Chancellor, grown more prudent since his maladroit declarations concerning the " scrap of paper " and the invasion of Belgium, " an act certainly contrary to International Law, but necessary to safeguard Germany," took great pains, on this occasion, to persuade his auditors that the submarine warfare was entirely in conformity with the law of nations. After him it was the turn of the Minister of War, General Stein, to divert the discussion to the pretended ill-treatment inflicted upon German prisoners in France, Russia and England ; he, too, indulging in vehement attacks upon " those who trample under foot the precepts of the law." And to complete the picture, with no other object than to conceal the atrocious character of the German submarine warfare, Dr. Kriege, Director of the Department of Foreign Affairs, judicial counsellor of Wilhelmstrasse, the man who contributed to the miscarriage of all the efforts of the conferences of The Hague to establish compulsory

universal arbitration, came to expose "the sad lot of the German prisoners and internés," and to give the Reichstag the opportunity publicly to stigmatize as "inhuman" the behaviour of the enemies of Germany.

The French Government has already done justice to all these accusations, and we are certain that the Russian Government will not be slow to do the same, since the Russian people, with their natural kindness, cannot indulge in any ill-treatment of the prisoners. However, the lot of prisoners, in itself, is sad enough, and it is one of the most elementary duties of each belligerent to do everything possible to ameliorate it. But, even admitting that the German accusations were justified—a purely theoretic supposition, in view of the very well-known facts—the indignation in German official circles seems to us lacking in sincerity, knowing what the Germans have done in Belgium and what they have sanctioned in Serbia. The European public is already informed of the behaviour of the Germans in Belgium, but it knows very little of what is happening in Serbia. Germany cannot excuse herself by the remark that it is Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria who are administering to invaded Serbia. A word from Berlin would be sufficient to make their allies relinquish their illegal and truly inhuman practices. But Berlin does not want to intervene, and so she becomes the conscious accomplice of all the misdeeds to which the Serbian population in the invaded regions is exposed.

What is the situation in Serbia? We know it only through what our adversaries tell us, and it is already extremely serious. The military governor of Serbia has declared repeatedly that perfect order reigns in Serbia, that the population obeys with docility all the measures of the military government, however contrary they may be to the law of nations. Still, from the confession of this governor himself (see the *Az Est* of December 7, 1916), a large number of the inhabitants are interned and deported to Bohemia and to Hungary! More than 50,000 old men, women, and even children were forced to abandon their homes and to go to work for their enemies or to perish in the concentration camps. The Austrian newspaper, *Beogradske Novine*, ac-

knowledge, in its edition of September 24, that Serbian women are being deported into Austro-Hungary, not to the concentration camps, as the French newspapers had claimed, "but to work in the munition factories, in the fields, or as servants in the officers' quarters." Other Austro-Magyar papers have published, as an interesting piece of news, the information that special schools had been opened at Aschach and at Braunau for the interned children! There are, then, so many interned Serbian children that the Austro-Hungarian authorities have been obliged to open special schools for them—naturally German schools! The Austrians do not hesitate at all to employ these methods, and they talk of them as if they were quite natural. Has the idea ever occurred to *a single German* to protest against such practices?

Mr. von Bethmann-Hollweg has also said that it is England that has made this war not one between armies, but between people. We are quite vexed at the short memory of the Imperial Chancellor, and we take the liberty of reminding him that that honour belongs solely to the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Austrian generals who were in command of the armies operating against Serbia had, in fact, given formal orders not to spare the population. The original of such an order was taken from an Austrian superior officer when he was made prisoner, and it was brought, by the Serbian Government, to the knowledge of all the Allied and neutral governments. Professor Reiss also reproduced it in his book on the atrocities committed by the Austro-Magyars in Serbia, as a document in reference to the causes of the attitude of the Austro-Hungarian army (see R. A. Reiss: *Austro-Hungarian Atrocities*, London, 1916, p. 181). The Austrian method was not followed by any other belligerent, and least of all by the English—who have not even had occasion to be in direct contact with the civil population of their adversaries. The Germans, nevertheless, have permitted their allies to act, and it is not at all astonishing that it should be a German, the author, Oskar-Maurus Fontana, who, in the magazine *Schaubühne*, of January 4, glorifies the beautiful exploits of the Austrians! This article, which we reproduce in *La Serbie*, will present

clearly to an impartial public the humanitarian sentiments prevalent in Germany.

March 11, 1917.

THE BULGARIANS VERSUS THE LAW OF NATIONS.

An Appeal to the Allied Governments.

The war is entering its decisive phase, and humanity awaits with anguish the next conflict of the formidable forces of the belligerents. The Allies are to-day in possession of abundant material resources, their effective forces are superior to those of Germany and her acolytes, and the morale of the troops is very high. The cause of right and of justice for which the Allies are fighting, united to the valour of the soldiers and to a perfect material preparation, assures them success in the end. The hard times when the Allies had to fight with inadequate arms are now in the past, and it is with a deserved pride and justifiable satisfaction that they may look upon all the work they have accomplished. The time of indemnities and of reparations is not far distant, and the reserve that governments have maintained up to the present, cannot longer prevent them from saying resolutely what they consider proper punishment for the guilty. Indeed, our enemies must know, and they must learn it from those who are authorized to speak, that victory will bring up for immediate consideration the question of responsibility, and that direct and individual indemnities will be ordered without delay and without pity.

The abuse of power by the Bulgarians in occupied Serbia makes this question one of very present interest. Things are happening in our country, in fact, that are incredible, and it would be impossible to believe them if the Bulgarian newspapers themselves did not contain precise and indisputable information concerning them. The Bulgarians call the Serbians of Serbia to arms, they enroll by force our unhappy brothers who have remained at home. Then they propose to expose the brothers and the children of our soldiers to the Serbian cannons and machine guns in Macedonia.

Never has any people at any time in its history abandoned itself to such a deed. All the crimes and all the violations of the law of nations committed up to now are as nothing in comparison with the measure that the Bulgarians are on the point of carrying out. It is not only in new Serbia that the Bulgarians have resorted to forced recruiting, but also in all Northern Serbia. The official newspaper, *Narodni Prava*, published in the numbers for March 4 and 5, the order of the Ministry of War commanding the recruitment of all the Serbians from 18 to 40 years at Nisch, Pirot, Vranje, Cuprija, Paracin, Svilajnac, Veliko Gradiste—in the very centre of our country.

This act is all the more odious since the Bulgarians know very well that the Serbians will never consent to fight against their own sons. There is no power in the world which could force our heroes of Morava, of Timok, and of Vlasina to fight for the Bulgarians. The Bulgarians are enrolling them then, either to massacre them themselves by placing them in front of their lines, or to shoot them on a pretext of insubordination. They do it, therefore, with the intention of annihilating the last remnants of the Serbian masculine population. With a cold-bloodedness, exceeding anything one could imagine, they set about this work of extermination without even dreaming of the consequences that such behaviour may entail.

In the presence of these facts, which are as sad as they are revolting, we do not wish to raise mere friendly objections which lead nowhere. The Bulgarian leaders have no feelings for considerations of a moral nature, and talking to Bulgarians of humanity would be like playing symphonies before deaf mutes. We therefore apply to the Allied governments with the demand that they hold the officials of Sofia responsible for the tragedy they are preparing in our country. Our good friends and Allies have a moral duty to prevent the destruction of the Serbian population and to curb Bulgarian audacity. Means are not lacking, and an official declaration, defining precisely the individual and inevitable penalties if the Bulgarians do not leave the Serbian population in peace, would suffice to save many innocent lives. No weakness is admissible at this moment, and a firm attitude on the

part of our Allies is the more necessary, since their own honour is in question. They must not permit the Bulgarians to treat with impunity the Serbians as they would never dare to treat the other Allies. The allied solidarity cannot be better manifested than by the threat of reprisals, expressed by all the Allied governments and followed by acts calculated to carry it out. It is certainly time to show the politicians of Sofia that France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy are also not to be ignored. The Serbians have the right to demand it, for their sufferings have assumed such proportions that silence would be a veritable crime.

March 18, 1917.

THE UNKNOWN MARTYRS.

In all the windows of the book stores in Switzerland can be seen a book bearing the above title; the author is Dr. Victor Kuhne.¹ Never has any publication appeared more seasonably than this book by the very sympathetic writer and physician of Geneva, Dr. Kuhne, already known for his remarkable articles on Balkan problems. At the moment when the Allies were declaring, in their reply to Mr. Wilson's Note, that a real peace could not be concluded until oppressed peoples were set free, a neutral publicist, a mind imbued with the ideas of justice and of morality, had just presented to the public of the entire world proofs of the justice of this point of view as far as it related to the Serbian or Southern Slav people. The book of Dr. Kuhne is, indeed, a striking speech for the prosecution in the case against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and its oppressive policy toward the Slavs; a manifest proof of the necessity of changing that policy in states nationally independent. What is especially important is that Dr. Kuhne has not merely recounted acts of injustice and violence committed by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. He has gone further and, while furnishing on each page authentic proofs and evidence revealing the martyrdom and the sufferings endured by the Serbian people, he has striven to give a complete

¹ Dr. Victor Khune: *Ceux dont on ignore le martyre*. (Les Yougoslaves et la guerre.) Geneve. 1917.

picture of this incredible policy, and to show us the true motives underlying it. It is particularly in this respect that his book merits special attention.

Mr. Kuhne speaks to us first of the Southern Slavs, that is to say, of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes, who form one people, speaking the same language, having the same national feeling and aspiring to the same liberty and the same national unity. In spite of the three names they bear, the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes constitute, therefore, a determinate ethnic unity, having special distinctive characteristics, and being adapted, from all points of view, to a common and independent political life. Now, two great branches of the Serbian or Southern Slav people live in Austro-Hungary, while the third, small but vigorous, enjoys political liberty in the form of the Kingdom of Serbia. All the mystery of the Austrian or Magyar rancour against the Southern Slavs lies in the fact that this people will not and cannot remain slaves. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy is therefore seeking to restrain this movement and to stifle the ever-growing desire of the Slavs of Austro-Hungary to be free of foreign domination. To this end she is employing every possible means : the imprisonment of Serbian leaders ; the organization of monstrous trials for " high treason " ; and innumerable prosecutions, of which Mr. Kuhne's book offers us a startling picture. Such proceedings have caused a reaction which has taken the form of criminal attempts against Austrian political personages, and which culminated in the attempt of Sarajevo. Instead of putting an end to this policy of violence, the Monarchy redoubled its efforts to " purify " the Serbian people. The records of actions begun during the war, as well as the exceedingly large number of executions, of sentences to forced labour, of confiscations and of other penalties inflicted upon the Serbian population, which the book of Mr. Kuhne reveals to us, demonstrate conclusively that the question here is one of a system, a method, or rather, of a plan. That plan Austro-Hungary unveiled when she gave to the officers of the army operating against Serbia the formal order to destroy all and to spare none. It is, then, a whole people, the Serbian people, that they wished, and that they wish, to annihilate !

Mr. Kuhne hopes that his book may open the eyes of those who have not yet perceived the martyrdom of the Southern Slavs. We can only express the same hope, especially at this present hour when the Allies actually wish to set the peoples free from all foreign domination. In spite of the unheard-of sufferings of the Serbian people, there are always those who pass by these martyrdoms in silence, and, consciously or unconsciously, contribute to their prolongation. With what sadness have we read, for example, the article of a publicist as eminent as Mr. Wagnières, director of the *Journal de Genève*, in which he says that the question of Slavic nationalities in Austro-Hungary is non-existent, the Slavs of the Monarchy having shown their devotion to the Habsburgs ! We feel sure that Mr. Wagnières will change his mind after he has read this book, and that he cannot then help joining those who, like Mr. Kuhne, find that "such proceedings overthrow all our conceptions of law and of the most elementary morality." The logical conclusion evolved is the demand for the liberation as a unit of the Southern Slav race. The conscientious study of an impartial publicist cannot produce any other result, and, while congratulating Mr. Kuhne on the success that his study cannot fail to have, we take the liberty of expressing to him here, in the name of the oppressed Serbian people, our profound gratitude for the moral support he has given to our national cause.

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